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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines why in a semi-peripheral and late-developing 
country such as Greece small artisanal businesses have persisted, 
despite the orthodox view that industrialisation should have spelled 
their demise. In the course of the investigation artisans are described 
and defined, put into context, compared with their counterparts in other 
contexts, and studied at both the macro and micro level to uncover the 
reasons for their unexpected survival.
The thesis is organized in three parts. Part One (chapters I-III) 
gives the theoretical, and comparative framework. Marxist teachings con­
cerning simp 1 e-commodity production are explored, followed by a survey 
of the petite bourgeoisie in advanced societies, and of the Italian ex­
perience of small firm resurgence.
Part Two (chs IV-VI) considers certain macro-level influences of 
the Greek formation on the structure of the artisanate. Circumstances 
and the new push towards industrialization after World War II are inves­
tigated to see what opportunities they furnished for the artisans* sur­
vival. State development plans and their impact on artisans are dis­
cussed, and the contextualization is rounded off by a review of the per- 
t inent 1i terature.
Part Three (chs VII-XI) directs a micro-level focus on a sample of 
100 small producers in machining and garment-making. After an explana­
tion of methodology the "who", "how" and "why" of artisanship is ex­
plored, followed by an examination of the situation of aspects of being 
an artisan, both within the workshop and in relation to the outside 
world. The artisans’ limitations, their collective organization, and 
their self-appraisal and plans for the future are taken up. The study 
concludes with an attempt at a synthesis that brings out the specificity 
of the Greek artisans.
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GENERAL INTOQDUCITON
The present study bears out the fact that the choice of a 
sociological research topic frequently reflects the author’s personal 
experience. Growing up in central Athens, I have seen my neighborhood 
change dramatically over the years. From a locality of small one- or 
two-storey houses each with its own little inner courtyard and with 
small family-run businesses here and there and artisanal workshops, such 
as might be found in any small town in Greece, it has become an area of 
city blocks with six or seven-storey apartment buildings. For all that, 
the workshops have not disappeared. Those that emitted visible pol­
lutants were relocated in more run-down parts of the city, but the 
majority of them have remained, and as the new multi-storey apartment 
buildings increased the number of local residents, new workshops sprang 
up. They are housed in the basement or on the ground floor of the new 
buildings, with a separate door to the street. This has remained the 
pattern until today, and is typical of the transformation that has taken 
place elsewhere in the Athens-Piraeus conglomerate - as, indeed, in all 
the cities of Greece since the late 1950s.
This contiguity of workshops and residences, though often an an­
noyance to the inhabitants, was nevertheless taken for granted. It was 
only with the somewhat heightened awareness in recent years of workshops 
as sources of pollution that relocation has been considered. Both the 
local and central authorities have drawn up projects to that effect, but 
with limited effect. The artisans object that they would not be able to 
afford the relocation costs, and the state is very slow to provide the 
necessary ’artisans industrial parks’.
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This Greek reality stands in sharp contrast with what I was taught 
as a student of sociology about the changes accompanying the advent of 
industrialism and modernity. In the countries of early industrialisation 
(e.g. Britain in late eighteenth/early nineteenth century) as well in 
the late industrialisers (Germany, Sweden, Japan, and other countries 
during the later part of the nineteenth century) - al 1 those that today 
are considered advanced industrial countries - the high tide of 
capitalist expansion went hand in hand with the sharp decline of non­
capitalist manufacturing. The latter was destroyed and/or absorbed by 
the former, and for the most part artisans and independent craftsmen be­
came a thing of the past. It is interesting that both liberalism and 
Marxism saw the demise of artisans and other non-capitalist producers as 
a necessary (if painful) step towards progress, towards what nowadays is 
identified as modernisation and development. Thereafter, whenever the 
theory built on these schools of thought was invoked to guide or en­
lighten changes actually happening, as in the case of the 'late-late* 
developers, the destruction of small independent producers was an­
ticipated as a sine qua non of development. (The notion of late-late 
development, introduced by A. 0. Hirshman, designates industrialisation 
attempts after the inter-war world economic crisis. Though the term is 
apt, I myself shall be using ’late* development).
The continued existence of the Athenian artisans also contrasted 
with my understanding of the country’s overall development. It was quite 
obvious that industrialism and modernity had come to Greece, and there 
was no lack of official statistics to affirm this. The evidence came 
from changes such as the twin processes of migration and urbanisation, 
the growth of new industries and services, the emergence of new life­
styles and consumption patterns, the opening up and democrat i sat ion of 
the political system, and so on.
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Yet, instead of the expected masses of wage-workers supposed to be 
created by these processes, there seemed to be no large-scale 
proletarianisation of the population. Artisans, moreover, who should 
have been declining in numbers, seemed to remain quite unaffected. It 
was my impression that not only were they not proletarianised, but they 
actually proliferated numerically. Was that really the case? and if so, 
why? Was it an expression of the supposedly fiercely independent charac­
ter of the Greek people that impels them to resist incorporation into 
capitalism? Perhaps it was merely a localised deviation from the path to 
the orthodox (i.e. English) path to industrialisation, another of the 
systemic ills haunting the country and holding back its development, as 
maintained by the Left and others (e.g. Filias 1974). Was there some 
other reason for this? These were my initial questions.
Official statistics for very small enterprises, particularly in 
manufacturing, which would prove useful for making international com­
parisons, are hard to come by. The most recent comparative (gross) data 
I have found are 1988 figures cited by D.J. Storey (1994: 21-23). There, 
Greece is mentioned as having 670,000 *micro-enterprises’ of all kinds. 
It is the European Union (E.U.) country with the highest number of small 
units relative to its population: 67 such enterprises (of all kinds) per 
thousand inhabitants tops Portugal’s 62 per thousand, and the E.U. mean 
of 45 per thousand. The average firm size for Greece is 3 employees, 
against 6 for the E.U.. The labour share of the so-called micro- 
enterprises, which employ from 1 to 10 persons, is 59% in the case of 
Greece, 48% for Italy, and an E.U. average of 30%. Units officially 
designated in Greece as artisanal numbered about 135,000 in 1988 (see 
chapter V, Table 5.2), and the country again had the highest relative 
number of artisanal units in manufacturing when compared with other E.U. 
members (computed by comparing ESYE statistics with Storey 1994: 26-34,
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and Weiss 1988: 15-19; also Steinmetz and Wright 1989). Therefore, it 
would seem that in the Greek case there is a certain discrepancy between 
what theory would lead us to expect and what has actually taken place.
This is the subject the present study attempts to investigate and 
answer. Why, despite a not insignificant measure of industrialisation 
and modernisation, have artisans persisted in a country of the semi- 
periphery (Wallerstein 1974) such as Greece (Mouzelis 1987: 16-26) in 
the time horizon of late development? The existence of Greek artisans 
having been taken for granted, the question has never been asked.
In order to answer it, it is necessary to provide a framework for 
understanding artisans in general, and define them. In particular, Greek 
artisans must be described as such, placed into context, and compared 
with other small producers elsewhere.
The material is organised in three parts. The first part (chapters 
I-III) examines approaches to the study of the artisans and provides a 
comparative framework. The second part (chapters IV-VI) considers the 
influence of macro-level developments on the structure of the Greek ar- 
tisanate. The third part (chapters VI-X) concentrates on the micro­
level; empirical material is presented and discussed from a sample of 
100 small producers in two trades: in machine-manufacture and garment- 
making.
At this point I should note that the examination of the macro­
level was not undertaken merely to support the empirical research. Of 
course this has been an important concern, but the emphasis on the 
macro-level was also necessary because, to my knowledge, it has not as 
yet been studied with artisans in mind, and because this was the only 
way to ask the appropriate questions about their unexpected survival. 
Therefore, the emphasis of this study is laid on both the macro and 
micro-levels.
Id
Specifically, chapter I explores the Marxist tradition attempting 
to establish the nature of simp 1 e-commodity production (SCP) and its 
links to the petite bourgeoisie. Chapter II investigates sociological 
approaches to the study of the petite bourgeoisie in the context of ad­
vanced industrial societies, taking into account the residual role ar­
tisans have come to play in advanced capitalist societies. It also 
touches on the official interest being shown today in promoting small 
firms in such countries. The Italian experience of small-firm resurgence 
(artisanal and other), which is the subject of Chapter III, stands out. 
Developments there have been hailed as an instance of industrial resur­
gence in a core country, and the study of this success story is useful 
for comparative purposes.
Chapter IV. which opens the second part of this study, tries to 
relate artisans to Greece’s historical legacy of the early post-war 
period when the issue of the country’s industrialisation was set anew, 
which has shaped macro-sociological and macro-economic constraints and 
opportunities. This is then carried forward in Chapter V by considering 
some of the development directions drawn up and pursued in the post-war 
period. In the process, the impact of state action (in terms of allocat­
ing a role to artisans) as well as inaction is brought out and 
evaluated. Chapter VI rounds off the contextual i sat ion of Greek artisans 
by looking at the available literature on them.
Chapter VII, and the next three chapters constitute the third 
part, where the empirical material is presented on which this study is 
based. The field-work was conducted by means of a questionnaire. The 
sample, which was of the "snow-ball" type, involved 100 interviewees 
equally divided among machine manufacturing and garment-making. Chapter 
VII introduces matters relevant to the choice of sampling methods and to 
the practical methodology adopted. Chapter VIII explores these artisans’
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backgrounds and the who, how and why of artisanship. Chapter IX examines 
patterns characteristic of the state of being an artisan, with reference 
to both the workshop and to the artisan’s relations with the outside 
world. In chapter X . the factors are examined that limit the artisans* 
further expansion; how they are linked with their collective organisa­
tions; and how they see themselves and their future.
As in all sociological work, the findings of the empirical chap­
ters are obviously tentative rather than conclusive. They are, 
hypotheses for further quantitative investigations to vindicate the 
criteria of reliability and representativeness of random samples. Yet, 
it is my belief that the biographical structure of the questionnaire 
employed, with its in-built exploratory proclivity, has allowed the dis­
covery of a number of patterns that subsequent research may certainly 
apportion with much greater exactness, but will not alter fundamentally. 
My belief is founded on the saturation of information that has been 
reached. In consequence, although my findings are tentative, this does 
not invalidate certain inferences that link the samples to the reality 
of Greece’s semi-peripheral social formation. This in fact, is the task 
of the last chapter of this study (chapter XI). which attempts to arrive 
at a synthesis and bring out the specificity of Greek artisans.
Elements of continuity and discontinuity
The term artisan is neither new nor uniform in time and place.1 
According to an older, now obsolete definition, an artisan is 'one who 
practices or cultivates an art; an artist' (Oxford English Dictionary, 
OED 1987). In modern definitions, an artisan, again according to the 
OED, is an individual ’employed in any of the industrial arts; a 
mechanic, handicraftsman, artificer’; for ¥ebster*s New Students Dic­
tionary (WNSD) of 1964, he is a 'person (as a carpenter) trained to have
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manual dexterity or skill in a trade’; in Longman's Dictionary of Con­
temporary English (1981), gives artisan as *a skilled workman, espe­
cially in industry’. The differences among these contemporaneous defini­
tions are not insignificant, and even the elements they have in common 
are not without qualifications. In the widest possible sense, they indi­
cate a worker’s association with some kind of skill as well as industry. 
However, to try to find common elements between the early sense of an 
artisan and the modern variants will prove all but impossible without 
going back to the root of the word. So the modern OED informs us that 
art is human skill as the result of knowledge and practice.2
Quite aside from semantic differences, the various versions and 
definitions of artisan and artisanate, as well as the various facets of 
social life related to artisans in every-day practice as well as the 
relevant literature (e.g. type and methods of work, the role of the 
family, apprenticeships, guilds, social outlook, etc.), do refer to a 
rather broad spectrum of petty commodity producers.3 At the same time it 
must be recognised that official statistics and records have helped to 
blur the picture by extending the term to apprentices and other pre- 
industrial workers (Thompson: 1979: 259). Be that as it may, it is im­
portant to compare, albeit very briefly, pre-industrial artisans and 
contemporary ones to find out whether elements not only of continuity 
but also of discontinuity are to be found between them.
A key prerequisite for the existence of the social category of in­
dependent artisans is that craftsmen had to renounce their dependence on 
the self-sufficient oikos or feudal manor that produced use-values. To 
put it differently, artisans acquired their special character only when 
they became agents of commodity production, albeit of small or petty- 
commodity production. Beyond this basic condition, certain enduring fea­
tures that have survived the successive transformations of the stratum
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must be brought out, but this is not to say that historical artisans 
and contemporary ones are marked by linear continuity.4
With respect to the features that have survived but in altered 
form, the following comments are pertinent.
The working methods of artisans have changed a great deal. Hand- 
tools and manual skills have been superseded by machinery and the know­
how of operating it, so that the range of skills that are brought into 
play has been completely transformed. Very few of the contemporary ar­
tisans I researched now use hand techniques exclusively. Virtually all 
of them operate with more or less complex tools and mechanised equipment 
that increasingly incorporates modern technology in its controls. In 
consequence, learning new skills, even if they are still mainly picked 
up on the job, is becoming less empirical and more part of a formal 
process of education. Technological progress and greater division of 
labour also mean that there are few instances today of artisans making 
their own tools as they used to do. Tools are now normally bought ready­
made. As a result of these developments, the unity of conception and ex­
ecution in the same person, which used to be a mark of artisans, has 
broken down. However, in the last twenty years there has been a limited 
resurgence of this feature among the more innovative artisans, like 
those found in the Third Italy. The artistic element in artisanal work 
has had a similar fate. Significantly restricted (largely due to mass- 
production methods) it is found only among the fraction of artisans who 
still rely on hand techniques (their workshops are known in Greece by 
the awkward name of ’artistic artisanal establishments’ (Kalitexhniki 
biotechn^a).
Another area where significant changes have occurred are the 
artisan’s civic status and organisation. The contemporary artisan is, at 
least nominally, independence from a boss, a master, an employer (or a
20
father), enjoys personal independence and indeed full rights as a 
citizen. S/he is a sovereign individual unlike her/his historical 
predecessor. This is a result of more general societal shifts, of 
course. Social categories in pre-industrial societies were nothing like 
as clear-cut as those of modern economic man. So for instance the unfree 
status of slaves in ancient Greece, who were often craftsmen, did not 
preclude their owning property invluding slaves; while much later in 
Germany, in 1800, rural artisans (who accounted for one-third of all ar­
tisans) were not legally free but part of the still feudal hierarchy 
(Borchardt 1976: 86). Craftsmen, probably the most widespread kind of 
pre-industrial producers, are another example (Cipolla 1988: 92). Often 
thought of as independent, they were by no means free of controls and 
restrictions, even if they were not proletarian in the strictly Marxist 
sense. This in turn meant that their interests could be represented only 
through membership of corporate guilds, and these guilds imposed con­
trols, effected closure mechanisms, and regulated opposing claims.
Given that the working class is a relatively recent phenomenon 
(Arendt 1986: 96), the distinction in late medieval Europe between ap­
prentice and craftsman (as employee and employer) on the one hand, and 
artisan (self-employed) on the other, had very little meaning in the 
past. When these three agents were under the authority of a guild or 
some other corporate body, the terms applied almost interchangeably. In 
such instances talking about an artisanate did make sense.5 By contrast, 
contemporary artisans operate in a much more clearly defined environ­
ment, and the difference between an artisan and an employee is not one 
of rank, but verges on or is a matter of class difference. There is no 
legal or ethical obligation for the master to assist the young appren­
tice or the skilled wage-worker to become artisans themselves, even if 
they eventually do. Similar reasons keep these two social types from
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belonging to the same horizontal organisations, and partly explains why 
the guilds declined. The organisations that group contemporary artisans 
markedly differ from guilds; they unite their members for specific pur­
poses and are not all-inclusive.
The demise of the guilds, one of the consequences of modernity, 
has meant the decline also of the communitarian and craft traditions, 
including the mystical element in the craft itself, the common set of 
values, and the sense of belonging that had organised the life of guild 
members and given it a special meaning. Members belonged to their guild 
heart and soul, and this inclusiveness has been replaced by new tradi­
tions, in which the communitarian element is less tangible and more im­
agined. Although the new traditions do have an impact on contemporary 
artisans, they are much less of a deep commitment than were those in the 
past.
The old ideology of a 'just* ordering of society, in which the 
small self-sufficient business dominates, is still to be found. However, 
since the environment from4it sprang is no more, its power to bind ar­
tisans and mobilise them into action is less. Contemporary artisans, who 
are more privatised than were their earlier counterparts, are also ex­
posed to and increasingly taken over by other, not strictly artisanal, 
representatives of ideologies.
Finally, there have been changes with respect to the artisans' 
relationship with their customers. In earlier epochs craftsmen and cus­
tomers often knew each other intimately, since the markets were small 
and restricted to the local village or town. Such relationships on a 
first-name basis are rather rare today, due to the urbanisation and con­
tinuing commodification of economic life, which increasingly affects the 
markets contemporary artisans address - the local market in most cases, 
but also the national market, and sometimes even the international
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market. Accordingly the small scale of operations, which used to be a 
constant in earlier times, is not so small any more. This begs the ques­
tion of how small is small? The definition of small can only be 
synchronical in respect of other forms of production, or relative to the 
production technologies available at a given time. Having said that, ar­
tisanal production in this relative sense does continue to be ’small*.
Concerning now the elements of the artisanate that have remained 
intact across time, these are as follows.
Both in the past and today, artisans, in the context of a workshop 
of their own, personally and directly participate in the labour process. 
They still do so as independent agents, using the skills they have 
learned in the course of an apprenticeship. They own their means of 
production, whether these are traditional hand-tools or modern 
machinery, with which they, and very often the members of their family, 
earn their daily bread. The overall purpose of artisanal production con­
tinues to be to make *a reasonable living*; once this has been realised, 
the objective becomes simply a matter of perpetuating this situation, 
which implies a continued engagement in simp 1 e-commodity production. 
This core of distinctive features uninterruptedly present among artisans 
throughout the ages, form a vital part of the definition of what it is 
to be an artisan.
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Notes to General Introduction
1. The artisan, the craftsman, has almost invariably been considered, 
until the present, to be of the male sex. This is not because women did 
not perform skilled craft work, but when they did they were under the 
authority of a man: father, brother, husband, son or uncle; they were 
not independent. Besides, women ’rarely entered fully into the 
"mysteries" of the craft, and capital, including tools and workshops, 
was bequeathed ... to sons’ (Berg 1989: 74). Women were not often for­
mally apprenticed, and their becoming members of guilds was rare 
(ibid,).
2. A clarification of our key-term artisan in modern Greek is of par­
ticular importance here, given that the empirical investigation 
presented in this study was conducted among modern Greek artisans. The 
modern Greek term for artisan is viot&chnis, and the artisan’s business 
is a viotechndia. This viotechndia is usually contrasted with 
viomehandia (industry, manufacturing company), and viotdchnis with 
viomehanos (industrialist).
It has been pointed out that in Greek the emphasis is on how people 
obtain their livelihood, whereas in English (in terms such as manufac­
turing, industry» artisanate) the emphasis is ’on the way man creates, 
with his hands, his tools, his craft’ (see Nikolaou 1988). Indeed, the 
above-mentioned Greek words are compounds assembled from vios meaning 
life, livelihood, and either tdchne, meaning art, craft, or mechand, 
meaning machine (also means, and way of assisting). They therefore do 
convey a sense of the way by which a livelihood is obtained.
3. As E. P. Thompson notes when writing about the year 1830,
’There were great differences of degree concealed within the term 
"artisan", from the prosperous master-craftsmen, employing labour 
on his own account and independent of any masters, to the sweated 
garret labourers’ (1979: 259).
4. For the purposes of this comparison I draw on the material on contem­
porary artisans presented in chs II-III and VIII-X.
5. The initially synonymous use in French of ouvrier and mattre for the 
worker/craftsman and the master-craftsman/artisan - or for that matter 
the indiscriminate use in modern Greek of ergdtis for worker, and 
mdstoras or technltis for skilled worker, craftsman (see Arendt 1986: 
223) - or the very broad meaning of the term artisan as discussed ear­
lier, support my point. In fact, if there are any differences in these 
synonymous appellations they appear to indicate rank, not class dif­
ferences in terms of relations of production. Accumulated experience may
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indeed be considered a useful index of hierarchical distinctions.
Hobsbawm has the following to say concerning the wage differentials 
between the skilled and the unskilled, which express traditions of rank 
differences too:
’The characteristic skilled worker in pre-industrial crafts 
would expect to get ideally about twice as much as the common 
labourer, a differential of great antiquity and persistence, ... 
(These are, of course, rates not earnings.') In fact, the skilled 
man normally tended to get rather less than this differential, 
especially when unable to restrict entry from the unskilled 
trades, and more when entry was effectively restricted, ... In 
practice the relation between the rates of the pre-industrial 
labourer and craftsman - say the mason and his labourer - was more 
likely to be two or three to five than one to two’ (1974d: 346).
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Part One: Theoretical Considerations: Approaches to artisans
CHAPTER I - ARTISANS. SIMPLE-CCMMOOnY PRODUCTION. AND THE MIDDLE 
CLASSES: MARXIST APPROACHES
Introduct ion
There are two sound reasons for studying Marx’s views and those of 
other Marxists on the subject matter given. Firstly, Marxism analysis 
still retains considerable heuristic force (Mayer 1975: 409). Secondly, 
Marx’s influence has been paramount in the more general discussion of 
social classes and forms of production, as well as in analyses of the 
petits bourgeois, and particularly artisans.
What has been interchangeably designated in the literature as 
simple, petty, small, small-scale, independent, or self-organised com­
modity production/producers pertains directly to artisans (and to other 
small-scale commodity producers).1 Indeed, they are considered the ex­
emplars of this form of production.2 On the one hand, simp 1 e-commodity 
production (SCP) is their basic, most enduring activity and expresses 
their particular set of relations of production. On the other, artisans 
are the agents of SCP (a polynomial abstraction), which may conveniently 
be thought of as a social structure.3
Marx employed the notion of SCP as an analytical tool for compar­
ing the features, development, and overall differentia specifica of in­
dustrial capitalism. More recently, SCP has also been used in socio- 
historical analyses and theoretical investigations of modes of produc­
tion. However, the status of the term has not been unambiguous. The 
foundations of SCP, its correspondence or otherwise of it to historical 
reality, as well as the concept itself, have all been much questioned.4
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It will therefore be useful to elucidate the precise nature of SCP as 
the first objective of this chapter. Following this, I shall make a sur­
vey of the views of Marx himself, as well as of certain of his followers 
- namely V.I. Lenin, N. Poulantzas, and E. 0. Wright - on the position 
of the middle classes and their artisan faction within the capitalist 
class structure.
1. The Marxian notion of SCP
An attempt to define Marx’s understanding of SCP on the basis of 
his writings soon shows that the notion is scattered throughout his 
work. This has given rise to some particularistic readings and allowed 
the ©mergence of conflicting conceptualisations. My own view is that, 
beyond some superficial ambiguities, Marx’s views on SCP are quite con­
sistent and uniform.
In Capital (1976, 1977) and elsewhere (1969, 1971, 1973), Marx’s 
concern was to investigate the features, specificity, and tendencies of 
modern capitalism and its mode of production. His critical understanding 
of the corresponding social regime became part of his revolutionary 
project for the overthrow of class society. In his critique of the 
political economy of his day, in which the features of the capitalist 
mode of production (CMP) are discussed as though it completely dominated 
society, the introduction of concepts such as SCP was for purposes of 
exegesis, a heuristic device, ’a method by which thought grasps the con­
crete’ (Rubin 1972: 255).5 SCP, therefore, is a logical concept, derived 
from the basic categories developed in Capital. It helped Marx describe 
the transition from an economy in which production for use had 
predominated (in the various pre-capitalist modes of production), to one 
in which the production of use-values for exchange attained its apogee 
(in the capitalist mode).
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Marx also saw SCP as reflecting certain aspects of some actual so­
cial formations. There are references in his work to historical 
societies, primarily classical Greece and late medieval Europe, with SCP 
or other non-capitalist modes of production. (These may be viewed as il­
lustrations of the differences between a society dominated by 
capitalism, and other societies in which capital appeared in undeveloped 
form.) These references, of course, also provide examples of how the 
transition to capitalism was effected (for instance Marx 1977: 593-613).
Whether Marx’s references to SCP are purely theoretical or more 
historically specific, he always contrasts instances of subsistence 
production with commodity production at various stages of commodifica­
tion and in various mixtures, up to the phenomenon of complete com­
moditisation including that of labour-power. The final step in that 
process is, of course, fully-fledged capitalism. Indeed, Marx explicitly 
recognised capitalism as predominantly the production of exchange-values 
(commodities);6 among these, the (generalised) production of labour- 
power as a commodity is a unique element, and seen to be so precisely by 
comparison with SCP.
This point needs stressing, since it is in terms of labour power 
that the distinction between simp1e-commodity and capitalist production 
is most obvious in logical terms. SCP is the production of use-values 
for the purpose of exchange by independent producers who own/control 
their means of production and do not resort to employing wage labour.7 
Capitalist production equally involves the production of commodities, 
but in this instance ownership/control of the means of production and 
its overall organisation lie in the hands of the capitalist who hires 
wage-labour in order to produce the commodities (i.e. two classes are 
involved in the production process). Both modes of production involve 
selling the commodities in order to use the proceeds for obtaining means
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of consumption, which are also commodities - except for labour-power, 
which is a commodity to be productively consumed only in the CMP, not in 
SCP. This difference aside, in both instances is there selling in order 
to buy. The process is represented by the simple circuit C-M-C’ (C: com­
modity; M: money; C ’: commodity different from C). Since use-values are 
exchanged for other use-values, the primary aspect of this circuit which 
opens and closes with commodity, is qualitative.
The independent producer sells in the market a final commodity 
which has already undergone the process of production. In Marx’s own 
words, members of this class ’... meet me as sellers of commodities, not 
sellers of labour, and this relation has therefore nothing at all to do 
with the exchange of capital’. In this sense their labour does not fall 
under the capitalist mode of production' (Marx, quoted in Hodges 1961: 
33). Besides, when the independent producer sells a commodity, he is 
finished with it, plus the fact that the commodities produced differ 
from one independent producer to the next.
By contrast, the capitalist producer must, in order to exchange 
finished products, acquire (purchase and engage in production) the com­
modity of labour-power. The wage-labourer sells his labour-power to the 
capitalist but, unlike other commodities, this is not a final commodity, 
nor is it always the same. In addition, labour-power as commodity cannot 
realise its use-value unless it is engaged in productive activity,® un­
less the wage-labourer is subsumed into the process of production ac­
cording to the capitalist's directives. In other words, the seller of 
the commodity labour-power must submit to the direct supervision and 
control of the buyer, the capitalist, for the transaction to have any 
meaning. Obviously, this situation is in sharp contrast to that of the 
independent producer. This means that, in capitalism, production of com­
modities is not ’simple', in that it necessarily involves the production
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of the particularistic and highly complex commodity labour-power (Kay 
1975: 63-70; also Sayer 1979: 34-35).
Another difference between SCP and CMP is in terms of reproduc­
tion. Since the independent simp 1 e-commodity producer does not aim at 
accumulation (expanded reproduction), s/he is structurally engaged in 
only simple reproduction, in more or less maintaining the status quo: 
each production cycle is to be of an adequate magnitude to replenish the 
inputs required for personal consumption as these are socially defined, 
as well as those for productive consumption, to allow the process to 
continue on the existing scale for a further cycle. By contrast, ex­
panded reproduction, which goes over and above what is required for a 
new round, involves enlarging the scale of production so as to result in 
accumulation, a sine qua non for capitalism (Marx 1976: 1022). So when a 
petty-commodity unit moves towards expanded reproduction, this is the 
surest indication that it is entering the process of transformation into 
a capitalistic unit. Inversely, a capitalistic unit which does not ac­
cumulate will cease being capitalist (Marx 1976: part seven). However, 
although expanded reproduction is necessary for capitalist development, 
in actual practice it is not by itself sufficient; it does not overcome 
all obstacles to entry, as I shall show when discussing my own empirical 
material in part III.
For Marx, the actual agents of SCP are independent pre-capitalist 
peasants, artisan-craftsmen, as well as producers combining both these 
basic characteristics, or other independent workers (miners, woodcut­
ters, shepherds, fishermen, etc.) owning/control 1ing their means of 
production, and producing at least in part for the market, while partly 
relying on certain commodity inputs for their reproduction. Independent 
producers can and do exist in a CMP-dominated social formation. Marx
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contends that in such cases the SCP is being destroyed by capital as a
matter of fact, and that capital will also destroy
’itself in those forms in which it does not appear in contradic­
tion to labour: petty capital, and intermediate or hybrid types 
between the classic, adequate mode of production of capital it­
self, and the old modes of production (in their original form), or 
as renewed on the basis of capital* (Marx in Hobsbawm 1978: 117).
This implicitly concedes that independent producers, petty capital 
(i.e. working owners), and other mixed types may also appear in the con­
text of a formation dominated by the CMP. In fact, in his later works 
Marx became quite explicit on this issue, and pointed out that independ­
ent producers, peasants, and handicraftsmen (as backward forms or ves­
tiges of the past - Marx 1977: 597) are found also in dominantly 
capitalist societies, although in altered form: their productive rela­
tions, even though they are not subordinate to the CMP, are given a 
capitalist stamp. Under the CMP,
’the independent peasant or handicraftsman is cut into two per­
sons. As owner of the means of production he is capitalist; as 
labourer he is his own wage-labourer. As capitalist he therefore 
pays himself his wages and draws his profit on his capital; that 
is to say, he exploits himself as wage-labourer, and pays himself, 
in the surplus-value, the tribute that labour owes to capital. 
Perhaps he also pays himself a third portion as landowner (rent), 
in exactly the same way ... that the industrial capitalist, when 
he works with his own capital, pays himself interest, regarding 
this as something which he owes to himself not as industrial 
capitalist but qua capitalist pure and simple’ (Marx 1969: 408).
Precisely because he owns them, the independent producer does not 
relate to his means of production as capital, nor indeed as a wage­
worker. Yet in a society that is dominated by the CMP, his means of 
production ’are looked on as capital, and he himself is split in two, so 
that he, as capitalist, employs himself as wage-labourer’ (.ibid.). In 
fact, the independent producer operating in such a society appropriates 
his own surplus-value — not because he has produced it himself, which is 
immaterial, but because he has ownership of the means of production - 
the capitalist form (Marx 1969: 407-09).
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Two further points should here be made. The first concerns the SCP 
labour force and relations of production. Aside from the independent 
small-commodity producer, members of his family also engaged in the work 
have been considered as part of the SCP unit. Marx seemed to accept that 
such working kin were not to be considered as wage-labourers. The same 
applies to apprentices taken into SCP units. Relations of simple- 
commodity production were therefore kin-based and/or based on the domes­
tic unit. Undoubtedly, the existence of family workers and apprentices 
is proof of the as yet incomplete commoditisation of the economy and its 
SCP units, with commoditisation not progressed sufficiently to disrupt 
the persistence of domestic and/or community ties.
The second point concerns Marx's treatment of the boundaries be­
tween SCP and capitalism. The qualitative difference between them has 
been explained already. Yet how is one to characterise, for example, a 
manufacturing concern in which, say, two artisans who are partners 
labour there together, along with two members of their family (perhaps 
sons), and also hire four wage-labourers? Is this concern a capitalist 
or a SCP one? Marx's criterion for distinguishing capitalism from other 
forms would then be 'mainly by the number of workers simultaneously 
employed and the mass of means of production concentrated for their use' 
(Marx 1976: 454).9
2. Marx on the petty bourgeoisie
Marx did envisage a process of 'complex’ simplification of classes 
to take place in the course of the development of capitalism (Hall 1977: 
35). For him this was an innate tendency of societies organised along 
capitalist lines. The classes and strata that stand half-way between 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat are forced by the impetus of capitalist 
competition and superior organisation to adapt and diversify their func­
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tions; most of them gradually sink into the proletariat. One of these 
intermediate classes is the petty bourgeoisie.
For Marx the petty or petite bourgeoisie iKleinbiirgerturn), or 
(lower) middle class,10 includes all those who own small amounts of 
property, i.e. ’the lower middle class, the small manufacturer, the 
shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bour­
geoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the 
middle class’ (Marx in Jordan 1971: 154). Another formulation specifies 
the lower middle class as ’the lower strata of the middle class - the 
small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the 
handicraftsmen and peasants’ ibid.: 156). In a third definition he in­
cludes in the petty bourgeoisie ’caf6 and restaurant proprietors, mei—  
chands de vins, small traders, shopkeepers, craftsmen, etc.* (Marx 
1973b: 65). Overall, the petty bourgeoisie is ’an independent section of 
modern society’ (Marx, quoted in Hodges 1961: 32-33).
Within capitalist society, the independence of the petits bour­
geois may be understood in terms of their particular position, in that 
they are neither wage earners themselves nor employers of the labour of 
others - which corresponds, as already noted, to SCP.11 Their independ­
ent existence is protected and maintained by virtue of the sacrosanct 
character of all property, including their own, in capitalist society. 
At the same time their independence is challenged, and their material 
base is eroded when the advance of that system, activates its inherent 
tendencies towards the concentration and centralisation of capital.
Of course, Marx’s social classes entail the existence of sig­
nificant differences between social groups. But one should remember that 
Marx’s sociology was not directed primarily to understanding the con­
stitution of society, but rather existed as part and parcel of his 
revolutionary plan. The formulation of his analyses and their
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very structure lose much of their meaning outside his overall project. 
Indeed, the inevitable tension between science and politics is reflected 
in much of Marx’s analyses, and/or in the plurality of meanings and 
definitions of some of his concepts.
Accordingly, social classes are defined above all on the basis of 
relations of exploitation. Individuals finding themselves in the same 
circumstances are unified by these relations into a unitary class - as 
either exploited or exploiters. Exploitation may be internal or external 
to the production process, although within Marxisms priority is usually 
accorded to the production process. Why? Obviously because in the 
capitalist system, the arena of Marx’s prime concern and intervention, 
the relations of exploitation are endogenous to the production process, 
the relations of production being also relations of exploitation. As 
such they alienate individuals from their earlier allegiances. At the 
same time they have the potential of bonding people with similar inter­
ests and uniting them into antithetical groups. It is here that one of 
Marx’s prime political priorities was expected to materialise, that of 
uniting the various groups of wage-workers into one - which can happen 
only if there is a fundamental cleavage in society. The emphasis placed 
by Marxists on defining social classes according to their members’ posi­
tion vis-A-vis the relations of production that organise the labour 
process, stems from this particular political priority; at the same time 
it is claimed that it conforms to the actual state of affairs. Once this 
perspective is applied to the definition of the working class in 
capitalism, it cannot be revoked for other social systems/modes of 
production, since that would be crass eclecticism. The definition of any 
social class, therefore, relies on its position vis-A-vis the relations 
of production, even though these, with the marked exception of
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capitalist relations, do not normally entail co-operation, differential 
roles, and exploitation within the production process.
With respect to the petty bourgeoisie, relations of exploitation 
internal to the production process (if we by-pass the thorny question of 
family labour), do not exist. This has led whole strands of Marxism 
(including in some instances Marx himself) to deny the petty bourgeoisie 
the status of a singular class. Instead, its members were scattered 
among several different social strata. Yet at other times Marx clearly 
presents it as a unitary class, as when he made reference to the debt 
problem by pointing out its negative impact on the petty bourgeoisie as 
a form of exploitation, hence as the basis of cl ass-type cleavage (Marx 
19973b: 65, 115), or when considering its exclusion from political power 
(ibid., p. 37). However, he did not elaborate.
In the context of the class in itself/class for itself schema, 
Marx’s stand on whether the petty bourgeoisie forms a class or not be­
comes much more explicit.12 In his political writings, the petty bour­
geoisie is treated on a par with small peasants. This, as I understand 
it, expresses a reluctance to treat it as a ’great’ or ’basic* class, as 
in the capitalist context Marx referred to the capitalists and 
wage-workers.13 The petty bourgeoisie is seen not as a homogeneous, as a 
formed social class, at times not even minimally so, but as a 
*transition class in which the interests of the two [basic] classes meet 
and become blurred’ (emphasis original; ibid.: 179).14
This perception of a class composed, in a sense, of diluted ele­
ments from other classes15 allows for the treatment of the petty bour­
geoisie as a mere auxiliary to either of the two basic classes of 
capitalist society - despite the fact that it is often given a pivotal 
role and position in accounts of political processes (Hall 1977: 41).
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Another issue that has kept much of its topicality is Marx’s 
closely related usage of the notions of political representation and the 
ideological complementarity of the middle classes. The latter notion 
directly concerns the peasantry, and what Marx had in mind by petty 
bourgeoisie was an essentially urban class (Hodges 1961: 36). The 
problems of articulating an autonomous ideology, and that of representa­
tion which the French peasants faced (see Marx 1969-1970), sprang from 
their particular circumstances: they were living much scattered and in 
isolation. But in this sense they resemble the urban petits bourgeois, 
who too are scattered and isolated. Hence, by extending the analogy, the 
notions may apply to the urban petty bourgeoisie too.
Political representation does, of course, occur on the basis of 
the interests of particular groups, but the correspondence between the 
two appears not to be one-to-one, but rather a matter of relative af­
finity. It is restricted within sociologically defined boundaries of 
what interests may be, which are based on the social situation of each 
class. Thus, the solution to the crisis, referred to in The Eighteenth 
Brumaire. is petty bourgeois, but not because all representatives are 
’shop-keepers* (petits bourgeois); in fact they are not. Even if they 
all were ’shop-keepers’, this would not be correct. If the solution is 
petty bourgeois in character, it is because the proposed way out of the 
crisis ’corresponds to the objective limits of the particular material 
interests and social situation of the petite bourgeoisie as a class’ 
(see Hall 1977: 44; also Calvet 1982).16
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3. Other Marxist approaches
3.1 V. I. Lenin
In The Development of Capitalism in Russia, one of Lenin’s primary 
concerns is to show how the differentiation of the peasantry spread 
capitalist relations of production, and how inevitable this process was 
in conditions of nineteenth-century Russia. Lenin presents a step-by- 
step examination of the various forms taken by SCP in the course of so­
cial evolution from a natural economy to capitalism. In this context, 
SCP as a form of production occupies an intermediate position between 
the two extremes; it is also peopled by an intermediate class.
SCP for Lenin is associated with the form of simple reproduction. 
This means that in SCP the process of production is always on the same 
scale — including its previous technical scale. It also means that, even 
when operating for a market, this form of production is not concerned 
with expanded reproduction, with accumulation: the whole of the surplus 
is consumed, and no portion of it is converted into capital (Lenin 1977: 
37, 52-6, 66). SCP, therefore, can continue for centuries without under­
going any substantial change in character or size, remaining localised 
and parcellised (ibid.: 67). What in Russia triggered the transition to 
accumulation (capitalism) was the differentiation of the peasantry, in 
the course of which emerged a rural artisanate.
But these incipient artisans did not break at once with tradi­
tional practices and continued to produce articles made to order (ibid.: 
335-36). They did not engage in commodity production for impersonal 
markets, only in commodity circulation - whenever they received payment 
in money, or when they purchased materials and tools. ’The product of 
the artisan’s labour does not appear in the market, hardly ever leaving 
the sphere of peasant natural economy’ (ibid.: 337). On the other hand, 
in as far as contact with the market stimulated production for it, the
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artisans became small-scale commodity producers (ibid.: 338), who 
nevertheless are ’characterised by [their] totally primitive hand tech­
nique that remains unchanged almost from time immemorial* (ibid.: 548). 
Lenin’s references to artisans are not entirely unambiguous, since he 
applies the term indiscriminately to producers at various stages of com­
modification.
The differentiation of the peasantry in Russia was historically 
intertwined with the abolition of serfdom, and released a considerable 
supply of labourers. Some of these obtained employment with artisans, 
initially as part-time workers, subsequently full-time. This meant that 
these wage-labourers provided for their small producer employers some 
surplus-value that could be converted into capital. At a given point, 
this hiring of labour, capitalisation, and expansion made certain ar­
tisans and other intermediate strata into fully-fledged capitalists — 
provided, of course, a market was or became available. It is with this 
in mind that Lenin declared that ’small-scale production gives birth to 
capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spon­
taneously and on a mass scale’ (Lenin: 1965: 9). In other words, he now 
perceived simple commodity producers as incipient capitalists.17
In their daily practice, petty-commodity producers form a part of 
the petty bourgeoisie, a social class according to Lenin. The criterion 
he employed for defining the petty bourgeoisie has been described as a 
’sort of class criterion’. It involves ’the relationship to the means of 
production minus the antagonistic relations* between the owners of the 
means of production and the owners of labour-power ’with, instead, a 
relationship in which the two poles are unified’ (Weso+owski 1979: 109). 
The petty bourgeoisie ’covers all independent production for the 
market’, while employment of wage-labourers is explicitly not considered 
one of its essential features (Lenin 1977: 179). In other words, ex­
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ploitation being external to the labour process, exploiters can also be 
for instance landlords, merchants, bankers, or money-lenders. For Lenin, 
the petty bourgeoisie as a class is not only an urban but also a rural 
category, and consists of peasants (commercial farmers), artisans 
(usually handicraftsmen), smal 1-commodity producers in industry, petty 
traders and shopkeepers (.ibid.: 384; Hodges 1961: 34-35).
In respect to the politics of the petty bourgeoisie, Lenin’s posi­
tion was similar to Marx’s. He invokes the ’two spirits’ present in the
petty bourgeoisie, the spirit of the worker and the spirit of
capitalist, in an attempt to interpret their vacillating position and 
attitudes, and their role as auxiliaries to one or other of the basic 
classes. Lenin held that in turn of the century Russia the petite bour­
geoisie was a revolutionary class ’within the working-class movement’. 
When, however, he saw them incline towards the bourgeoisie, he 
criticised them severely; eventually, petty bourgeoisie became a 
derogatory term for him (Lenin 1965: 16-17).
In Lenin, simp 1 e-commodity producers are shown as portraying cer­
tain features which, I think, are indicative of the form of production 
they represent, and in this sense appear to transcend the specificity of 
The Development of Capitalism in Russia. Thus smal 1-commodity producers 
are depicted as fearing competition because it might entail their ruin, 
and are secretive of any technical inventions and improvements, so as to 
keep them for their own exclusive use and perhaps to defeat their com­
petitors. They are known to work long hours without stopping, and indeed 
have to unless they cut down their own standard of living. In un­
favourable conditions they do not have a full set of tools, they make a
limited assortment of articles, they lack storage space, they pay much 
higher costs when buying smaller amounts of raw material retail, and 
must sell more cheaply since they are in dire need of money. The only
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asset they control is themselves and their labour input. In these cir­
cumstances their income may be considerably lower than wages in a 
capitalist enterprise. Petty-commodity producers are aided by family 
labour, especially in the smaller units. Marketing of their products is 
direct to the customer or to a small neighbourhood market.
One final point concerns the border between small commodity and 
capitalist production. Lenin’s index for this is the number of wage­
workers employed in relation to their employers’ own and family labour. 
When wage-labour predominates over family labour, then capitalism has 
taken over. Lenin is not consistent, however. At one point he specifies 
the employer's transformation into a ’real capitalist’ when s/he employs 
15 to 30 wage-labourers (ibid.: 355), but elsewhere he approvingly 
quotes Isayev, who gives a lesser number.18 In Isayev too the 
proprietor's ability to divorce himself completely from manual labour is 
important in connection with how much wage-labour is employed. Of 
course, these are only manifestations of the main underlying issue, 
namely how much available capital the artisan-to-be-capitalist has at 
his disposal (see ibid.: 361).19
3.2 N. Poulantzas
N. Poulantzas draws a sharp distinction between the petty bour­
geoisie and smal1 capital, holding that lumping the two together serves 
only monopoly capital’s attempt to co-opt the former (Poulantzas 1978: 
104, 139, 151). The petty bourgeoisie is not seen as a fraction of the 
bourgeoisie,20
'[it] is not a bourgeoisie smaller than the others; it is not a 
part of the bourgeoisie at all, since it does not exploit, or at 
least is not chiefly involved in exploiting wage-labour’ (ibid.: 
151; emphasis added).
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Poulantzas regards the petty bourgeoisie as constituting a distinct 
class with two basic factions, the ’traditional’ and the ’new’ petty 
bourgeoisie.
For him, the traditional faction belongs to the simple-commodity 
form, the form which historically made the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism. In terms of relations of production it includes both small- 
scale production and small-scale ownership {ibid.: 206). More specifi­
cally, small-scale production consists of types of artisanal production, 
or small family businesses, where ownership and possession of the means 
of production coincide with the direct producer. Thus,
’there is no economic exploitation properly so-called, in so far 
as these forms of production do not employ wage-labour, or at 
least only do so very occasionally. Labour is chiefly provided by 
the actual owner or by members of his family who are not 
remunerated in the form of a wage. This small-scale production 
draws profit from the sale of its goods and through the overall 
redistribution of surplus-value, but it does not directly extort 
surplus-value* {ibid.: 285-86).
The statement that smal 1-commodity producers do not directly ex­
tort surplus-value is accurate only as far as the ideal-typical version 
of artisan, self-employed in SCP. For the rest, the claim is flawed be­
cause in practice exploitation is by no means unknown.
Poulantzas’ qualification (which he does not actually specify but 
which can be inferred) for including establishments employing wage- 
labourers in SCP and the petty bourgeoisie is that the employees’ labour 
must not exceed that of the owner and of his family. In this he aligns 
himself with classical Marxists. He holds that ’in the strict sense’ the 
artisanal petits bourgeois in France are to be found within the en­
terprise category of fewer than five employees, the smallest grade for 
which there are official data. He therefore excludes some of the larger 
employers from the petty bourgeoisie on the basis, apparently, of too
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high a ratio of wage to family labour. What the precise dividing line 
should be is not spelled out.21
Poulantzas therefore emphasises the principal role played by the 
labouring owner and his family, but we must also take into account the 
numerous cases where such wage-labour is exploited. I would identify the 
artisanal petty bourgeoisie among small-scale producers in the fewer 
than five employees bracket, but some artisans certainly operate 
businesses with a larger workforce and still their family members out­
numbers the wage-workers. Empirical data are required if we are to 
reach a more definitive conclusion on this issue.
Poulantzas also holds that there is a ’class barrier’ between the 
petty bourgeoisie and the small (non-monopoly) capitalists. One implica­
tion is that mobility between them is minimal, especially upward. 
Another is that the nature of the contradictions that drive the petty 
bourgeoisie away from the in capitalist formations dominant monopoly 
capital is supposedly completely different from those that divide small 
capitalists from monopoly capital. Concerning the first set of con­
tradictions, the ’dissolution effects imposed by monopoly capital on the 
traditional petty bourgeoisie ... actually do assume the forms of an ac­
celerated process of liquidation and elimination* (ibid.: 151), an index 
of which is the decline of artisanal enterprises.22 This process is, 
however, tempered by the intervention of the state, which for political 
reasons concedes economic privileges to the petty bourgeoisie.23
The relationship between monopoly capital and small (non-monopoly) 
capital, is in sharp contrast to that between monopoly capital and the 
petty bourgeoisie. Although it is at times affected by competition, it 
is always characterised by the unity that monopoly capital has imposed 
upon its non-monopoly brethren (ibid.: 150). Existing cleavages among 
the various factions of capital do not lead to the elimination of non­
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monopoly capital, although the cleavages between capitals (small or 
large) and the petty bourgeoisie, which are not related to differences 
in ’magnitude’, promoted the elimination of the latter (ibid.: 153).24
Poulantzas in fact launches an attack against the notion of ’small 
and medium-sized enterprises’ (SME). He considers SME to be a myth con­
cocted by political forces that is as much of an aberration as (some) 
orthodox Communist Parties in the West. According to him, rolling ar­
tisans and other petits bourgeois into one with small capitalists serves 
only the purposes of the latter, who co-opt and utilise them in their 
struggles against the more monopolistic factions of capital. As the 
petits bourgeois are led to consider themselves on a par with small 
capital — both being members of the SME, in actual practice and even by 
law — they begin to dissolve their autonomous organisation, even though 
this undermines their position with their new allies. Strategically, via 
the SME scheme the petits bourgeois become, and are utilised as, 
auxiliaries of capital in the latter’s continuing struggle against the 
working class (ibid.: 139-40, 150-53).2S
Patterns of recruitment into artisanal positions are important. 
According to Poulantzas, in France, 60,000 workers joined the artisanate 
between 1959 and 1964, two-thirds of whom were skilled and one-third 
semi-skilled. One-third of the total, quite a significant figure, were 
the sons of artisans. This indicates that the stratum is fragmented to a 
considerable extent. Part of it reproduces itself in terms of position, 
but the majority decomposes into other class positions and is recruited 
anew from the working class, at which point there is upward mobility. A 
not insignificant further upward mobility of artisans into the small- 
capitalist stratum is also acknowledged.26 In a country like France ar­
tisans would, therefore, seem to be a very mobile stratum indeed.27
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Does this evidence invalidate Poulantzas* rejection ’of the myth 
of social promotion’, his claim of a class barrier, and his critique of 
the SME notion? I think it does not, given that the move from skilled 
wage-worker to independent artisan would, at best involve, a slight bet­
terment of one’s situation. With respect to mobility from artisan to 
small capitalist, the proliferation noted may indeed involve business 
growth of a capitalist type. But then the issue is whether or not these 
new entrepreneurs can manage to maintain themselves in their new posi­
tions. Perhaps is safer to say that the above data question and qualify 
Poulantzas* postulates, and make it necessary to search for an explana­
tion of the observed deviations, which his structuralist scheme really 
cannot account for.
At this point a short excursus is indicated. For Poulantzas, as 
noted earlier, the traditional and new petits bourgeois, form a single 
class. He investigated their ideological and political underpinnings, 
and found them permeated, due to class polarisation, by the dominant 
bourgeois and working-class ideologies, and always determined by the 
class struggle. Both groups exhibited certain features in common that 
compose the petit bourgeois ideology.28 Similarly, in political outlook 
the petty bourgeoisie as a whole or in its parts has no stable autonomy 
and is subservient to that of either of the two main classes 
(Poulantzas 1978: 287-97; and see Wright’s critique 1978: 40-41, 58-59).
However, the origins of the two factions are quite different and 
their economic determination, constitution and overall make-up is very 
dissimilar: the traditional group continues to be engaged in non­
capitalist SCP, while the ’new’ petty bourgeoisie is the product of ad­
vanced capitalism (Therborn 1983: 172-73). They are united in one class 
due only to their common ideological and political features. According 
to Poulantzas, both ’old’ and ’new’ petits bourgeois being excluded from
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the basic classes gives them a common negative element that, as he 
claims (but not expounds), 'actually produces economic similarities 
which have common political and economic effects' (ibid.: 206). In fact, 
it is due to this renowned overpoliticisation, understandable in view of 
the priorities of Marxism, that Poulantzas lumps the two petit bourgeois 
groups into a single class.29 Interestingly enough, that unifying ele­
ment does not always operate. Because of the artisans’ working-class 
origins and traditions and their participation in manual labour, they 
tend to adopt the perspectives and positions of the working class. This 
establishes them as a 'class faction* distinct from the small retailers 
who exhibit different, pro-bourgeois affiliations. The division is not 
between 'old' and 'new* petty bourgeois, but between artisans and shop­
keepers (ibid.: 330). Of course this is an indirect way of acknowledging 
the vastly heterogeneous character of the groups that constitute the 
lower middle class(es) or petty bourgeoisie (see critiques of 
Poulantzas* views in Hunt 1977: 81-107; and Wright 1978: 43-59, 1985: 
40).30
Closing this section, I think that three points need to be em­
phasised.
Firstly, I find the rejection 'of the myth of social promotion’, 
the critique of the SME notion, and the claim that there is a class bar­
rier, very useful — not for the political reasons that prompted 
Poulantzas’, but heuristically I believe they may help direct studies 
towards questions more pertinent to the social cohesiveness of the ar­
tisan stratum and of its divergence from other social groups, from the
perspective of both actors and institutions. However, the idea of a 
class barrier should be modified to allow for more autonomous action,
which in concrete empirical cases is important for mobility; it also re­
quires more specification.
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Secondly, the role of the state in mature capitalism, in temper­
ing, alleviating, and even countering the consequences of the endemic 
tendency towards class polarisation must, since the state is not a mere 
class apparatus, also be taken into account, as well as the actors’ in­
teraction with the various state agencies.
Thirdly, Poulantzas shows the difficulties, and unwittingly the 
dead-lock, involved in advocating a class analysis which relies on 
polarisation and struggle between the basic classes,31 and perceives 
other classes and strata as revolving around them and determined by 
them, without showing how the subservient classes and strata counteract 
by themselves exerting influence on the various structures bearing upon 
them. Social classes other than the two basic ones should be analysed in 
their own right, without shedding all references to their economic, 
political, and ideological determinants. This can be done only if class 
analysis is not taken to be quasi-synonymous with political strategy.
3.3 E. O. Wright
In his discussion of contradictory class locations Wright con­
cerned himself with the petty bourgeoisie and what he calls small 
employers, that is employers who, while they exploit labour-power, are 
not capitalists. The petit-bourgeois form of production is SCP, and he 
contrasts it with capitalist production, which is defined in class terms 
(Wright 1985: 34-35).
SCP is characterised as production for the market by self-employed 
producers who do not employ workers and exhibit a high degree of work 
autonomy. In this Wright follows other Marxists already surveyed. For 
the petty bourgeoisie to be considered a class portraying the above 
characteristics - class being a relational concept for Wright - it must 
engage in systematic exchange relations with other classes.32
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Accordingly, surplus appropriation in SCP does not involve ex­
ploitation; ’whatever surplus is produced is generated by the petty 
bourgeoisie producer and his family* (Wright 1978: 74, 79-80). It must, 
however, be said that since part of the surplus they produce is 
’appropriated by capital through credit relations and other forms of ex­
change relations, self-employment is obviously insufficient to define 
self-exploitation’ (Wright 1985: 62). For Wright, unequal exchange on 
the market is exploitation, and therefore some petits bourgeois are ex­
ploited by capital, although he qualifies this statement by saying that 
these transfers are ’redistributive of a social product already produced 
within a set of proper ty-rel at ions* (ibid.: 98, 103). If we were to ac­
cept his proposition, small employers would also have to be considered 
as exploited by capital; obviously such a conception of exploitation is 
non-Marxist.
The magnitude of the surplus of independent producers is insig­
nificant to allow for accumulation. However, employing even a single 
worker alters the social relations of production, though the surplus- 
value he produces is very small, and at any rate likely to be less than 
that produced by the owner-producer. This is especially so if members of 
the owner’s family contribute their unpaid labour. As additional wage­
workers are employed, the ratio of family to wage-labour declines.
’At some point it becomes less than half of the total surplus 
product, eventually becomes a small faction of the total surplus. 
At that point the petty bourgeoisie producer becomes firmly a 
small capitalist. There is no a priori basis for deciding how many 
employers are necessary to become a small capitalist’ (Wright 
1978: 80).
For Wright, divisions of labour, technologies employed, and the timing 
of wage-labour employment in terms of the lifespan of the artisanal 
business and the historical period, have a determining influence upon 
family/wage-labour ratio and the size of the surplus, which must be
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large enough to facilitate the transition from one form of production to 
the another. This grey area between SCP and CMP in terras of agents is 
covered by what Wright calls the * small employer1. Indeed, between the 
petty bourgeois placed in an 'unambiguous location within class rela­
tions' (ibid.: 74) and the small capitalist stands the contradictory 
location of the small employer as a location between modes of 
production.33
Wright eventually abandoned the emphasis of his general approach 
on relations of domination, i.e. control or non-control that was his key 
criterion of class inclusion (rather than 'location in the capitalist 
process of production', as Therborn had argued - 1983: 173). These rela­
tions in SCP. he had defined as self-control, 'i.e. the individual self- 
direction within the labour process'. Later he acknowledged that the 
theoretical autonomy involved in self-control in the labour process, the 
unity of conception and execution, in real life suffers constraint by 
the market, by credit institutions, long-term contracts with capitalist 
enterprises, etc. (Wright 1985: 51-54). It would seem that the dif­
ficulties with autonomy are similar to those of dependency, both stem­
ming from the indeterminate character of these concepts. Wright now 
regards work autonomy/control over the labour process as contingent upon 
work settings for particular jobs, and not as a distinctive petit- 
bourgeois characteristic.
In Wright’s re-evaluation of his concepts he has also argued that 
the 'contradiction' involved in the small employer location is not 
really contradictory: while small employers may have market interests 
that run counter to those of the bourgeoisie, their fundamental inter­
ests (’interests which call into question the structure of social rela­
tions' - Wright 1978: 89) are not opposed. The location, therefore, of
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the small employer may be ’dual* or * heterogeneous ’, but it is not con­
tradictory.
In his latest formulations of his theoretical approach, Wright, 
having left aside the understanding of exploitation on the basis of the 
labour theory of value, adopts J. Roemer’s concept of exploitation, 
which is based on a labour-transfer approach. Exploitation is defined as 
surplus labour transferred from one class to another. It can occur both 
inside and outside the institution of wage-labour in a market economy, 
in the sense that labour transfers are to be found in the inequalities 
in the distribution of productive assets. These assets may take the form 
of property relations in the means of production, but labour power is 
also a productive asset, as well as skills, credentials, and organisa­
tional control (ibid.: 62-84). This approach to exploitation he calls 
’multidimensional* (ibid.: 283).
In a capitalist formation, according to the multidimensional ap­
proach, the petty-bourgeois self-employed producer with (in relation to 
all other producers) average capital stock/means of production as a 
principal asset, would be neither exploiter nor be exploited. An impor­
tant condition is that the self-employed producer must have precisely 
the per-capita level of the relevant asset - in our case, capital. Any 
deviation would then make him either exploiter or exploited. Of course, 
if other assets are also taken into account, he may well be an exploiter 
in some respects, and exploited in others (ibid.: 86-87, 103).
From this multidimensional standpoint there are two other ways in 
which different forms of exploitation (different in terms of assets as 
the basis for labour transfers) can be linked together. In the first, 
the ‘external’ link, two forms of exploitation exist within a given 
production process that interact with each other. Wright mentions the 
interaction between simple-commodity producers and capitalist firms as
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an example of such an external link. In the second, the 'internal* link, 
there is a simultaneous operation of different forms of exploitation 
within a single production process. An example could be small employers. 
External links are considered instances of articulations of modes of 
production, while internal links are instances of the more complex in­
terpenetration of modes (.ibid.: 111-12).
Applying this new approach to our particular interests leads to no 
breakthrough. On the basis of 'different ownership of assets in the 
means of production' (i.e. capitalist assets), the largely ideal-typical 
traditional petit bourgeois is defined as someone who owns just enough 
to reproduce himself, but not enough to hire anyone else. The small 
employer is defined as one who owns enough means of production to hire 
workers, but not enough to have the option of not working at all. With 
respect to numbers, the petit bourgeois has one employee (due to an ac­
knowledged error in questionnaire construction he should have had none); 
the small employer has two to ten employees; while an employer with ten 
or more employees is considered as a fully-fledged capitalist (Wright 
1985: 149-51). If we ask into which class the small employer belongs, 
the answer is by no means clear-cut. He is a mixed type, nearer the 
ideal-typical petit bourgeois at the lower and more populous end, but a 
semi-capitalist in the upper margin.
Overall, the strong point Wright's approach is, I think, the in­
corporation of skill and other assets in the determination of class, al­
though I think it is unwise to depart completely from the more classical 
Marxist approach. On the negative side, he does not at all account for 
family labour.
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Conclusions
The strong point of the Marxist approaches surveyed seem to me to 
be their definition of SCP and the petits bourgeois on the basis of 
their objective and intrinsic characteristics and situations. Their 
structures are perceived as a product of historical circumstances within 
advanced capitalism, and there is extensive similarity among the authors 
on the basic features of the lower middle class, in particular on the 
economic foundation of artisans in SCP. The differences discernible in 
their writings are related to the political and ideological developments 
of the historically specific formations on which the authors base their 
arguments. These differences concern the particular profile of the lower 
middle class and its constituent parts, but not its basic economic 
structure.
The Marxists* concentration on strategic class behaviour, large- 
scale transformations, and structural-institutional influence on the 
lower middle classes often has heuristic and interpretative importance. 
Yet it also exhibits a broad negligence towards issues with which they
were not directly concerned which, while understandable, also shows the
/
limits of their analyses. This neglect includes the circumstances and 
material conditions of petty-bourgeois existence, the way the various 
petty-bourgeois strata constitute themselves, how their practices in­
fluences other institutions and agents, and how they assert themselves 
as social actors.
Given the priorities of Marxist analysis, it would seem that this 
neglect stems from the fact that, once the petty-bourgeoisie failed to 
assume a revolutionary role and/or did not enact an autonomous role at 
particular historical junctions, it was judged to be unable to speak up 
for itself, but ’must be represented* (Marx 1973b: 239), and that it is 
not a coherent and self-conscious class.34
bl
It was ’discovered* that the petits bourgeois are interested with 
only minute changes, that their horizon is limited by the smallness of 
their daily activities that render them incapable of active participa­
tion in larger developments, that their only aim is to stabilise or mar­
ginally improve their position, while constantly being afraid of a pos­
sible (and according to Marxists inevitable) deterioration and their 
eventual demise. In short, the petty bourgeoisie’s was perceived as 
pathologically self-centred and tied to its petty property; therefore to 
be, or to be called, petty bourgeois became derogatory. Thereafter, the 
issue was the question of which of the two main classes of capitalism 
would manage to represent the petty bourgeoisie in the forthcoming class 
struggle. In other words: the petty bourgeoisie became a mere object, 
unable to speak with a voice of its own.
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Notes to Chapter I
1. ’Under the heading of small-sale producers we include urban craftsmen 
and artisans as well as peasants', notes W. Weso+owski (1979: 154).
Kalomalos has pointed out that the English term ’petty’ bourgeoisie, 
hence ’petty’-commodity production - unlike the French ’petit* or the 
German %klein’ meaning small - was first used derogatively by the 
English aristocracy when referring to the lower middle class, and that 
this use of the term has infiltrated the social-sciences vocabulary. He 
consider it a prime example of value-laden terminology employed by a 
supposedly value-free sociology (Kalomalos 1989: 4). Similar objections 
most probably underlie the employment of petit instead of ’petty* or 
’small’ by some contemporary authors writing in English (see for in­
stance Bechhofer and Elliott 1976; 1982; Crossick 1984; Cuneo 1984), al­
though an aversion to the Marxian undertones of SCP may also be at play. 
However, it may be countered that, whatever its particular trajectory, 
the term ’petty’ as an anglicized version of petit (see OED), has become 
established as a value-free synonym for the word ‘small’. (So ’petty’ 
and ’small’ have both been used, in different contemporary translations 
of the same Marxian text; compare Marx 1973: 512; and Marx in Hobsbawm 
1978: 117.)
The terms simple, independent, small, or petty commodity production, 
which are widely used today involve a quantitative criterion that is of 
course arbitrary. I myself have opted for *simp1e-commodity production’, 
because this has a definitively qualitative aspect, discussed later in 
this section. The other terms appear in the text interchangeably and in 
a neutral sense.
2. W. Weso+owski considers it a ’mode of production characterised by 
only one class and not two, antagonistically situated classes' (1979: 
14). The issue of whether simp 1 e-commodity production is a form or a 
mode of production is not at all straightforward. For Marx, a mode of 
production is a specific structure, which in Capital and Grundrisse he 
elaborates at some length, but this is not the case for some later Mar­
xists. (A shorthand definition of Marx’s mode of production would be ’a 
totality (das Game), which is composed of a structure of production and 
of human and non-human material, that the structure orders and articu­
lates in their positions and roles in production’ (Kalomalos 1989: 5, my 
translation.) For Marx’s followers the notion of mode of production has 
at times become almost identical with social formation or society, 
despite some attempts to clarify the issue (see for instance Althusser 
and Balibar 1977: 317; Cutler et al. 1977: 222-31; Hindess and Hirst 
1975: 9-17, 1978: 20, 46-62). To the existing ambiguity over the mode-of 
-production concept should be added the obscure issue of what is a form 
of production and how it is to be related to a mode of production, and
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of course decide on the status of simp 1 e-commodity production. Since 
this would take us too from my present thesis, I shall restrict myself 
when discussing simp 1 e-commodity production to using the more neutral 
form of production, and avoid the mode/form issue as it does not have a 
direct bearing on my central subject.
3. T. Kalomalos discusses what he has termed ’smal1-propertied mode of 
production’. As I understand it, this notion more or less overlaps with 
SCP although it is narrower; control is not incorporated along ownership 
of the means of production in the definition. (I should note that in a 
personal communication Kalomalos asserted that such control is 
included).
4. Some discussions of SCP, especially structuralist elaborations, may 
be criticised as unwarranted theoreticism. With them the avoidance and 
indeed complete absence of any reference to empirical evidence, which 
they reject as empiricism, has reached almost programmatic status 
(Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985: 168), inexorably leading to sterile theoris­
ing. On the other hand, the lack of theoretical clarity has been ag­
gravated by some authors building up their theoretical schemata on the 
basis of distinct empirical contexts.
5. Marx often uses SCP in this way (for instance Marx 1976: 273, 927 ff; 
Marx 1977: 175 ff). I. Rubin’s account of Marx’s theory of value argues 
that Marx utilised SCP for explanatory purposes (as a theoretical 
abstraction), not for historical analysis (Rubin 1972: 95-105).
6. ’Capitalist production is the first to make the commodity into the 
general form of all produce’ (Marx 1976: 951).
7. Independent producers enjoy a good measure of personal freedom, and 
are not tied to relations of external personal dependence that regulate 
the appropriation of their surplus by some non-labouring stratum.
8. ’Labour-power becomes a reality only by being expressed; it is ac­
tivated only through labour’ (Marx 1976: 274).
9. The following excerpt illuminates Marx’s view on the limits of SCP 
and the starting point of capitalist production and, although lengthy, 
is worth quoting.
'Capitalist production only really begins, as we have already 
seen, when each individual capital simultaneously employs a com­
parative large number of workers, and when as a result, the 
labour-process is carried on on an extensive scale, and yields 
relatively large quantities of products. A large number of workers 
working together, at the same time, in one place (or, if you like, 
in the same field of labour), in order to produce the same short 
of commodity under the command of the same capitalist, constitutes 
the starting-point of capitalist production. This is true both 
historically and conceptually. With regard to the mode of produc­
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tion itself, manufacture [Manufaktur] can hardly be distinguished, 
in its earliest stages, from the handicraft trades 
[Handwerksindustrie1 of the guilds, except by the greater number 
of workers simultaneously employed by the same individual capital. 
It is merely an enlargement of the workshop of the master 
craftsman of the guilds’ (Marx 1976: 439).
10. P. Calvet has made it clear that for Marx these terms refer to ex­
actly the same social entity (1982: 90). A. Giddens makes the same point 
(1978: 31).
11. S. Ossowski has pointed out that in Marx one can identify two sets 
of criteria in the definition of the petty bourgeoisie. The first is 
ownership of the means of production and the input of the owners’ in­
dividual labour. Hie second includes ownership of the means of produc­
tion and non-employment of wage-labour (see Ossowski 1973: 112-23). Used 
separately, each set of criteria forms the basis of a trichotomous dis­
tinction of social classes. But if both sets of criteria are utilised 
together, this allows for a more precise description of social classes. 
The three criteria involved are: ownership/non-ownership of the means of 
production, whether the owner supplies his own labour or not, and 
whether or not wage-labour is being employed.
12. Thus in the Eighteenth Brumaire he writes:
’in so far as millions of families live under economic conditions
of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and
their cultural formation from those of the other classes and bring 
them into conflict with those classes, they form a class. In so 
far as the small peasant proprietors are merely connected on a 
local basis, and the identity of their interests fails to produce 
a feeling of community, national links, or a political organisa­
tion, they do not form a class. They are therefore incapable of 
asserting their class interests in their own name’ (Marx: 1973b: 
239).
13. According to W. Weso+owski, in Marxism ’classes related to the
dominant mode of production are usually termed basic classes’; other so­
cial groupings are called ’non-basic classes* or ’strata’ (1979: 15).
14. In other words the strain between sociology and politics in Marx 
shows itself in terms of whether the petits bourgeois form a distinct 
class or not. S. Ossowski (1963: 75), as P. Calvet notes (1982: 153), 
has brought into the open this instance of conflicting loyalties between 
science and revolutionary ideology, which has led some sociologists to 
treat Marxism not as a strain within sociology but rather outside it 
(for instance Giddens 1990: 701-02; for a thorough discussion of the 
issue see Therborn 1977; for a contrary view see Bottomore 1978).
15. As WesoTowski notes, small-scale producers are deprived of an op-
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posite class pole, ’which is, as it were, combined in the person of 
every small-scale producer. This is expressed in the "two spirits" so 
frequently analysed by Lenin: the spirit of the capitalist and the 
spirit of the worker’ (1979: 109).
16. Similarly, L. Napoleon does represent the peasantry without being a 
member of that class. There was a ’resonant complementarity’ rather than 
a one-to-one correspondence between his ideas and the ideological out­
look of the peasantry. ’There is an homology of forms between them’ 
(Hall 1977: 45). This complementarity, operating in the midst of a par­
ticular conjuncture, allowed Napoleon to represent the members of a 
class that ’cannot represent themselves, they must be represented’ (Marx 
1973b: 239).
17. This process, from peasant, to artisan, to capitalist, is what has 
come to be known as 'Way No. 1’ to capitalism (G. Lefebvre 1978: 124).
18. According to Lenin, Isayev argued that while
’the employment of 2 to 3 workers provides the proprietor with 
such a small surplus that he has to work alongside them, ... the 
employment of 5 workers already gives (him) enough to enable him 
to give up manual labour in some measure, to take it easy some­
what ’ (ibid.: 361),
and to be mainly involved with business functions. At 10 wage-workers or 
more,
'the proprietor not only gives up manual labour but practically 
ceases to supervise his workers: he appoints a foreman for the 
purpose ... .He now becomes a small capitalist, a "born master’” 
iibid.).
19. The criterion of capital is the main consideration, although it is 
very difficult to quantify it. Lenin operationalised this criterion in 
terms of the artisan’s quantitative means of production. This did made 
sense in the context of what was mainly handicraft production; in a dif­
ferent context, e.g. nowadays, it would be absurd. Other indicators - 
such as technical organisation, access to larger markets, volume of out­
put, etc. - although useful in gauging the level of capitalisation, were 
of secondary importance.
20. For Poulantzas, economic divisions within a class give rise to class 
factions. Divisions within a class that stem from ideological and 
political determinants, are referred to as the strata constituting that 
class (1978: 23).
21. Actually, enterprises in France are legally defined as artisanal on 
the basis of how many workers they employ, i.e. ’fewer than 5 workers, 
excluding family members and apprentices' (Berger 1980a: 125, my
emphasis). For Poulantzas, an artisan’s establishment could have a big­
56
ger workforce, say a total of 7 or 8 employees, as long as the 
proprietor’s large labouring family offsets their labour input; then, by 
Poulantzas* criterion, it would nevertheless keep its petit-bourgeois 
character.
22. Poulantzas notes that in France between 1954 and 1966 the percentage 
of establishments employing from 1 to 4 (4.99) workers fell from 13 to 
10% of the total number of establishments, after which he speaks of a 
’massive process of pauperisation’ and indeed proletarianisation of the 
petty bourgeoisie (1978: 152).
23. In the French context, the state permits extensive tax evasion to 
take place; also, certain benefits accrue as a result of inflation, 
price increases, etc., all of which are ’political mechanisms* tempering 
the subjection of artisans and other petits bourgeois to capital (ibid. : 
152-53, 239-40).
24. By way of contrast, A. Giddens understands the Marxian perception of 
the petty bourgeoisie in the following way: ’the petty bourgeoisie, if 
it is to be regarded as a class separable from the grande bourgeoisie, 
is so in virtue of a difference in scale of enterprises owned, not be­
cause it is in an exploited position vis-d-vis the latter class* (1978: 
101). This is exactly what Poulantzas (and Marx) rejects.
25. In France, the country that serves as the framework for Poulantzas’ 
Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, a firm of up to 300 employees is inr- 
cluded among the SME (Poulantzas 1978: 140), along with self-employed 
craftsmen’s and artisans’ establishments of two, three or four persons.
26. In France between the years 1954 and 1966, small capitalists, which 
includes ’those with from 6 to 9 (9.99) employees, increased by 73,000*. 
Part of this increase is attributed to artisans who managed to expand 
their businesses (ibid.: 329).
27. This mobility undoubtedly has repercussions as far as the stratum’s 
ideology, traditions and reference points, cohesiveness, identity and 
organisation are concerned, which are likely to be very loose. In fact, 
to speak in these conditions of an artisanate as a class agency would 
hardly correspond with reality.
28. Basic elements of this ideology are a reformist anti-capitalism, a 
challenge of the established order not for purposes of overthrowing it 
but for participating in it, a moral critique on the basis of 'order*, 
’discipline’, ’authority’ and ’hierarchy’, individualism and power 
fetishism, expressed particularly in statolatry, in subordination and 
subservience to the dominant bourgeois ideology, etc. (see ibid. : 285- 
99).
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29. The political rationale behind this particular issue is acknowledged 
by Poulantzas himself throughout his Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. 
The absurdity into which it led him with respect to the issue at hand, 
is politely noted by T. Benton (1984: 146).
30. A conception of class as an effect of ideological, political, and
economic ’structural determinants’, inseparable from the class struggle, 
cannot explain the absence of common economic determinants, whatever 
Poulantzas say. To my mind, existing similarities in politics and ideol­
ogy among the ’old' and the ’new’ petty bourgeoisie, or for that matter 
among artisans and shopkeepers or other petit bourgeois types, may be 
explained as responses to similar structures of subservience and depend­
ence. Again, they cannot be accounted for in terms of the non-existing 
similarity of position and overall situation, the so-called negative 
criterion of class.
31. ’The principal aspect of an analysis of social classes is that of 
their place in the class struggle’ (ibid.: 17).
32. If all producers were in fact petits bourgeois, they 'would cease to
be a class in the proper sense of the term’ (ibid.: 59). While this has
never occurred in history, Wright perceives the petit-bourgeois class 
and its form of production as always having a subordinate role in rela­
tion to other classes and forms of production.
33. This implies that, for Wright, SCP is treated as a mode of produc­
tion on a par with other modes, such as the capitalist one.
34. Paraphrasing Marx, the petty bourgeoisie, in the relevant contexts, 
would seem to be formed as a class ’by the simple addition of isomor- 
phous magnitudes, much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes’ 
(Marx 1973b: 239).
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CHAPTER IT ~ CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE PETTY
BOURGEOISIE AND SMALL FIRMS IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 
Introduct ion
In the context of advanced industrial societies, artisans have 
only exceptionally been treated separately in the literature. This is 
undoubtedly related to the fact that of the various petit — bourgeois 
strata, they are the one to have survived least. The dearth of material 
directly relevant to them creates a serious problem in their sociologi­
cal study, especially since the internationalisation of sociology has 
meant the transference and utilisation of Western theories, concepts and 
analytical tools to analyses of non-Western societies. In consequence 
there is practically nothing available in perspectives and analytical 
tools that is directly relevant to the sociology of artisans in the ad­
vanced societies and which could be applied to the analysis of artisans 
in a country of the semi-periphery, or would provide a foundation to 
build on.
Historically speaking however, all artisans, in the semi-periphery 
and periphery as well as in the advanced countries, exhibit a qualified 
structural affinity with the various other groupings of small 
proprietors. Acceptance and recognition of the homology among them has 
led to the incorporation of artisans and other groupings under the 
single umbrella of the petty bourgeoisie. This would suggest that 
analyses of various other petit-bourgeois groups and their discussions 
could be useful for the analysis of artisans proper by facilitating com­
parisons. It is in this sense that some of the approaches and issues ex­
amined by what has been termed the sociology of petit capitalism (Curran 
and Burrows 1986; 1987) are surveyed here. Obviously, the move from a
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broader category to a more restricted and particularistic one, rules out 
any one-to-one correspondence between the two, so that the literature on 
the petty-bourgeoisie may in fact be only indirectly relevant to study 
of artisans.
In this chapter, after a brief look in the decline and subsequent 
renewal of interest in the petty bourgeoisie, I shall examine the views 
of Bechhofer and Elliott and their associates’ on the marginality and 
survival of the stratum, the members of which are then examined as ac­
tors. This is followed by a look at what the impact of the state has 
been at entrepreneurship, and at industrial relations in small firms. 
’Small firms* is yet another mixed category that both includes the 
petits bourgeois (and artisans) and transcends them, so one must be 
cautious in extending to artisans the conclusions reached.1
1. The decline and resurgence of the petty bourgeoisie in advanced in­
dustrial countries
As predicted by Marxist and liberal theories, large enterprises, 
employing thousands of workers and producing huge quantities of diverse 
products for mass markets, have in the course of the twentieth century 
come to dominate the industrially advanced countries.2 The processes of 
capitalist development that led to their emergence were at the same time 
processes furthering the decline of small-scale craft and artisanal 
production.
The drop in small production (measured by number of employees) has 
been substantial, as verified by data for selected western countries, so 
in the category of 1-10 employees per firm the share of industrial 
employment — a useful index for ascertaining the overall impact of small 
concerns on society3 - dropped in France from 19% to 12% between 1962 
and 1966; during the same period it went down in Germany from 13% to
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2%. In Italy the drop was more gradual, from 28% to 25% between 1961 and 
1971 (data mentioned in Weiss 1984: 21; see also Bairoch et al 1968).4 
In the USA too, the proportion of employees in manufacturing estab­
lishments of less than 20 employees has undergone significant reduction. 
It was more than halved in the course of this century, from a high 14.4% 
in 1909, to a low of 6.2% in 1972, and 6.5% in 1977.s It would seem, 
therefore, that it was with good reason that social scientists were not 
particularly concerned with owners of small businesses. These were per­
ceived as having no future. Destined to wither away altogether as a 
socio-economic category, they were dubbed ’transitional*. Those that had 
not yet gone under were considered a residue from a bygone age and 
termed ’traditional*; they played only a marginal role in the modern 
economy and society. It was the groups which were in the ascendant - 
technicians, managers, clerks and other white-collar workers - all those 
that comprised the so-called new petty bourgeoisie, who did engage the 
attention of the social scientists.6
The revival of sociological interest in the traditional petty 
bourgeoisie of the developed counties began about twenty five years ago. 
At first it was considered something of an oddity, but soon it became 
respectable and led to a growing output of sociological literature.7 The 
awakening of sociological interest in the petty bourgeoisie coincided 
with a new emphasis by economists on small businesses, that was first 
focused on shopkeepers. For Britain, the turning point was the 1971 Bol­
ton Report (Curran and Stanworth 1982), which concurred with sociologi­
cal inquiries (such as G. Ingham’s, 1970) on the effects of size on or­
ganisations. Sociologists were intrigued that, contrary to all theory 
and predictions, the petit-bourgeois stratum had survived. There was 
confirmation of its survival from various, quarters, for instance a 
reluctant C. Cuneo (1984) admitted it with respect to Canada, while E.
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0. Wright and B. Martin (1987) discovered that, overall, the petty bour­
geoisie was holding up rather well in the United States. Since in some 
cases SMEs had patently expanded their numbers, it was reasonable to 
deal with the phenomenon. In particular G. Steinmetz and E. 0. Wright 
(1989) noted an increase in the self-employed category of the U.S. 
labour force.® Similar conclusion were reached by Bogenhold and Staber 
(1991) in their study of eight advanced industrial countries. They 
pointed out that in six of them (Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, 
the U.K. and the U.S.) the upswing in self-employment is a counter­
cyclical response to unemployment.9 Gradually, therefore, it has been 
acknowledged that these groups/strata have not perished but are thriv­
ing.
2. Marginality of the traditional petty bourgeoisie
Credit is due to F. Bechhofer and B. Elliott and their colleagues 
for instigating the revival of interest in the traditional petty bour­
geoisie which, after a period of falling off, has bounced back. Their 
studies focused on small shopkeepers in and around Edinburgh undergoing 
numerical growth attributable to urbanisation.10 Shopkeepers as small in­
dependent entrepreneurs, were considered a section of the traditional 
petty bourgeoisie (Bechhofer and Elliott 1968, 1976, 1978, 1981; Be­
chhofer, Elliott and Rushforth 1971; Bechhofer, Elliott, Rushforth and 
Bland 1974a, 1974b; Elliott, Bechhofer, McCrone and Black 1982; Elliott 
and McCrone 1982).
Three criteria were taken into consideration in the Bechhofer et 
al. definition of the petty bourgeoisie: ownership, labour, and technol­
ogy. For them, members of the petty bourgeoisie own small businesses, in 
which they themselves work and very often use also the labour of their 
families and kin. The employment of wage-labour is limited; where it ex-
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ists it is an extension of, rather than a substitute for, the 
proprietor’s own and family labour. The third element, the technology 
employed, is generally viewed as being of a relatively low level 
(Bechhofer and Elliott 1976: 76-77, 92; 1981: 182-83).
2.1 Technology
The first two criteria fall largely within what in earlier chap­
ters has been defined as simp 1 e-commodity production, and indicate a 
structural homology between small shopkeepers, artisans, and other 
petits bourgeois. But the criterion of technology is an important depar­
ture from the earlier conceptualisations. It is not clear how or why it 
was included in Bechhofer’s definition. Perhaps he and his associates 
saw the resurgence of the petty-bourgeoisie as the reappearance of an 
extinct species, as it were. On the other hand, the traditional shop­
keepers who were investigated from the late 1960's onwards did look like 
earlier ones, and did not utilise high technology. It would seem that 
the authors then generalised this characteristic and took it to be a 
defining feature of all petit-bourgeois factions. This is unwarranted, 
however.11
Technological advances have automated a wide range of industrial 
and clerical tasks. The flexible application of technological implements 
has made it possible to combine small business size with quality, ef­
ficiency, and labour-saving (Sabel 1982; Piore and Sabel 1984). This 
has led to a proliferation in the advanced countries of very small 
firms, which are themselves innovating or producing new technologies 
and/or are at least equipped with them (see Giaoutzi, Nijkamp and Storey 
1989); this is especially so in the service sector (Gershuny 1985, 1988; 
Gershuny and Miles 1985).12 A significant number of such small firms 
successfully compete with larger enterprises. It is misleading to see
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them ‘a la Bechhofer and Elliott, in terms of marginality, as residues 
from the past that have managed to survive by adapting themselves (like 
the artisan bakers in the studies by the Bertaux 1981a, 1981b), or by 
specialising in the production or administration of Hirsch’s 'positional 
goods’, i.e. luxuries or other goods and services which are not amenable 
to mass production and mass provisioning (see Ellis and Heath 1983). 
Concerning the owner-managers of these small units, they must, in terms 
of their structural position, be acknowledged as belonging to the 
petty-bourgeoisie, to a segment of it that is not decaying but reviving. 
This means that Bechhofer and Eliott's views on the whole petty bour­
geoisie need to be revised.
The authors base their definition of the petty bourgeoisie on a 
market and work situation, on a Weberian approach.13 This suggests that 
they perceive knowledge as a capital asset. Bechhofer et al. think that 
the owners of small high-technology firms of the self-employment type,
i.e. petit-bourgeois elements, who have set-up their businesses in order 
to exploit some very recent technological innovation(s),14 trade more on 
skill and esoteric knowledge than those whose small businesses utilise 
mature technologies. The utilisation of such skills and knowledge would 
certainly result in a work situation and market very different from 
that of the traditional petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers).
Three main differences may be identified. Firstly, the market 
situation of the owner-managers of small high-technology enterprises, 
instead of deteriorating (as is claimed to be the case for the petty 
bourgeoisie at large) is in fact improving. Secondly, proprietors of 
small high-technology firms invest little of their own capital, and are 
financially dependent on public agencies, banks, and other sources of 
financing. This significantly departs from the condition of independence 
exemplified by self-financing, which marks the traditional petit-
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bourgeois market situation. Thirdly, the authors claim that their work 
situation differs considerably from that of the traditional small high- 
technology owners, in that they do not do ’a good deal of hard work’, 
but invest instead in esoteric knowledge. This is, of course, a highly 
dubious proposition, and not supported by factual evidence or logical 
arguments. The overall life styles between the two groups are quite dif­
ferent, but they can reasonably be expected to be different in terms of 
both status and political power (Bechhofer and Elliott 1976: 76-77, 
1981: 198).
The above viewpoints make Bechhofer and associates exclude the 
high-technology small-firm owners from the petit bourgeoisie proper. It 
may be argued, however, that the absence of skill and esoteric 
knowledge, as a distinguishing feature of most shopkeepers, renders them 
equally incompatible with the other two major groupings of the tradi­
tional urban petty bourgeoisie, i.e. artisans and merchants. Artisans 
particularly do in fact trade on skills and esoteric knowledge which, 
along with other apprenticed workers, they perceive as their personal 
property.15 Obviously from this perspective their situation is com­
parable to that of the self-employed high-technology entrepreneurs.16 In 
any case, as technological level/esoteric knowledge does not cut across 
all the various petit bourgeois groupings, it cannot provide a suffi­
cient dividing line sharply differentiating the petty bourgeoisie from 
other classes or strata.17
Referring to the ’structural equivalence’ between the old and the 
new bourgeoisie (for example between the cobbler and the boutique 
retailer) Bechhofer and Elliott have noted that although the two posi­
tions are in many respects different, they do exhibit a basic consis­
tency as far as essential structural conditions are concerned (Bechhofer 
and Elliott 1976: 91-92). In that case I see no reason why one should
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exclude small high-technology firm owner-managers from the petty bour­
geoisie. In fact, it seems to me reasonable to include them since they 
also exhibit this structural equivalence.18
Now the marginality thesis may indeed reflect the condition of 
small shopkeepers. By marginal ity, Bechhofer and his associates meant 
the deterioration of the shopkeepers’ overall position, in particular 
the deterioration of their status and their market situation, and their 
increasingly felt powerlessness, which reduces their membership of the 
lower middle class to the single factor of small ownership (Bechhofer 
and Elliott 1968: 181-82, 191-92). But, as already mentioned, this mar- 
"ginality does not always or. necessarily designate the status of the 
other petit-bourgeois groupings. The erroneous emphasis on the (low) 
level of technology has its origin in over-generalisation. It would seem 
that the difficulties with the appropriate level of technology stem from 
an unwarranted extension of features found in only one grouping (the 
shopkeepers) to the rest of the petty bourgeoisie. Such an -extension, 
however, was largely built into the particularistic and exclusive 
methodology employed.
2.2 Moral economy and its usefulness
The marginal position of the petty bourgeoisie is reflected in 
what Bechhofer and Elliott have called the ’defence of a moral economy*, 
which refers to how they live and act out their ideology.19 
The members of this stratum think of themselves as enjoying a 
substantial degree of independence and autonomy. However, they 
also realise that these highly valued qualities are continually 
encroached by increasing bureaucratisation, large corporations, the 
state, political parties and economic crises, which implies that they 
themselves are becoming marginalised. Part of the petty bourgeoisie’s
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reaction to this deteriorating situation is the creation of an imagi­
nary, unadulterated and virtuous past state of affairs. These images - 
in which highly personalised and reciprocal relationships of an intimate 
and affective type predominate in and between socio-economic units 
(encompassing the family, kin, friendships, work-places, neighbourhoods, 
the community) - are ruled by an economic, social and moral order of 
competitive and responsible capitalism. The idealised version of the 
world in which they live and work is romantically sanitized and 
sanctified; it is the apotheosis of small proprietorship. That idealised 
imagined Gemeinschaft is then taken as the yardstick for measuring their 
"own current situation.
The ideology of moral capitalism is the underpinning for the petty 
bourgeoisie’s complaints and protests. It is not restricted to a 
critique of the economic effects of corporations, crises, etc. It is 
also an ethical critique, because it addresses itself to what is 
portrayed as the collapse of a moral system — a euphemism for the col­
lapse of their own social position (see Bechhofer and Elliott 1981: 
190-91).
The petty bourgeoisie’s critique of actually existing social 
relationships is appropriated by right-wing politicians attempting to 
provide capitalism with a moral basis. At the same time, these righteous 
principles of proprietorship, independence, autonomy and laissez-faire 
economy, with the petty bourgeoisie as their living remainder, elevate 
the latter to the position of ’custodians of certain "core” capitalist 
values’ (Scase 1982: 149). In this way the stratum exercises important 
material and ideological function(s) for contemporary capitalism {ibid.: 
160). It exonerates some of the dysfunctions of capitalist society, and 
by doing so conduces to its continuation. The implication then is that
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the dominant forces in capitalist societies have a vested interest in 
supporting the maintenance of the petty bourgeoisie.
3. The entrepreneurial middle class as actors
According to R. Scase and R. Goffee, the interpretations of the 
contemporary petty bourgeoisie in industrial societies that see it as 
rather marginal to capitalism (Bechhofer and associates), or as standing 
outside the accumulation process, and/or as a vestige of a pre­
capitalist past (Marxist approaches discussed in ch. I), do not suffice 
to account for either the stratum’s legitimising role in the capitalist 
system, or for its persistence (Scase 1982: 160). ’The manner in which 
actors are able to create opportunities for small-scale capital ac­
cumulation and, hence, sustain the reproduction of positions* (ibid.: 
148, emphasis original) has largely been neglected by the structuralist 
emphasis on position. It remains therefore to explain how and why the 
lower middle classes are currently on the up-swing.
The two authors have concentrated on examining the processes 
whereby actors themselves contribute to the reproduction of positions, 
and on the mechanisms by which they are reproduced in present-day 
society. The consideration of actors makes this approach better grounded 
and more sensitive to real-life processes. Scase and Goffee are not 
greatly interested in the distinction between actor and structural posi­
tion which they regard as too complex to be useful at the empirical 
level,20 but this does not mean that they are a-theoretical and em­
piricist. On the contrary, Scase insists that *a satisfactory analytical 
framework must take account of the fact that the small-scale production 
of goods and services is embedded within a general process of capital 
accumulation* (ibid.: 157; emphasis original).
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Scase and Goffee, unlike Poulantzas, see the petits bourgeois not 
as insulated from monopoly and non-monopoly capital. For them, the 
self-employed and the small employers are attached ’objectively’ to the 
logic of capitalist accumulation through small production of goods and 
services for the market. They argue that, in spite of the preponderance 
of large corporations in the economy, there is room for the development 
of small units, especially so in sectors where work-processes are 
labour-intensive. Subcontracting, the existence of an underground 
economy, market variability, and small-scale technological innovations 
are additional economic factors conducing to the development of small 
businesses (Scase and Goffee 1980: 159-60).
3.1 Work-role classification
In studies of the traditional lower middle classes the focus has 
often been placed on groups for the members of which property-ownership 
was the most distinguishing characteristic. However, according to Scase 
and Goffee, there are certain petits bourgeois groupings (like that of 
small builders) whose input of their own labour-power is not dissimilar 
to that of traditional craftsmen, and is the most important single fac­
tor of their work-situation (see Scase and Goffee 1984: 98). If labour 
input diminishes - say because of injury - their livelihood is 
threatened.
The authors stress this particular petit-bourgeois segment’s 
relationship to work. Property ownership as such is not insignificant or 
inconsequential, but the independent variable is changes in the work 
performed by the small proprietors themselves. On the basis of their 
work role,21 the self-made business owners fall into four different 
types: the self-employed, small employers, owner-controllers, and owner- 
directors.22 The first two are linked to petty-commodity production,
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which is perceived as both an ’escape from proletarian deprivations’,
and a narrow path into the ’privileges of the bourgeoisie’ (Scase 1982:
160). The self-employed and the small employers are identified as
belonging to the middle class, but they form its somewhat erratic and
marginal segment. They are defined as follows:
’The self-employed ... work for themselves and formally employ no 
labour. However, they are often dependent upon the unpaid services 
of family members, particularly their wives.
Snail employers ... work alongside their workers but, in addition, 
undertake the administrative tasks of running their own business’ 
(Scase and Goffee 1980: 23-24).
The turning point for a sustained process of capital accumulation 
is when the small employers cease to work alongside their employees and 
instead concentrate on managing their businesses full-time. They then 
become ownei— controllers. The next group is those who cannot personally 
keep up with all the necessary supervision and control and delegate some 
of these function to others, which means developing an administrative 
structures. These are the owner-directors, who retain personal ownership
of their business. These last two types are proprietors who are con-
/
cerned solely with managing and directing their firms. They form the 
more established segments of the middle class. Their ’structuration is 
largely determined by the amount of capital assets* they hold, and in 
fact, as members of the capitalist class, they belong to the bourgeoisie 
proper.
Comparing the first two types of entrepreneur with artisans shows 
that the first (the self-employed) matches the artisan quite well 
(although the self-employed are a category wider than that of artisans 
and include for instance professionals. The second type (small 
employees), covers the grey area between the ideal types of artisan and 
capitalist: semi-artisans at one end of the spectrum, semi-capitalists 
at the other.
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3.2 Becoming businessmen: actors* response to the impact of 
capitalism
Scase and Goffee*s findings shed light on an important aspect of 
smal1-business formation, namely the why of it. Their work makes it 
clear that there is a discrepancy between the general view of who sets 
up small businesses, and the detailed biographical accounts of the 
self-employed and small employers. It is evident from their histories 
that ’highly variable non-monetary factors ... are often central to the 
formation of business enterprises’, although economic rewards retain 
their importance. A prominent role seems to be the wish for upward 
mobility and personal success (.ibid. 1980: 161).
In building-construction, the industry sampled by Scase and 
Goffee, employees have traditionally enjoyed a good degree of work 
autonomy. The authors discovered that an important reason for their 
respondents’ decision to become self-employed was an attempt by their 
employers to impose capitalist controls over the work process and so 
limit this autonomy.23 In that sense 'self-employment may be seen as in­
dividual response ... to developments within capitalist relations of 
production’ and an expression of resentment over insufficient economic 
rewards (Scase and Goffee 1981: 734-35, 744). Conversely, dependence on 
his own labour may impel a craftsman to opt out of self-employment in 
favour of wage labour, in order to cover himself against illness, old 
age and other adversities. So, among business proprietors of working- 
class origins, it is labour, not petty ownership, that seems to play the 
most significant role in the formation of their world-view. The 
craftsmen highly value ’productive’ (i.e. manual) labour. Indeed, many 
identify themselves with the ’productive’ working class, and a substan­
tial number of them are critical of society because of the inadequate
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way productive labour is appreciated and rewarded (see ibid. 1981: 741- 
43).
Work autonomy, pride in one's skills, identification with one’s 
peers, as well as economic rewards have all been threatened by the in­
roads of capitalism. Since they form important parameters of a worker’s 
immediate circumstances, they occupy a prominent place in his definition 
of worker situation. Most important, in the actor’s own definition they 
are recognised as being threatened. One way out of the pressure exerted 
by capitalism that is open to workers and appears to safeguard what they 
value best, is to engage in independent business activity themselves.
3.3 Obstacles to growth
There are important obstacles to the growth of small firms into 
capitalist enterprises, not least among them economic competition. But, 
as Scase and Goffee point out, there are also obstacles that have to do 
with the petits bourgeois view of the real world that forms the basis 
of their actions. The question of managerial skills aside, small 
businessmen often do not wish to become employers. Since they greatly 
value their work-autonomy and personal achievement, they perceive the 
status of employer, as infringing this autonomy. Moreover, they fear 
that employees might endanger their all-important personal relations 
with customers, and so affect their business negatively. In consequence, 
the employment of others is often regarded as unreliable and un­
desirable.
A factor which may similarly block development along capitalist 
lines is that a good number of small employers never had any intention 
of becoming employers.24 Their new role may have been precipitated by 
market pull: having to keep up with their increased customer demand, 
they responded by expanding production and somewhere along the road be­
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came employers. If they were coerced by circumstances into employer 
status, the pronouncement that they ’do not see themselves as positively 
committed to profit-making and capital accumulation' (Scase and Goffee 
1984: 99), does make sense. They simply feel uneasy in their 
entrepreneur ia1 status.
Where petits bourgeois employ labour, a good part of them can be 
regarded as self-employed with employees alongside. Small employers can 
come to terms with their employer status only by acting as fellow 
employees of their hired workers. To manage their employees as well as 
maintaining identification with them, requires strategies of frater­
nal ism and/or paternalism. ’Fraternal attitudes towards their employees, 
which lack the hierarchical elements commonly associated with 
paternalism', is to be found especially among small employers who 
operate concerns requiring a high degree of skilled labour. Of course, 
this strategy is not free from its own strains or conflicts (see Scase 
and Goffee 1981: 739-40; Goffee and Scase 1982). Undoubtedly, these con­
ceptions and choices, or lack of them, and the strategies, alone or 
combined, act as non-economic disincentives, severely limiting the pos­
sibilities for capital accumulation, and indeed acting as obstacles to 
it.
4. Small firms and ideology: The state. entrepreneurship, and in­
dustrial relations
4.1 The label 'small’
For seme European countries there are no systematic data on ar­
tisans, this sociological category being part of the much broader offi­
cial administrative/legal and/or statistical categories of small, or 
smal 1-medium, firms (see Dale 1991: 36).25 An essential feature of the
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renewed emphasis on small businesses is the re-definition of smallness. 
This is a very important issue, because it reflects the different ap­
proaches and objectives with respect to small firms. The arbitrary dis­
tinctions drawn between small and large, or small-medium and large, en­
terprises effectively conceal existing qualitative differences - as for 
example between simple-commodity producers, semi-capitalists, and truly 
small (and medium) capitalists. The other side of the coin is that the 
catch-all title of ’small business* encompasses a form of class alliance 
(even when manufacturing and other segments are considered separately). 
Qualitatively different strata and classes are lumped together by the 
quantitative criterion of size, and this melange of units often comes 
under the patronage of institutions of the dominant class.26 The al­
liance is brought about by labelling in accordance with state-issued 
ordinances as well as human aspirations for economic betterment — i.e. 
ideology, political power and economic interests are all brought into 
play.27
The official or semi-official use of the label ’small* by powerful 
institutions means that it prescribes from the outset the types of 
policies that are addressed to the enterprises so designated.26 The de­
gree of similarity between these enterprises is not known, but may be 
assumed to be rather limited. However, no better way has yet been found 
to approach artisans or the petty bourgeoisie. The aggregates and/or 
statistical averages known as ’small firms* are the best that is avail­
able, often forming the only available means of differentiating them 
from other categories. So we must be careful: what applies at the lower 
end of the small-firm category may well fit the petits bourgeois and 
perhaps the artisans too — or it may deviate to an unknown degree, or 
not apply at al 1.
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4.2 Small firms and the state
The 1970s and early 1980s saw renewed interest in small firms. The 
reasons for this, which paralleled the renewal of sociological interest 
in the petty bourgeoisie, were manifold. Here it suffices to mention 
government attempts at restructuring (circumscribed by the prevailing 
view on what constitute acceptable levels of state intervention) so as 
to adapt the economy to a changing environment; the attractiveness of 
images of a post-industrial, high-technology society; the impact of the 
* small is beautiful’ type of critique of modernity;29 and the time 
factor.30 The coincidence of these factors aligned government-initiated 
projects for small businesses with new technologies and currents of 
thought, and enhanced the ideological status of ’smallness* which by now 
has begun to have a positive significance. The upshot of all this was an 
intensification of earlier initiatives, and an ongoing enhancement of 
European Union (EU) sponsored and national schemes to assist in the 
creation and development of large numbers of small units in manufactur­
ing and the service sector.31 In a sense these efforts supplanted ear­
lier projects, which had aimed at the creation of small farms in 
European agriculture, and extended them to urban areas.
A number of objectives underwritten by various governments or­
chestrated measures and projects specially designed for small 
businesses. In terms of their qualitative objectives, these can be 
grouped as long-range attempts by the state for maintenance of the sys­
tem; facilitating the short to medium-term needs of the economy; and as­
sisting with short-term priorities.32 Another and not incompatible way 
of classifying them is to distinguish five main objectives in the state 
intervention on behalf of small businesses.
(i) First, it assists in the restructuring of large capital. So if 
there is a need to cut down on overheads and/or unproductive depart­
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ments, the state will assist by promoting the establishment of efficient 
small enterprises to provide the former with specialist goods and serv­
ices, open new markets and themselves carry part of the relevant 
research and development costs.
(ii) Second, it creates a class of new owners, and in this way 
propagate the virtues of free-market competition. This helps to boost 
and realise aspirations of upward mobility, at a time when oligopolisa- 
tion of economic life has become self-evident in everyday life. Most im­
portantly from the point of view of the state, this kind of intervention 
yields political and social support (from the wide circle of aspirants
s'
to upward mobility) for the market-oriented values being promoted.
(iii) Third, the ideological nature of state assistance aside, it 
results in some of the new small businessmen entering the bourgeoisie 
proper. In this way the state not only makes up somewhat for the un­
developed state of the country’s bourgeoisie, or reinvigorates bourgeois 
institutions by, for example, the artificial operation of a free market 
through anti-trust legislature (in the industrial countries), it also 
actively advances the numerical proliferation of the middle class.
(iv) Fourth, it creates new jobs, small businesses with employees 
being an important source of new employment, and
(v) fifth, it reduces unemployment, because some of the un­
employed, given a modicum of financial assistance, establish themselves 
as self-employed. This helps to bring down unemployment statistics, and 
so is a good public-relations play for those in authority.
4.3 Entrepreneurship and snail firms
4.3.a The enterprise culture
The proliferation of the post-war, social-democratic collectivism 
has by certain social scientists been seen as a reaction to the tendency
76
in the developed countries towards an oligopolisatisation of the economy 
(McHugh 1979; Burrows 1991a). In terms of social values, the resurgence 
of small firms which, by exemplifying a very positive manifestation of 
individualism stand in sharp contrast to the values of collectivism, may 
be regarded as part of the back-lash against collectivism. In Britain, 
the revival of small firms obtained ideological support from the politi­
cal Right, which has come to interpret modern history in terms of the 
contours of entrepreneurship and foresaw the re-invigoration of the 
economy through a small-firm renaissance (Burrows 1991a; Dale 1991). The 
overall concept has come to be called enterprise culture.33
The exponents of enterprise culture have seen small-firm resur­
gence as an indicator that the capitalist system has not stagnated but 
maintains its vitality and is still open-ended. Opportunities still ex­
ist, new ones crop up continually, and it is up to ordinary, hard­
working and enterprising individuals to pursue them. If they do, the 
market is sure to reward them with a purpose in life, with upward 
mobility, and with material wealth. Furthermore, if many individuals act 
in concert, then Britain (so it is prophesied) shall reverse her decline 
and become great once more. Obviously, the ideological impact of new 
small-firm proprietors is very important for unobtrusive capitalist 
hegemony in times of economic crisis and mass redundancies. New, 
business-oriented men and women embody the vigour of individualist 
dynamism and act as models to be emulated. The continuous emergence of 
new small firms helps the spread of values which not only do not con­
tradict, but actually celebrate capitalism, and inter alia exonerate its 
past misdeeds. Capitalism then appears as an open system, full of oppor­
tunities available to every individual willing to grasp them and work 
his way to the top (see Scase 1992: 44-46).
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The men and women setting up new small firms have come to be seen 
as bearers of the positive quality of entrepreneurship, which concept 
was previously associated mostly with core capitalist institutions, such 
as property-ownership and the free market. This means that the continu­
ing proliferation of small firms is regarded as contributing sig­
nificantly to entrepreneurship and the capitalist ethos. It has been 
argued that this is why governments have stepped in to bolster new 
proprietors with certain material assistance (Gerry 1985a, 1985b).
Yet engagement with the enterprise culture does nothing to explain 
what exactly it is. J. Richie has rhetorically wondered, whether it is
’some handy little slogan? A simple shorthand way for describing 
developing small business activity? Some proverbial wisdom about 
such? Small businesses’ new guiding spirit? Or just some well- 
promoted party political trademark? Maybe the latest populist 
catchphrase? A carefully sanitized euphemism which glosses over 
something else?’ (quoted in Burrows 1991a: 2).
Catchphrases usually have an ideological si and and the purpose and 
the widespread preoccupation with the enterprise culture, initially 
propagated by a right-wing political agency, is no exception. Of course, 
the materiality of an ideology is expressed by its impact, in how far it 
succeeds in influencing actors to act in a particular way. Yet, it has 
been claimed (Burrows 1991b: 22), that the concept and practice of en­
terprise culture cannot have played an ideological role worth mention­
ing, or be considered as an explanation of the restructuring that took 
place in Britain in the 1980’s, an important facet of which was the 
smal1-firms boom.34
This denial of ideological impact is supported by the fact that 
the majority of the new entrepreneurs belonging to the self-employed 
category without employees.35 For example, in the service sector, 
single-person enterprises are the norm, amounting to as much as 75% in 
some branches (Burrows and Curran 1989: 532). Much of what passes as
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self-employment involves in fact disguised workers recently made redun­
dant, who have utilised redundancy funds and government schemes to be­
come ’self-employed’ (Gerry 1985a, 1985b; Burrows and Curran 1989; Cur­
ran 1990; Hobbs 1992).36 These can hardly be taken as good examples of 
entrepreneurship. Besides, in the majority of the small firms that do 
have employees, these are few (Burrows and Curran 1989: 532) and in­
herently limited in their activities. This implies that there, too, en­
terprise is more or less restricted. In fact, studies of small-firm 
proprietors have shown that they are chiefly preoccupied not with high- 
minded projects, but with very down-to-earth issues of daily survival. 
What characterises them is adherence not to an enterprise, but rather to 
a survival culture (Curran 1990: 135; Dale 1991: 49). When asked what 
led them into self-employment in the British (Curran 1990: 135) or other 
contexts, e.g. in the U.S. (Peterson, Schmidman and El if son 1982), they 
repeatedly mentioned a strong wish for independence, which confirms 
Scase and Goffee’s findings discussed above. It would seem, therefore, 
that enterprise culture has not operated much as a push factor in the 
direction of fostering economic development.
But if the enterprise culture as a whole has not affected the 
setting-up of genuine businesses, in what sense, if any, has it in­
fluenced small business proprietors? It would seem that it has provided 
them with ’a meaning system from which actors can draw different 
rationalising "vocabularies of motive", to make sense of and define 
their situation’ (Burrows 1991a: 5).
A meaning-system, in the sense of ideology, is not inherently as­
sociated with any particular class or stratum. However, refutation of 
class reductionism need not imply absence of any class influence as it 
is manifest in the specific articulating principle of an ideology (see 
Laclau 1979: 160-63). It remains a fact that the enterprise culture was
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articulated and propagated by a particular political and social source, 
and impinges on and has an elective affinity with themes (such as 
property, individualism, and the free market) that have long been part 
and parcel of bourgeois values. The right-wing orchestrated meaning- 
system of enterprise culture predominantly addressed its ideology to the 
petits bourgeois; neither is its influence insignificant among the work­
ing class (see Hobbs 1991; 1992). It consistently highlights themes that 
are held in common by the petits bourgeois and the bourgeoisie proper, 
not those that divide them.37
It is in this sense that enterprise culture operates as a 
mechanism of hegemony. Its successful utilisation by right-wing 
politicians for equating the aspirations of the self-employed with the 
hegemonic ideals of property and market, shows how strongly such 
ideological man-handling can affect the petty bourgeoisie at a time of 
economic crisis and restructuring.38 By accepting and internalising it, 
the stratum becomes neutralised as an oppositional force, and some of 
its members may even be deluded into feeling themselves as capitalist 
entrepreneurs.
4.3.b Entrepreneurship
If enterprise culture is largely an issue of ideology, this should 
not lead us to reject entrepreneurship. While, analytical writings, 
especially in the sociological literature, assume automatically that 
entrepreneurship is a problematic concept (Curran and Burrows 1986: 
269-70; 1987: 165; Burrows and Curran 1989: 528, 525; Curran 1990: 133- 
36; Dale 1991: 43-5), this need not be so. What then is an entrepreneur, 
and what is entrepreneurship?39
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A large number of definitions are available but there is none 
agreed in sociology. The term is used with a gamut of meanings, from a 
synonym for business ownership, to something which is ‘rare but pivotal 
to the development of market-based economic systems’ (Curran 1990: 
134).40
Max Weber saw the entrepreneur as an outsider (Weber 1978). His is 
a perspective that has survived in accounts where the entrepreneur is 
portrayed in terms of social marginality (see the earlier discussion on 
Bechhofer; also the survey by Curran 1986), or when entrepreneurship 
forms a way out from marginal ity, as in the case of ethnic entrepreneurs 
(Ward 1987; 1991; Boissevain and Grotenbreg 1987). More pervasive, 
however, has been the influence of A. Schumpeter's perception, who sees 
the entrepreneur as the prime economic mover, the non-conformist 
economic hero who carries out new combinations, i.e. as an innovator. 
The innovative entrepreneur breaks existing impasses and opens new 
horizons, which lead directly to economic development and capital ac­
cumulation. It is this, his entrepreneurship, which distinguishes the 
entrepreneur from the functional role of manager or capitalist 
(Sutcliffe 1971: 109-10; Casson 1989: 256; Dale 1991: 45).
A sociologically more interesting definition of the function of an 
entrepreneur is found in the work of the economist M. C. Casson. For 
Casson, the entrepreneur’s role inside a business unit specialises ‘in 
taking decisions where, because of unequal access to information, dif­
ferent people would opt for different strategies' (1989: 257). Now the 
element of inequality in the access to information refers us to multi- 
person organisations, for example large firms, with hierarchically 
structured systems. Functions and roles there have undergone at least a 
measure of differentiation and specialisation, and this applies even to 
the smallest of multi-person business organisation. In fact, they may
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have room for more than one specialist in decision-making, each one 
being responsible for particular areas. So Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is 
a type of specialist, a promoter and organiser of innovative solutions 
or projects who specialises in decisions, or whose decisions generally 
initiate change.41 Accordingly, the innovative entrepreneur can be in­
cluded in a typology of the genre as a variant of entrepreneurs/ 
entrepreneurship. Other kinds of decision-making relate to different 
types of entrepreneur, i.e. the ordinary manager whose decisions concern 
day to day operations, or the risk-taking capitalist investor.
Another variant of the entrepreneur, one that emerges in very 
small organisations that have not progressed to the extent that distinct 
managerial structures have emerged between the owner(s) and the workers, 
may be someone who undertakes a project in more than one capacity. There 
too decision-making is an identifiable process, even though the three 
entrepreneurial roles of innovator, manager, and capitalist, are not 
differentiated but merge in the same individual. An illustration would 
be Scase and Goffee’s type of small employer who works alongside to his 
few employees, manages the day-to-day business affairs, and decides on 
new investments and projects as well as on routine issues. In this in­
stance the small employer stands at the top of a hierarchically struc­
tured, though elementarily, two-tier, social system.
By way of contrast, the self-employed person without employees 
does not talis qualis form any particular social system (though s/he 
may be part of one in the family context). So although such an in­
dividual certainly does take decisions, it is not in the context of some 
particular system of information to which s/he has privileged access. In 
this sense, s/he cannot be described as an entrepreneur. For all that, 
as suggested earlier, it may be quite correct to call entrepreneur a 
self-employed person whose concern is a family business. In such a case
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the family, as an effectively overlapping group and business, is a mini­
mal system not immune from divisions of labour and specialisations, nor 
of structuration according to age, gender, authority, skill or produc­
tive function, and the consonant inequality of access to information. 
Decision-making exists therefore as an identifiable specialist function, 
in which case it could be said that the self-employed, although not 
fully an entrepreneur, enacts the role of the entrepreneur, by having an 
entrepreneurial function, alongside that of the designer, manual 
labourer, retailer, and so on.
4.4 Industrial relations and small firms
Among the ’small is beautiful* ideas, propagated and spread by 
political parties, state agencies, and the media, stands out the claim 
that industrial relations in small firms are almost ideal. To the extent 
that artisans are frequently also employers, an examination of in­
dustrial relations in heterogeneous small firms has relevance for the 
purposes of the present study.
Industrial relations in small firms have been considered by a num­
ber of influential authors, such as G. Ingham (1970), J. Bolton,42 and 
E. F. Schumacher (1978). They have claimed that small firms have better 
industrial relations than large ones. For instance, according to Bolton:
’In many respects the small firm provides a better environment for 
the employee than is possible in most large firms. Although physi­
cal working conditions may sometimes be inferior in small firms, 
most people prefer to work in a small group where communications 
present fewer problem: the employee in a small firm can more 
easily see the relation between what he is doing and the objec­
tives and performance of the firm as a whole. Where management is 
more direct and flexible, working rules can be varied to suit in­
dividuals’ (Bolton quoted in Curran and Stanworth 1979a: 317).
This quotation is representative of arguments in favour of small
firms and may be taken as an illustration of the type of expectations
small-firm revival has cultivated.43
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Questioning the accuracy of the claims made must include the 
perhaps most important aspect of industrial relations, and one that is 
consistently played down by the exponents of the view that harmonious 
relations between employers and employees is the general condition in 
small firms. This is the subject of pay. As is well known, fair wages 
are of major importance in industrial relations. The low pay in small 
firms has been a pervasive characteristic of several advanced industrial 
societies.44 This would suggest that, on the whole, industrial relations 
in small firms cannot be as excellent as claimed. There is in fact ample 
room for employee dissatisfaction with their employers - in other words, 
for unsettled industrial relations.
4.4.a Worker selection and self-selection
In the context of the sraal 1-firms euphoria it has been claimed, by 
Ingham in particular, that in conditions of full employment (which for 
the last twenty years have been entirely hypothetical, anyway) small 
firms would be preferred by workers exhibiting a non-economistic- 
expressive orientation to work, i.e. by those who on the basis of their 
work experience have come to value highly the informal, easygoing, vari­
able work and friendly atmosphere supposedly available there.45 This 
orientation is contrasted with the economistic-instrumental attitude to 
work which stresses economic remuneration at the exclusion of other 
rewards (Ingham 1970: 50-51).
This way of looking at the issue of self-selection, and more 
broadly at industrial relations in small firms, is faulty if not 
downright absurd. It assumes that workers have a thorough knowledge of 
the labour market and the options open to them, and that their choice of 
workplace is free of compulsions and situational influences. This is 
patently not the case, as shown by relevant empirical material
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(Blackburn and Mann 1979; Williams, and also Roberts referred to by Cur­
ran and Stanworth 1979b: 429). Self-selection of working environment is 
largely a myth. In fact, actual conditions and circumstances - for in­
stance, the need to earn some money, to avoid unemployment, availability 
of assets such as skill credentials, as well as low expectations and the 
influence exerted by peer and reference groups - drive young workers to 
enter the labour market and take any job immediately available or recom­
mended to them; in a sense it is existing conditions that channel them 
into jobs (Curran and Stanworth 1979b: 430). 4 6
Since total rejection of the thesis of self-selection would mean 
that actors have no influence at all over their own future, as well as 
implying an intolerable structuralism, it is only common sense not to 
overstate the influence of circumstances. For all that, the involuntary 
causes of action cannot simply be ignored. Two external factors par­
ticularly, personnel selection in small firms and industrial sub­
cultures, must be held greatly responsible for the subsequent formation 
of an extrinsic or intrinsic proclivity in workers’ orientations to 
work.
First, small employers select workers on the basis of personality 
rather than skill. The fact that they prefer to hire the young, who are 
usually unskilled or semi-skilled, not unionised, willing to accept low 
wages, and are generally more malleable than older workers, largely ex­
plains the observed numerical preponderance of young workers in small 
firms. Their age-related mobility combined with lower pay may help to 
account for the observed significantly greater job mobility of workers 
in small firms compared to large firms (Curran and Stanworth 1979a, 
1979b; Goss 1991: 156).
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Second, Curran and Stanworth (1979b) have discovered that it is 
not firm-size but differences among industry’s specific sub-cultures 
that explain the type of orientation some workers exhibit.47 Besides, 
different industrial subcultures - most prominent among them unionisa­
tion rather than firm-size - have also been considered responsible for 
the type of relationships that develop between worker and supervisors 
and worker and owner-managers (Curran and Stanworth 1979a).48
4.4.b Harmonious relations or sweating?
Another aspect of the working situation in small firms is sweat­
ing. This, according to one commentary, ’is the generic response of em­
battled firms — whether mass or small producers — that cannot innovate’ 
(Piore and Sabel 1984: 264). While such a comment may not be altogether 
accurate, especially in its implication that there is no sweating in in­
novative firms,49 it does convey some truth. While sweating may or may 
not be linked to the dependent position of the small firm to a sub­
contracting one, it is always associated with very low wages and a con­
stant pressure to work, often with obsolete machinery, and in conditions 
which do not safeguard the operators’ safety or health. It involves con­
tinuous and direct personal control of the workers by their employer, 
which in small firms is greatly facilitated by the latter working next 
to them. Controls and intensive work are coupled with a commanding style 
of management, where the smallest infringement of orders invokes the 
threat of dismissal (see Rainnie and Scott 1986; Goss 1991).50
There is a distinct managerial style among small business owner- 
managers which has repercussions for industrial relations (Scase and 
Goffee 1980). This is characterised by an aversion of ’defined proce­
dures, role specification and forward planning* (Stanworth and Curran 
1986: 92). Such owner-managers concentrate all decisions in their own
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hands, and the firm depends entirely on them for its operation (Curran 
and Burrows 1986: 270); they are apprehensive that without this obses­
sive control the entire business will fall apart. Not surprisingly, they 
also exhibit an aversion to unions, and a marked tendency to perceive 
any dissenting views coming from workers as challenges to their 
proprietorial prerogative (Goss 1991: 157). These features - but not the 
inclination observed among businessmen of craft origins towards inde­
pendence and autonomy - seem to me to fit in well with the aggressive­
ness and restlessness associated with the entrepreneurial personality.51 
Perhaps, however, an explanation of this behaviour may lie not in some 
psychological constant, but in culturally determined variables. Among 
the working-class entrepreneurs the lack of administrative skill seems 
to be universal, and may well reflect the dearth of it in their cultural 
background.
4.4.c Coping with the employment situation: Paternal ism, 
fraternal ism, and pragmatism 
The sociological concept of paternalism refers to a system of con­
trol which legitimises existing hierarchies between, for example, a 
business proprietor and ’his* workers, by reference to traditional 
authority.52 The legitimacy of the person holding traditional authority 
is, according to M. Weber, a function of the traditions responsible for 
the expectations and obligations of proprietors and workers respec­
tively, and form the framework in which these operate. The person in 
authority is the bearer of personal, traditional, prerogative, which is 
without any clearly marked limits concerning the obligation of 
obedience. What stabilises traditional authority is the acceptance by 
those in subordinate positions of the superordinate’s definition of the 
situation. This definition is their personal prerogative, bestowed on
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them by the traditional system which puts them in loco parentis over 
their underlings.
Obviously, paternalistic relations have more potency when they are 
not contested, when those in subordinate position have little or no ac­
cess at all to alternative meaning-systems, and therefore to alternative 
definitions of the situation.53 In contemporary societies, where such 
circumstances no longer obtain, there is ongoing tension between the at­
tempt by the paternalistic employer to maintain the hierarchical dif­
ferentiation so as to maintain his dominant position, and his need to 
cultivate his employees* loyalty to his person and enterprise, which 
enables him to define the employment relationship as an organic partner­
ship. Ideally it is in small firms, where contact between proprietor and 
workers is constant and there is little room for the development of 
bureaucratic procedures, that paternalism flourishes best. If the per­
sonal standing of the proprietor is not sufficient, alternative tactics 
are required. Fraternal ism is invoked to fill the gap, being charac­
terised by more collegial, non-hierarchical, responsible autonomy type 
of working relations.54
A more complex situation arises when businessmen of the small- 
employer type (see Scase and Goffee’s typology), possess economic power 
superior to that of their employees, but at the same time labour them­
selves as skilled craftsmen. In such an instance hierarchical differen­
tiation is even less easy to maintain. Background, work and skill are 
equalising factors, so that such employers, regard other skilled workers 
as their peers in terms of craft and skills, sometimes even as their su­
periors. This situation may be the reason for the concentration, so com­
mon in small firms, of all decision-making in the person of the 
proprietor, and the commandeering style of control so often encountered. 
These may all be seen as responses largely due to the uneasiness
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proprietors feel when trying to keep a dividing line between themselves 
and their workers.
The reported proclivity of small firms towards hiring unskilled 
labour may in part be explained on the same grounds. To the rather ob­
vious explanation, that the owner-craftsman who knows his trade 
thoroughly has little need for other skilled workers, we may add that 
perhaps he deliberately avoids hiring skilled workers because their 
presence creates problems for the dependency relation entailed by the 
emp1oyer-emp1oyee nexus which he is striving to maintain. A similar 
reason may explain differential treatment of workers in small firms, 
which exhibit paternalism towards the unskilled, and fraternal ism with 
the skilled.
If industrial relations in small firms are indeed unsatisfactory, 
then why are there are so few incidents of observable conflict, such as 
strikes? For one, small-firm proprietors (as already mentioned) are 
anti-union to the extent that very often a worker’s membership in a 
trade-union brings automatic dismissal; workers cannot unite effectively 
without at the same time risking their jobs. Whenever differences with 
employers do surface, they take an individualised form and, given the 
superior power position of the employer, bargaining between the two 
sides often means that workers have to make a choice between ’take it or 
leave it’. They are constantly exhorted to behave themselves, or 
threatened with the firm having to close down, or that it will go 
bankrupt. There is enormous pressure on workers who are anxious to keep 
their jobs, especially in periods of widespread unemployment. In conse­
quence, the workers tend to take a pragmatic view. They avoid express­
ing their view, raising objections, or making demands, and may show 
signs of deference, appear acquiescent, and go along with the pater­
89
nalism or even fraternal ism of their employer - but they do not really 
believe in or agree with any of it.
The relatively high labour turnover of small-firm employees is a 
revealing index of existing level of friction in these units: it shows 
that workers do express their dissatisfaction, presumably once they get 
hold of a new job, even if they do it in a somewhat defensive way, ’with 
their feet’ (see Rainnie and Scott 1986; Rainnie 1989; Goss 1991). All 
in all, we may say that despite the facade of unity and tranquillity, 
cleavages between employers and employees are no less in small firms 
than in large enterprises.
The claim about harmonious relations in small firms is purely 
wishful thinking. Persisting in the dissemination of this view is some­
thing of a service to small-firm employers, since it draws public atten­
tion away from their operations. It particularly, draws away the atten­
tion of those in authority whose duty it is to rectify inappropriate 
work conditions. In practical terms, the claim about harmonious rela­
tions facilitates small employers to continue cutting costs at the ex­
pense of a particularly unprotected work-force.
Therefore, to the extent that artisans with employees constitute 
an overlapping sub-section of small firms, labour relations there may be 
similarly inharmonious, and similar mechanism may be used to cope with 
the employment situation.55
Summary and conclusion
Examining the various approaches to the petty bourgeoisie and more 
thematic concerns with small firms in advanced countries provides a 
basis for the study of artisans in the semi-periphery. Although the 
theoretical, methodological, and more empirical issues involved are of 
considerable interest, there can be no one-to-one correspondence between
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them for the centre and the semi-periphery. After deriving some key no­
tions, the usefulness of the surveyed material is more in terms of con­
trasts and comparisons.
That the petty bourgeoisie has not simply survived in developed 
countries but has undergone a resurgence should by now be beyond ques­
tion. Contrary to Bechhofer and Elliott who limit themselves to the 
shopkeeper fraction of the petty bourgeoisie, technological advances are 
directly responsible for a good part of that revival. Their exploitation 
is not only a key for new small high-technology firms, but they fre­
quently provide the modern technological tools and equipment by means of 
which the small businesses and artisans may effectively compete and 
safeguard their position. This reliance on advanced technology means 
that a stratum that in terms its of basic characteristics is non­
capitalist has been brought back to life largely by technological ad­
vances developed for explicitly capitalist purposes, and produced in 
capitalist organisations through the application of capitalist- 
controlled processes.
Indeed, simp1e-commodity production in the advanced capitalist 
societies is embedded in the overall process of capitalist accumulation. 
This is shown by the fact that, aside from its technological impact, 
capitalism has brought about the economic restructuring that creates op­
portunities for the petty bourgeoisie, furthers the curtailment of 
self-consumption, enhances the commercialisation of the economy, etc. - 
all of which allow the emergence of new intermediate strata, sometimes 
replacing older ones. As on the macro, so on the micro level. It is the 
consequences of capitalist inroads, as illustrated by the case of the 
small builders researched by Scase and Goffee, which have prompted 
lower-class actors to set themselves up independently. They thought that 
this would free them from the aspect of capitalism they most resented.
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Once the capitalist forces have provided the conditions that lead 
to the attitude of ’small is beautiful’ and so have given the small ac­
tors the opportunity to remain among or cross over and join the petty 
bourgeoisie, capitalist agents quite deliberately make ideological capi­
tal out of that stratum’s resurgence. They highlight particularly the 
prospects of upward mobility, and focus on exaggerated rags-to-riches 
stories. In this way the values of independence, autonomy, and working- 
freedom are reaffirmed as values specific to capitalism. They are linked 
to the notions of free trading and a free market, which appear to 
guarantee the openness of the capitalist system, the legitimisation of 
which effectively conceals the monopolisation and exploitation inherent 
to it.
The small entrepreneur of working-class origin is not the most 
common representative of the entrepreneur genre in developed countries, 
but it is the most pertinent for our purposes. As working-class 
entrepreneurs themselves directly participate in the labour process, 
they are not completely cut off from their craft and their working-class 
roots. This may result in their becoming reluctant employers. Often they 
are not sure where exactly they stand, and their lack of managerial 
skill aggravates their difficulty in how to handle the workers and how 
to cope with the employment situation. Small employers may rely upon 
paternalistic authority to manage employees, though if the work-tasks 
are highly skilled they may opt for fraternal is ing tactics — which 
should not be taken to imply that their fraternal ism is hypocrisy.
This image of the small entrepreneur of working class origin some­
what conflicts with the findings concerning the more general category of 
small-firm proprietors. The latter, who may or may not be capitalists, 
show a proclivity for hiring young, unskilled, non-unionised workers and 
paying them low wages. In general, small firms have a very centralised
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style of management and, in the absence of trade-union protection of 
workers, their managerial prerogative extends to all activities involv­
ing workers in the work-place. Where work is hard, supervision very 
close and constant, and the threat of the sack frequent, such small 
firms are simply sweat-houses. Worker dissent is not tolerated, those 
dissatisfied with existing conditions are invited to resign, which they 
do often enough for small firms to exhibit a high labour turnover. The 
majority of the employed, however, opt to remain and to adapt by taking 
a pragmatic view. These facts have largely demolished the claim that 
workers prefer small firms because the intimacy of the environment there 
is more gratifying and rewarding their strictly monetary considerations.
The discordance in the above accounts has to do with the dif­
ficulties of defining ‘small’ firms. The heading ’small’ in fact covers 
several incongruous categories.. While the situation in the SCP units of 
craftsmen entrepreneurs, whose awkwardness as employers may lead to 
paternal ism/fraternal ism and all that implies, sweating the labourers 
occurs in the larger small businesses, where the work-force does not 
consist primarily of family members and/or partners but of wage-workers. 
In other words sweating, which requires wage-labour, is primarily a 
variant of capitalist small businesses.
Unlike the craftsman or artisan and SCP, which are structurally 
related, the small entrepreneur and the small firm are adulterated 
capitalist categories, constituted and ideologically defined by outside 
agents. These agents may be various administrative state apparatuses or 
outright capitalist forces, who make use of the category they have 
created in accordance with their own priorities. Their legislative power 
enables them to interpolate small-firm proprietors among capitalist 
owner-employers proper, or to use them to reinforce already established 
ideological categories. Herding all the varieties of small-firm
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proprietors into the deceitfully neutral but in fact ideologically 
loaded category of owner-employers is meant to impose some measure of 
control over them. This, however, disregards the fact that the kind of 
ownership we are here concerned with is too often volatile and uncertain 
to be taken as the determining criterion; skill level or labour might be 
more appropriate. As I see it, the use here made of the categories of 
ownership /employment is a prime example of how ideology may provide a 
framework for making it possible to organise predominantly non­
capitalist actors for the purposes of capitalism.
The inter-relationship in the economies of the advanced counties 
between the informal secondary and formal primary sectors - i.e. between 
SCP and CMP — has usually been considered as positive, in the sense that 
there are numerous functional links between the two to facilitate co­
operation and so redound to both of them flourishing. Their relationship 
has been described as one of positive complementarity (Mouzelis 1978). I 
think this concept should be modified by taking into consideration the 
ideological arrangements that assign SCP and its agents particular posi­
tions within advanced societies. That smal 1-commodity producers allow 
themselves to be channelled in this way is due not to their being 
manipulated by some devious planning authority, though the role of these 
should not be ignored. It is primarily because they have come to accept 
the legitimacy of the hierarchies imposed by the market (Williamson 
1983) which, however, does not in fact give priority to the nowadays 
resurgent sector of small business.
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Notes to Chapter II
1. Gender and the nexus of relationships of women to the petty bour­
geoisie, although it occupies an increasingly significant position in 
the literature, will not be discussed here.
2. Relevant data are cited in Clegg, Boreham and Dow (1986: 70-76).
3. As in small firms the number of employees is very low, a drop (or 
rise) in employment figures indicates a respective drop (or rise) in the 
number of independent business concerns.
4. However, there has not been an absolute drop of employment in small 
production; drops in both relative and absolute terms are rare. This be­
comes plausible when considering that the displacement of small concerns 
by large ones did not necessarily involved the ruin of those already ex­
isting. It would rather seem that the intensification of competition 
made entry into the craft trades more risky, so effectively keeping a 
good part of prospective entrants away. On the other hand, there were 
surely sane new independent small producers, while the gradual pace of 
the competition being built up allowed established masters to remain in 
business by adapting and/or transferring their business concerns to 
their offspring. The drop has, therefore, been mostly relative.
5. The proportion of firms with fewer than 20 employees (in retailing, 
wholesale, and services) has also undergone some, though much less, 
reduction during the twentieth century (data cited in Granovetter 1984: 
326).
6. In the literature, traditional (urban) petty bourgeoisie, has been 
the term for collectively designating small shopkeepers, merchants and 
artisans. The adjective ‘traditional* refers to the existence of these 
groupings in earlier times, and is contrasted with the new petty bour­
geoisie which is held to have come into being during this century. As 
already noted, today’s existence of a traditional petty bourgeoisie is 
usually seen as a residue from the past. Increasingly, however, they are 
also considered in terms of resurgence, and this has provoked a revival 
of interest in them.
7. Not only did established journals print articles pertaining to the 
petty bourgeoisie, but new specialist journals launched in the late 
1970s and 1980s (like the American Journal of Small Business, or the 
European Small Business Journal later renamed.as the International Smal 1 
Business Journal), also published some articles by sociological authors. 
The revival of interest was widespread. Specialist studies were under­
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taken, and governments announced support for small businesses, initially 
perhaps as merely a token gesture. In the end, government-sponsored 
agencies for small businesses or small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) were established or revitalised in the Western European countries.
8. ’Self-employed5 is not an unadulterated category. While it includes 
the petty bourgeoisie, it should not be equated with it (A. Dale 1986).
9. N. Meager (1992) scrutinised Bogenhold and Staber’s (1991) methodol­
ogy, and noted that it is flawed, in which case support for their 
counter-cyclical point is weakened.
10. Following official classifications, small shopkeepers were opera­
tionally defined as owners of a single establishment with no more than 
three full-time, or six part-time employees (Bechhofer and Elliott 1968: 
182; Bechhofer, Elliott and Rushforth 1971: 162; Bechhofer et al 1974b: 
104).
11. The social-mobi1ity pattern of shopkeepers should not be rashly 
generalised. It differs rather markedly from that for Athenian artisans 
(discussed in latter chapters). Presented for comparison, the shop­
keepers* mobility pattern indicates that:
(i) Shopkeepers are highly successful in promoting their children 
into the professional ranks. Their position serves as a springboard for 
intergenerational mobility into professional occupations. The rate of 
occupational inheritance is low; there is no parallel in this respect 
with small farmers or peasants.
(ii) Shopkeeping is not a refuge for the ill-educated and those with 
little capital who aspire to the middle class. Recruitment comes from 
roughly similar-status occupations (by 56%), but also from higher-status 
occupations, all of them part of the middle class. About half of those 
recruited had some previous experience (53%), but many enter the job 
without any; for about a third shopkeeping is a new venture (Bland, El­
liott and Bechhofer 1978).
12. I shall not examine here the approach which see the stratum’s 
renewal in terms of an overall societal shift towards a post-industrial 
tertiarisation of economy and society.
13. By market and work situation they mean ’to distinguish a specific 
set of occupations with broadly common market and work situations and 
essentially similar interests’ (Bechhofer and Elliott 1968: 183-90; 
1976: 78-79). This approach, useful as it is, is predisposed towards 
particularistic analyses.
14. The authors totally by-pass the thorny question of which technology 
is ’high* and which ’low*. We must assume that their high/low technology 
corresponds to modern/ant iquated.
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15. The following excerpt from a British union rule book of 1869. cited 
by A. Briggs, illustrates the inter-relationship between belonging to a 
trade, hence knowing the skills, etc., and the rights stemming from this 
fact.
’The trade by which we live is our property, bought by certain 
years of servitude, which gives us a vested right, and we have an 
exclusive claim on it, as all will have hereafter who purchase it 
by the same means’ (mentioned in Hollowell 1982: 183).
16. Of course, comparing self-employed high-technology experts with ar­
tisans implies a comparison of knowledge in high technology with the 
seemingly less complex and empirical artisanal technologies. This is a 
very complex exercise, which I shall not concern myself with here, al­
though some relevant discussion follows later in this chapter.
17. Bechhofer and his associates have somewhat contradicted their em­
phasis on technology being included in/excluded from the petty bour­
geoisie. So, they admit that the petit-bourgeois ’stratum survives be­
cause technological change, urban development and many other factors 
produce new opportunities for small business’(Bechhofer and Elliott 
1976: 91). Concerning dependence/independence, they have claimed that 
the petite bourgeoisie ’is a dependent stratum; depending first and 
foremost on the dominant groups and institutions’ (Bechhofer and Elliott 
1981: 187).
18. Such a stance would re-affirm that the dichotomy of traditional ver­
sus new refers only to the timing of the emergence of the various 
petits-bourgeois groupings.
19. The concept of ideology is not only a complex one with a number of 
established meanings, it is also multifarious (Larrain 1980). Here, I 
shall merely note that by ideology I do not simply mean some form of 
shared false consciousness, or imaginary miscognition, or legitimation, 
which is a reflection of logically pre-existing social conditions 
(Friedman 1989: 376), but also ’a manifestation of a particular being- 
in-the-world of conscious actors, of human subjects’, the way a subject 
or an item operates in the ’formation and transformation of human sub­
jectivity’ (Therborn 1982: 2).
However, ideology should not be seen as limited to operating at the 
level of ideas, for this does not suffice to explain the tremendous grip 
of its hold on actors. The reason ideology can become pervasively deter­
mining is because it possesses materiality. It operates the way a pair 
of spectacles do. Wearing spectacles makes it possible for the eye to 
bring into focus objects which previously were blurred or not seen at 
all. This is done even though the spectacles lenses themselves in­
variably distort the objects of observation. The individual responds to 
what the eye sees. By extension, ideology provides a system of meaning 
through which actors see the world. By providing a way of perceiving and
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defining reality, it triggers an actor’s hidden dynamic to embark on 
some form of (binding) social action, which may well reinforce or 
qualify the particular ideology (see Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies 1978; Huaco 1981; Laclau 1979).
20. Scase and Goffee argue that although they acknowledge the distinc­
tion between actor and position as helpful in the study of careers 
within large bureaucratic organisations, it is of little use in the 
study of the entrepreneurial middle class’ business careers. They ex­
plain:
‘As we found in our research, it is difficult to distinguish be­
tween actor and position if only because proprietorship is 
"carved” out of a process of capital accumulation. An actor ac­
quires capital which, in turn, determines position within the 
entrepreneurial middle class; they are, in other words, virtually 
indistinguishable. Although, therefore, it is possible to dif­
ferentiate conceptually the category of self-employed from the ac­
tors within it, to overstate the distinction is to detract from an 
understanding of the processes whereby the actors themselves con­
tribute to the reproduction of the positions which they occupy’ 
(Scase and Goffee 1984: 193).
21. Work role is taken as an
’index of the nature of [the business owner’s] enterprise as it 
will tend to reflect, for example, size of labour force and level 
of trading. It has a general applicability which any simple 
qualitative measure, such as number of employees lacks’ (Scase and 
Goffee 1980: 23; emphasis original).
22. The authors developed their views on the basis of a sample of 25 
self-employed craftsmen working in building construction (Scase and 
Goffee 1981; 1984: 70-97), a sample of 25 small employers who themselves 
did manual work in building construction, (Scase and Goffee 1984: 98- 
125); a similar-sized sample of same-trade owner-controllers, as well as 
15 owner-directors, were also investigated {ibid.: 126-84).
23. Erosion of worker’s occupational autonomy has been observed also 
among skilled American construction workers (Riemer 1982).
24. A structural factor that may decide a man to become a small employer 
in the building industry is the following. The work role of carpenters 
(studied by Scase and Goffee 1984: 99) articulates with other building 
jobs in such a way as to make than co-ordinators. This co-ordinating 
role obliges them to learn a number of work tasks other than their own, 
so as to be able to decide when one specialist work gang should be re­
placed by another. At the same time they informally pick-up skills of 
personnel management. It would appear that these carpenters’ work situa­
tion needs only a minimum of effort to make them small employers them­
selves.
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25. ’Firm1 is employed in the literature interchangeably with enterprise 
or business; 1 industry’/’manufacturing industry* is reserved for firms 
engaged with transformative activities.
26. It has been reported that in Britain big business and establishment 
organisations, such as the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) and 
the National Chamber of Trade (NCT), have as their members small firms 
whose interests they represent. They may, for example, obtain tax relief 
on their behalf, while at the same time controlling them organisation­
ally. Roughly one third of CBI’s members in the late 1970s were small 
firms (see McHugh 1979).
27. Poulantzas* critique of SMEs in France, which also applies to the 
category of small firms (see ch. I), seems to be equally pertinent to 
other developed countries.
28. Various national and transnational organisations have adopted dif­
ferent definition of what constitutes a small, or small and medium-sized 
enterprise or business. One particular study records over 50 different 
statistical definitions in 75 counties for distinguishing small from 
large units (mentioned in Storey 1986: 82).
In Europe, despite EU attempts to implement a comparable nomenclature 
among member countries, wide variations still exist, reflecting dif­
ferent national conditions and priorities. The most prevalent criterion 
distinguishing the small from other categories is size of the work­
force, which has the advantage of being easy to apply. In the EU the up­
per limit mark for SMEs is set at ’up to 499 employees’, though each in­
dividual member-country sets its own; in the U.S. the plateaux is raised 
further to 1000 personnel. As no legal definition exists different 
agencies in most member-country may each define SMEs on the basis of 
their own criterion of employment provided the upper limit established 
for the whole EU is not transgressed (KEPE 1989: 31, 58).
Ancillary criteria, particularly annual sales turnover, which is more 
readily available, but also the volume of capital employed, market 
share, horse-power capacity (all three of which must be ’small’), 
owners’ working relationship to the business, style of management, for­
mal independence, etc., might also be emp1oyed (Curran and Stanworth 
1979b), but here too there is no unanimity.
29. E. F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful (1978), initially published in 
1973, was a partial reaction to capitalist modernity. He sees the exist­
ing world as largely productivist, hence irrational and inefficient, and 
also incorporated an ecological critique well before the concept became 
fashionable. Schumacher argued that existing problems were attributable 
to gigantism and automation, not to capitalism as a social and economic 
system. Yet, this is the feature which has made the book so acceptable 
to decision makers and the wider public in the West.
The author’s attitude, though emotive, was non-escapist. He declared
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that it was possible for both advanced and developing countries to adopt 
a path to development that would take small units into full considera­
tion (depending on circumstances, smallness would include anything from 
villages/small communities to small countries), in the context of which 
people would matter, and which would allow them to proceed by utilising 
intermediate and environment-friendly technologies.
The appeal of 'small is beautiful’, the so-called post-materialist 
type of critique and perspective, and other widely-read texts of a 
similar nature (e.g. those by I. Illich or Reich), can be explained in 
terms of their timing (Gerry 1985: 298-99). They have certainly played 
an important role in influencing the shape of the contemporary world by 
preparing public opinion for perceiving change as something not neces­
sarily negative, perhaps even as desirable. The influence of these texts 
is seen in the more widespread acceptance by the educated middle classes 
(their main readers) of a pro-small perspective. Alternative forms of 
organisation, alternative life-styles and goods, the promotion of or­
ganic methods of cultivation, of appropriate/intermediate technologies, 
and other ideas and practices consonant with smallness have 
proliferated. In particular, their influence has been pivotal in at­
tempts to supplement large-scale projects in developing countries with 
smaller and more user-friendly ones. (A compendium of pro-small applica­
tions and projects is found in McRobie 1985). It is interesting I think, 
that the emphasis of these libertarian and rather populist critiques on 
education as the greatest productive resource (i.e. that knowing about 
something allows the people to decide and act), on opposition to nuclear 
power, on energy conservation, the pro-agriculture stance, the adoption 
of ethical-religious tenets (Christian, Buddhist, and others), and 
issues already mentioned, all have a relative affinity with some aspects 
of the moral critique of capitalism to be found especially in the 
various petty-bourgeois strata (see ch. I).
30. The interest in small firms came after the oil crisis, and the end 
of the long post-war boom.
31. For a bird's-eye view of areas of support for small businesses in 
the various Vest-European countries see Haskins and Gibb (1987).
32. This is not the place to discuss the issue of the nature of the 
state and state intervention. Generally speaking, however, it can surely 
be agreed that the state is not a neutral apparatus. Bentham’s liberal 
state is in fact the foremost guardian and sponsor of private property, 
and of the free-market and other relevant socio-economic values and in­
stitutions associated with the bourgeoisie, whose adoption by the state 
renders them hegemonic. Neither does the state stand above politics. 
Changes in the political sphere are reflected in the state’s executive 
apparatus, which certainly affects the policies pursued. But the state 
is also a bureaucracy and like all bureaucracies, has interests of its 
own and a largely independent view of its own role (on the relationship
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of small businesses and various autonomous Western states see Weiss 
1988). The state and its policies certainly cannot be identified once 
and for all with those of a particular class or class faction, not even 
in the now infamous ’last instance*.
33. The enterprise culture promotes individualism, privatism, so-called 
flexibility and self-help, and is opposed to trade unions and other col­
lectivist institutions (Burrows 1991a, 1991b: 27; Hobbs 1992).
Interestingly enough, the Left has also had to admit that small firms 
provide much-needed employment, alternative life-styles, etc. The direct 
impact of this new left-wing perspective has been rather limited so far,
but indirectly, by putting up no ideological resistance to the idea of
small private businesses, it has allowed the enterprise culture of the 
Eight to spread freely.
34. This is not to say that the enterprise culture has not been seen by
some as a causal factor of economic restructuring (for example Brown 
1992: 17).
35. Bogenhold and Staber propose that Scase and Goffee’s self-employed 
can be sub-divided. The first sub-type does not differ from Scase and 
Goffee’s, but the second includes those who have no autonomy in the 
labour process, and m y  not even own the implements they work with. In 
other words these are self-employed only in a formal /statistical sense. 
In reality, they are thinly disguised wage-workers without the benefits 
associated with either wage-working or self-employment. The authors em­
phasise that the second sub-type of the self-employed makes up the 
largest segment of the species in Britain, West Germany and in the U.S. 
(1991: 225, 227).
36. Bogenhold and Staber note that such trajectories into so-called 
business independence are not limited to Britain, but are found in other 
industrial countries too (1991: 229).
37. By way of contrast, survival-re la ted themes might provide an alter­
native collective meaning-system, and would promote identification of 
the interests of the self-employed without employees with those of 
wage-1abourers.
38. This is especially remarkable since the petits bourgeois as a group 
fall largely outside the category of those who benefit from restructur­
ing. In fact, sections of the self-employed are simply pathetic examples 
of proletarians in disguise, pushed into becoming ’independent’ for the 
benefit of their employers who in this way obtain a so-called flexible, 
i.e. unprotected work-force (see Curran 1990: 136, 142).
39. The question is here being pursued because an answer to the issue of 
entrepreneurship will provide an analogy and so be relevant to seeing
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artisans as businessmen.
40. In the work of R. Scase and R. Goffee (1982) entrepreneurship is a 
synonym for proprietorship; an identical meaning is implied in Giddens 
after his definition of the entrepreneur: ’the owner of a business firm’ 
(1990: 739). By contrast, A. Dale (1991; 44) adopts the Schumpeter 
perspective which emphasises innovativeness. In between stand J. Curran 
and R. Burrows who, although they express a preference for the Schum­
peter view of entrepreneurship and the entrepreneur as breaking new 
ground and leading towards a new equilibrium when the previous one has 
stagnated, then go on to refer to all small business proprietors as 
entrepreneurs (1987: 165).
41. According to J. Burch, initiation of change distinguishes 
entrepreneurship from management (mentioned in Dale 1991: 45). I think 
that this approximates the notion of entrepreneur (and the function of 
entrepreneurship) to that of the innovator (and innovation).
42. Bolton headed Britain’s Committee of Inquiry on Small Firms which, 
relying heavily on Ingham’s work, with its report of 1971 established 
the official renewal of interest in small firms (Curran and Stanworth 
1979a, 1979b).
43. To the cultural and media interest in small firms evident since the 
1970s; and to the small businessmen’s protests against unfavourable laws 
concerning employers welfare contributions, unfair dismissals, trade 
union interference, high taxation, need for financial assistance, etc. 
was added an explicitly political-ideological dimension when the British 
Conservative Party wholeheartedly took up the subject of small 
businesses and, as discussed earlier, it gave its own imprint of 
’enterprise culture’ (Curran and Blackburn 1991: 179-82). The party 
claimed in the 1980s that
’working conditions are easier and happier in small companies. 
Many of the problems that arise in large enterprises are unknown 
in firms where the owner is known to all his employees’ (quoted in 
Goss 1991: 152).
Or, even more directly:
’One of the advantages that small businesses do, in fact, enjoy is 
the generally good state of relations between the owners and 
managers and their employees. There is a sense of partnership 
based on the willingness to work for a clearly perceived common 
purpose from which everyone benefits’ (ibid.: 154).
It should be noted that when the Conservatives took office in 1979, 
they largely satisfied the demands of small businessmen in the context 
of restructuring the British economy (Stanworth and Curran 1986).
44. Concerning Britain, see Ingham (1970: 49, 87), and Cleland mentioned 
in Ingham 1970: 49); Rainnie (1989: 3-4, 172-77). D. Goss has reported
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that (young and unskilled) workers in small printing shops earned about 
a quarter (25 pounds sterling a week) of the wages of their skilled 
counterparts in larger firms (155 pounds sterling per week), and worked 
longer hours: the former a 42-hour week, the latter a 37-hour week 
(1991: 173). On Japan, see Hoselitz (1968: xv); Shinohara (1968: 39-41). 
On Italy, see Berger (1981: 78), but it should be mentioned that Italy 
is supposed to deviate from the norm — see next chapter.
45. Informal and good inter-personal horizontal and hierarchical 
relationships have been propagated by the human-relations approach to 
management. Such an approach seeks to depoliticise relationships in the 
workplace (according to Rainnie and Scott 1986:45); in vertical hierar­
chical relationships its implementation would invariably benefit manage­
ment.
46. A different approach - one that considers remuneration and working 
conditions in small firms as less acceptable than in large ones, (e.g. 
Berger 1980a) — blames workers just the same for being docile and for 
agreeing to work there without any guarantees. Obviously the same as­
sumptions obtain as in the self-selection thesis, and the same critique 
must be applied.
47. The authors note that,
’by industrial subculture is meant the distinctive meaning and in­
stitutions shared by those who work in a particular industry which 
concern work and social relations connected with work’ Curran and 
Stanworth 1979b: 439).
48. In particular, Curran and Stanworth report that in their empirical 
research they questioned respondents on whether they had asked the help 
of supervisors or bosses when faced with a personal problem. Most 
answered negatively (71.2% among the small-firm worker respondents), and 
a large percentage (43.25%) of the total rejected the suggestion vehe­
mently. They thought that to do so would be an infringement of their 
autonomy and self-respect. These responses run counter the established 
view that precisely at that level small firms have the advantages of a 
more intimate and indeed friendly working environment and relations be­
tween employers and employees (1979a: 336-37).
The relationships of employers and employees in small firms are 
reflected in workers’ job satisfaction. Curran and Stanworth formulated 
this in a set of items either intrinsic or extrinsic to the job. The 
responding workers had to select what seemed to them to be most impor­
tant about their job. Answers in terms of intrinsic rewards were clearly 
in the lead among small-firm workers (63.5% compared to 50.5% among 
large firm workers). But when age was taken into account (small firms 
had a work-force younger by 9 years than larger firms), marital status 
(far fewer were married in the younger work-fore of small firms), and 
the expectations concomitant to these factors, the responses concerning
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job satisfaction were the same in small and in large firms (Curran and 
Stanworth 1986).
49. According to G. Thompson, sweating is the technologically backward 
aspect of craft production. As a production technology it may be found 
among both mass-producing and flexibly specialised firms (1989: 531).
50. Sweating may be absent among more service-oriented small high- 
technology firms whose work-force consists of highly trained profes­
sionals, as these are often allowed discretionary responsible autonomy.
51. I have in mind the psycho-dynamic entrepreneurial personality ex­
pounded by Kets de Vries, which model is not, of course, immune from 
criticism (see Chell 1986).
52. In this discussion of paternalism I rely on Newby’s (1977) article 
on paternalism and capitalism.
53. E. P. Thompson (1978) has pointed out that exclusive dependence on 
elite meaning-systems did not exist historically, not even during tradi­
tional eighteenth-century English society. The lower strata always had 
access to some alternative cultural-meaning systems.
54. As mentioned earlier, small employers of working-class origin use 
fraternal ising tactics to handle their relations with skilled-worker 
employees when they depend upon the latter and cannot replace them 
(Goffee and Scase 1982; Goss 1991).
55. It is telling that authors taking a critical stand on industrial 
relations in small firms do not fail to refer to the capitalist nature 
of the employer-employee relationship (Curran and Stanworth 1979a, 
1979b, 1986; Rainnie and Scott 1986; Stanworth and Curran 1986; Rainnie 
1989; Goss 1991). Although artisans can easily be differentiated from 
capitalists (see previous chapter), their hiring of wage labour tars 
them with the capitalist brush.
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CHAPTER III - THE "THIRD ITALY" - A SUCCESS STORY. FACTORS EXPTATNTM1
ARTISANS1 RESURGENCE
Introduction: The ’Third Italy*
In this chapter I shall examine the circumstances and conditions 
in which the phenomenon of the 'Third Italy' came into being. The Third 
Italy is widely considered as the most successful instance of the par­
ticipation by contemporary artisans in economic development. The Italian 
artisans did not merely exist or survive 'out there’ but have undergone 
a veritable renaissance, and present a very useful case for purposes of 
comparative study. They expanded numerically, built up their businesses, 
and have become affluent. In good measure their prosperity set the tone 
for the rest of Italy, an advanced industrial country that in the 1980s 
had the fastest-growing economy in Europe, challenging Britain and 
Canada as the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world as measured by 
GDP (see Goodman 1989: 1; Thompson 1989: 540). Studying them will help 
us think about artisan potential and dynamism in a more informed way, 
especially since it has been suggested that from this particular 
phenomenon an exportable development model may be extrapolated for other 
countries.
Italy has generally been divided into an industrialised, advanced 
and affluent North, and an agrarian, backward, and poor South. But since 
1977 a Third Italy has come into being, which includes the central and 
north-eastern regions of the country, i.e. those between Rome and 
Veneto, but excludes the north-western areas, i.e. the older core in­
dustrialised regions (according to Bagnasco, mentioned in Weiss 1988: 
20). The distinguishing feature of this Third Italy is a strong con­
centration of artisanal and small manufacturing firms. These have
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largely effectuated a type of industrialisation which is a post-1945 
phenomenon.1
Italy’s artisanal as well as other small manufacturing units have 
increased in both absolute and relative terms between 1951 and 1971. By 
1976, the artisan sector comprised 1.5 million units, employing ap­
proximately 3 million persons, or 15% of the entire working population 
(Germozzi, cited in Weiss 1988: 14). Actually, the number of artisanal 
workshops should be increased by at least 30%, to include those evading 
registration (according to Barberis, mentioned in Weiss 1988: 15). 
Evidence shows that the proliferation of small manufacturing concerns 
has been maintained since, at least in absolute terms. The bulk of them 
are to be found in the regions of the Third Italy (see Bamford 1987).
Small manufacturing firms, using both craft methods and modern 
automated equipment, have provided employment and invigorated the area’s 
economy. The wide range of products manufactured there sell well, not 
only in local markets or nationally, but even abroad; they have secured 
market niches in world markets, to which they themselves directly export 
large quantities of goods. As a result, the regions of the Third Italy 
have, according to several different standards, become affluent (Sabel 
1982: 221-22; Bamford 1987), and may be seen as a prime example of a new 
socio-economic paradigm (Brusco and Sabel 1981; Brusco 1982; Piore and 
Sabel 1984).
Two types of artisans, outworkers and innovative artisans as well 
as the traditional kind, have been the centre of discussions on the 
resurgence of Italian artisans’ firms. Putting out, or outworking,2 has 
been regarded as a form of decentralised production, and the innovative 
artisan as given to with flexible specialisation. Outwork 
takes three basic forms: subcontracting with artisans (or other small 
firms), homeworking (on domestic premises), and on-site labour — only-
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subcontracting. I shall elaborate on the first two forms, as they 
directly concern our subject matter of artisans.
Outworkers/homeworkers are frequently distinguished from artisans 
by one of two criteria: (i) use of dependent labour (i.e. wage-labour), 
and (ii) employment of sophisticated types of machinery. In the presence 
of either of these we are supposedly dealing with artisans, otherwise 
with homeworkers (Solinas 1982: 331). These criteria are not, however, 
sufficient for establishing meaningful distinctions. 3 It would seem that 
a mere spatial difference has unduly been elevated into a more com­
prehensive one. For our own purposes, when very small outworkers and 
homeworkers meet the criteria set forth in earlier in this work, they 
are artisans; in other instances they approximate wage-labourers.
1. Decentralisation of production
(Xitwork has become almost a by-word for what in Italy has been 
termed decentralisation of production. This decentralisation was the 
employers’ response to the massive labour unrest of the ’hot autumn of 
1969’ in the industrialised North. The unrest resulted in an effective 
challenge of managerial prerogatives and increased labour control over 
the labour process, substantially raised wages, put a virtual ban on 
lay-offs, and initiated a new set of pro-labour legislation. It has been 
argued convincingly that by 1970, for giant corporations such as Fiat 
for example, ’it was no longer profitable ... to expand its productive 
apparatus in Turin’ (Amin 1985: 159, 171-73). In consequence, large 
employers had to find other ways of overcoming their difficulties, and 
this involved a comprehensive restructuring of the productive apparatus. 
The three main solutions were splitting up production between factories 
of the same firm, subcontracting work to ’detached workshops’ newly es­
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tablished by the company, and putting out work to artisans and other 
small firms.
Splitting-up was intended to avoid the dangers of ’concentrating 
large numbers of workers in large factories located in large industrial 
towns’ (Murray 1983: 84). It involved the mother company setting up new 
small factories in the economically depressed regions of southern Italy. 
An alternative to this strategy was to assist middle managers and 
skilled craftsmen/foremen to establish themselves as independent 
entrepreneurs. Under the direction, financing, and technical assistance 
and specifications of the old company, these established small plants 
known as ’detached workshops’ that undertook subcontracted work; most of 
their output was guaranteed to be absorbed by the chief company. Such 
new small businesses, employing 30 to 80 workers, had the benefit of a 
willing and flexible, semi-skilled workforce, which at the same time 
could continue to till its land (Murray 1983: 84).
The third way to effect decentralisation was, of course, putting 
out work to older established artisans and to other small firms. Such 
decentralisation was the means of restoring profitability and regaining 
control at shop-floor level. Apart from monopsonistic situations, which 
mostly profit large enterprises, decentralisation (particularly in the 
form of subcontracting/putting-out) offers them an additional safeguard 
against economic recession. It means that a large enterprise will 
produce well below the average demand in its own factory, so employing 
as few workers as possible. At the same time it puts out work to redress 
the difference between what it produces itself and what is demanded by 
the market. In periods of recession, the larger enterprise can continue 
its normal production, while shedding the subcontracting smaller firms 
that are then cut off from the market (Murray 1983).
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2. Techno 1 og ica 1 deve 1 opment
Decentralisation in the sense of putting-out to artisans and 
homeworkers depended for its success on a number of structural factors. 
One of these is technological progress as manifested in the work tools 
and equipment for making a number of goods that in earlier times could 
be manufactured only in large factories.
The tendency towards miniaturisation of tools and appliances based 
on a small electric motor and/or a small internal combustion engine, is 
continuing unabated, as the great variety of technological applications 
makes abundantly clear. A large and stil1-growing range of equipment now 
exists, deployed in a number of industrial sectors, that makes possible 
the production, wholly or in part, of technically sophisticated products 
in small workshops just as in large factories, and sometimes even in 
private hemes.
'This use of similar technology in large and small plants un­
derlies an important precondition for the success of extensive 
subcontracting: economies of scale are realised at the level of 
machines, not whole factories. Ten lathes in ten different rooms 
can be operated as efficiently as ten lathes in one room.' (Brusco 
and Sabel 1981: 106, 113; Brusco 1986: 191-92).
This applies particularly to multipurpose machinery, and is especially 
advantageous for very small manufacturers. Multipurpose machinery repre­
sents a lower capital investment, and may allow the additional deploy­
ment of craft skills. With special attachments or minor modifications it 
can be easily converted to perform a wide range of, for example, machin­
ing operations, and so is suitable for both long and short production 
rounds. The technological prerequisites for both large - and small-scale 
production do, therefore, exist in artisanal workshops - which I con­
sider a factor of critical importance.
Outworkers in Italy do not restrict themselves to what C. Solinas 
has very reluctantly described as ’traditional’ kinds of machines. They
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also have access to the technologically mature, but ’modern*, numeri­
cally controlled (NC) machine-tools and various programmable automation 
tools.4 For example, sewing is not done by hand but by electrically 
operated machines that may incorporate such recent technological ad­
vances as the microchip. Besides, some artisans have begun to employ 
computer-numerically controlled machine-tools (CNC) and industrial 
robots (see Bamford 1987: 21).5 Of course, beyond state-of-the-art tech­
nology, established artisans as well as homeworkers commonly use the 
traditional but by no means superseded screwdriver.
Another important dimension of technology is the process of 
modularization which involves the standardisation of the major sub­
assembled parts of a product. Although there has been an increase in the 
number of models in a given product line, say television sets, the basic 
component-modules remain the same for all models. In conjunction with 
the newer and more precise productive capacity increasingly being in­
stalled in small manufacturing units, this means that subcontracts for 
components/modules can be given to small firms or artisanal workshops, 
even to homeworkers in certain lines, with the final assembly taking 
place in some central factory (Murray 1983: 77-78; Piore and Sabel 1984: 
198-89; Dicken 1986).
3. Availability of Artisans
Another key factor in the decentralisation project was the fact 
that the artisans (and homeworkers), who were to be responsible for a 
substantial share in the production output, already existed as such and 
had the necessary skills for the outwork. These were the traditional ar­
tisans, who employed multipurpose tools and/or machinery and catered for 
local needs as well as specialist markets. Italy came into the post-war 
period with a larger sector of small manufacturers than did other west­
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ern countries. In particular, her endowment with highly skilled artisans 
has been outstanding (according to M. Paci and J. Bamford, mentioned in 
Weiss 1988: 198-99). At a time of her entry into the modern age, Italy 
was plentifully supplied with master craftsmen, the artigiani, whose 
origins can be traced back to the Middle Ages. Their exceptionally 
skilled craftsmanship and superior artistic flair has gone hand in hand 
with a ready adaptation to new technical developments that has greatly 
assisted their use of flexible tools and work methods (Goodman 1989: 
1-16).6
Since the end of the war, many more artisans have come into exis­
tence, and managed to survive — even flourish — by utilising the oppor­
tunities offered by the existing structure of manufacturing. During the 
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, before becoming independent artisans, these
people were usually employed in large factories as skilled craftsmen, 
but then laid off in the aftermath of labour protests; they were also 
employed in craft trades as workers.7 They established their own 
businesses by using as capital the redundancy money they received when 
being laid off. Oddly enough, after 1969, scores of them found them­
selves working as outworkers for the same firms that years earlier had 
laid them off.
Of course, there is no evolutionary process whereby traditional 
artisans become outworkers, but some of them adapted to industrialisa­
tion in this way. Still others, who were already outworking, continued 
to do so while mechanising and modernising their workshops (Brusco and 
Sabel 1981: 104; Piore and Sabel 1984: 154).8 In parallel to the 
decentralising of production under the direction of large companies, the 
artisans intensified sub-contracting and putting out arrangements within 
their own ranks. Some of them became specialist in very particular types 
of processes or products and, by using flexible tools and production
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methods, developed the innovativeness for which they have become 
renowned.
4. Industrial districts
Innovativeness, of course, depends on individuals or social groups 
coming up with ideas that can profitably be developed into a new design, 
production method, service, or product. Innovative artisanal firms in 
Italy are largely excrescences of decentralisation, as well as of out­
working linked to the more traditional artisans. These processes 
provided the framework which instigated the conglomerations of small 
workshops and factories, otherwise known as industrial districts.
An industrial district is a system of small and medium-sized 
firms, all situated in the same geographical area, and producing a range 
of commodities. The inhabitants of an industrial district live and work 
inside or very near the district, which is characterised by considerable 
divisions of labour. Each of the constituent firms specialises in one 
particular type of operation - be that design, the making of prototypes, 
production process, or whatever. This is the key that allows the unfold­
ing of synergies, by realising economies of scale internal to the dis­
trict but external to each constituent individual firm. Hence the com­
petitive production of a large range of products by very small firms is 
possible via extensive subcontracting (Goodman 1989: 20-23).
TVro further points on industrial districts in Italy. First, they 
emerged in areas of some earlier industrialisation, where a number of 
medium and large factories existed already, producing goods similar to 
those produced later by artisans. The innovative type of artisan emerged 
only in areas where it was possible to manufacture the bulk of the 
necessary means of production locally,® and in which the craft tradi­
tions of the artigiani had survived. Second, industrial districts are
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complemented and serviced by specialised agencies set up for that pur­
pose that assist with issues ranging from design to accounting. These 
agencies operate under the auspices of local authorities and various as­
sociations of artisans and small firms.
Industrial districts are composed of *a core of more or less equal 
enterprises bound in a complex web of competition’ (Piore and Sable 
1984: 265). Enterprises both compete with one another for contracts, and 
co-operate once these have been awarded. They form in a sense a com­
munity, in which co-operative institutions flourish among artisan 
producers, for instance for the purchase of materials, for marketing 
products, and for obtaining credit. Of course, the community concept in­
volves living in the same territory, holding common values, sharing com­
mon beliefs, having the same interests and sense of identity, orienta­
tion and/or objective.10 The sense of community may be expanded to in­
clude arrangements with trade unions and local authorities Ccomuni') — 
(Goodman 1989: 10-15; Trigilia 1986).
These arrangements tend to ensure industrial peace, as well as 
providing cheap land, and infrastructure and other facilities, such as 
communally-run nurseries for the workers’ children, facilities for craft 
training, etc. They also include some form of social regulation against 
excessive informal practices in the district. In return, notwithstanding 
the internal fragmentation of the labour market within the industrial 
districts, almost full employment is ensured even in periods of reces­
sion. This may be attributed to the success of the products of the in­
dustrial districts in the Italian and international markets (Solinas 
1982; Trigilia 1986).
The blooming of the artisans’ communities and industrial districts 
coincided with the large companies being preoccupied with labour unrest 
and attempts at decentralisation (Sabel 1982: 227). This meant that the
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latter did not compete with the small firms, thus giving them precious 
time to strengthen their organisation, skills, equipment, finances, and 
market position. As already noted, subcontracting within the industrial 
districts is extensive.11 Work done is usually of high quality and this, 
in conjunction with market success means, on the one hand, high wages 
for the skilled workers, and on the other, a mutuality of interests be­
tween all those involved in subcontracting (Piore and Sabel 1984; for a 
critique see Wood 1989: 14, 18).
Lower-quality parts and modules, however, are subcontracted to 
firms outside the industrial district, in the depressed agricultural 
regions. There the skills are less, but suitable for the lower-qual ity, 
mass-produced products; wages are lower too. During recessions, firms in 
industrial districts always have the option of re-centralising these ac­
tivities which, though less profitable, are nevertheless necessary. In 
this way, near to full employment is maintained within the industrial 
district, but the periphery suffers (Solinas 1982).
5. Flexible specialisation and the innovative artisan
The small innovative artisanal firm has been seen as an essen­
tially new element brought to the surface by the resurgence of artisanal 
activity and the decentralisation of production in Italy. Some writers 
even see it as an alternative paradigm of production, i.e. ‘flexible 
specialisation*.12
Flexible specialisation is regarded as the opposite of mass 
production, Fordism particularly, and an alternative to it. The 
flexible-specialisation thesis holds that firms today, instead of 
producing mass-production goods in large quantities, can profitably 
produce specialised goods for particular market niches. The production 
becomes flexible when it can be geared to produce a small batch of one
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specialised product, and then of another and another, and so on. This 
can be done with modern technology, which allows a continual reshaping 
of the productive process through re-arranging/re-programming machine 
components/software (Piore and Sabel 1984, chapter 10).13 The workforce 
needs to be highly skilled, well trained in both theory and on-the-job, 
and there is built-in co-operation at shop-floor level between workers- 
technicians and managers, which makes the work psychologically more 
rewarding. In fact, flexible specialisation is a return to the multi­
faceted craftsman, to craft practices on the basis of high technology. 
At the same time, there is still room for workers doing unskilled jobs, 
e.g. packing.
The technological foundation of flexible specialisation is the
computer and computer-mediated control, with computer-controlled
machines adaptable to particular purposes and personal habits. In the
words of Piore and Sabel:
'The computer is thus a machine that meets Marx's definition of an 
artisan's tool: it is an instrument that responds to and extends 
the productive capacities of the user. ... The advent of the com­
puter restores human control over the production process; 
machinery again is subordinate to the operator' (1984: 261).
Accordingly, it has been argued that this particular technological 
development bridges conception and execution in the same person. It has 
made feasible the elimination of hierarchical structures in production, 
so that in theory at least it becomes conceivable that worker subsump­
tion may become structurally impossible.14 However, the social peace the 
computer was expected to help bring about is still an ideal only and 
this form of technological determinism has proved to be rather 
superfluous.1S
Disagreeing, Williams et al. (1987) have objected that, not­
withstanding some degree of plausibility, several of the postulates of 
flexible specialisation, an well as the differences between this form
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and mass production, are lacking in specificity. Since the thesis can 
give no clear-cut criteria for dominance of the one or the other form of 
production, it is conceptually flawed and inadequate. On his part, S. 
Vood (1989), investigating whether work has been transformed in the 
1980s, focuses on the distinction between numerical or external 
flexibility ’which is concerned with enhancing the firm’s ability to ad­
just labour inputs to fluctuations in output* (ibid.), and functional or 
internal flexibility ’which is about what workers "do, and consists of a 
firm’s ability to adjust and deploy the skills of its employees to match 
the tasks required by its changing workload, production methods and/or 
technology"* (NEDO quoted in ibid.: 1). He is careful to highlight some 
of the difficulties that bedevil the issue of flexible specialisation. 
It is particularly interesting to note that sectors such as engineering, 
in which small-and medium-batch production dominated, already had a 
flexible element long before any idea about flexible specialisation had 
surfaced (see ibid.: 29); interestingly enough in the Emilia-Romagna 
region in Italy, the show-case of Third Italy, one of the artisans' main 
areas of specialisation was/is mechanical engineering. Wood, observes 
that though we need not discard the notion of flexibility, we do need to 
define it more precisely. This can be done by studying it not in isola­
tion, but by integrating it into more sober accounts of the contradic­
tory character of the various forms of work organisation.
However, despite these criticisms and admonitions the post-Fordist 
argument provides an interesting interpretation of the small firm resur­
gence in advanced countries. The claim is that competitive pressure 
leads firms to aim for greater efficiency to reduce their costs and that 
this in part is achieved by means of numerical flexibility. Thus, a firm 
employs only the minimum of workers required at any point in time with 
the irregular parts of its work being carried out by usually small
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specialist firms to which they are subcontracted out. In this sense the 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation encourages the growth of small firms 
and even of self employment (Warde 1993). This in part explains why 
there has been a resurgence of small firms in a number of advanced 
countries in recent years, especially in the Third Italy in which small 
units are often artisanal.
The range of new products put out by innovating artisans in their 
industrial districts is limited only by the particular branches of 
production available in a locality, which may include both mature and 
newer branches of manufacturing.16 New products are not limited by 
monopsony. Instead, producers themselves, or through their marketing and 
other associations, sell to national and international markets. The 
availability of small subcontracting firms within the industrial dis­
tricts means that parts and components for the new products can be sub­
contracted at competitive prices. The innovative ability, therefore, is 
actually linked up with the way the industrial district operates (Brusco 
1986).
In the Italian context, therefore, flexible specialisation can be 
seen as an offshoot of decentralisation, or as an outcome of development 
of independent artisans coinciding with new technologies, or as a result 
of both of these two sets of circumstances together, and a facet of 
post-Fordism. This, of course, does not mean that artisans who are de­
pendent subcontractors will necessarily evolve into becoming innovative; 
most of them will not. Nor that artisans who have not been involved with 
subcontracting, and/or have developed in the context of a circuit of 
small and very small firms operating in parallel or symbiotically with 
or in antagonism to the economy of large-scale enterprises, would be led 
into becoming innovators; again, most of them will not. Nevertheless, 
one may confidently assume that the numerical preponderance of very
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small units playing a complimentary or independent role in an advance 
economy, greatly conduces to the development in their ranks of flexibly 
specialised firms.
6. Labour relations
The subcontracting small firms have often been subjected to 
sweated labour. Sweating, according to one commentary, ’is the generic 
response of embattled firms [whether mass or small producers] that can­
not innovate’ (Piore and Sabel 1984: 264). While such a comment may not 
be entirely accurate, especially in its implication that innovative 
firms dispense with sweating,17 it does convey some truth. Subcontract­
ing small firms, whether within the industrial districts or more 
peripheral, do face cut-throat competition. This is a matter of the of­
ten monopsonistic situation between the commissioning firm and the sub­
contracted small firm, which routinely results in unequal exchange be­
tween them. Consequently, the simp1e-reproduction squeeze operates upon 
the latter, which means low wages and sweating for the employees of 
small firms and even for their artisan-entrepreneurs.18 Intense competi­
tion is also conducive to a host of underground activities in which ar­
tisans and other small firms excel (Contini 1982; Del Boca 1982; Brusco 
1986: 186;).
In the literature on the Third Italy there is a tendency to ex­
onerate the small artisan firms from charges of sweating. The usually 
close contact of working side by side and col laboratively is invoked to 
point out that relations between wage-labourers and artisans are infor­
mal, fraternal and relaxed, and that skilled workers are treated by 
their artisan employers as expert colleagues. Ihis seems to be something 
of an exaggeration, but however ideal the situation, it remains a fact 
that the workers are under the constant control of their employers and
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the employers’ families. In the case of firms with a work-force of five 
to ten or even fifteen persons, owner-family members’ surveillance, 
which does exist, often becomes intolerable. Therefore, the celebrated 
social peace found in the artisans’ sector of the economy is more an in­
dication of effective employer control than of arrangements with trade 
unions, as is claimed.19
Sweating certainly indicates that there are strata of employees in 
artisans workshops, mostly young people, women and the old and retired, 
that perform unskilled and semi-skilled labour and are low paid. Next to 
them one finds the skilled core workers who receive high wages, and on 
top are the various types of artisans and their families who reap the 
profits and are well off. Therefore, the labour market is segmented at 
the micro-level (Ruggiero 1987). Accordingly, the celebrated ’amoeba- 
like ability of the Italian small firm to respond to changing demand* 
(G. Becattini, quoted in Goodman 1989: 2), is founded upon utterly ex­
ploitative labour relations that no measure of economic success of the 
artisan firms should be allowed to conceal.
Another objectionable facet of the Third Italy concerns the role 
of women in the artisan sector. As wives or daughters of artisans they 
may enjoy the fruits of the newly discovered prosperity of their men­
folk. As labourers (no available information indicating otherwise) they 
are restricted to their stereotyped role: that of performing rather un­
skilled types of work in a patriarchal context. In either case the es­
tablished patterns do not seem to have changed. Obviously, compared to 
Piore and Sabel’s pronouncements on the improved ’quality of work life’, 
or the ’convergence between conception and execution*, supposedly 
brought about by flexible specialisation, the actual situation shows a 
gap that borders on mockery.
119
7. The role of the state
The role of the central state is a key factor in artisan resur­
gence. Artisans in Italy are not a professional but a legal category 
(see the first foonote of the present chapter). L. Weiss has pointed out 
that the legal definition, which makes it possible to distinguish the 
artisans from other businessmen, has been instrumental in the Italian 
state’s pursuance of a series of important pro-artisan measures (1988: 
57, 204).
Thus, they have been accorded the benefit of special legal protec­
tion, lower taxes and employers’ social-security contributions, reduced 
premiums for welfare benefits, exemption from keeping accounts and from 
bankruptcy proceedings, access to loans and loan guarantees, and financ­
ing at especially low interest rates. The state also assisted the col­
laboration of artisans and small firms by sponsoring various schemes; 
those participating enjoyed additional subsidies, infrastructure 
development and preferential tax treatment (Weiss 1988: 57-58). Addi­
tionally, important clauses of the Workers’ Statute do not apply to 
small concerns, e.g. provisions against unfair dismissals (Brusco 1982: 
174; Solinas 1982: 331; Murray 1983: 80; Weiss 1984: 225; Artioli, Ianno 
and Barberis 1986). In effect, state support was so great as to effec­
tively persuade most artisans not to transgress the legal limits for 
fear of loosing it.
The importance of financing for artisan regeneration deserves to 
be highlighted. The Artigiancassa was the most important vehicle of 
government-led artisan financing. Between the years 1952 and 1976 it 
financed about one-third of all registered artisans, with two-thirds of 
the loans going to new firms. These loans were mostly for ten years with 
a nominal 3 to 5% interest, at a time when normal loan-interest rates 
stood at around 15% (Allen and Stevenson, mentioned in Weiss 1988: 66).
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Well over half of these loans went to the Third Italy, which indicates 
the importance of state-sponsored financing in the region’s 
development.20 Additionally, Italian artisans have been given financing 
by various local banks, usually called savings or artisans’ banks, which 
derive their funds locally, and whose managers personally know new 
entrants into the sector and their situation, and can decide on granting 
loans on the basis of local conditions.21 Local banks also sponsor 
centres providing specialist services to artisans. Similarly the In- 
stitutione Intermedia tore con 1'Estero assists artisans with their 
export-import business (see Goodman 1989: 24-25). Clearly, in the 
Italian case we can establish a tradition of industrial banking (close 
to that of Germany or Japan) and a willingness to assist industrialisa­
tion ’from below*.22 The state’s role has been paramount, but private 
financial institutions have also adopted industrial-banking attitudes 
and practices towards artisans. Undoubtedly, this is a factor which has 
greatly enhanced the artisans* resurgence.23
Although most authors are persuaded that the state has played the 
paramount role in supporting the artisans’ proliferation and develop­
ment, this view is not a unanimous. J. Bamford considers that actually 
the state has done very little to foster the artisans growth, and that 
their proliferation has been largely a result of their independence and 
self-reliance.24 Bamford does, however, acknowledge the absence of 
government interference with artisans, and s tat e-apparatus laxness in 
enforcing certain legal statutes applying to them (Bamford 1977: 14-15). 
Of course, non-action can also be effective, and such non-interference 
could be seen as a complementary means by which the state encouraged the 
establishment of small businesses.
This distinctly favourable treatment of .artisans was part and par­
cel of the Italian state’s project to sustain the stratum as part of the
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middle classes. The aim was to enlarge the ranks of the property owners. 
This implied a diffusion of entrepreneurship to wider strata of the 
population, as well as manufacturing being spread among many newly- 
created small artisanal firms. These were encouraged to modernise, but 
not to expand beyond the confines of the legal definition of artisans. 
Once created, the new propertied class had a stake in upholding the 
socio-economic system, so they had to be maintained intact. The idea was 
to create a force which would act as a bulwark against the working class 
post-war challenge, real or imaginary (Weiss 1988: 153-55). Thus, those 
controlling the state, i.e. the Christian Democrat (DC) coalitions that 
dominated it in the post-war period, pursued, as part of a political and 
social strategy, policies that to varying degrees encouraged and sup­
ported artisans. Moreover, it has been suggested that the DC also 
pursued its pro-artisan policies because it became a captive of its own 
ideological pronouncements (Weiss 1988: 158).
The Italian state’s early pursuit and administration of a pro­
artisan and pro small-business industrial policy, was at the time (in 
the 1950s) not only a departure from the orthodoxy of gigantism, but 
also meant heavy state intervention while paying lip service to the 
free-market principles. That intervention did not subside in more recent 
years, but continued relentlessly into the 1980s, even though this has 
at times, required deficit financing (Thompson 1989: 541). The pay-off 
has been the establishment of a diffuse, small-scale industrial base.
DC-controlled central-state assistance to artisans was not the 
only politically inspired intervention for their benefit. The wooing of 
artisans was continued at local level, seeing that much of the implemen­
tation of pro-artisan measures had to be organised and administered, on 
the spot. Since many artisans were communists or left-wing sympathisers,
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in areas of the Third Italy where local government was controlled by the 
communists, as well as where it was not,25 the DC’s above-mentioned per­
ception on the state’s role in strengthening pri vat e-property institu­
tions was enhanced (Weiss 1984, 1988: 48). Yet obviously, state measures 
in support of artisans were not in themselves sufficient to lure them 
away from communist influence and towards DC values. The intense party- 
political struggle over the middle classes at national level was 
reflected regionally and locally too.
But regional and local governments (both provincial and municipal) 
were not simply the mouthpiece of central party directives. The Italian 
local authorities enjoy a significant degree of autonomy, and accord­
ingly take their own stand on a number of issues in their area of juris­
diction. Local authorities draw their power from long traditions of lo­
cal community self-government (Bamford 1987: 23) and from the relevant 
stipulations of the liberal 1948 constitution. The latter empower them 
with extensive administrative authority and some financial resources. 
Therefore, notwithstanding overall political affiliations, local 
authorities were well placed to extending their own support towards ar­
tisans. They knew that by doing so they would raise living conditions, 
secure employment, and control urban development (Sabel and Righi 1989) 
— in a word, improve their locality.
So, on the one hand, in regions in which the communists controlled 
local government (such as Emilia-Romagna), the PCI strategy of 
neutralising the petty bourgeoisie, or even winning it over, was an im­
portant consideration in the mobilisation of local authorities to serve 
the artisanat. The PCI aimed to mediate the representation of local in­
terests and to promote the areas it controlled as models, which the 
central DC-dominated government could not emulate (Heilman 1975; Brusco 
1982; Trigilia 1986; Brusco and Righi 1989). To this purpose it fostered
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agreements at local level between trade unions and artisans, in a situa­
tion where the three factors involved were politically homogeneous, i.e. 
when it was a controlled process. For example, by watering down labour 
demands and alleviating the more extreme forms of exploitation, agree­
ment was reached on wages or lay-offs, forging in the process a measure 
of social peace and understanding. To the extent that such agreements 
were respected and considered as equitable, the local authorities became 
more credible.
Among other pro-artisan measures taken in the ’red* areas (e.g. in 
Modena), were the establishment of a number of artisan parks (industrial 
districts) at a fraction of current costs,28 a loan-guarantee artisans* 
co-operative giving low-interest loans on the basis of the artisan’s 
reputation and skill, and ’real* service centres27. It should be noted 
that integral to the policy pursued by local authorities was the active 
involvement of artisans in both the making and implementing of deci­
sions. In fact, the above projects were operated largely by artisans 
themselves, usually well known and respected by the others, who did not 
receive any payment for participating in meetings on who would get a 
loan or who was to be allocated a workshop in the new industrial park; 
in this respect they are reminiscent of medieval guilds (Brusco and 
Righi 1989: 411-13). Obviously such measures helped build up the requi­
site consensus, presented local government as credible, and elevated the 
self-image of the citizens in that they perceived themselves as members 
of a collaborative community.
On the other hand, in DC-dominated areas (such as Veneto), trade- 
union demands were softened at the instigation of pro-Catholic and DC 
unionists. This was the result of a compromise between local community 
traditions and the DC’s ideology of small ownership (Weiss 1984), and 
mediated by both the Catholic Church and the DC in an effort to
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safeguard the areas under their control, and to prevent the infiltration 
of communist influence. Projects for assisting artisans similar to those 
described above, and urging them to participate in running their own af­
fairs, were put forward also in ’white* areas.
In both ’red’ and ’white* regions, the primary unit of reference 
is the locality in which the industrial districts are situated. The 
policies that were pursued by the municipalities were not directed at 
single firms but, as Brusco and Righi point out, ’to the system of 
firms, and tend to equip the sector with those capacities which it can­
not supply through its own means* (1989: 419-20). This phenomenon of 
co-operation among artisans themselves and with the local authorities, 
in the context of industrial districts and/or localities, has been 
described as neo-localism (Trigilia 1986). It should be noted, however, 
that although the standing and backing of local authorities helped to 
bring about the change, it could not have been effectively pursued and 
sustained if it had met with opposition from central government. The 
success of the local initiatives was possible only because a central- 
government industrial policy already existed that addressed itself to 
the problem of artisans and small businessmen - as Brusco and Righi 
maintain (1989: 421-22), themselves actively participating in local 
authority initiatives.
Overall, therefore, the political element, at both national and 
local level has provided widespread support for artisans. The Third 
Italy seems to have benefited from a rare instance where party-political 
antagonism has led the political parties to compete in pro-artisan 
measures and policies. More recently the artisans, having greatly 
profited from the massive help they were given during this struggle over 
their hearts and votes, have begun to depart from the tutelage of the 
country’s mainstream political parties. It appears that large numbers of
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artisans and the so-called small and medium entrepreneurs participate in 
and/or follow the various ’leagues’ by means of which they claim their 
own independent political representation. These political formations 
have been at the very heart of the significant changes that are restruc­
turing Italy’s political system (Solaro 1992: 29-30).
8. The family
It has been stated that artisanal firms can cope with the reces­
sion much better than larger ones. This is often attributed to the long 
hours of work, the high intensity of labour, the various underground ac­
tivities, and the role of the family. Indeed, the family does appear to 
play a vital part with regard to outwork, and without it this productive 
arrangement would not be possible. The general scheme is that artisans 
and homeworkers, by being able to draw on family labour which is paid 
poorly or not at all,2* can survive periods of crisis by lowering their 
consumption requirements, laying off any employees they may have, inten­
sify their own labour contribution, and still sell cheaply. Their 
renowned resilience and tolerance of high degrees of self-exploitation’ 
is an important element in their continuance in action.
The type of family is of course very important: it this case it is 
a more or less extended family. The Third Italy includes rural regions 
where, in contrast to the rest of the country, productive relationships 
on metayage (mezzadria, i.e. a form of share-cropping) predominated un­
til the 1960s, alongside some tenant farming (boaro). The mfetayage sys­
tem involved the whole of a family; in the course of its development 
cycle this was at first nuclear and then, increasingly after the 40th 
birthday of the head-of-family it became extended (Bamford 1987: 17). 
Co-ordination and co-operative practices of family labour for agricul­
tural work were absolutely necessary since, notwithstanding the formally
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individual character of the share-cropping contract, in fact the 
landlord entered into an agreement with the entire share-cropper’s 
family, over which he exercised strict controls and from whom he 
demanded hard work. In response, the share-cropping family had to or­
ganise intra-familial divisions of labour, and some of its members had 
to assume new responsibilities. The family also needed to be led, and 
the head-of-family had to devise means of persuading his people to work 
harder, to save, and to evade the landlord’s demands. Among other things 
this meant learning how to calculate, maximise profits and acquire an 
acquisitive mentality (see ibid.: 19-20). Of course, these new tasks and 
abilities form a good part of what we associate with entrepreneurship.
The argument is not only that there is a high correlation between 
artisans and direct experience in metayage, but that entrepreneurial 
skills have passed ’through a slow sedimentation of managerial com­
petence within the whole social texture* of the regions concerned 
(Brusco 1982: 180; 1986: 197-98). The gradual mechanisation of agricul­
ture in the ’third Italy* was accompanied by migration to the cities. 
Although there the migrants laboured in factories, they did not lose 
their mutually supportive relationships with their rural families. When 
the time was right, or when they were laid off, they left the factory, 
to set up a business of their own, having the benefit of family backing 
and some entrepreneurial experience, to which they added their own, 
newly-acquired technical skills.
In the urban setting, the family not only plays an important role 
as the source of unpaid or cheap labour, it is also a major provider of 
starting capital (in about 25% of the cases, according to Bamford 1987: 
21). Moreover, it is the unit which one can fall back on when a small 
business has failed, or when support for expansion is required. Often 
one or more members of the family work full-time in a formal, and part­
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time in a secondary job. The income from these jobs allows the family to 
meet its basic consumption requirements. Business problems are tackled 
by all of them together as a unit, not by individuals (Del Boca and 
Forte 1982; Goddard 1981). It has been argued that kinship relations are 
actually the structuring principle of industrial organisation in ar­
tisanal firms, and greatly facilitate the accumulation of capital, espe­
cially in the earlier stages of the productive decentralisation and of 
the emergence of small firms (Piore and Sabel 1984: 228). Obviously, the 
unbroken familial entrepreneurial traditions, maintained due to rural- 
urban interpenetration, and the cohesion of the family unit is a crucial 
factor in artisan resurgence.
Concluding remarks
What are the artisans of the Third Italy — instances of SCP, or 
budding capitalist? This question is not usually asked in the relevant 
literature. However, implicitly, the particular strand of artisans is 
seen as more akin to capitalism - see for instance Weiss' (1988) employ­
ment of the ambiguous terms 'micro-capitalists' and 'micro-capitalism'. 
I think that ambiguity of class is a built-in element of artisans in the 
Italian context; these are defined in such a way that pure small 
capitalists are included in their ranks. In general, writers use the of­
ficial category without purging it of foreign matter.
Artisans in the Third Italy have unquestionably exhibited 
dynamism, but this was not endogenous. It stemmed largely from external 
sources - organisation and technologies of production, to mention only 
two. Various social and political forces (be they intellectuals, politi­
cal parties, or the state both local or central), have addressed them 
for their own purposes, and indeed constituted them as a distinct social 
group. To this end they have provided the artisans with the relevant or­
128
ganisational technologies and framework, and have played a key role in 
the artisans’ collective organisational upgrading. The artisans* tools, 
machinery, and industrial work methods were not developed or produced by 
themselves, but became available once they were externally subsidised. 
On their own, artisans were not able to emerge as collective actors. 
What in earlier chapters was recognised as their individual basic cir­
cumstances and structure isolates rather than unites them, leading them 
away from intensive horizontal (social) and vertical (productive) 
relationships. Artisans re-emerged as such in the context of an economy 
dominated by capitalism, only when consciousness and the necessary co­
operative organisation and technologies came from the outside, from the 
'window*. Their development and success, which are critically dependent 
on their co-operation and collaboration, has largely been the result of 
externally determined processes.
Most probably, artisans left on their own would undergo processes 
of differentiation, although one should not be hastly in forecasting 
their imminent doom. However, given the particular context, such dif­
ferentiation is rather unlikely. The initial political imperatives that 
helped so many artisans to become established may no longer be in opera­
tive, but their political, economic, and social importance is not negli­
gible - it is actually on the rise. Nowadays, artisans as collective ac­
tors form particular constituencies which may well put sufficient pres­
sure on political elites to continue providing them with assistance and 
privileges and thus maintaining them collectively. In this sense the fu­
ture of the stratum does seem to be assured.
Although Italy was a late-comer to industrial society, as E. Good­
man (1989) points out, artisan resurgence took place in a context which 
must be considered industrially advanced. The dislocations brought about 
by the process of industrialisation did not produce massive destruction
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of family and smal 1-community systems in the Third Italy. Instead, they 
conduced to providing the framework and opportunities (including the 
large-scale capitalist establishments that faced with a crisis of the 
Fordist model of accumulation needed complementary smaller units to 
transcend it) to which the artisans’ response led to their ’take-off*. 
Italy’s position in the international division of labour has brought 
about a specialisation, compatible with and conducive to small-sized 
firm development. The emphasis on the political involvement in artisan 
development must not obscure the fact that the artisans’ success was the 
result not merely of state intervention. Artisan producers themselves 
played an active part in the further specialisation of their nation’s 
manufacturing industry. As M. Paci has pointed out (1986: 157), within 
this overall specialisation, and drawing on traditions of craftsmanship, 
entrepreneurship, family support, and communal collaborative practices 
of mutual dependence which they further enhanced, Italy’s artisans 
utilised or became receptors of politically motivated infrastructure 
developments and multifarious local/central state help, and relied upon 
flexible tools and a compression of labour cost to pursue a distinct and 
dynamic course of their own.
Finally, the experience of the Third Italy has often been recom­
mended as a model to be emulated elsewhere. However, it would seem from 
the hot very successful attempts to do so in the Italian South, that to 
achieve the synergies required for diffused industrialisation is not 
simply a matter of pouring more money into a subsidising artisanat (Amin
1985). Furthermore, attempts to isolate this or that feature of the 
Italian artisans with a view to duplicate it in social environments of 
quite different cultural, socio-economic and political structures, would 
prove very difficult. In the industrial districts of central and north­
eastern Italy, a set of factors operating at various levels (grass-root,
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medium and macro), converged and entwined at particular points in time 
to produce the resurgence of artisanal activities.29 I think that it is 
important to realise that artisan resurgence has been a total social 
phenomenon. While the relative weight of the various factors on artisan 
resurgence is not the same throughout, all of them were indispensable 
for its unfolding. The way to verify this is, of course, to ask 
hypothetically what would have been the most likely course of events, 
had each single entailing factor been missing. Therefore, a study of the 
Third Italy can be helpful to those who consider it the most successful 
case of small-scale industrial development and accord it the standing of 
a paradigm, only if they survey the phenomenon in its totality.
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Notes to Chapter III
1. The official Italian definition of units and small industrial firms 
is as follows. Artisans’ workshops have a maximum workforce of ten; 
depending on their product, this may include from five to ten appren­
tices, raising the workforce to a maximum of twenty. Small firms have no 
more than one hundred employees (Brusco and Sabel 1981: 105; Weiss 1988: 
14-15; Goodman 1989: 8, 18).
2. Outwork, as the term indicates, involves the placement of work out­
side the firm, i.e. formal or informal subcontracting. It implies that 
work currently placed outside the firm was earlier produced within it, a 
condition which may be reversed again in the future. Ihe outworker may 
or may not be provided with materials, credits, blueprints, and 
machinery. The main characteristic of outwork is that
’ . . . labour can be purchased in discrete and variable 
amounts, payment is directly related to output [there are no 
fixed costs 1, and the labour process is unsupervised’ (see 
Rubery and Wilkinson 1981: 116; also Goddard 1981, where
there is a description of flexibility from the perspective
of the outworkers).
Outwork is therefore an extremely flexible form of work organisation, 
certainly from the perspective of the firm doing so, but often from the 
outworkers’ point of view too.
3. On the one hand, ’dependent' labour is not necessarily typical of ar­
tisans; it can be found in homeworkers too (Goddard 1981: 32; Rubery and
Wilkinson 1981: 130). On the other, the criterion of sophisticated 
machinery is meaningless unless the level of sophistication is 
specified, which it is not.
4. The ancestor of the modern NC machine tools is the Jacquard loom. It 
was developed between 1800 and 1820 by artisans in the Lyon silk trade, 
and allowed some measure of programming and correction. M. Piore and C. 
Sabel have given the following description of its mode of operation:
’The loom wove complex favonn&s or brocaded patterns according to 
instructions on perforated cards which automatically raised and 
lowered the threads of the warp in the appropriate sequence' 
(1984: 30).
In a study of work processes involving machining equipment, H. 
Shaiken, S. Herzenberg and S. Kuhn explain some of the different func­
tions of NC and CNC machine tools.
’The earliest NC machinery used a punched tape to guide the cut­
ting tool. The micro-computer inside CNC machines facilitates the 
integration of machinists into product in planning by creating the 
possibility of programming or editing right at the machine’ (1986:
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171).
See also R. Walkers’ expos6 of the principles of programmable automated 
machinery (1989: 60-71).
5. By comparison, very small firms in some other developed countries 
have been known to operate CNC and other high-tech industrial equipment 
with a greater frequency than in Italy. In Japan, for instance, it has 
been reported that a father-and-son firm operates with ’a leased, 
second-hand robot system that hammers out components in a "backshed" 
workshop’ (reported by Macrae, mentioned in Murray 1983: 97). In the 
U.S., firms of only six employees have been reported to operate CNC 
millers and lathes (see Shaiken, Herzenberg and Kuhn 1986: 170).
6. Traditional artisans are master craftsmen, very highly skilled - ’it 
is for [them] to use the machine and not for the machine to use [them]’ 
- and independent (Goodman 1989: 6). Their products are characterised by 
good design and a sense of form. In considering the object to be made, 
the artisan has to take into account what his customer could afford, as 
well as the use to which the product is to be put. If the two seem in­
compatible, it is up to him to find new solutions, innovating in the 
process. S. Brusco says:
'The tools used by the traditional artisans are in general simple 
and multi-purpose. The skill of the artisan lies here: in being 
able to cope in complex situations, working with few tools, often 
with unsuitable material.* (quoted in ibid.: 4).
Smaller artisans concentrated more on commissioned craftwork, while 
the larger produced goods for wider sale in retail markets; they might 
sub-contract work to other artisans or practice putting-out to 
homeworkers (ibid.: 6-9).
7. The proletarian origins of most artisans in the 1970s has been well 
established. For instance, it was 80% in Lombardy (mentioned in Weiss 
1988: 199).
8. Other groups of people utilised for the purposes of decentralised 
production included those with a commercial background who then switched 
into production (Brusco 1986: 186).
9. This indicates, or rather reconfirms, the importance of the machine- 
building industry in prompting innovation and growth.
10. It is no accident that in a number of countries various types of 
small businesses are the domain of entrepreneurs who share a common eth­
nic background and belong to a particular community; on the ethnic 
aspect of small entrepreneurs see Boissevain 1981; Boissevain and 
Grotenberg 1987; Ward 1987, 1991.
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11. Twenty to thirty subcontracting arrangements per year are considered 
normal for each contract awarded; whole subcontracting chains are in­
volved (Goodman 1989; 23).
12. Flexible specialisation is a notion developed largely in M. Piore 
and C. Sabel*s The Second Industrial Divide (1984). Other works had 
prepared the ground for it or support its main thesis (for instance 
Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 1969; 1975; Sabel 1982; Sabel and Zeit- 
lin 1985; Sabel, Herrigel, Deeg and Kazis 1989). A useful review of the 
economic premises of flexible specialisation and an introduction to the 
pertinent discussion is found in Lyberaki 1991; 31-47).
13. Flexibility, however, should not be considered incompatible with the 
development of standardisation (Wood 1989: 43). Actually, for Third Ita- 
lys’ artisans and small-firm industrial districts, flexibility operates 
at the level of the district, on the basis of a wel 1-organised 
specialisation and standardisation of production in the individual 
firms.
14. According to G. F. Thompson, flexible specialisation is not unitary, 
but assumes various forms, some of them more ’dynamic progressive* 
others more ‘stagnating backward*. He considers the former as building 
blocks for a future socialism (see Thompson 1989: 527-30).
15. Somewhat ironically, only two years after the major pronouncements 
on flexible specialisation were made, M. Piore (1986) was appealing to 
employers not to lay off workers made redundant by the introduction of 
new technologies, and asked employees to accept alternative employment 
schemes. It so happened that the next article of the same issue of the 
journal that had published Piore*s admonitions to management and workers 
presented solid evidence that the burgeoning small innovative firms 
utilising flexible technology were sweating their workers (Shaiken, Her- 
zenberg and Kuhn 1986). In his study of instant print workshops in 
England, D. Goss (1987) reached similar conclusions.
16. As Sabel, Herrigel, Deeg and Kazis point out, ’there are, strictly 
speaking, no "mature” industries* (1989: 374) in terms of innovative 
potential. An example is the textiles industry which due to new fibres, 
dyes, and designs has undergone a resurgence, especially so in Italy.
17. According to G. Thompson, sweating is the technological backward 
aspect of craft production. As a production technology it may be found 
among both mass-producing and flexible-specialisation firms (1989: 531).
18. A good criterion of the artisanal firm’s degree of dependence/ in­
dependence is the number of clients it has (Brusco 1986: 190) and their 
relevant share of orders.
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19. Trade unions, on the one hand, organise and guide only a very small 
fraction of workers in the artisanal sector; workers there are 
notoriously difficult to organise. On the other, trade unions are in­
variably a function of party-political evaluation and strategy and so, 
while claiming to represent the workers, they will enter into agreement 
with artisans as part of a wider strategy to co-opt them (Trigilia
1986).
20. Statistical data and other information on Artigiancassa loans taken 
are presented in Weiss 1988; 58-80, 212-22.
21. These banks have counterparts in Germany, the Handwerk savings or 
co-operative banks, notes Goodman (1989: 24).
22. On industrial banking see the definition of Yao-Su Hu, quoted in M. 
Binks (1991; 152).
23. The character of the Italian banking and financing differs sharply 
from that in Britain. The latter, it is claimed, lacks all industrial- 
banking tradition, and this has led to a hands-off policy vis-A-vis in­
dustrial firms, a situation that cannot be changed overnight. In Britain 
and other countries with similar banking traditions, artisans and small 
firms could not expect financing in the foreseeable future, hence a 
replication of the Italian experience would face severe difficulties 
(Binks 1991).
24. Bamford's premise is that the Italian state did very little for 
small manufacturing when compared to other European governments/states, 
fostering instead an industrialisation that relied on co-operation with 
banks and large firms (Bamford 1987: 13). This position is contrary to 
Weiss' well documented and persuasive thesis that Italian state support 
was decisive in the unfolding of the diffused small-scale industrialisa­
tion (Weiss 1988: chapters 6 and 7). However, Weiss does point out that 
the Christian-Democratic strategy was not unilinear; indeed at times a 
big business strategy was pursued (ibid.: 130). Overall, however, a 
policy of ’walking on two legs' was implemented, aiming to preserve and 
modernise small firms. At the time of the policy's initial implementa­
tion in the late 1950s and 1960s, it involved a partial brake-away from 
the 'gigantism' which then dominated economic thinking (ibid.: 154).
25. As part of the partisan movement and the political struggles of the 
post-war period, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) had forged ties with 
the workers and peasants during the last years of fascist rule in Italy. 
As artisans usually come from the working class, they have retained 
their identification with the PCI (Heilman 1975; Sabel 1982: 229).
26. Artisans purchased municipal plots at 25% of current prices with the 
help of a low-interest loan directly guaranteed for the mortgage by the
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municipality. Likewise they purchased municipality-built workshop sheds 
at prices down by 50% of privately-built ones. Priority in shed alloca­
tion went to consortia of artisans as part of a general policy of en­
couraging producers associations. Priority was also given to artisans 
already established in town but whose workshop emitted pollutants; they 
were relocated in the workshop park. (Brusco and Righi 1989: 409).
27. The agency behind these ’real5 service centres, set up with public 
funds, were: regional government, the municipality, artisans’ associa­
tions, Cofindustria (the association of Italian industrialists), and 
other producers’ associations. As an example, a ’real’ service centre 
specialising in knitwear provided the following services: a periodic 
market-trends report, precise information on raw materials and their 
prices, literature on equipment and notes comparing the technical 
characteristics of machinery, and well-timed fashion reports (Brusco and 
Righi 1989: 417-18).
28. According to one report in the Val d ’Elsa, 40% of artisan units used 
family labour and that of other kin (mentioned in Bamford 1987: 21).
29. Similar, Japan’s extraordinary success in economic development may 
most fruitfully be explained in terms of a convergence of factors 
(Thompson 1989: 541-42).
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Part Two: Artisans in Greek Society and Economy
CHAPTER IV - HISTORICAL LEGACY
Introduction
This chapter will provide some of the macro-sociological and his­
torical background for the emergence, development, and character of the 
numerous artisanal strata in contemporary Greece. In particular, the aim 
is to identify the ’the structure of the situation, the structure of op­
portunities’ (Boudon 1987: 59), that impelled artisans to become what 
they are. I propose to do so by delving into the repercussions of World 
War II, foreign occupation and the civil war in Greece, and by discuss­
ing the early post-war attempts at reconstruction and development, which 
are given in some detail.
1 Post-war Developments
1.1 Early post-war developments
This section presents an overview of the country’s crucial early 
post-war situation. I shall then attempt to ascertain whether there is a 
relationship between Greece’s particular type of industrialisation and 
the increase in the number of artisans and artisanal manufacturing 
units, what it consists of, and in what ways it affects the continuing 
revival of the artisanate - the idea being that it both imposes struc­
tural constraints and creates openings for possible alternative forms of 
action in the pursuit of a work career and earning a living.
A first question which must be answered is, why is it necessary to 
delve into the 1940s for understanding artisans at the end of the twen­
tieth century? As I see it, it was during that period, in the 1940s,
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that the artisans’ stratum was given a new lease of life, due to 
processes that marked the country’s post-war trajectory. These processes 
were directly related to the severe and violent structural discon­
tinuities and the serious challenges to ordained hierarchies brought 
about by a decade of war, foreign occupation, and civil war. In such a 
context, decisions taken on the course of the country obtained constitu­
tive importance. They initiated new developments and gave a new twist to 
older societal features. In this sense, the 1940s stamped the course of 
Greece’s economic, political, and societal developments, including those 
pertaining to artisans; they defined the limits of what was possible.
1.1.a An index of industrialisation
When judged by today's standards, Greece's overall industrialisa­
tion has not fared well in the last seventy or so years when compared 
with the levels achieved by other European countries (see Table 4.1). In 
terms of the country’s own very low post-war position, which in 1953
still had a value of only 3 out of a possible 100 in terms of total in­
dustrialisation, and of 17, on the per-capita level, the growth is very
impressive, however. By 1980, the total level of industrialisation had
risen to 26, a ninefold increase, and the per-capita level to 114, an
increase of 6.7 times over that of 1953 (Bairoch 1982).
Per-capita levels are more accurate and of particular interest for 
present purposes, since they refer to the manufacturing industry only. 
With the exception of Finland, which achieved a post-war per-capita in­
crease slightly higher than Greece’s, but which after the war had 
started from a much higher position, Greece had the highest European in­
crease ratio in per-capita levels of industrialisation. In terms of its
increase ratio in total levels, only Yugoslavia, an until recently
qualified centrally planned economy, has ranked above her.1
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Table 4.1
Levels of Industrialisation (1913-1980) for Selected
European Countries (U.K. in 1900=100)
Total Levels
Rate of
Change
1913 1928 1938 1953 1963 1973 1980 1953-80
Greece 1 3 4 3 7 20 26 8.6
Bulgaria 1 2 3 6 11 21 28 4.6
Yugoslavia 1 5 7 11 32 70 103 9.3
Romania 2 4 5 15 37 85 118 7.8
Italy 23 37 46 71 150 258 319 4.5
Spain 11 16 14 22 43 122 156 7.0
Portugal 2 3 4 5 10 23 31 6.2
Pei— Capita Levels
Rate of
Change
1913 1928 1938 1953 1963 1973 1980 1953-80
Greece 10 19 24 17 26 93 114 6.7
Bulgaria 10 11 19 32 54 102 139 4.3
Yugoslavia 12 15 18 28 69 137 174 6.2
Romania 13 11 11 36 81 169 218 6.0
Italy 26 39 44 61 121 194 231 3.7
Spain 22 28 23 31 56 114 159 5.1
Portugal 14 18 19 26 45 105 130 5.0
Source: Paul Bairoch (1982). Countries were selected on the basis of 
similar initial levels, and/or upon belonging to the European periphery. 
Balkan countries, other than Greece, were until recently planned 
economies, and therefore functioned differently from, and are not easily 
comparable to, Greece which has a market economy. Nevertheless, it is of 
interest to see their recent industrial advancement, as these were 
countries that in the past, i.e. in 1938, lagged well behind Greece in 
terms of industrial development. On this issue see also Mouzelis (1978: 
120).
Figures for Change 1953-1980 are my own computations.
The figures in Table 4.1 also indicate that as a consequence of 
the war, occupation, and civil war, Greece suffered a serious retarda­
tion in her attempt to industrialise. After the occupation, not only in­
dustry but the whole of the economy was dislocated, stagnant, and in
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disarray. Famine was lurking due to very low agricultural production 
that amounted to only one-third of the pre-war level, and the war 
blockage of staple imports upon which Greece traditionally depended for 
feeding her population.2 Furthermore, homes, the infrastructure and 
communications, were almost totally destroyed, and losses in human life 
were very heavy indeed. Therefore, as the then Governor of the National 
Bank of Greece pointed out, ’... in Greece, in addition I to repairing 
the damage caused by the war] we have to build an non-existent economy 
anew ’.3
1.1.b The bequest of Occupation, and conditions after 
Liberation
Looking at Greece’s currency difficulties will give some idea of 
the country’s economic post-war problems. The hyperinflation that 
erupted during the occupation in 1943 and was to reach almost world- 
record levels, was halted only in 1946 (Makinen 1986: 799). Stabilisa­
tion of the currency was a difficult and indeed a tortuous process, as 
it was hampered by political instability, social unrest, the civil war, 
speculation and hoarding, and by the widespread mistrust in the drachma. 
It took three reforms and recourse to foreign (British) funding (via the 
Anglo-Greek agreement) to effect some measure of control. In a certain 
sense the currency was effectively stabilised only in 1953, when the 
drachma was devalued and a new rate was set for the U.S. dollar, at 30 
drachmas per dollar, to last for about 20 years (see Freris 1986: 124- 
25, 138-42).
The cost of stabilisation involved the institutionalisation of 
foreign intervention in Greek currency matters, with the participation 
of one Briton and one American as full members in the newly created Cur­
rency Commission. The foreign members of this supra-governmental body
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were invested with the veto, and so with considerable power, since una­
nimity was required in the Commission’s decisions.4
When the occupation forces left, industry as a whole was stagnant. 
A number of industrial plants had been damaged or completely destroyed, 
much of the machinery had been sold in order to meet the skyrocketing 
daily increases in general expenses and the unobtainability of credits. 
An exception to the rule were certain food-processing plants, which ac­
tually made a profit during the occupation. The bulk, however, of the 
country’s feeble industrial equipment was saved (National Bank of Greece 
1946a: 29-30), if no major new companies came into being during the 
occupation,5 although this was indeed the case in other European 
countries occupied by the Axis-powers.6 This is not to say that no new 
industrial enterprises emerged at all in the course of the occupation: 
they did, at a rate of 1,592 per year (Vergopoulos 1984: 534), but these 
were exclusively artisanal and moreover employed hand-too 1 s.
The post-war recovery of industry was faced with a great many 
problems and was slow to come about. For instance, domestic demand had 
plunged as the population, including the middle class, had become im­
poverished; the home market had to be built up again almost from 
scratch. Industrialisation could not proceed on the basis of providing 
inputs for agriculture, as the rural areas were largely beyond effective 
state control; nor could it proceed on the basis of meeting the needs of 
the rich. While the latter’s needs could not be satisfied by imports, 
which were restricted to staple commodities, the rich were not numerous 
enough to instigate the creation of domestic industries for their needs 
specif ical ly.
Another problem concerned industrial inputs. Spare parts for 
machinery, raw materials, and fuel all had to be imported, and this was 
often impossible for lack of foreign currency and financing, and a host
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of other reasons. To illustrate this point, let us look at the situation 
regarding the provisioning of spare parts for industrial machinery. The 
great bulk of the existing industrial equipment, was made in Germany 
before the war. Conquered, divided and in ruins by 1945, she was in no 
position to supply the required parts - not in 1945 or in 1946, and not 
even in 1947, even if the foreign currency for imports should have be­
come available. In theory, restrains of this nature, particularly the 
inability to import could, of course, provide the indigenous industry 
with new opportunities and a new market. Although evidence is sparse, it 
seems indeed that the need for spare parts was met as far as possible by 
Greek manufacturers. This gave a considerable boost to the indigenous 
machinery sector and its network of contractors and suppliers, and along 
with it the business tradition of putting out such tasks to local 
manufacturers.
All in all, the situation was not without its positive aspects, in 
that it was instrumental in advancing the development of indigenous 
production. In the mid-1940s, however, any such positive effects were 
not yet felt in big industry* but chiefly in the artisanal enterprises. 
The latter did not have to contend with the same difficulties as did 
capitalist industry in its effort to recover, and enjoyed greater 
flexibility though not having to rely on bank financing or on imports of 
machinery. They used whatever pieces of machinery were available, and 
where there were none, resorted to manual labour. The artisanal en­
terprises, therefore, could operate in local markets by providing low- 
grade goods and services at affordable prices. At an overall level, 
however, the economic and socio-political conditions did not permit such 
a prospect for indigenous industia1isation.
Thus, industrial recovery was besieged by a host of difficulties. 
Social and political cleavages were exacerbated, financing was not
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forthcoming, the banks were unwilling and/or unable to give credits to 
industry as savings were non-existent, and markets had shrunk. Besides, 
as the National Bank of Greece (1947: 31) noted, the labour productivity 
of larger firms was very low, reaching in 1946 a mere 20% of the pre-war 
level.
The very modest initial level of industrial output in the early 
post-war period, and the agonisingly slow recovery are portrayed in the 
figures of Table 4.2. Only by the end of 1950 did overall industrial 
production in Greece reach pre-war levels again unlike in other European 
countries, which regained their pre-war outputs earlier. Certain impor­
tant industrial branches, which depended on inputs from abroad (such as 
metallurgy, machine construction, chemicals and wood), took rather 
longer to recuperate (National Bank of Greece 1948: 44; 1949: 53, and 
Bank of Greece 1951: 82).
Overall, industrial production of capital goods fell in Greece 
from 43% in 1939, to 40% in 1945, to 37.9% in 1947. Inversely, produc­
tion of consumer goods rose from 57% in 1939, to 60% in 1945, to 62.1% 
in 1947 (mentioned in Antaeus 1948a: 47). Where raw-materials were 
available — either because they were being produced locally, e.g. 
tobacco, or because they were imported, as was the case with textiles 
supplied by UNRRA. during the first three post-war years, recovery was 
faster,7 otherwise it lagged. Industrial recovery, therefore, exhibited 
a divergent pattern. In this sense the pre-war industrial structure — 
with its emphasis on light industry employing domestic raw materials, 
and its neglect of intermediate and capital-goods production for which 
virtually all industrial inputs were imported - was duplicated in accen­
tuated form during the early post-war years.
The structural weaknesses of manufacturing industry, i.e. the vir­
tual absence of such key sectors as metallurgy and machine construction,
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were not dealt with by the state and those responsible as areas of 
priority in the early post-war years. They were not regarded as sectors 
on which, through an industrialising and modernising chain-reaction, the 
future development of the country would depend. Industrialisation was 
still not widely accepted among dominant groups as the course to 
development par excellence, not least because it was the Left that was
General Index of
Table 4.2
Annual Industrial Production, Including Electricity and
Excluding Mining (A): General Index of Manufacturing Production (B), for
Years 1945-1952.
1939
(A)
100
(B)
100
1945 33 —
1946 48 -
1947 67 -
1948 73 65
1949 87 79
1950 110 100
1951 125 114
1952 124 111
Source: CA): For 1945 and 1946, National Bank of Greece (1947: 29). For
1947 to 1950, Bank of Greece (1951, 80). For 1951 and 1952, Kondonasis
(1976, 61). (B): Kondonasis (1976, 62). Figures originally supplied by
the Association of Greek Industrialists.
demanding it. It was the financial and mercantile traditions and orien­
tations of the dominant class that orchestrated and led the recovery 
project. This meant that the historical experience of successful late 
industrial isers was not taken into consideration; the heavy emphasis on 
textiles in Greek industry was typical of early industrial isers. Those 
who came later, while not neglecting textiles and other light industry, 
relied more heavily on metallurgy, machine construction and chemicals to
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achieve their industrial development and modernisation. This was the 
case for late industrial isers such as Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
and Japan.8 Conversely, the Greek metallurgy, machine and tool in­
dustries, and to a lesser extent chemicals - all potentially key in­
dustries — were more or less left to get along on their own.
The course actually followed in the early post-war period was as 
already indicated: not to create a new comprehensive industrial struc­
ture, but merely to reconstitute the lop-sided pre-war one. The dominant 
and seemingly sensible argument at the time (1946-1947), in favour of 
aiding light industry versus heavy, was that a major way of invigorating 
the economy and satisfying the basic needs of the population was to help 
those industries that were using domestically produced inputs (National 
Bank of Greece 1947: 31). However, during the implementation of this 
policy, state-administered foreign aid was not limited to hand-outs of 
subsidies to companies using domestic raw materials, but also included a 
number of direct and indirect grants to them of scandalous amounts (Afea 
Oikonomia 1947c: 361; Antaeus 1946: 161-62). In this sense the pre-war 
capitalists were resurrected, not only by the state bureaucracy inter­
vening to safeguard the threatened political and social bases of ex­
panded reproduction, but also by providing them with excessive 
privileges. These became a system, which although it safeguarded high 
profits for large enterprises, it reduced their competitiveness by fos­
tering inefficiency — this was advantageous for smaller and artisanal 
units. Such activity favouring capitalists seriously discredited the 
state’s bridging and balancing role vis-A-vis the dominated classes, and 
exacerbated a rampant legitimation crisis.
To recapitulate: during the early post-war years hyperinflation 
was curbed only with great difficulty, industrial recovery lagged and 
the pre-war industrial structure was duplicated, while foreign interven­
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tion became institutionalised. The snail-paced industrial recovery left 
ample room for artisanal types of activity extensively employing manual 
labour. Artisanal outputs supplied the frugal needs of an impoverished 
clientele, which formed markets so marginal that they did not attract 
the attention of large capitalist firms.
1.2 Structural changes and the conjuncture in the post-war 
revival of artisans
It has been suggested, for instance by Thomadakis C1984: 134) that 
the petty bourgeois strata were, by and large, destroyed during the oc­
cupation, having lost their savings and often their properties, i.e. 
that which in economic terms differentiated them from the rest of the 
working population. Among these destroyed petty bourgeois we must in­
clude a large part - perhaps the bulk - of the 31% of the active popula­
tion employed in 1930 in industry, then officially classified as ’owners 
and directors’ and ’self-employed’ (mentioned in Delendas and Magioros 
1946: 48), i.e. the artisanate.
The pre-war working class was economically destroyed too. During 
the occupation and the early post-war period it was jobless or only 
nominally employed, or shifted to other occupations. Accordingly, the 
claim that during the occupation workers lost their professional ethos 
(Antaeus 1948a: 50-51; Delendas and Magioros 1946: 163) must, in the ab­
sence of any evidence to the contrary, be accepted as highly plausible. 
Job training, either formal or in situ, also suffered greatly. The bulk 
of workers in employment during the 1940s were unskilled. Given the 
structure of Greek industry, this is not in itself surprising. Still, 
what clearly indicated a loss of skills due to the disarray in industry 
during the occupation is that young workers in their middle to late 
twenties, who should have acquired their training during the occupation
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period, were particularly unskilled, and as such were paid lower rates 
(see Antaeus 1948a: 50-51, and Delendas and Magioros 1946: 49).
Labour remuneration was a matter of much concern in official docu­
ments of the early post-war years. It was argued that wages were ’very 
high*, and workers were exhorted to disassociate themselves from trade 
unions that put forward excessive demands.9 Actually, according to 
Dimitrakopoulos (1951: 34), wages fell considerably during this period. 
Vergopoulos agrees, but gives somewhat different figures (1984: 546). 
According to Angelopoulos (1946: 13; 1950a: 3), wages in 1946 were as 
low as one-third of the pre-war wages, while in 1949 they corresponded 
to 40-50% of the pre-war purchasing power.
The reasons behind this fall in real wages are highly complex. 
Among those of particular importance, however, would seem to be the in­
flux of relocated civil war refugees in search of work; the pressure ex­
erted by the urban unemployed, exacerbated after the gradual demobilisa­
tion of the army after 1949; and the break-up in 1946-1947 of the left- 
wing unionism to which workers had subscribed and which had agitated for 
fair wages (see Poll is 1984).
From the mid 1940s to the early ’50s, the income of the urban 
population was severely depressed as a result of the vicissitudes of 
war, occupation and civil-war. The limited purchasing power meant 
limited market demand. On the other hand, basic needs had to be 
satisfied somehow. In view of the slow recuperation of large-scale in­
dustry, the conjuncture of the late 1940s and early *50s will certainly 
have presented opportunities for the emergence of artisanal types of 
business to cater for local needs. Artisans’ workshops, for repairs and 
producing inexpensive goods were not beyond the reach of the working 
population’s purse, and competition from the capitalist sector must have 
been minimal, if it existed at all, given the latter’s high prices.
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A strong reason prompting craftsmen and others to become independ­
ent. and persuading older artisans to remain in the trade, were the low 
wages paid in the primary labour markets. Widespread unemployment was 
another. In these circumstances, setting up a shop of his own would have 
been a skilled worker’s way to survive or improve his lot, as was the 
case in later years. The requirements of starting-capital may have been 
met from savings, but in any case would have involved quite small sums 
since the work was based on hand-tools. Mechanisation was very low, 
since the small power tools were not yet available.
In the course of the interviews conducted for the purposes of this 
thesis, most artisans claimed to have started their businesses with 
amazingly small amounts of money. For example, one man told me during my 
pilot study that his starting-up capital in 1969 was only 15,000 drach­
mas, roughly 150 Pounds Sterling at that year’s rate of exchange. Con­
sidering that all interviewees but one used quite complex electrical 
machinery, it seems more than probable that forty or so years earlier - 
at a time when machinery, if used at all, would almost certainly have 
been of inferior quality, less powerful and perhaps cheaper — starting- 
up capital was not the main problem for setting up a workshop. The main 
problem in the 1940s would have been a matter of skills, of the ability 
to perform the various operations required in repairs, and in one-of-a- 
kind orders or smal1-batch, custom-made orders.
Politically, the emergence of new intermediate elements appears to 
have been welcomed by those in power, since artisans were a form of 
evidence that the system offered chances of upward mobility. Artisans by 
their mere presence sanctified hard work and (small) property, issues 
which were at the heart of the bourgeois discourse, ideology, and 
morality. Furthermore, artisans had the practical effect of at least in 
part alleviating the problem of unemployment. These attitudes agreed
148
with the objectives of the official post-war policy of the recreation 
and rehabilitation of the middle classes, as shown by Vergopoulos (1984) 
referring to relevant statements of persons then in power. The dif­
ference with respect to the artisans was simply that they were not a 
creation of state policies, and were not employed or dependent on the 
state for their livelihood. In contrast to the state-sponsored commer­
cial and services-1 inked middle strata, it seems that the artisans had 
appeared spontaneously by taking advantage of the existing situation; 
they were not part of the overall strategy. As a group, they came from 
three backgrounds: (i) from the more skilled sector of the working 
class, from craftsmen, since a certain dexterity was required for their 
work; (ii) from older artisans that survived the occupation without 
switching to a different profession; (iii) from persons of varied non- 
worker and non-artisan background, who had somehow learned a craft and 
became artisans during or after the occupation.
It has been suggested that artisans have been regarded by plan­
ners, state bureaucrats, and entrepreneurs alike as destined to die out 
with advancing industrialisation. This has indeed been the standard un­
derstanding in the historical development of industrial capitalism until 
quite recently.10 It was therefore only tactful on the part of planners 
and those in authority, not to announce their prognostications of the 
artisan’s ultimate demise and proletarianisation, but simply to ignore 
them. But, despite the neglect of the state artisans refused to disap­
pear and proliferated instead. A figure worth citing is the 23,500 new, 
overwhelmingly artisanal, manufacturing enterprises set up between 1946 
and 1950, whose appearance has been noted as ’... the most important 
entrepreneurial wave in the history of Greek capitalism’ (Vergopoulos 
1984: 549).11 This was unforeseen and unexpected as it contravened the
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dominant presuppositions about the overriding importance for growth and 
development of foreign aid.
The state responded to the re-emergence of artisans with shocked 
embarrassment. The background of artisans was uncomfortably close to the 
insurgent working class, with whom they even associated and sympathised. 
They certainly did not fit into the contemplated foreign-induced in­
dustrialisation on a grand scale (see the following section). In conse­
quence, the response of state officials was reserved. While they paid 
lip service to these new entrepreneurs, whose existence as already indi­
cated exonerated the regime and 'proved* its vitality, in practice they 
did next to nothing to aid them. It was only when the incipient failure 
of the first five-year plan’s industrial projects began to become ob­
vious that the state thought of changing its official position towards 
artisans and began to regulate and control them.
The decisions of the Currency Commission in 1949-1950 to establish 
a Handicraft Loans Committee,12 which was authorised to extend loans to 
artisans at the low interest rate of 6-8%, expressed the official inter­
est to assist, or to be seen to assist, in the establishment of these 
new intermediate strata, as well as to co-opt them. The decision to 
finance them at all was justified in the Bank of Greece’s annual report 
for 1950 in the following way:
'... owing to the peculiar position held by handicraft enterprises 
in the structure of our economy, [it was] decided to extent to 
them credit assistance with the object of increasing production5 
(emphasis added; my translation).13
The original sum allocated (Bank of Greece 1950: 91-92) was very 
small - 45,000 million old drachmas. In subsequent years the sums were 
fixed at 5% of the total allocated for bank loans, but this level was 
never reached - the percent of loans taken out consistently remained far 
below that mark.14 But, while these loans which involved very small sums
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were nominally open to all, for a number of years to come their perspec­
tive recipients were screened for their political inclinations. This ex­
presses the reluctance of the banking establishment, state-owned in the 
main, to lend money in what was regarded a be risky situation. Meanwhile 
’major* industry usually managed to draw the full 15% of total bank 
loans it was allocated. The fact that banking institutions have withheld 
the set proportion of loan funds to artisans shows their strength in im­
posing their will in contradiction of central government directives, 
which they are by law required to follow. It also shows the inconsis­
tency of the state in this matter, its ad hoc approach to artisans and 
the development potential they offered, and the negligible impact it ex­
erted on their resurgence.
One should not forget the role of ideology and political activity 
in the resurgence of artisans. Evidence, however, is hard to come by. 
The break-up of the of trade unions in 1946-1947 and the military defeat 
of the forces of the Left two years later must have produced confusion 
in the collectivists ideologies to which the workers had subscribed. It 
is reasonable to assume that in the wake of these developments there was 
an increase in the more individualistic attempts to improve one’s posi­
tion, for example by setting up an independent workshop. It has also 
been suggested that left-wing activists and sympathisers could not find 
employment in the primary labour market because of effective police 
screening. In the secondary labour markets, however, employment often 
evaded police screening and was hard to detect, because too many small 
and very small enterprises were involved, including artisanal concerns. 
Such environments, often unofficial themselves, cushioned leftists, 
provided them with jobs and an income, and taught them skills. In over­
all terms, they provided a context where opportunities could and did
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arise for those who possessed the necessary skills, by offering them the 
alternative of setting themselves up as independent artisans.15
2. Early Post-war Industrialisation: Agendas. Strategies, and Agents
2.1 Strategy for a new position in the international division of 
labour.
It would be a mistake to think of the dominant groups and the 
state as completely uninterested in Greece's post-war industrialisation 
in the years that followed World War II. Their interest was, however, 
circumscribed by their beliefs and attitudes, as well as by their par­
ticular understanding of circumstances, priorities, needs, and poten­
tials.
As early as 1945, very powerful and institutionalised sections of 
the financial community with strong links to industry and largely con­
trolled by the state - to wit, the National Bank of Greece18 - proposed 
a project that linked Greece's industrialisation to the potential of at­
tracting foreign capital. An examination of the proposals is useful for 
ascertaining what role, if any, it allocated to artisanal enterprises, 
particularly because this project formed the backbone, as it were, of 
subsequent development.
It was argued (National Bank of Greece 1948: 24) that Greece 
'presents large opportunities for the development of industry, and espe­
cially the metallurgical sector’; that she had an industrial leadership; 
that there were plenty of water-falls, a requirement for the development 
of electric-power generating; and that labour was abundant (see National 
Bank of Greece (1949: 29). What was missing was capital.17
Foreign capital in the form of aid, war reparations, and loans to 
the state, was seen as the most important means for revigorating the 
economy, and the main beneficiary was to be manufacturing industry
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which, as already noted, mainly processed locally-produced agricultural 
and other raw materials. Part of the state-distributed aid was to be 
used by manufacturing industry for the import of raw materials, 
machinery/spare parts, and fuel. In this way, industry would employ for­
eign aid to create the necessary preconditions for its recovery and 
development. The overall aims of industrialisation were seen to be the 
satisfaction of domestic demand, the promotion of consumer goods so as 
to close the gap between supply and demand, (i.e. import substitution), 
and exports to South-East Europe and especially to the Middle East 
(National Bank of Greece 1949: 28-29). Greek industrial products were 
thought to have the potential of a comparative price-advantage over 
British and U.S.-made products in these markets.
The geographical distances involved meant that the (relatively 
small) quantities of consumer goods these markets could absorb from 
Greece were not burdened by high transportation costs. Low transporta­
tion costs to the Middle East, and low wages, were considered to be 
Greece’s main assets for attracting private foreign capital, American or 
British. Private foreign capital was invited to exploit these assets by 
investing directly in the existing industry and/or by creating new in­
dustrial branches and plants.1® Clearly, the proposal aimed at making 
Greece an export platform for the Middle East and the South-East 
European markets.
This strategy, which was constantly reiterated (National Bank of 
Greece 1946b; 1947; 1948; 1949; 1950; 1951; 1952), openly acknowledged 
that the scope of the forthcoming industrialisation would be limited. 
Indeed, in 1948 industrial autarchy was severely criticised - in answer 
to the demands of the Left for all-round planned industrialisation with 
priority for heavy industry - as ’harmful’ (National Bank of Greece
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1948: 24) and in 1949 as Jmost harmfully utopian’ (National Bank of 
Greece 1949: 29).19 In this sense the strategy was directed at Greece’s 
full integration into the U.S.-dominated, post-war world economy, and 
acquiring a new, though subordinate, position in the emerging interna­
tional division of labour. Manufacturing industry was to play a more im­
portant role in the country’s economy, although it was to be restricted 
to those branches ’best suited’ for it, where a comparative advantage 
did already or could be made to exist, namely in the branches of light 
industry. All in all, the project was an attempt to achieve and 
safeguard the new aspiring position of Greek capitalism by the use of 
direct foreign investment; it eschewed risks, and implied an enhancement 
of compradorship.
To put across the new orientation, industrialists and other 
spokesmen for the economy were cautioned, on the one hand, to take into 
account ’the now existing international conditions’, in the context of 
which the U.S.-sponsored free market was the paradigm; and on the other, 
to ’adapt* their operations on the basis of the principle of free trade 
(i.e. non-protectionism) and the country’s ’natural possibilities’, and 
comparative advantages (see National Bank of Greece 1948: 24; 1949: 29; 
1950: 18; 1952: 20). At the state level, much eagerness was demonstrated 
to accommodate the new orientation, and to show that Greece was keeping 
the rules; the objective was to convince foreign agencies and states to 
shell out more aid. So for example Greece partially lifted her tariffs 
in accordance with a European agreement of 1949, well before other 
European countries did so. Although clearly disadvantageous, the move 
was meant to show willing compliance with the free-trade ethos (National 
Bank of Greece 1950: 17-19).
The role of the state in all this, in as far as it may be ascer­
tained, was nominally limited to the allocation of private resources and
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supervision of the productive effort; private initiative was responsible 
for the rest. In addition, the state had to develop the infrastructure, 
procure more foreign aid and, of course, win the civil war. In theory, a 
more extensive state intervention was regarded as unsuitable for Greece 
in 1946, or at least an issue which had to be left for some later date, 
provided that by then the state had become effectively consolidated, and 
that viable industrial programmes had come into existence (see National 
Bank of Greece 1946: 79-80). In practice, heavy state intervention on a 
selective basis was employed from the outset, which was to make way for 
the free operation of the market principle once conditions matured.
This project, it should be remembered, was not a state plan and 
therefore not legally binding; it was a proposal from the National Bank, 
put forward repeatedly in its annual reports in the early post-war 
years. In basic outline it appeared as early as December 1945. Its im­
portance lies in the fact that it laid out a general framework for 
Greece’s future orientation and industrialisation, which is very similar 
to the actual process of industrialisation pursued. In the late 1950s, 
the ’60s and ’70s, industrialisation was both import-substituting and 
export-oriented (Giannitsis 1983), and limited as originally envisaged. 
This pattern, which was hardly accidental, indicates the extensive in­
fluence of those who put the project forward; they can perhaps be best 
described as representing Greece’s finance capital.20 That this set of 
proposals came into existence at all is an important indication that not 
all the dominant groups in Greek society were engaged in wild profiteer­
ing. They were also those concerned with elaborating a strategy they 
persistently followed, and defended against U.S.-sponsored attempts to 
mobilise private indigenous capital for the purposes of industrialisa­
tion.
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The project outlined above was not the only one that acknowledged 
the importance of a future industrialisation, and tried to to regulate 
it from a conservative point of view. A. Delendas and I. Magioros, in a 
jointly authored work commissioned by the Ministry of Reconstruction in 
late 1945, i.e. in a work endorsed by the state bureaucracy, argued 
along similar lines.
They pointed out that demographic expansion would create a popula­
tion surplus, which would remain unemployed unless industry expanded to 
absorb it.21 The two authors acknowledged that industrial expansion 
would be very difficult, mainly due to the lack of competitiveness, low 
productivity, antiquated artisanal-type production methods and organisa­
tion, and the lack of skills and capital. To cope with these dif­
ficulties it was hoped that the Allies would donate capital and/or ad­
vance loans, and war reparations were earmarked for essential 
reconstruction. Skills and organisation were to be improved through for­
mal education and training, production methods and productivity by the 
introduction of new techniques, Fordist mass production, and Taylorist 
principles of work. Provided all these issues could be tackled, Greek 
industry was believed to have a chance of expanding and becoming com­
petitive (Delendas and Magioros 1946: 126, 163-69, 173-85).
Delendas and Magioros pointed out that if the industrialisation 
effort was to become effective and bring about increased employment, 
Greece would have to produce well in excess of what her domestic market 
could absorb and export the surplus, while at the same time increasing 
her imports of raw materials. The pursuit of such a policy would mean 
the lifting of tariff barriers and an end to protectionism; Greece would 
have to be fully incorporated into the world economy. As a result, the 
forthcoming industrialisation would have to be centred on those areas 
where a comparative advantage already existed or that could be made to
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emerge. This is to say that Greece’s industrialisation was seen as 
primarily export-oriented, and as import-substituting only in second 
place. To co-ordinate the industrialisation process, it was suggested 
that a supra-govermental body should be formed, consisting of represen­
tatives of the state and private industry (Delendas and Magioros 1946: 
160). The state was to have a subordinate role, monitoring the whole 
process but not intervening directly.
Notwithstanding the different emphases in the two sets of 
proposals - with the National Bank advocating more strongly than Delen­
das and Magioros that industrialisation should not only be export- 
oriented but also import-substituting, and that foreign capital should 
be encouraged to invest directly in industry - it is quite clear that 
both projects wanted to see Greece in a better position in the interna­
tional division of labour than she had occupied before the war. Both ad­
vised the liberalisation of trade as a means for achieving such an im­
proved position, and both accepted the restricted character of the 
forthcoming industrialisation on the basis of comparative advantage and 
the free trade principle. However, this is not the best way for a 
country’s consistent and comprehensive development as D. Senghaas (1985) 
has argued convincingly.22
The importance of these proposals lies in their timing. They were 
advanced well before the summer of 1947, when the American Mission in 
Greece called for industrialisation as the country’s only viable future 
(see Vergopoulos 1984: 538; Thomadakis 1988: 36; Stathakis 1990: 66). 
This of course is not to deny that there was heavy foreign influence, 
and indeed intervention, in the post-war development effort, or to mini­
mise the importance of this intervention.23 All the same, there can be 
no pretending that industrialisation, its actual course and orientation 
as well as its impact, were peremptorily imposed on the indigenous bour­
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geoisie in return for outside assistance in the fight against communism, 
as has been suggested. Such as it was, Greece’s industrialisation should 
be seen primarily as the result of initiatives by the elites involved, 
as their own overall strategic choice. The following quotation from H. 
David of the National Bank of Greece, formulated as early as 1945, is a 
call for that comprador-dependent industrialisation that was typical of 
the views of wide sections of the bourgeoisie, and indicative of their 
position.
’It is absolutely imperative and indispensable that the large in­
dustrial nations, the USA and England, take under their protection 
the creation of industrial enterprises in [Greece] and safeguard 
the consumption of the goods produced. In other words, our young 
industry must be an inseparable part of the American and English 
industries, a kind of vanguard of their advanced industrial camp 
in the Mediterranean’ (mentioned in Dovas 1980: 84; my
translation).
A restricted form of industrialisation, implying some degree of 
re-orientation of the indigenous elites’ entrepreneurial priorities was, 
therefore, an acceptable option - with two provisos: (i) such in­
dustrialisation would safeguard and enhance the deliberately dependent 
position of Greece’s ruling classes in the context of the new post-war 
international division of labour, and (ii) others would foot the bill, 
in that it was foreign aid and direct foreign investments that were to 
provide the finance.
2.2 Foreign aid and intervention, the first five-year plan, and 
industrial isation.
Foreign aid originating mostly from the U.S. was massive — as was 
foreign intervention. Between the end of the war and July 1950, a total 
of $2,138 million were poured into Greece, making the country rank as 
the highest per-capita recipient of foreign aid at the time (A. An-
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gelopoulos 1950a: 2; also in 1959: 32). Another comparison, makes the 
amount of aid more than four times Greece’s pre-war national income.24 
Most of this aid was supplied under the agreements related to the Truman 
Doctrine, signed in mid-1947, and the Marshall Plan, signed a year later 
(Angelopoulos 1947; Antaeus 1948b: 200-03; Fatouros 1984; Freris 1986: 
128-30; Hadziiossif 1988; Thomadakis 1988: 38). These agreements gave 
plenipotentiary powers to the American representatives in Greece (AMAG), 
and placed all activities, economic included, under their direct 
control.25
Once the agreements were signed, the first comprehensive Greek 
plan for a medium to long period was drafted in 1974 with the help of 
the American Mission. It was revised and submitted in November 1948 to 
the European co-ordinating counterpart of the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, 
precursor of the OECD; this was standard practice with all national 
plans employing Marshall Aid funds (Freris 1986: 130-31). In late 1949 
it was withdrawn, extensively revised and reduced in its objective, as 
its architect L. Nikolaidis admits (1971: 10), and then re-submitted. 
Covering the period 1948-1952, the plan advocated a shift away from 
agriculture in favour of industry. It aimed at ’restructuring* the 
country. Reconstruction was to go beyond a simple return to pre-war 
production level, national income, and overall economic and social 
structure, as earlier reconstruction plans under British auspices had 
foreseen.28 The U .S.-sponsored five-year plan went further, in that 
basic reconstruction was linked to democrat i sat ion, and to the elimina­
tion of some of the other structural causes underlying the civil war 
(Thomadakis 1988: 30; Stathakis 1990: 63). It aimed at restructuring the 
country so as to make her a viable unit in the post-war constellation of 
countries and nations.27 The means to achieve this aim was in­
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dustrialisation. In other words, Greece was to undergo a major uplift 
(which in later years was called development) to become a modern nation.
To begin with the U.S. , while offering material aid as well as ex­
pertise, had no intention of by-passing the indigenous agents of 
reconstruction and development. Neither did they aim to assist the 
development of the country per se. It was rather that they saw the aid 
as ’a medium for achieving the social and political pre-conditions of 
development’, as Thomadakis put it (1988: 25). Domestic funds being un­
available, the Greek state was to use Marshall Aid funds to finance and 
otherwise assist her industry.2® Once it was back on its feet, new in­
vestments could be financed by private capital, both domestic and for­
eign. The initial state intervention was to be temporary. According to 
the five-year plan, the state was to have a merely co-ordinating role 
(see Freris 1986: 131), although implicitly it was expected to pacify 
the country and to effect a smooth functioning of the market principle.
The five-year plan emphasised the need for mechanisation in 
agriculture, and the development of Greece’s hydroelectric and lignite 
potential for expanding the generating of electric power, which was im­
perative for any overall industrial expansion. Although the targets for 
energy production were not met, four electric generator plants were 
built - ’the only significant achievement’, according to a student of 
national versions of the Marshall Plan (Hadziiossif 1988: 69). The first 
plan also allowed for the establishment of an oil refinery, a small 
steel mill and the expansion of chemical production, especially fer­
tilisers (see Freris 1986: 132). Notwithstanding successive curtailments 
and revisions, the original emphasis on industry was retained, although 
its provisions were never realised - as was the case with virtually all 
subsequent Greek plans.
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It should be noted that in its final form the plan once more 
stressed the overriding importance of American aid if its targets were 
to be met, and reiterated hopes of attracting private investments, both 
domestic and foreign (Freris 1986: 113). There were broad similarities, 
then, between the National Bank’s strategy and the first five-year plan. 
They diverged over the provenance of investments in industry: the Na­
tional Bank, unlike the five-year plan, virtually absolved indigenous 
entrepreneurs of the task, relying exclusively on foreign aid and direct 
private foreign investments.
The five-year plan envisaged an improvement in the balance of pay­
ments, and expected an annual saving of $98 million in industry alone.29 
Total investments in industry was to reach a $103 million per annum, 
plus the equivalent of $51 million in drachmas, or a yearly total of 
$154 million (Nikolaidis 1971a: 10).
The planners wished to present the industrial projects less as 
part of a national plan, but more as only an aspect of European 
reconstruction generally. This was not just a formality, but a matter of 
substance. After all, participation in the Marshall Plan implied a very 
definite position in the international division of labour, and accept­
ance of the ideology of the free market, of freedom of commerce, opening 
up of the economy, and specialisation by individual countries on the 
basis of comparative advantages.
It has been argued by Freris (1986) that the particular type of 
industrialisation advocated by the five-year plan was dependent on high 
tariffs and an over-valuation of the currency. Indeed, certain import 
quotas persisted until 1953 and since the plan was to some extent 
oriented towards import substitution, it could not avoid at least some 
tariff protection. There can be no doubt, however, that by advocating 
private foreign investments the five-year plan was preparing the ground
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for opening Greece up to the world market on the basis of the free-trade 
ideology.
At any rate, the 1953 devaluation of the drachma, and the promul­
gation of Law 2687/1953 on attracting private foreign capital (and of­
fering many substantial concessions and incentives), made it clear that 
the country was energetically opening up to free trade and gradually 
pulling down the protective mechanisms.30 This very important law was 
preceded by the promulgation of a comprehensive set of legal regulations 
for modernising the institutional framework and particulars of business 
activity (Freris 1986: 143; Stathakis 1990: 71-72). This shows that the 
state was played a very active part in enhancing the principles of 
economic rationality, by pursuing measures conducive to a more rational 
capitalist progress, and by enacting the prerequisites of a foreign- 
induced industrialisation.
2.3 Assessment of the five-year plan: failure to support 
industrial isat ion
Assessing the 1948-52 plan, it cannot be seriously maintained that 
it was successful in meeting its targets for reconstruction, and even 
less so its targets for industry and industrial isat ion. 31 Realisation of 
the plan, at least in its industrial dimension, was a failure. The pic­
ture becomes even more unsatisfactory with regards to the overall al­
location of reconstruction funds among the main economic sectors. 
Christoula-Grigorogianni (1951: 194) gives the following figures for how 
much of the available money was spent in the period between April 1948 
and July 1950: agriculture 22%; industry 2%; communications 32%; housing 
30%; with the remaining 14% presumably spent on tourism. Overall, the 
total spent on reconstruction comprise no more than roughly 30% of the 
foreign aid made available, since 70% of it went to the military in
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1949-1950 and to feeding the relocated - from the guerrilla controlled 
countryside to the regular army controlled urban areas - population 
(Angelopoulos 1950a: 3).
It is obvious that industry as a whole, contrary to the verbal em­
phasis it received, was neglected. This neglect went further than the 
small sums allocated to it - a mere 2% of the funds allocated for 
reconstruction, or $2.6 million and drs 24.2 billion for the first two 
years (1948-1949) of the five-year plan. So in 1946, of the $68 million 
made available for imports, only $4.3 million went for machinery and 
spare parts (Angelopoulos 1946: 14). Between, from 1950 to 1954, a num­
ber of industrial projects were finally devised (as Nikolaidis (1971b: 
10 indicates),32 but industrial progress lagged well behind the set tar­
gets. Even the infrastructural projects that were eventually completed -
i.e. some public works in communications, construction/housing and 
agriculture - were not of the anticipated magnitude; besides, these 
works could only partially be considered as infrastructural and support­
ing the recovery and growth of production.33 The failure of the five- 
year plan to aid the creation and development of an indigenous industry, 
which was one of the plan’s fixed strategic priorities, must be con­
sidered as a failure of the reconstruction project, given its aim to 
make the country ’viable’ by developing and modernising.34
2.4 Foreign influence on industrial isat ion and internal 
resistance
During the early period of U.S. involvement in Greece, the U.S. 
Mission strongly advocated the county’s modernisation and industrialisa­
tion. This fact is in strong contrast to the standard apology for 
Greece’s failure to finance and effect structural changes in her in­
dustry so as to advance the industrialisation process. It is explained
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that AMAG, the U.S. representation in Greece, vetoed any attempt to 
build up industries that could have processed local raw materials, and 
so would have given the country some measure of industrial muscle. In 
other words, it is claimed that the reasons for Greece’s industrial 
retardation lay in her dependency on outsiders, and was the result of 
some kind of ’conspiracy’.35
The Americans were not at the start against the industrialisation 
of Greece, frequent assertions to the contrary notwithstanding.36 In 
fact, in early 1947, the tentative report of the American Economic Mis­
sion concluded that, if Greece was to achieve stability, she would have 
to undergo a wide-ranging restructuring of her economy, including the 
build-up of industrialisation. It was industrialisation that would help 
establish a modern state and a viable bourgeoisie, and thus stabilise 
the regime. P. Porter, the head of the Mission, insisted again and again 
that industrialisation was necessary for Greece (mentioned in Ver­
gopoulos 1984: 538, 557). Porter, in one of his reports, gave priority 
to the development of the country’s energy sources as indispensable for 
industrial expansion (Thomadakis 1988: 30-31); by 1950, however, he had 
changed his mind and considered Greece more suitable for becoming a 
second California, that is to say, a developed producer of agricultural 
products (Dovas 1980: 81).
Nikolaidis, Greece’s chief representative in the OEEC and main en­
gineer of the first five-year plan, did argue in a little-known 1971 
article (1971a; 1971b), that AMAG was rather reserved in the matter of 
Greece’s industrialisation, and often opposed it. However, he did not 
hold AMAG primarily responsible for the industrialisation projects being 
abandoned. He pointed out that there were ’certain cadres’ of the Greek 
Co-ordination Ministry’s Service for the implementation of the five-year 
plan whom he considered to be the chief culprits responsible for the
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difficulties in obtaining Marshall Aid funds and in carrying out the 
five-year plan - much more so than the other countries competing for a 
slice of the the Marshal 1-Aid pie.37
Nikolaidis does not offer any direct explanation as to why there 
was internal resistance to industrialisation. He does, however, provide 
valuable indications. He points out that there were certain principles 
with which all national draft versions of the Marshall plan, including 
the Greek one, had to comply with, if they were to be accepted and 
receive the relevant aid. The avoidance of autarchy was one. Another was 
that production would not be more expensive than in other European 
countries, i.e. the emphasis had to be on competition and not on tariff 
protection. A third principle was that production targets in any par­
ticular industry must not exceed overall European consumption.3®
Nikolaidis also argued that, aside from those ’certain* members of 
the Greek Ministry of Co-ordination, there were also ’certain’ exporters 
of Greek industrial raw materials who obstructed the country’s in­
dustrialisation effort. They did so because a comprehensive in­
dustrialisation would have put an end to their business activities. 39 A 
third member of the anti-industrialisation party were, according to 
Nikolaidis, the already mentioned European countries that had an inter­
est in maintaining their Greek market share and loathed the prospect of 
a potential competitor; at the same time they were hoping to obtain a 
larger share of Marshall funds. Therefore, as far as the five-year 
plan’s industrial priorities are concerned, Nikolaidis’ indications al­
low us to see that these were determined by preoccupations with whether 
the projects were viable - not for Greece, a single country, but for 
Europe. The previously mentioned criteria for grouping the plan’s sug­
gested industrial projects point in much the same direction.
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While I see no reason for denying that foreign (U.S.) intervention 
did play its role in the abandonment or postponement of projects to 
build up certain basic industries,40 it should be pointed out that the 
priority disputes were conducted over whether it was feasible at all for 
Greece to have such industries, given her comparative advantages and 
disadvantages. In view of the new openness advocated by the dominant 
elites, it goes without saying that the above-mentioned principles were 
accepted, as the (earlier mentioned) National Bank reports show, and as 
we may conclude from the behaviour of the Co-ordination Ministry offi­
cials.
Once this consensus was established, it was relatively easy to 
persuade those responsible for actual planning decision to drop any 
plans and projects considered as too high-flying. The planners and 
decision-makers — both invariably state personnel — knew that all-round 
industrialisation, which would require heavy and consistent state inter­
vention in the form of high tariffs, subsidies, etc. to off-set teething 
difficulties, was impossible and actually unwarranted on the single­
nation level. Opening Greece up to the world economy was quid pro quo 
for aid to the crippled country, to which the indigenous ruling groups 
did not object. The Greek bourgeoisie too subscribed to such an option, 
which had an elective affinity with their comprador-merchant traditional 
activities. Such an orientation, with its emphasis on international com­
petition, obviously left no room for the protection and assistance of 
artisanal enterprises. These were considered by definition archaic and 
highly perishable.
As far as the role of the U.S. is concerned, it is more reasonable 
to attribute the opposition that did surface to the prospect of Greece’s 
industrialisation to the U.S. priorities for the reconstruction of other 
West-European countries, since Greece was a marginal country in all
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respects except perhaps geopolitics. There are no mysterious con­
spiracies, although after 1950 AMAG did become increasingly uneasy about 
Greece’s industrialisation, convinced that at best Greece might become a 
second ’California5, as already noted (Vergopoulos 1984:538; Freris 
1986: 136-37).41
The influence of exogenous factors can be explained on the basis 
of internal processes. The Greek state, the industrial elites, as well 
as the indigenous bourgeoisie as a whole, while throughout the early 
post-war years kept asking non-stop for foreign aid on which they relied 
absolutely, nevertheless consumed the aid monies non-productively and/or 
used them for sheer speculation. Indeed aid, and what to do with it, ap­
pears to have been the apple of discord between the leading Greek 
circles and the British and particularly American planners and aid 
donors.42 The Greek elites insisted on more aid funds as absolutely 
necessary for all kinds of reconstruction activities which, however, as 
far as possible, precluded industrial reconstruction and investments. 
Such investment would have involved processes that deprived them of the 
very high rates of return to which they had been accustomed, implied a 
certain amount of risk-taking, and presented them with other dif­
ficulties they were not willing to face. AMAG, on the other hand, trying 
to overcome the local entrepreneurs’ unwillingness to take risks and to 
get them involved in industrial investments, strove to limit the sums of 
foreign aid-donation they handed out. AMAG even tried strong-arm tactics 
by way of economic policies to compel investments away from highly 
profitable commercial and financial activities and into industrial ones. 
In effect, it was trying to transform opportunistic entrepreneurs into 
agents of industrial development, without offering the lure of excessive 
incentives and privileges they were used to. It is not unreasonable to
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assume that AMAG gradually became disillusioned with a state of affairs 
where the agents of industrialisation were simply absent.43 That this 
was so is borne out by the non-productive activities of the indigenous 
industrial bourgeoisie, as well as the distribution pattern of aid. It 
was only common sense for the U.S. Mission, therefore, to drop the main 
industrialising project and to attempt some kind of compromise with the 
indispensable indigenous elites. The result was a change in focus, 
upgrading Greece’s traditional activities of agriculture, commerce, and 
shipping.
At this point the only practical way towards industrialisation, as 
a theoretical priority and the key to thoroughgoing development, on 
which AMAG could agree with the indigenous Greek bourgeoisie was at­
tracting direct foreign investments. This was a matter the five-year 
plan advocated, but was not successful in bringing about during its 
lifetime. Direct foreign investments were pursued later, and for this 
the five-year plan paved the way: its failure effectively blocked the 
alternative (Barrington Moore Jr’s ’suppressed alternative’) of an in­
digenous, though not necessarily less comprador, industrialisation. It 
also of course provided an officially sanctioned directive, and a stan­
dard to be pursued.
Sumary and Conclusion
War, foreign occupation, and the civil-war during the 1940s most 
severely dislocated Greek society and its economy. The manufacturing in­
dustry was badly harmed, and artisans suffered too. The restoration of 
the economy to its relatively high pre-war level was not achieved until 
the early 1950s, but the artisans in the 1940s and early 1950s were 
presented with new opportunities and obtained a new lease of life. The 
break-up of the national economy during the Occupation had fragmented
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markets, which the localised and utterly informal artisans could address 
and so enlarge their scope. The cutting-off of foreign provisioners 
alone opened-up markets for local manufacturers. The predominantly 
manual artisans, who could rely on their families’ multifarious support, 
managed to secure some of the new openings, while the larger manufac­
turers ready to do so were crucially hampered by crippling shortages and 
a dramatic plunge in productivity.
Once recovery started after the end of hostilities, light in­
dustry, whose output met the most urgent needs of the population, 
recovered faster than heavy industry. In view of the low priority given 
to large-scale manufacturing for purposes of reconstruction, artisans 
could supply part of these needs by seizing peripheral market niches. 
This, gave them additional scope and greatly helped their resurgence as 
a stratum. Moreover, the capitalist groups being uncertain about the fu­
ture of the regime, they avoided medium and long-term investments in in­
dustry, and concentrated again on reaping quick and high profits. 
Manufacturing operated along similar ’principles’, and domestic would-be 
investors used access to state policy-making and state-distributed for­
eign aid not so much as means of reconstruction and development, but for 
personal enrichment. While manufacturing firms came to depend upon 
lucrative subsidies and concessions, they remained highly inefficient as 
production systems and unable to compete. Obviously, this weakness of 
the large manufacturers presented the artisans with fresh opportunities.
Aside from economic opportunities acting as ’pull’ factors, 
prospective artisans were driven to becoming independents also by cer­
tain ’push’ factors. First and foremost amongst these was the low and 
then further declining wage obtainable in capitalist manufacturing in 
the 1940s, which taught them that they had no future there. A facet of 
the post-war re-emergence of artisans is that it was a consequence of
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the class struggle in terras of wages. Another pull factor was the 
civil-war defeat of the political Left. The collectivist solution to 
which workers had subscribed had now collapsed, and an ideological al­
ternative amongst skilled workers and craftsmen was the decision to be­
come independent artisans. The absence of any state support was also an 
absence of state control, and this had certain economic advantages. 
Lastly, the informal world of the workshop economy acted as something of 
a refuge for those considered officially as politically deviant.
The come-back of artisans may be seen as the result of spontaneous 
and uncoordinated individual action by the more skilled workers facing 
problems of survival. Their solution involved abandoning wage-labour. 
While the cumulative effects of the structural imbalance and delays in 
the country’s earlier industrialisation as well as the overall upheaval 
in the 1940s threatened the workers’ sheer survival, these circumstances 
also provided market opportunities for artisans to cope with the crisis. 
The delays in post-war reconstruction and industrialisation allowed the 
artisanal enterprises a breathing space to either become established or 
strengthen their market position, without recourse to external funding 
being necessary. Those in authority were forced to think of artisans as 
a body to be reckoned with since, at least potentially, they might well 
acquire a political voice.
With respect to early post-war industrialisation: both Greece’s 
U .S.-sponsored first five-year plan and the National Bank strategy in­
volved one kind or another of comprador industrialisation - there was 
never any question of all-round national industrialisation. Both 
authorities accepted that development would have to proceed on the basis 
of the free-trade principle, that the market was to be given full play, 
and that the role of the state would be limited to that of the guarantor
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of expanded reproduction, and the provider of the necessary infrastruc­
ture.
There were, however, not insignificant differences between the two 
projects. The agenda of the former was integrated with the American-led 
effort to reconstruct and build up a new Europe. It was expected that 
once Marshal Aid had set things moving, further development would accrue 
from the energetic participation and investments by local entrepreneurs. 
Within this context Greece’s industrialisation was limited to areas 
where the country had a comparative advantage, i.e. to light manufactur­
ing. It meant that Greece’s economic ruling class would have to invest 
not only in manufacturing, which would spell a departure from its prac­
tice during the 1940s, but also to be content with lower profits and, 
most importantly, to help open up the system: industrialisation was con­
ceived of as the impetus for the country’s overall democrat isat ion as 
well as economic development. It was expected that the ruling class 
shedding some of its outdated privileges would result in a more stable 
regime.
The National Bank project held that the country’s geographical 
position endowed her with the comparative advantage that allowed her to 
become an an export platform for western manufacturing firms in the 
region; some import-substitution was also anticipated. It was direct 
foreign investments that would finance the operation, with the local 
elites playing only an intermediary role. In this scenario, the local 
elites remained virtually unchanged in themselves, nor did they open up 
the system. They would merely take advantage of the fact that they per­
sonified bourgeois rule in the threatened country: their being indispen­
sable to the West would compel the latter not only to undertake the bur­
den of keeping the country in the western bloc, but could be a source of 
added revenue at no particular cost. In the end, the failure of the
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first post-war five-year industrialisation plan (which failure was due 
primarily to the absence of agents to carry it along) belatedly led to 
developments that accorded more with the second project.
In either case, plans for industrialisation were conspicuously 
silent on the subject of artisanal enterprises. In accordance with the 
then widely-held belief that regarded artisans as remnants of a bygone 
pre-capitalist and proto-industrial age and due to be swept away by the 
industrialisation to come, such enterprises were considered as inconse­
quential to overall industrialisation and development. They were hardly 
a threat to industry proper, since they supplied only small amounts of 
low-grade products to minor markets. Accordingly they were ignored. Left 
virtually to themselves, the slow pace of industrialisation afforded ar­
tisans precious breathing space. Their proliferation indicates that they 
did not fail to take advantage of the situation.
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Notes to Chapter IV
1. See Bairoch (1982; 330-31). Finland’s total level rose from 5 in
1953, to 43 in 1980, an increase of 8.6 times. Per-capita level rose
from 53 in 1953, to 371 in 1980, a sevenfold increase.
2. For instance, in 1898, 58% of the country’s imports had consisted of
foodstuffs, while in 1900 cereals alone represented 25.8% of all im­
ports; cited in Nikolinakos (1976: 35-36).
3. On the situation and losses suffered during the occupation see G. J. 
Pesraazoglou’s report to the National Bank of Greece (1946a: 17). On the 
’politics of hunger*, see laiou-Thomadakis (1980).
4. The creation of the Currency Commission was one of the results of the 
1946 Anglo-Hellenic agreement. The Commission’s function included super­
vision of the activities of the Bank of Greece (the issuing bank), con­
trol of the issuing of bank-notes and the allocation of bank credit in 
general. The Commission was abolished in 1982, but foreign membership in 
it had lapsed well before that date; Freris (1986: 124-25).
5. Thomadakis (1984: 126-27) mentions instances of Greek factories relo­
cated abroad but argues, in consonance with the National Bank of Greece, 
that the overall machinery was saved.
6. For instance in Belgium and France, new industries were established 
in the course of the war and occupation (Bairoch 1982: 299). In France, 
at least in Paris, artisans did well well during the war, as demand 
picked up for goods that were not mass-produced (Berger 1980: 101).
7. Stathakis (1990: 69-70) points out that production of foodstuffs, 
tobacco and textiles reached pre-war levels by 1947, while chemicals, 
metallurgy and mining took a markedly longer period to catch up with 
1939 levels. He adds to the reasons already presented for explaining the 
divergent pattern, the priority accorded by bank financing to branches 
of consumer-good production, and their use of simpler production tech­
niques than those producing capital goods.
8. On Germany as a late developer see Borchardt (1976: 155, and 
throughout his article); Kocka (1986: 299) too. On the role of machine 
construction during Germany’s early indust ial isat ion and in what until 
recently was West Germany, see Sabel (1981) and Piore & Sabel (1984), 
also Gerschenkron (1992: 113-15); on overall German industrialisation 
see Kocka (1986). On Finland, Denmark and Sweden, see Senghaas (1985); 
also Therborn (1990: 21-56) on Sweden. On Norway’s road to deve 1 opment,
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see Fagerberg et al (1990: 60-94); on South Korean industrialisation, 
Amsden (1990: 5-31) is useful. On Japan, the USSR, India, China, Brazil 
and Nigeria, all of which (unlike Greece) are countries with large 
populations and hence with a potentially large internal market - see 
Kemp (1989).
9. See for instance National Bank of Greece (1946: 21, 31), and 
Delendras and Magioros (1946). From such statements it appears that un­
til 1947, when a number of trade unions and/or trade-union leaderships 
were dissolved, workers as a rule tended to follow their Communist- 
controlled unions, ’blindly5.
10. An example of this may be found in Anderson (1982) - also see Ch.
11.
11. Vergopoulos errs on the character of these units for as indicated 
earlier capitalists were very reluctant to invest in manufacturing at 
the time. These were pre-eminently simple commodity production type of 
units. However, he correctly notes that this upsurge took place in con­
ditions in which capitalism has dominated; these artisans were a by­
product of the specific conditions of a peripheral capitalist formation.
12. The state’s preference for the term handicraft rather than artisan 
reflects the labour-intensive character of the units named.
13. ’Peculiar position’ - the choice of words reflects that artisans 
were considered by those in authority as an anomaly.
14. In the early and mid-1980s, artisans were allocated 10% of bank 
loans. In more recent years the amount available for artisans* loans has 
not been fixed, as the system has been ’liberalised’.
15. In the course of my interviews, political persecution surfaced as a 
major reason prompting today’s small producers to seek employment in ar­
tisanal workshops. I was told by several interviewees that many of their 
older colleagues, now mostly retired, became artisans only because they 
could not find alternative employment owing to the institutionalised 
purge of leftist elements in the primary labour markets.
16. The National Bank of Greece was the agency that historically was 
most closely related to Greece’s industry, which it financed. In 1948, 
for example, it furnished 70% of the financial requirements of industry. 
The bank’s predominance and role in economic and political life is dis­
cussed in Burgel (1976: 298-99, 303-04). See also National Bank of 
Greece (1947: 31; 1949: 30; 1950: 34; 1951: 35).
17. It was stated quite openly that the sums available for industry were 
insufficient. Thus, in 1946, the Bank of Greece advanced to industry
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only 6%, or 39 billion inflated drachmas, of the total sum available. 
The National Bank also provided drs 50 billion, but this too, was only a 
small fraction of pre-war advances to industry. By contrast, the Bank of 
Greece allocated to agriculture 60% of the total of available sums (see 
National Bank of Greece 1947: 31).
Apparently the strategy of full employment and taxation of labour, 
which was part of the USSR industrialisation experience and followed by 
China and other so-called socialist countries, was not at the time per­
ceived as a means of creating capital; see Hoogvelt (1987) and Kemp
(1989).
18. See National Bank of Greece (1946a: 30; 1946b: 81; 1947: 43). With 
regard to low wages, see also Thomadakis (1988:76).
19. A development plan for industry was elaborated by Bats is (1977). See 
also the issues of the journals Nea Oikonomia and Andaeos of the middle 
and late 1940s.
20. On the interlocking and family relationship among leading bankers 
and industrialists in the late 1940s, see Hadziiossif (1988: 29-30).
21. One way out, discussed in all seriousness but considered rather im­
probable (Delendas and Magioros 1946: 19-20), was to get the Allied 
governments to accept Greek emigrants into their countries and colonies.
22. The neglect of key sectors such as metallurgy, chemicals, and 
machine construction have in recent years led to increasingly more 
severe balance-of-payments problems. It has also led to dependence on 
abroad, as well to technological stagnation. The situation has reached 
such an impasse that Giannitsis, a noted economist, has argued that the 
lop-sided development of industry in Greece may, in the near future, 
mean that the positive results so far achieved will be disregarded and 
discontinued. The end of the long post-war boom has set definite limits 
to further expansion along such lines. Therefore, unless new competitive 
enterprises are speedily put into operation, prospects for the country’s 
welfare seem to be discouraging (1979; 1983).
23. On U.S. intervention see Fatouros (1984), Wittner (1984), and Pollis 
(1984). A sober account based on archive material is to be found in 
Kariotis (1979). The relationship between U.S. intervention and in­
dustrialisation is discussed by Stathakis (1990).
24. The U.S. aid, as a proportion of Greece’s Gross Fixed Capital, was 
as follows:
1948 - 42.0% 1951 - 78.5% 1954 - 20.8% 1957 - 12.4%
1949 - 83.3% 1952 - 54.5% 1955 - 19.8%
1950 - 76.5% 1953 - 26.8% 1956 - 19.4%
(mentioned in Freris 1986: 150).
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25. The aid supervision by AMAG and the Currency Committee, has been 
described as ’covert planning’, although no direct planning of produc­
tive ventures was involved. Such ’covert’ planning, pursued through the 
agency of the Currency Committee, survived AMAG for a number of years to 
come (Thomadakis 1988: 44-51). A diverging view in respect of the 
breadth and scope of this type of planning, and the actual cir­
cumstances, is to be found in Hadziiossif (1988).
26. The earlier plans, it seems, involved a stage of ’stabilisation’ and 
a subsequent stage of ’reconstruction’. According to a student of that 
period’s economic history, the particular meaning of stabilisation did 
not include a sense of development of the country’s economy as an im­
mediate priority (Thomadakis 1988: 20-30).
27. The preoccupation of Greece’s intel 1 igensia and ruling elites with 
the country's and, to a lesser extent, the nation’s viability, has been 
examined by Hadziiossif (1986).
28. This, after all, had been one of the principal aims of Greek
economists, planners and politicians: to persuade the donors of aid
that, without their assistance, the reconstruction of the country’s
economy could not take place (see Hadziiossif 1988: 68). Stathakis
(1990) also indicates that foreign aid was the cornerstone of Greek
policy and an issue of dispute between the local elites and their west-
•
ern patrons.
29. Sums of US $ 15, 9, 70, and 14 million were expected to be saved 
respectively in the four categories of planned industry mentioned previ­
ously (Nikolaidis 1971a: 10).
30. However, as Vergopoulos points out, the remaining import quotas that 
were aimed at balancing foreign trade also protected indigenous industry 
(1984: 536).
31. Under the revised plan, $592.2 million and drs 6,988.6 billion were 
to be spent on reconstruction. However, since an official forecast ex­
pected only approximately 63% of the programme to be realised (i.e. 
$374.7 million and drs 4,332.1 billion), it was announced that during 
the first two years of the plan the monies to be spent would amount to 
approximately 40% of the total sum forecast, i.e. $152.0 million and drs
1,732.1 billion. In fact, the sums actually spent in the course of the 
first two years were, respectively in dollars and drachmas, only 87% and 
70% of the revised forecast.
32. Stathakis (1990: 70) mentions substantially different figures of 
sums allocated to industry for the period 1947-52, in the form of in­
dustrial loans presumably, not included in the five-year plan. He notes 
that AMAG industrial loans amounted to $1.8 million, distributed to 25
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firms; ECA/G loans of $12.7 million were distributed to 18 firms, the 
three largest receiving the lion’s share of 70% between them. Neverthe­
less, he also points out that later these funds were substantially cur­
tailed.
33. See Christoula-Grigorogianni C1951; 194-95). The author’s evalua­
tion, referred to above, concerns the years 1948-1950.
34. It is against this background of failure of the five-year plan’s in­
dustrialisation projects that the Varvaressos Report must be seen see 
Antaeus 1952: 72-75); Nea Oikonomia 1952a: 49-52; 1952b: 124-26). Var­
varessos advocated putting a stop to Greece’s attempt to build up cer­
tain basic industries. In 1952 and 1957, he criticised the model of 
post-war development followed, and again argued that Greece should have 
abandoned industrialisation in key sectors such as aluminium and steel, 
because she lacked the necessary entrepreneurs as well as the technol­
ogy, and because of ’dis-economies of scale’. To continue the current 
development would mean that industialisation could not progress 
’naturally’, as he said, but only by ’technical means, outside the con­
ditions of free competition and free market’, i.e. under state protec­
tionism. This was an abhorrent prospect for Varvaressos, a convinced 
free-trade liberal. He therefore proposed a limited industrialisation on 
the basis of small self-financed and self-supported enterprises in 
agriculture and building construction. Had it been applied, Varvaressos’ 
option would have meant that Greece would not even have had such trun­
cated industrialisation as eventually did come about.
35. The main evidence this explanation offers is the notorious case of 
the U.S. Mission, allegedly vetoing a proposal in 1949 for Germany to 
hand over a small steel mill to Greece as part of her war reparations. 
This general interpretation of Greece’s maimed industrialisation is held 
by a number of authors, among them Tsoukalas (1974: 102), Haralambidis 
(1985: 78-80), and Dovas (1980: 64), to mention but a few. They base 
themselves on evidence supplied in a 1956 article in Nea Oikonomia by 
L. Nikolaidis. His point, as mentioned in Tsoukalas (1974: 102), was 
that Greece’s
’industrialisation met with much negative reaction because of the 
effects it might have had on the foreign trade of other European 
countries, and because of the economic self-sufficiency it would 
have created in the course of a few years. Thus commercial, 
economic, and political interests necessitated an unrelenting op­
position (to Greece’s industrialisation) from the countries 
[offering aid]’ (my translation).
36. Exceptions to the norm are Vergopoulos (1984: 543) who does not deny
that the U.S. agreed with the prospect of Greece’s industrialisation,
along with Nikolaidis (1971a: 9) and Stathakis (1990: 63).
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37. Nikolaidis, in this 1971 article, absolves the Americans of any 
guilt in the case of the steel mill, and again blames the same ’certain 
cadres’ for it (1971a: 10).
38. The U.S. planners were obviously making sure that European 
reconstruction would not compete with American economic expansion in 
markets outside Europe.
39. Of course this type of mercanti1istic opposition to industrialisa­
tion is typical of bourgeois comprador-merchant elements. On comprador 
capital see Hoogvelt (1978: 100-08) and Mao Zedong (1967: 13-18). Ele­
ments of the comprador-merchant class had emerged and successfully es­
tablished themselves in Greek-speaking lands during the Ottoman period 
(Stoianovich 1960; Moskof 1974a; 1974b).
Reading between Nikolaidis’ lines (1971a: 10), one discerns a pos­
sible link between the two groups putting forth internal resistance to 
industrialisation.
40. Stathakis (1990) indicates that the initial U.S. enthusiasm for 
Greece’s industia1isation was thwarted as their priorities were 
redirected.
41. Earlier, a report of the U.N. Food and Agriculture organisation 
(FA0) in 1946 had argued in support of the modernization of Greece’s 
agriculture, but pointed out that any such modernization would create a 
major surplus labour force. Thomadakis (1988) considered it reasonable 
to expect labour-intensive industry to absorb surplus labour from a mod­
ernised agricultural sector, and that it was ’compatible with (though 
not to be exclusively based on) the preservation and expansion of small 
enterprises’. These small enterprises were important because they
’diffused the commitment to private property to the lower social 
strata, and small entrepreneurs could continue as the social 
buffer zone traditionally interposed between the bourgeoisie and 
the increasingly militant working class. Such small businesses 
finally offered an organisational vehicle for the enforcement of a 
cheap labour policy, since they would operate with owner or family 
labour, and so, remain outside the area of labour struggles and 
the collective impact of union demand* (ibid. 36; my translation).
However this line of reasoning was not one the planners applied, since 
no real assistance towards the development of industry was forthcoming; 
there is no evidence of active state support for small businesses 
either in 1946 or the subsequent years of civil war. This political 
reasoning behind the creation of extended middle classes, a point raised 
by other authors too, (e.g. Vergopoulos 1984, and Tsoukalas 1984), does 
not seem to have been applied to artisanal enterprises. In fact planners 
shrugged artisans’ concerns as an unfortunate anomaly that somehow had 
to be accommodated. Attempts towards the creation of new middle strata 
that would depend on the state for their livelihood focused exclusively
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on the non-productive service sector. It must be understood that 
Thomadakis’ type of industrialisation, which would rely on small ar­
tisanal enterprises, did not exist in the planners’ minds in the early 
post-war years. To argue otherwise introduces, apart from functionalist 
bias, ex post facto the problematic of small high-technology firms - 
otherwise called the flexible specialisation paradigm - which appeared 
only in the late 1970s and ’80s. It is quite wrong to assume not only 
that a small-scale flexible paradigm could have been recognised in the 
1940s-early ’50s, but also that the decision not to work with it 
(presumably in the form of the Varvaressos Report) meant blocking the 
way to industrialisation.
42. See for instance, the various commentaries in the issues of the 
journals Andaeos and Nea Oikonomia; see also Stathakis (1990).
43. This is an issue implied as early as 1946, in the Porter report. 
Porter, according to Thomadakis (1988: 31), on the one hand noted the 
ideological/political importance in issues concerning industrialisation, 
modernisation, and development (related to the outlawed Communists, the 
political and social enemy). On the other hand, he saw that the in­
digenous bourgeoisie did not appear to welcome development in the sense 
of industrialisation and modernisation. The point I suggest is that, in 
principle, the leading Greek circles had already accepted a particular 
form of industrialisation, one which would not involve them in high 
risks and would depend on foreign capital input. They were ready to such 
a course, provided they were allocated and guaranteed a new comprador 
role in the altered post-war international division of labour.
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CHAPTER V - ARTISANS AND CXKTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
This chapter will concern itself with artisans in the context of 
overall development in Greece from the late 1950s to the present. The 
artisans’ resurgence will be established on the basis of official 
statistics. The relationship between development, industrialisation, and 
artisans is then explored via a survey of state development plans.1 The 
focus is on the official perspective and how it proposed to deal with 
them, and what the relationship was, if any, between the resurgence of
artisans and the state’s efforts at overall development.
1. Numerical Survey of Artisans
Tables 5.1 to 5.6 illustrate crucial aspects of the changes in the 
morphology of Greek manufacturing in the post-war period. The data 
presented - both for the country as a whole and for the Greater Athens 
area - show the number of establishments and their employees, as well as 
the horse-power (HP) capacity of installed machinery.
Table 5.1 establishes that there has been a continuous increase in
absolute terms concerning all three indices for the manufacturing in­
dustry in the whole of Greece. The same is true for the Athens region, 
except for the roughly 2% drop in the total number of establishments in 
the last censi.
Table 5.2 shows that artisanal units, defined by official statis­
tics as establishments employing up to 10 persons, have undergone a 
proliferation in absolute terms. Hie decline noted above affected mostly 
the number of artisanal workshops in the Athens region, and was in the
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region of 6.3%. Nevertheless, overall employment and HP capacity of in­
stalled machinery still increased.
The Table 5.2 figures are broken down into smaller employment 
groups in Table 5.6. This makes it clear that the 6.3% decline affects 
the lowest bracket, that of 0-1 employees, which could indicate an in­
cipient crisis. However, the fact that all the remaining artisanal 
groups having increased in terms of all three indices appears to indi­
cate rather a process of growing maturity. It is interesting that al­
though the total number of establishments with 0-1 employees has 
decreased, their HP capacity has gone up by 15%, indicating that 
mechanisation is spreading.
Table 5.3 shows that in relative terms artisanal units have main­
tained their share in the total number of Greek manufacturing estab­
lishments, virtually unchanged from 1958 to 1988, with about 94%.
Table 5.4 echoes the above finding in terms of employment, which 
again remained virtually the same from 1963 to 1988.
Table 5.5 indicates that artisanal HP capacity has gone up some­
what, especially in the establishments with the fewer employees. This 
suggests that artisans, having held their ground in relative terms, are 
improving their position in absolute terms. The general assessment of an 
artisanal regeneration does, therefore, appear to be reflected by actual 
developments.
The multitude of small and inefficient producers with backward 
production techniques and equipment compare?unfavourably to large firms. 
The latter are able to profit from economies of scale and effect produc­
tion increases that are further supported by the introduction of innova­
tions (dynamic efficiency). If, therefore, the small producers wished to 
acquire a measure of productive efficiency to help them withstand com­
petitive pressures, they had to mechanise and generally modernise their
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workshops. Of course, a main consideration in modernisation was financ­
ing, with one possible source being the state. However, even if the 
necessary funding had been available (which it was not), given the con­
text of the constraints and imperatives with which the state was con­
fronted, probably it would not have made good economic sense for it to 
invest the huge sums required for financing artisanal modernisation. Be­
sides, the artisanal units were too numerous, too dispersed and usually 
unprofitable, so that the necessary investments for equipping them fully 
would have been huge, while the resultant benefits would have been 
limited.
The artisans managed to gradually mechanise their units largely by 
relying on their own individual resources (savings, family help, bills 
of exchange, loans from banks or loan-sharks - see Ch. VIII). This 
self-reliance buttressing their renowned self-sufficiency ethos resulted 
in the steady increases in the HP-capacity of machinery installed in 
small artisanal enterprises, despite the lack of any significant state 
financing (see Tables 5.2, 5.5, and 5.6). It also demonstrates that ar­
tisans are not inherently immutable. When the opportunity initially 
arose and they could lay their hands on some old items of machinery, 
they were ready to start the transition from hand-tools to specialised 
electrical tools; today they are going a step further and are gradually 
acquiring electronic equipment.
Mechanisation, which makes sense for the purposes of addressing 
growing local, national, or international markets, is associated his­
torically with the emergence of large-scale factory production. In the 
case of the artisans, rising domestic demand and the chance of buying 
used capital equipment at very low prices, and/or paying for purchases 
of machinery on the instalments system (see Ch. VIII) have facilitated 
mechanisation. As a result, artisans increased productivity, reduced
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Table 5.1: Number of establishments, annual mean employment, and horse-power 
(HP) capacity of installed machinery in the manufacturing industry (all of 
Greece, and Greater Athens Area)
All of Greece
Total Productive units with machinery of known HP
No. of Mean No. of Mean No. of Mean
Units annual Units annual Units annual HP
Year employment employment employment
19301 67,598 225,937 9,6772 224,2642
19511 — 450,424 — — — — —
19581 109,236 441,092 — — 30,985 279,929 809,012
1963 122,851 482,294 121,353 468,949 50,688 351,182 2,277,5913
1969 124,651 501,521 122,577 488,458 69,189 404.833 2,014,418
1973 121,357 604,042 118,917 587,217 84,237 529,412 3,768,988
1978 128,988 671,496 126,793 654,155 86,697 578,353 4,519,918
1984 144,463 684,145 141,001 660,699 115,753 620,937 6,143,968
1988 144,717 706,307 141,395 680,275 117,832 639,923 6,880,057
Greater Athens Area
Total Productive units with machinery of known HP
No. of Mean No. of Mean No. of Mean
Units annual Units annual Units annual HP
Year employment employment employment
19301 11,646 67,997 _ _ 62,459
19511 — 133,235 — — — — -
19581 25,709 181,860 — — 10,187 - 280,473
1963 34,303 225,870 33,581 217,620 19,735 185,091 678,6233
1969 40,956 233,799 39,822 224,956 25,583 198,174 585,8103
1973 42,907 279,824 41,346 266,442 31,291 246,699 1,467,364
1978 47,332 281,821 45,980 267,993 31,581 236,595 976,426
1984 49,631 244,151 47,836 228,038 39,328 212,810 1,070,355
1988 48,656 246,880 46,906 228,538 — — 1,315,026
1 Figures taken from industrial censi, which normally take place during Sep­
tember. They are less representative than the remaining figures which repre­
sent annual averages, due to an upturn of seasonal employment during that 
month.
2 Waterworks are included.
3 Probably an error in official statistics: the HP capacity of businesses out­
side manufacturing may have been included.
Sources: Census of Industrial Establishments for 1930, 1958, 1963, 1973, 1978, 
1984 and 1988; Population Census for 1951; Statistical Year-book of Greece 
1986, and for 1990-91; data for the year 1930 were processed by me for com­
parison.
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Table 5.2: Number of establishments, employment and HP in artisanal manufac­
turing per employment bracket (0-4. 5-9 and 0-9) - all of Greece and Greater 
Athens area
0-4 All of Greece Greater Athens area
workers
Year No. of No of No of No of
units employees HP units employees HP
1930 62,435 106,645* 78,175 9,468 21,278 3,660
1958 92,760 162,766 80,947 19,004 38,124 23,828
1963 102,986 168,125 330,037 26,486 53,339 46,600
1969 108,878 191,815 488,767 32,983 64,663 89,186
1973 102,359 183,474 597,499 33,276 65,198 129,500
1978 109,291 196,792 761,567 37,937 71,328 163,350
1984 123,962 218,274 1,086,182 41,083 76,012 251,400
1988 122,623 219,409 1,266,198 39,592 74,599 282,626
5-9
workers
1930 2,979 22,093 1,172 8,743
1958 10,809 67,892 59,075 3,938 25,237 23,297
1963 8,785 57,278 133,136 4,633 31,000 39,259
1969 9,558 71,064 171,581 4,693 31,338 57,778
1973 11,120 71,542 221,530 5,516 28,967 73,760
1978 11,030 72,886 278,302 5,457 35,323 89,657
1984 11,704 75,594 427,779 5,127 33,002 114,852
1988 12,704 82,059 480,148 5,531 35,644 120,541
0-9
workers
1930 65,432 128,738 10,640 30,022
1958 103,569 230,658 140,023 22,942 63,361 47,125
1963 111,771 225,403 463,173 31,101 84,339 85,859
1969 118,436 262,879 660,349 37,676 96,001 146,964
1973 113,479 255,016 819,029 38,792 94,165 203,260
1978 120,321 269,678 1,039,869 43,374 106,561 253,007
1984 135,666 293,868 1,513,961 46,210 109,014 366,252
1988 135,327 301,468 1,746,346 45,123 110,245 403,167
Note: Employment figures for years 1930 (inclusive of waterworks), 1958, and 
1969 are taken from the industrial censi conducted, at the end of September. 
Employment figures for the years 1963, 1973, 1978, 1984 and 1988 refer to 
average annual employment.
* Water works are included.
Sources: Census of Industrial, Artisanal and Commercial Establishments for 
1930, 1958, 1963, 1969, 1973, 1978, 1984 and 1988; Statistical Year-book of 
Greece 1986.
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Table 5.3: Numerical share of artisanal establishments in overall Greek
manufacturing* (in Der cent)
Year 0-4 5-9 0-9
workers workers workers
Over 10 
workers
Total
Manufacturing
1930 92.4 4.4 96.8 3.2 100
1958 85.0 9.8 94.8 5.2 100
1963 84.0 7.0 91.0 9.0 100
1969 87.0 8.0 95.0 5.0 100
1973 84.0 9.5 93.5 6.5 100
1978 84.7 8.6 93.3 6.7 100
1984 85.8 8.2 94.0 6.0 100
1988 84.7 8.7 93.5 6.5 100
Sources: as mentioned in note to Table 5.2; computations my own.
Table 5.4: Numerical share of artisans* employees in overall Greek manufactur­
ing* (in per cent)
Total
Year 0-4 5-9 0-9 Over 10 Manuf actur ing
1930 47.2 9.8 57.0 43.0 100
1958 40.0 12.3 52.3 47.7 100
1963 33.3 11.4 44.7 55.3 100
1969 36.5 13.5 50.0 50.0 100
1973 30.0 11.5 41.5 58.5 100
1978 29.3 10.7 40.0 60.0 100
1984 32.0 11.0 43.0 57.0 100
1988 31.0 11.6 42.7 57.3 100
Sources: as mentioned in note to table 5.2; computations my own
Table 5. 
turing*
Year
5: Mechanisation (HP) of artisanal workshops in overall Greek manufac-
(in Der 
0-4
cent)
5-9 0-9 Over 10
Total
Manufacturing
1958 14.5 10.5 25.0 75.0 100
1963 14.5 5.8 20.3 79.6 100
1969 24.2 8.6 32.8 67.2 100
1973 15.8 5.9 21.7 78.3 100
1978 16.8 6.2 23.0 77.0 100
1984 17.7 7.0 24.7 75.3 100
1988 18.4 7.0 25.3 74.6 100
Sources: as mentioned in note to table 5.2; computations my own.
* Overall Greek manufacturing figures include units employing over 10 persons.
Table 5.6: Number of establishments, annual mean employment, and HP in ar­
tisanal and large-scale manufacturing in all of Greece and the Greater Athens
area (by number of employees (0-1. 2. 3-4. 0-4: 5-9. 0-9: 10-19)
All units All of Greece Greater Athens area
Year No. of Employ­ HP No. of Employ­ HP
units ment units ment
1963 122,851 482,294 2,277,594* 34,303 225,870 678,622*
1969 124,651 501,522 2,014,418 40,956 233,779 585,810
1973 121,357 604,047 3,769,988 42,907 279,822 1,467,364*
1978 128,988 671,487 4,519,918 47,332 281,822 979,426
1984 144,463 684.146 6,143,968 49,631 244,150 1,070,355
1988 144,717 706,307 6,880,057 48,656 244,880 1,315,026
* This is probably an error in the official statistics: the HP capacity of
businesses outside manufacturing may have been included.
0-1 workers
1963 _ — — — — —
1969 59,978 59,074 165,059 15,418 15,945 18,857
1973 52,255 52,315 196,334 14,590 15,053 26,904
1978 57,505 58,329 274,386 18,256 18,816 43,347
1984 65,032 65,977 390,959 20,162 20,695 65,033
1988 60,911 60,658 459,887 18,279 18,718 72,818
2 workers
•
1963 — . — — — — —
1969 29,895 61,631 153,008 9,950 20.436 27,330
1973 29,814 61,400 191,131 10,316 21,178 42,229
1978 31,488 64,741 234,062 11,015 25,556 50,096
1984 36,068 73,988 327,412 11,942 24,417 71,451
1988 37,789 77,101 376,468 12,329 25,084 87,236
3-4 workers
1963 __ — __ — —
1969 19,005 65,172 170,699 7,615 26,308 42,998
1973 20,290 69,759 210,034 8,370 28,967 60,367
1978 20,298 69,826 253,119 8,668 29,866 69,907
1984 22,862 78,309 367,811 8,979 30,900 114,916
1988 23,923 81,650 429,843 8,984 30,797 122,572
(Continued)
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(Table 5.6 continued)
0-4 workers All of Greece Greater Athens area
Year No. of Employ­ HP No. of Employ­ HP
units ment units ment
1963 107,689 175,653 330,037 26,468 52,437 46,600
1969 108,878 185,877 488,767 32,983 62,689 89,185
1973 102,359 183,474 597,499 33,276 65,198 129,500
1978 109,291 192,896 761,567 37,937 74,238 238,688
1984 123,962 218,274 1,086,182 41,083 76,012 251,400
1988 122,623 219,409 1,266,198 39,592 74,599 282,626
5-9 workers
1963 9,091 59,219 133,136 4,633 30,394 39,259
1969 9,558 61,620 171,581 4,693 30,402 57,778
1973 11,120 71,542 221,530 5,516 35,546 73,760
1978 11,030 71,244 278,302 5,457 35,323 89,657
1984 11,704 75,594 447,949 5,127 33,002 114,852
1988 12,704 82,059 480,148 5,531 35,644 120,541
0-9 workers
1963 116,780 234,872 463,173 31,101 82,831 85,859
1969 118,436 247,497 660,348 37,676 93,091 146,963
1973 113,479 255,017 819,029 38,792 100,744 203,260
1978 120,321 264,140 1,039,869 43,394 109,561 328,345
1984 135,630 293,868 1,534,131 46,210 109,014 366,252
1988 135,327 301,468 1,746,346 45,123 110,245 403,167
10-19 workers
1963 3,397 45,742 110,600 1,818 24,318 36,809
1969 3,438 46,213 140,463 1,833 24,601 49,897
1973 4,240 56,579 192,694 2,317 30,770 72,022
1978 4,574 61,872 264,624 2,203 29,568 82,900
1984 4,863 65,437 447,949 2,036 27,153 96,418
1988 5,140 69,131 488,710 2,136 28,519 106,730
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labour costs, and enhanced their flexibility in adapting to developing 
circumstances. In the purely technical sense they became more eligible 
to do business with larger firms and/or be involved in subcontracting 
chains.
This is not to say that there were no serious obstacles. For in­
stance, financial burden incurred was disproportionate to the workload 
they could handle, so that real profits were slow to come. From a 
strictly economic point of view such investments were rather unsound. 
However, artisans were and are not motivated solely by short-term 
economic prospects. As discussed earlier, their interests lies mainly in 
eking out a livelihood by maintaining their chosen way of life and 
everything that that implies. This could be realised only if they were 
ready to operate in an increasingly more open environment - and so re­
quired mechanisation. The costs and strains involved in the purchase of 
machinery were, therefore, accepted as absolutely unavoidable.
Of course, since mechanisation/modernisation is not a matter to be 
effected once and for all, follow-up investments in more modern produc­
tion equipment and methods are continually necessary to maintain the 
same measure of productive efficiency — let alone increase it. This 
means that once artisans have embarked on this path, they are drawn into 
addressing themselves to larger markets, which then impels them to 
produce more and more. This process has its definite limit. The point 
comes when there is a clear contradiction between the values of self- 
sufficiency through artisanal production on the one hand, and on the 
other being drawn into expanded reproduction that calls for a radically 
different outlook and different ways of operating (see Ch. IX).
As noted already, mechanisation of small artisanal units was by 
and large financed by the producers’ own savings (relevant empirical 
evidence appears in Ch. VIII). To a limited extend, they also used
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state-guaranteed loans, which are given at lower (subsidised) interests. 
When such special loans for artisans wfere first instituted (in 1949-50), 
they were set at a mere 5% of total bank financing. Later, the sums in­
volved (in absolute terms) were raised. For instance, during the 1968-72 
period the amounts allocated to artisans rose by 23% in absolute terms, 
and were anticipated to go up an additional 20% between 1973 and 1977 
(Ministry of Planning and Policy 1973: 684-85). However, until the mid- 
1970s only approximately half of the set percentage of total bank 
financing (now raised to 6%) was actually used for that purposes,2 but 
since then increasingly larger amounts have been advanced. This tendency 
was intensified in the 1980s, concurrently with the first PASOK govern­
ment raising the share of financing available for the artisanate from 6 
to 10% of total bank financing (see Lolos 1988: 9-11). Thereafter and 
until the early 1990s, changes in regulations were too continuous and 
rapid to be listed here. I shall merely note that the general trend has 
been towards the lifting of restrictions on collaterals. On the other 
hand, SMEs have been reclassified for loan purposes to include units 
employing up to 99 persons (up from 49) and occasionally even larger 
ones). Their having become eligible for subsidised artisan loans and 
other financial benefits may reduce the assistance available to very 
small units.3
Overall, state financing of artisanal industry is far from satis­
factory, although artisans did obtain some financial help, particularly 
in the last fifteen years, and despite the usurpation of the bulk of the 
available funds by small capitalists sailing under the SME banner. State 
funding is, of course a way for the state to assert a measure of control 
over the stratum. At the same time it acts as a mechanism fostering not 
the artisans’ independence, but rather their caging within a context 
which is dominated by the logic of expanded reproduction.
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2. Development Considerations (late 1950s to early 1990s)
2.1 Development and industrialisation: a new ideology
The notion of development came to Greece in the aftermath of World 
War II, and soon became naturalised as the necessary extension of the 
belated post-war Reconstruction (see Ch. IV). Development was portrayed 
as a process that moved away from the existing general disorganisation 
and towards the developed-modern situation as exemplified by the western 
capitalist societies and economies. In broad terms, planners and other 
persons in authority recognised in development a process of steady quan­
titative as well as qualitative improvements that would bring the 
country closer to the ideal of affluence, already reached by the West, 
and the power associated with it. It was assumed that it was possible to 
‘catch up* with the West, and this made development and the development 
process a finite task, an end in itself. The same was true of the 
synonymous notion of modernisation.4
In parallel, an important by-product that outlived the politico- 
military confrontation of the late 1940s (Civil War) was the cultivation 
and dissemination to the wider public of pro-western ideals and the 
western way of life. This was the result of a policy that initially was 
propagandist pure and simple, i.e. to detract the population’s attention 
from communist ideas and direct it towards a positive appreciation of 
the western way of life.s Favourable images of the western world were 
widely disseminated so as to invoke the desire to live in similar condi­
tions, to provide a social model to be emulated, and to show up the 
then current local situation as stagnant or backward.
The images evoked for popular consumption by the propagandists 
were very closely related to those of the development plans. Based on 
the western course of development, they projected a similar understand­
ing of the current situation, mapped significant in-between stations,
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and promised the glorious end station of full development. The 
electrification of the countryside, the building of a road net, new 
homes and gainful employment for all the population, the spread of new 
consumer goods, an overall improvement in the standard of living, and 
indeed the eventual prospect of affluence - these were objectives wished 
for and anticipated both by the population at large and the state 
development plans.
The state-sponsored development process involved compromises that 
were not socially neutral. The choices that were made were expressions 
of the state's autonomous role in organising society, a process in­
herently unequal. This meant that despite considerable efforts to har­
monise conflicting interests, the potential for disruption of the chosen 
course was ever-present — hence the functional need for an ideology of 
development that would justify the options and actions pursued and so 
could minimise conflict. The necessary ideology referring to the general 
good and emphasising the need to spread western cultural traits, was im­
ported wholesale from abroad and used extensively.6
The dual aspect of development, as an economic practice with so­
cial impact and ideology, was reflected in the assumptions, orienta­
tions, and projects of the state development plans. Development was 
presented as a tangible process affecting the lives of all the people. 
However, the development ideology impinged not only on the common 
people, but equally took over elites and even the planners. Nobody 
remained immune.7 In this sense it may be claimed that development has 
been the organising ideological discourse in Greece since the 1950s.
As the dominant idea of Greece's development was from the outset 
modelled on that of the advanced countries, it was closely linked up 
with the prospect of industrialisation, with the acquisition of an ex­
tensive manufacturing base. But beyond replicating the western model,
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there were other immediate domestic needs that made industrialisation an 
urgent necessity. First and foremost to get the economy moving was the 
twin necessity of satisfying the demand for goods that could not be im­
ported, and to provide the population with employment so as to enable it 
to pay for these goods. Manufacturing was believed to be the key, be­
cause productivity in that sector was seen to have the potential of con­
tinuous increases due to the introduction of technological improvements 
and the use of larger plants. Therefore, linking economic growth-cum- 
development to industrialisation was the practical thing to do. In­
dustrialisation was perceived as potentially the motor of growth which 
would pull along the economy as a whole, and until recently was 
professed to be the major building block of development.®
In this spirit, the conservative then Prime Minister K. Karamanlis 
declared in 1959 that,
’The country’s industrialisation remains a basic intention of the 
plan. Through it, it will become possible to draw in the surplus 
and unemployed work-force, not only from the urban but also from 
the rural regions, which indirectly will push up rural incomes. 
The effort to develop the manufacturing industry aims mainly 
towards the utilisation of domestic raw materials ... Beyond this 
the intention is to develop all manufacturing industry that has 
the potential of becoming competitive’ (mentioned in Ministry of 
Co-ordination 1960: 9; my translation).
The politically more liberal A. Piapandreou, then director of the
official Economic Studies and Planing Centre (KEPE) and a future prime
minister, would also point out that,
’only through the development of industry it is possible to reduce 
unemployment and to raise incomes and exports to a satisfactory 
level’ (1962: 18).
These points were reiterated in all the country’s development 
plans until the early 1990s. The emphasis so often given to the remedial 
impact of industrialisation also had its ideological aspect. It is ap­
propriate to note that the importance given to these issues was so cru­
cial that they structured the state’s position vis-A-vis small and ar­
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tisanal units. They inserted a pragmatic strain of tolerance since, 
despite a strategic opposition to than because of their perceived ar­
chaism, these workshops were a significant source of employment (see 
Tables 5.4 and 5.6).
Besides, Greece wanted to participate more fully in the world 
economy and the country’s international standing required to be raised 
(Ministry of Co-ordination 1960: 23; see also Ch. IV). This meant that 
an overall improvement in the country’s productive capacity and output 
were necessary, for what was at stake was not only economic competition 
between individual firms, but competition between states. If development 
was to be the means for achieving these aspirations, it required a rapid 
build-up of the economy, and this in turn meant industrialisation via 
focusing on a quantitative and qualitative expansion of manufacturing.
On 9 July 1961, an association agreement was signed between Greece 
and the European Economic Community (EEC) - since then renamed the 
European Union (EU) - that opened up prospects of change in the 
country’s economic position and of its position in the international 
system.9 Under this agreement Greece became an associate member to the 
EEC, the first country ever to do so, but eligibility for full member­
ship was delayed by a transition period of 22 years (until 1984). Nor 
would it be automatic even then. It depended on whether the country 
could achieve parity of its socio-economic, legal, and political struc­
tures with those prevailing in the EEC countries. Above all, full acces­
sion depended on restructuring and transforming the economy, which by 
the end of the transition period had to be able to respond to the com­
mitments accruing from the status of an EEC member-state.10
With Greece’s new relationship with the EEC, industrialisation ac­
quired the prospects, urgency, and direction that it had lacked. Instead 
of the undeveloped, small, and impoverished domestic market that posed
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tremendous difficulties for sustaining industrialisation, Greek manufac­
turers potentially now could address an already formed, large, and 
prosperous market, which at any rate was a necessary condition for in­
dustrialisation (see Hobsbawm 1969; Committee for the National Develop­
ment Model 1972b: 64, 70). Accordingly, it was thought that access to 
EEC markets could sustain an export-oriented industrialisation that 
would foster growth. It now hinged on whether domestic firms would mod­
ernise to become competitive, and on whether new companies and in­
dustries would grow. In all this the EEC was seen as the trigger that 
would set off development.
The challenge and the task were formidable, since by reason of 
that EEC association it became imperative for Greece, which at the time 
was firmly in the semi-periphery, to modernise and catch-up with some of 
the most advanced countries in the world. She had to open up to market 
forces, and do so on the basis of a timetable. An additional difficulty 
was that there was no recourse to the experience of other countries: it 
was the first time an underdeveloped country entered into a customs 
union with a group of developed countries, and no records existed on how 
to travel this route (see Nugent 1966: 17).11
The agreement with the EEC was of strategic importance, because it 
determined and structured the country’s priorities, as of course do all 
plans. Accordingly, ever since the late 1950s/early 1960s, attempts had 
been made to draw up a plan for the Greek economy’s optimal structure. 
It was believed that if only the economy could be restructured accord­
ingly, full entry into the EEC would make possible survival + prosperity 
= development. Successive plans explicitly considered the EEC as their 
point of arrival and oriented their course towards it, or at least 
claimed they did.12
2.2 Sma11 enterprises
The attempt to advance the dual process of opening-up to market 
forces and industrialising was premised on reallocating the country’s 
resources according to her ’comparative advantages’. Which branches of 
industry were the most suitable for development purposes hinged on ex­
isting constraints circumscribing comparative advantages. Here, because 
of limitations of space, I will touch only on how the existence of small 
units was perceived in development plans as a constraint, and then I 
will examine the place artisans had in them.
2.2.a Smal1 enterpr ises 
According to the development plans, a stumbling block to modern­
isation, and one that fostered persistent underdevelopment, was the 
dualism between small and large units. No organic complementarity be­
tween the two sectors was deemed to exist. Indeed, it was pointed out 
that:
’the present structure of manufacturing is characterised on the 
one hand by a small number of large units concentrated in certain 
geographic zones and, on the other, by a large number of small and 
intermediate enterprise of a semi-artisanal character’ (Ministry 
of Co-ordination 1960; 99) [my translation!.
But why was small size considered the most important structural 
constraint and most pressing problem by virtually all development plans? 
According to the prevalent paradigm, manufacturing units had to be 
’large’. Large size was associated with the possibility of using modern 
technologies, introducing innovations, and realising economies of scale. 
To achieve efficiency, productivity, and competitiveness a productive 
unit simply had to be big - all the more so given the anticipated ac­
cess to EEC markets. That was the crux of the official bias in favour of 
large enterprises.
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By contrast, small units were seen as intrinsically inefficient 
and disadvantaged in terms of all available standards. They were quite 
simply beyond modernisation. As specialisations of a broader branch or 
sub-branch of economic activity — for example the wooden furniture and 
cupboards sub-branch of carpentry - they were unable of specialising any 
further. Instead, each produced an array of very small quantities of 
products that were different but of a similar type, and had a very 
limited vertical organisation of production. On the managerial front, 
artisans were considered ignorant, exhibited severe organisational 
deficiencies, and showing exceptionally limited entrepreneurial 
dynamism.
In particular, small units were seen as a source of many problems 
for the modern and large-scale tier of manufacturing. Among these were 
the fact that :
- artisanal units were oriented towards general-purpose ac­
tivities, lacked modern equipment and the skills to operate them, and 
used antiquated and hence inexact production methods. This made the ar­
tisans’ difficulties in meeting set specifications and quality require­
ments virtually insurmountable; and this in turn pre-empted them from 
collaborating with large-scale units as, for example, subcontractors of 
the latter (see Committee for the National Development Model 1972b: 66- 
67; Ministry of Co-ordination, 1977: 51 ; Ministry of National Economy 
1988: 66).
- As already mentioned, most small concerns put out a number of 
different products, with each establishment contributing only a few 
stages of the production. This had repercussions that transcended the 
individual unit. Taken as a group, artisanal units were multiplying the 
intermediate stages of exchange. This augmented the final per-unit cost 
and had adverse effects for the rest of the economy.
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- The small producers taken as a whole controlled a significant 
share of the market in the branches where they were concentrated, even 
though they focused on the lower end of that market. It was argued that, 
in an economy where small firms occupied a large market share, the 
larger firms had difficulties in fully exploiting economies of scale and 
performing efficiently, and that there was competition between the two 
sectors (Nugent 1966; Ministry of Co-ordination 1977: 51-52).
- Due to the particular structure of Greek manufacturing and im­
port penetration, small units for the most part used inputs (tools, 
machinery, materials) that came from abroad, and their linkages with in­
digenous large manufacturers were weak.
- Artisans were a ’bad influence’ on other skilled workers, be­
cause they demonstrated that it was possible for the small worker or 
craftsman to be his own master (Ministry of Co-ordination 1968: 82-86).
- All in all, the existence of small units did not provide the 
large domestic producers with a market, and on occasions actually 
weakened them.
The above points amply indicate that the links between the two 
sectors were few, and that there was no ’proper’ organic complementarity 
between them. On the contrary: to a large extent their interests were 
antithetical. The prevailing view was that the ’backward’ artisans were 
retarding the desired modernisation and expansion of Greece’s large- 
scale manufacturing industry, and thus the development process as a 
whole. This official perspective on artisans obviously did not acknow­
ledge any existing elements of dynamism. Later plans show that specific 
changes occurring in the overall situation brought a partially re­
appraisal of the artisans’ potential, even if it did not radically 
depart from the initially negative evaluation. Artisans and their units 
continued to be perceived as a burden, as something which somehow
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of more established, larger units. Hence, something had to be done to 
minimise their adverse impact.
2.2.b The place of artisans in development plans
Faced with this unwanted dualism in manufacturing, the planners 
decided that the more promising small units should be encouraged to 
grow, until greater concentration of production allowed economies of 
scale. Meanwhile, co-operative arrangements were to link up small units 
with one another and particularly with larger ones. The overall idea was 
that each unit would either specialise in one or at most a few products, 
or concentrate on a single manufacturing stage of some particular item. 
It was predicated that a high degree of specialisation would enhance 
competitiveness, reduce costs, effect quality improvements, and 
generally contribute to economic growth (Committee for the National 
Development Model 1972b: 67). The way to trigger the process was quite 
simple via the ’the re-educational pressure of competition' (A. 
Papandreou 1962: 110).
Since light industry predominated in Greece, and since it was 
precisely in light industry that small and very small units, most of 
them artisanal, were to be found, it was realised that the sudden un­
leashing of market forces could create more problems than it solved. 
Only a handful of those small units would be in a position to take-up 
the challenge, the rest would perish, creating considerable unemployment 
- which would definitely contravene one of the chief aims of in­
dustrialisation.
To prevent such a development, it was argued by some experts that 
investments must not be allowed to bring an abrupt substitution of capi­
tal for labour. Instead, encouraging the branches of labour-intensive 
light industry would maintain and even increase employment, and
197
safeguard the rate of economic growth (ibid.: 41-42). Nugent similarly 
held that Greece’s comparative advantage lay in more labour-intensive 
agriculture, metal products, chemicals, transport equipment, and not in 
the very capital-intensive manufacturing sectors like metallurgy or 
petroleum refining (1965: 125). A. Papandreou too, in accordance with 
some of Varvaressos’ earlier pronouncements (see Ch. IV), spoke out 
against the grandiose large-scale projects that so often in the past had 
failed to deliver what was promised, and opted for more labour-intensive 
smaller units.
This approach had a major problem, however: it was nowhere clearly 
set out, and existed only in bits and pieces in one plan or another. 
Since it lacked clear formulation, it was not consistently pursued. In 
any case, it was of course based on continuing the existing lop-sided 
industrial structure, and did nothing to broaden or balance it. In addi­
tion, it in no way took issue with the dominant view that artisanal 
units were parochial and without development potential.
While the development plans painted an image of the artisans as 
residual and marginal, they could not be ignored as a category because 
of their social weight. However unwanted they might be, their mass 
destruction through intensified competition was not feasible. Instead, 
there were attempts at incorporating them through sub-contracting net­
works, or using them as the a recruiting ground for fledgling capitalist 
entrepreneurs. Finally, there remained the solution of simply turning a 
blind eye - which much facilitated the operation of small units - but 
this did not ensure the country’s desired development, and at best 
avoided unemployment.
The following survey of what the official development plans said 
concerning the question of artisans will clarify the role allotted to 
them and show in how far the state’s policies related to the stratum’s
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resurgence.
The 1960-64 plan did not concern itself with artisans. Its 
priorities lay firmly with large-scale industrial projects, and when ar­
tisanal units were mentioned at all it was as sources of employment and 
a training ground for workers. Rural handicrafts were commended in pass­
ing, because they assisted the development of tourism, increased rural 
incomes and employment,13 and were export-orientated (Ministry of Co­
ordination 1960: 22-23, 53-57, 100). At the time of the plan being 
drafted, therefore, the attitude towards artisans was that, while they 
had some uses for alleviating unemployment, raising incomes, worker 
training, and helping the balance of payment, they certainly had no role 
to play in the country’s broader development.
Against this virtual absence of state interest in artisans (ELKEPA 
1965: 8), the 1966-70 plan did advocate a series of organisational 
measures aimed at restructuring the manufacturing sector and to ’assist 
the modernisation and development of artisans'.14 (It is telling that 
the attempt to subjugate artisans was presented in the guise of 
modernisation/development.) This was to be achieved through merging the 
’anti-economical* small units into larger ’healthy’ ones, and by a sys­
tem of interconnected linkages.
The greater concentration of units meant elevation into the 
capitalists ranks of the few who could adapt and compete. The putting- 
out in which the more ’laggard’ small firms would lose much of their in­
dependence was likely to benefit above all the larger units, but would 
also provide the participating artisanal units with a potentially more 
dynamic environment, and so bring them closer to the capitalist sector 
of the economy.
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The 1968-72 plan recognised the labour-intensive character of ar­
tisans and other sraal1-unit producers, who by 1968 employed about half 
of the total workforce in manufacturing, and produced roughly one-third 
of its output. This performance put a stop to ideas about promoting 
development through eliminating the small units, and necessitated a more 
accommodating attitude to the stratum. While growing awareness of the 
artisans’ role helped to protect them,15 containing their proliferation 
through mergers and subcontracting networks was still believed to create 
potentially more viable units. For an enterprise to be ’viable*, it had 
now to be identified as medium-sized, and the process of capital con­
centration was described as *invigoration’.18
Rationalisation and invigoration were the rallying cry under which 
it was attempted to incorporate artisans into capitalist manufacturing. 
Incorporation for the purposes of enhanced economic activity and growth 
was based on the principle of unit specialisation, and inter alia meant 
breaking up the closed circuit of SCP. It implied (i) ’culling’ the ar­
tisans with a view to assisting those few that seemed likely to join the 
capitalist sector and class; (ii) putting small units to rational use 
through subcontracting and putting-out arrangements; and (iii) promotion 
of horizontal networks among artisanal businesses that would allow fur­
ther specialisations/collaboration and eventually economies of scale. If 
they had been successful, (ii) and (iii) would have resembled develop­
ments in what was lat er called ’the third Italy’, but the actual 
results were quite negligible.
To the extent that these processes unfolded, it meant some of the 
desired complementarity did develop between small and larger productive 
units. At the same time, some of the state measures helped non- 
incorporated units to survive in relative seclusion, and their example
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fanned skilled wage-workers * aspirations to upward mobility (Ministry 
of Co-ordination 1968: 82-86, 243).
Next came the 15-year model plan for 1973-1987.17 It reiterated 
the state’s policy on artisans by declaring that small industry con­
tributed to industrial development as a whole, and represented a neces­
sary intermediate stage for developing business skills and creating an 
entrepreneurial class. At the same time, however, in economic terms 
small units still were seen as complementary to rather than a competi­
tive part of major industry, as well as exhibiting ’an inability to ad­
just to the changing conditions in production and organisation*. Their
low degree of specialisation, and their involvement with the production 
of a variety of products, intensified the disadvantages inherent in 
small production: economies of scale were left unexploited, modern­
isation of equipment could not be afforded, etc. In other words, the 
plan confirmed the existence of an industrial dualism, and implicitly 
acknowledged the failure of earlier attempts to improve the situation.
Another feature of the plan was its emphasis on the need for 
manufacturing to address itself to large markets if industrialisation 
was to be enhanced and broadened. The development of an internationally 
specialised and competitive industrial structure was considered an ab­
solute must. It was precisely this imperative that provided the 
ideological impetus for incorporating artisans in the development 
process. Unless, it was argued, they understood why they had to re-align 
themselves, they would have little reason to abandon their established 
ways - especially since their antiquated machinery, low-productivity, 
and poor competitiveness ability were no real hindrance in the localised 
domestic markets where they flourished (and where larger firms were 
largely absent). If artisans were to open themselves up to restructur­
ing, they had to be convinced of their marginal position. This would
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disarmed them ideologically and prepare them for the anticipated role 
change, which entailed residual but specialised productive and com­
plementarity with larger, export-oriented firms.1® The new official 
orientation was complemented by the state pledging to help small 
producers ready to partake in such restructuring. The support offered 
was left unspecific, but preferential treatment was promised to ’the 
most dynamic firms susceptible to growth’ (Committee for the National 
Development Model 1972b: 66-80).
The next five-year plan to be published was for the years 1973- 
1977. It was quite explicit concerning what function the artisans were 
expected to play. Artisanal industry, described as the ’nursery of 
large-scale industry’, was subject to a more realistic approach, while 
the survival of the handicraft industry was granted ’as a home-working 
industry’ of the rural population. The plan acknowledged that a good 
part of the sector managed to continue and even develop on the basis of 
necessary repair work and for the bespoke manufacture of non­
standardised items. However, it maintained that small producers had to 
modernise by making use of modern technology, and by adapting generally 
to the changed market conditions.19 Unless they did so, artisans would 
be faced with very serious problems. In order to effect the necessary 
transitions, artisans were encouraged to orient themselves towards ac­
tivities ’complementary to those of large industrial enterprises’, and 
advised to ’avoid competing with them’.20 It was obvious that proceeding 
along these lines would mean the gradual incorporation of SCP into the 
generally capitalist development.
From the measures announced and the exceptions it allowed it was 
evident that the state now not only abstained from putting obstacles in 
the way of artisanal industry, but actually authorised their continued 
existence. It merely tried to channel them in the desired direction by
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controlling the pre-conditions for licences, loans, and other amenities 
(Ministry of Planning and Policy 1973).
The 1976-1980 plan was announced even before the expiry of the 
1973-77 plan.21 Again, the artisans were seen as outdated elements ham­
pering progress. The plan questioned the previously expressed view 
that they were at least useful in providing employment, and declared 
them to be anti-economical, despite their flexibility and adaptability. 
In consequence they had no other future than incorporation with larger 
firms. The view that the existence of a plethora of small units favoured 
competition and the smooth functioning of the market and prevented the 
emergence of monopolistic-oligopolistic situations, was also questioned. 
While actual competition was in fact restricted, profit margins in a 
number of cases were alleged to be comparatively high.22
The plan focused on SMEs, particularly the more dynamic among 
them, which were declared to provide the key to development. It also 
showed special interest in small units amenable to specialisation. These 
were seen to have a potential to play a supportive role in synergetic 
production circuits with larger SMEs, and be capable of independent 
growth (Ministry of Co-ordination 1977: 51-52, 86, 92-93).
The 1978-1983 five-year plan again followed in the footsteps of 
earlier ones. It declared that there had been some broadening of the 
manufacturing base, and that the competitiveness of certain larger 
manufacturing firms had been strengthened. On the other hand, there was 
much room for improvements in terms of specialisation and broadening the 
industrial base in respect of the branches/sub-branches utilising domes­
tic raw materials for the production of intermediate goods. The disad­
vantage of small unit size was to be overcome mainly by sponsoring 
inter-1 inking and collaboration between units from various branches, by 
advancing group purchases, and other collaborative activities. As in the
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past, this was recommended to make it possible to realise economies of 
scale. Since improved performance by the small and medium firms - with 
SME development complementary to that of larger firms - expected to have 
positive results for the economy earlier decisions on financing were 
reaffirmed, and the will expressed to put them into practice - so in­
dicating that until then they had remained a dead letter (Ministry of 
Co-ordination 1979: 69-74).
The plan for 1983-1987. was drafted after Greece’s full entry into 
the EEC. It repeated the diagnosis of dualism in manufacturing, and 
noted that small units had become even more numerous as well as even 
smaller,23 and were not providing increased employment. This con­
tradicted earlier assessments of the employment potential of artisanal 
enterprises.24 The plan suggested that small units be organised more ef­
ficiently through incorporation,25 and proposed,28 sectoral programs of 
assistance to SMEs.27 Priority was given to the vertical development of 
selected intermediate and capital-goods branches, two of which were 
machining (useful for vertical expansion of the metal branches, and 
hence with import-substitution potential), and garments (with export 
potential). Special emphasis also went to (a) assisting the development 
of heavy industry (including machining) and raising its technological 
level; (b) to processing indigenous raw materials locally; (c) to 
labour-intensive units; (d) to import-substituting units; (e) to 
branches with export potential (such as garments or shoes).
The plan also stressed the need to spread modern management tech­
niques and production technologies among the SME. It recommended the 
cultivating of such commendable practices as launching new products on 
the basis of feasibility studies, as well as upgrading skills by con­
tinued training courses.
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At the institutional level, it said that laws and regulations, 
which earlier plans had also announced as imminent, would be promulgated 
for the co-operative and collaborative organisation of SMEs in terms of 
provisioning and exporting. Entrance into the artisanal trades would be­
come subject to the institution of a special artisan’s operating 
licence. Other measures - e.g. the patenting of innovations, networking, 
protection against unlawful competition, relocation to low-priced lodg­
ings in industrial parks, creation of exhibition centres, etc., were 
also promised.
The objective underlying the 1983-1987 plan was to bridge the per­
sistent industrial dualism. Its main purpose was stated to be the 
’development of artisanal industry in organic relationship with the 
mainstream manufacturing industry’ - in other words, to achieve the full 
incorporation of artisans in the economy and a more dynamic complemen­
tarity between units of various sizes (Boule of the Hellenes 1983: 10, 
33-34, 53-60). To this end SMEs were pressured by the state to address 
impersonal markets and rationalise their operations. However, given the 
lop-sidedness of large-scale manufacturing, the desired organic com­
plementarity was destined to be nothing more than putting-out schemes 
benefitting the capitalist sector.
The plan for years 1988-1992. brought a change of direction in the 
overall developmental objectives. It openly advocated abandoning heavy 
industry and mass-production industrialisation. The new emphasis was on 
manufacturing branches - such as textiles, fertilisers, chemicals, etc. 
- with good prospects in the medium-to-long range. Special emphasis was 
given to the technological level of new investments. The overall aim was 
both a technological upgrading of the more traditional industries, and 
the development of new high-tech industry to al low the country to par­
ticipate in the changing international division of labour.
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To follow these broader realignments, SMEs had to further orient 
themselves towards exports. The state was ready to assist them by sup­
plying the necessary infrastructure, to allow them to become ’productive 
and viable in the open competitive environment of the EEC*. They would 
receive assistance either individually or as teams of enterprises, for 
the purposes of upgrading their product quality and modernising their 
technology and marketing operations. SMEs were scheduled to receive EEC 
support for training purposes and funds for fixed-capital purchases/in­
vestments. The plan also announced the setting up of a specialist agency 
for SME financing similar to the Italian Artigiancassa, as well as 
‘regional innovation centres’ and ’artisanal industry centres’ (Ministry 
of National Economy 1988: 115, 160-61).
From a more detailed KEPE report on SMEs (KEPE is the planning 
authority) that accompanied the 1988-1992 plan emerges a more realistic 
understanding of the situation of artisans and their potential. This
report recognises that artisans and the nebulous category of SMEs repre­
sent a very important part of Greek manufacturing. It states that,
’SMEs occupy a particularly important position in the Greek 
economy and ... we can say that Greece is virtual ly the country of 
the small and medium-sized enterprises’ (KEPE 1989a: 54).
It was noted that Greece, with 99% of her manufacturing units 
designated as SMEs (’manufacturing units’ employing up to 49 workers), 
was the EEC country with the highest percentage of SME units in manufac­
turing in 1984 (the year of the last published census).
The editors of the report introduced an important distinction into
the official discourse: the very small artisanal enterprises, which ac­
tually form the vast majority of SMEs, are now considered as a category 
of their own. Their proprietors are dubbed 'professional artisan’ 
(epagelmato-viotehnes) since they ’personally participate in all the
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work* and because what they expect to earn is actually a good wage.28 
The other, larger units form the second constituent group of the SMEs.
The report also drew a distinction between handicraft and/or ar­
tistic homeworking (considered a mostly rural side-occupation), and 
homeworking as part of sub-contracting/putting out networks (which is 
mostly urban). All homeworking units were acknowledged to be very small, 
and as many as 100,000 of them were estimated to operated in Greece in 
1989. They are not officially registered and are quite separate from the 
recorded 120,000 artisanal units. The estimate is eloquent about the ex­
tent of the informal sector at the popular level, and suggests that the 
significance of petty manufacturing may be far greater than previously 
thought. Regarding the prospects of homeworkers, however, the report is 
as silent as were all the previous plans.
Despite the distinction now drawn between artisans per se and the 
remaining SMEs, many of which are in fact small capitalist firms, the 
strategic approach towards artisans expressed in previous plans has not 
changed in any fundamental way. The report generally considers SMEs as 
suitable for filling basic gaps in production and the market that larger 
units cannot meet, and therefore as supplementary to mainstream manufac­
turing. But, unlike in the ‘Third Italy*, the Greek SMEs are not thought 
as having any potential to directly address world markets.
The report emphatically reiterates the recommendation that ar­
tisans should co-operate and collaborate, since the various forms of 
collaboration for specialisation, quality improvements and upgrading 
technologically and organisationally, now have a chance to succeed. This 
optimistic prediction was based on the new source of external funding: 
the EEC or European Union (EU). Special EEC-funded programs, plus help 
by local specialist organisations (also partly funded by the EEC), were 
declared to be now available. The larger among the many small producers,
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particularly the larger ones in the SMEs category, were noted as 
suitable to play a central role in this project. The only problem en­
visaged was that, though such collaborative schemes may have some posi­
tive export prospects, for objective reasons (e. g. lack of whole 
branches of production) they might not be able to play a more important 
role towards a more comprehensive industrial development.
All in all, the principal aims for artisans and SMEs remain as 
before: to increase employment, raise incomes, promote specialisation 
and technological improvements, assist larger firms through incorporat­
ing small firms into their complementary networks (to compress costs to 
boost exports), and to recruit from among the larger SME proprietors new 
members for the entrepreneurial class. This list of objectives im­
plicitly recognises the lack of success of previous attempts to enlarge 
unit size by means of mergers, and the partial failure of attempts to 
herd small enterprises into subcontracting networks dominated by larger 
producers.2 8
There are a number of critical points I would like to raise con­
cerning this report. First, the report completely ignores what has been 
highlighted by the Italian experience: the need to arrive to a political 
consensus about the role of artisans (Weiss 1988), without which little 
will or can be achieved.
Second, reiterating the earlier orientation on this issue, the 
report points out, that SME development will not be pursued independ­
ently, but as part of each particular branch of industry. This sounds 
sensible in itself. However, the non-existence in Greece of a reasonable 
number of larger producers of intermediate and capital goods makes any 
talk about small units assisting the country’s industrial regeneration
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by attaining organic complementarity with big industry largely void of 
content.30 By contrast, the explosion of the ‘Third Italy* relied upon 
an extensive indigenous manufacturing industry.
Third, the drafting of the particular report and the policies it 
sets out, were obviously affected by some unacknowledged factors. There 
is evidence between the lines of antagonisms and inter-agency feuding, 
of an absence of independent external controls, of red-tape, and even of 
the personal interests of some of its editors.
Fourth, while the report claims to support co-operative arrange­
ments among artisans and other small business people, it remains silent 
on the failure of existing co-operatives (e.g. the machinists’, or that 
in micro-electronics).
Fifth, despite talk about better training and controlled entry 
into the various artisans* trades — in response to pressures by the more 
establ ished smal 1 concerns - nothing has been done at al 1. There is no 
registration worth speaking of, nor is a formal apprenticeship required 
for most of the trades in which artisans are to be found (KEPE 1989a: 
3-9, 44, 51-59, 67-90). This laxity, due to an early free-market liber­
tarianism and a lack of concern for the less privileged (be they the 
workers, artisans, or the consumers), not only facilitates the 
uninhibited reproduction of the stratum; it also advances the immediate 
interests of larger manufacturers, by enabling them to use artisans as 
cheap subcontracted labour.
The last available plan was that for the years 1990-1993.31 It 
considered SME development as a crucial feature of the policy for 
manufacturing. SMEs, it argued, should become ’productive and viable’, 
and the appropriate state agencies should assist them to become so — as­
sistance here meaning giving them advice on how to make use of EU
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programmes (the new panacea) for their education and training, for the 
development of regional innovation centres, the advancement of local in­
itiative and of artisans’ centres, and for the financing of their 
fixed-capital investments (i.e. business premises and purchases of im­
ported equipment). These proposals are essentially similar to those of 
the 1988-1992 plan. Despite the continuing official conception of small 
units as inefficient, small firms are exhorted to co-operate in inter­
connected systems of production units for purposes of exports; the aim 
of creating dynamic individual companies out of them has never been 
abandoned (KEPE 1990: 239, 242-43, also see KEPE 1989b: 123-28).
It is worth pointing out that the 1990-93 plan notes the existence 
of a labour-market dualisms between public and private-sector wage­
workers, with the former better paid than the latter, as also between 
those who work in larger and smaller units, where again the former are 
significantly better paid. By contrast, an artisan’s remuneration by far 
exceeds that of the skilled waged-earning craftsmen working in the 
primary labour markets (KEPE 1990: 86-87; also KEPE 1989a). The surest 
way for skilled wage-workers to increase their income is, therefore, to 
establish themselves as artisans. This in itself provides an economic 
explanation of artisanship, and the point is confirmed by fieldwork 
findings on the working-class background and motivation of artisans (see 
Ch. VIII). Becoming an independent artisan does indeed make good 
economic sense for wage workers.32
Summary and Conclusion
In the course of the last 45 years artisanal units have increased 
in absolute numbers, and have maintained their number intact in relative 
terms also. Artisans have kept their share of manufacturing estab­
lishments and of employment, and they have managed to mechanise their
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workshops at a rate approaching that of larger manufacturers. Official 
figures show that an artisanal resurgence has definitely taken place.
In overall terms, the need to expand employment, to meet the 
population’s basic needs, to improve Greece’s position in the interna­
tional division of labour and compete with other countries, has made 
those in power regard development and industrialisation as imperatives 
requiring the concerted action by both state and society. Within this 
context artisans were tolerated in the 1950s, given that they were a 
source of employment potential as well as supplying the markets with 
traditional goods.
From the late 1950s onwards, Greece’s association with the EEC 
prefigured the country’s opening-up for industrial development, and put 
business modernisation and specialisation firmly on the agenda. It also 
acted as a limiting factor, since these processes had to take place in 
an increasingly competitive environment in which the foreign competitors 
were greatly advantaged. Furthermore, ideological fixation with free- 
trade principles, considered as one of the pillars of modernisation/ 
westernisation, pre-empted a more thorough and strategically concerted 
state intervention for development. In these circumstances it was the 
existence or absence of comparative advantages that usually became the 
criterion for whether or not to go ahead with industrialisation in any 
one sphere. While there was some progress, there were also serious 
delays that resulted in many projects being aborted, and this prevented 
the establishment of an industrial base that could have transformed the 
already badly lop-sided structure of domestic manufacturing.
The country’s overall development has been a mixed blessing for 
its artisans. On the one hand, delays in industrialisation/modernisation 
allowed them to strengthen their own market position. They also profited 
from the tariff protection accorded to all manufacturing, and from the
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general economic growth from the late 1950s onwards. On the other hand, 
the non-development of whole branches of industry, e.g. of machine-tool 
manufacture, and the absence of an indigenous advancement of technologi­
cal appliances, meant that any dynamism of Greek capitalist manufac­
turers could not be passed on to the artisans. In consequence, the or­
ganic complementarity between the artisanal and capitalist sectors that 
was required for development did not evolve beyond the limited confines 
of subcontracting links.
The mechanisation of artisans’ establishments was effected mainly 
through the artisans’ self-financing, just like their first setting up 
and operating their workshops. In more recent years special state loans 
have also played a part in assisting artisans, even if the bulk of these 
loans went to the larger SME (i.e. capitalist) units. There has been 
mounting pressure lately (in part by the EU) to allocate available funds 
to the more ’dynamic’ of the SME. This makes loans to artisans something 
of a weapon in the hands of governments, which always prefer larger 
firms and are keen to incorporate artisans in networks that are control­
led by larger businesses subcontracting the small ones.
While most plans have emphasised the importance of industrial ex­
ports, they did not consider artisans as autonomous agents capable of 
enhancing the country’s position in the world market. They saw the role 
of artisans as limited to that of providing cheap labour for the larger 
firms* export drive. From being completely ignored to begin with, ar­
tisans have gradually acquired an official place in development. The 
smal1-unit specialisation envisaged by the plans can only proceed 
slowly, however, avoiding the too rapid substitution of labour with 
capital so as to prevent unemployment. In line with the modernisation 
and specialisation proposals of development plans, the role assigned to 
the artisans was never anything more than an auxiliary one to the larger
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capitalist producers: they were to play their (cheap) part to advance 
import-substitution manufacture, as for instance in machine-tool produc­
tion, or to help exports, as with garments.
To a lesser extent, artisanal workshops were regarded as a good 
seedbed for dynamic new entrepreneurs, but in the final analysis ar­
tisans were treated far more as a means to keep down unemployment than 
as promoters of development. On the organisational front, it has been 
suggested that existing problems could be overcome by collaboration in 
networks and the adoption of co-operative practices. However, failures 
of early attempts in this direction have not been analysed, so that the 
mistakes that were made are likely to be repeated. All in all, the 
policies put forward for artisans have viewed them more as development 
fodder, even when a nominally post-Fordist future was being propounded, 
than as autonomous agents who should be assisted to contribute to that 
process.
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Notes to Chapter V
1. Why were state-sponsored development plans singled out for 
scrutiny? They have their flaws, and they are even not legally binding
iA Greece (Nugent 1966: 143; Koutsoyiannis 1984). Moreover, they are af­
fected by the swings in power of the political factions - they are cer­
tainly neither neutral nor value-free. For all that, development plans 
are very important as the basic documents outlining and organising the 
desired course of the country’s development, and form the standard 
against which to assess what actually takes place. Overall, development 
' plans are the most authoritative and accessible expressions of the offi­
cial attitude, outlook and policy directives concerning development - 
including that of artisans.
It should be clarified that these plans are by no means the only of­
ficial documents pertinent to artisans. With respect to what has been 
omitted, excluded, or incorporated in this study, let me note the fol­
lowing. If documents from the early or mid-1950s are not mentioned, this 
means I have been unable to locate them. In cases where their objectives 
seem to have been abandoned (Sakkas 1994: 68-70), their essential 
aspects are mirrored in subsequent plans or reports. Secondly, I have 
refrained from delving into the plans, guidelines and decisions of the 
various state apparatuses that relate to artisans, because they are of a 
purely tactical concern. On the other hand, whenever pertinent reports 
were available to back up development plans, they are included in the 
discussion.
2. Loans to artisans were issued for the purchase of machinery* for ac­
quiring a building to be used as a workshop, and to supply liquid capi­
tal for current operations. As security, the banks required mortgages on 
artisans' real-estate. This clearly restricted the number of artisans 
eligible for such loans, and meant that larger SMEs, which could provide 
the necessary security, obtained the lion's share of artisanal loans. 
Moreover, when the required collateral for such state loans were peri­
odically re-examined, it was argued that only those artisans should 
profit from them who showed a certain amount of dynamism (Ministry of 
Co-ordination 1979: 70-74; Boule of the Hellenes 1983: 60).
3. As P. Alexakis has disclosed (on 17/11/94 during an economic-policy 
workshop held as part of the Conference on Greece: Prospects for Modern­
isation, L.S.E., 17-19 November 1994) that the recent broadening of the 
definition of Greek SMEs adopted by EOMMEX, on the basis of which sub­
stantial EU funds will be distributed to the SMEs in the form of loans 
(see the report in the Express newspaper of 21 Oct. 1994), was the 
result of pressure exerted by EU officials. This evidently aimed at en­
suring that loan recipients were dynamic companies certain to effect
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repayment, rather than letting them be diverted to the mass of artisanal 
enterprises that are considered as inefficient.
The SME category (about which see Ch. II) provides an ideological 
cover for the organisational outflanking of artisans by small 
capitalist. This has become quite obvious in the case of loans to ar­
tisans. Further supporting this claim is what artisans I have inter­
viewed have told me about their treatment by specialist state organisa­
tions (see Ch. IX and Ch. X), as well as other evidence. For example, 
EOMMEX subsidises the purchase of micro-computers and training in their 
use for units with more than 5 employees (Deniozos 1993: 231) - at the 
expense of the smaller ones. Then, very recently the responsible Junior 
Minister for Industry disclosed that under a new project "small en­
terprises having less than 30 personnel will not be excluded [from 
receiving assistance] as was the case in the past" (Express: 21 Oct. 
1994, emphasis added). This is a clear admission that until today the 
very small units have indeed been discriminated against.
4. Within this context, modernisation refers to a set of processes by 
means of which traditional societies attempt to become modern, by con­
tinually undergoing differentiation of their structures that previously 
exhibited a high degree of coalescence "between the more in­
stitutionalised and the more informal" (Eisenstadt 1966: 10).
5. The probably most effective method used in the 1950s was the regular 
showing throughout the country of American films, sponsored by the U.S. 
military authorities and the Greek Army. The aim was to disseminate 
western values and life-styles in attractive wrappings. Such film show­
ings, often held in makeshift crossroad open-air cinemas, attracted big 
audiences that might include whole villages or urban-neighbourhood com­
munities. Being gratis, they also formed an important recreational out­
let at a time of generalised poverty. Studying the impact of this form 
of cultural influencing should prove to be an interesting field of 
research.
6. For an account and appraisal of the post-war emergence of an ideology 
of development, see Tsaousis (1971a). On the priority that modernisation 
theorists accorded to changing attitudes and values at the level of in­
dividuals, see the work of D. Jaffee (1990: 17-44).
7. Some aspects of its hold over the elites and its impact in Greece, 
are discussed in Ch. IV.
8. The processes leading to modernity are understood as encompassing 
economic growth and development, the latter seen as the ’engine’ of the 
anticipated social transformations and usually associated with in­
dustrialisation (Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin 1988; Hulme and TXirner 
1990: 110).
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9. Concerning the EEC, I have drawn largely on N. Skandamis’ work 
(1981). A. Mitsos (1981) and S.G. Triantis (1965) were also consulted.
10. The decision to become linked to the EEC, first as an associate and 
potentially as a full member, was based mostly on political considera­
tions. In economic terms, it appears that the decision-makers thought 
that joining a customs union of developed countries would ensure access 
to a large market, and that this would foster development more or less 
automatically (Triantis 1965: 57-60, 91-110).
11. It seems that the officials concerned were aware of some of the dif­
ficulties involved, hence the implicit caution expressed in the declared 
aim to ’survive and prosper’ within the EEC. Still, they have been 
criticised for having grossly misread the economic benefits of EEC 
association/entry (Triantis 1965: 109-10).
12. For reasons we cannot go into here, Greece’s relationship with the 
EEC during the time from association to membership was not smooth. I 
will only mention that largely in response to the colonel’s junta in 
Greece from 1967 to 1974, the EEC bloke off relations with the country. 
On the economic front, it for many years withheld equitable treatment, 
although Greece continued as scheduled to open up her markets to in­
dustrial goods of EEC origin. Considerable improvements notwithstanding, 
the gap between the Greek economy and that of the EEC countries, which 
had to be bridged as a prerequisite for accession, was not. Then came 
the world recession of 1972, and trade deteriorated, as critics had 
indeed anticipated (e.g. Triantis 1965). After the fall of the military 
junta and following the country’s return to democratic normalcy, Greece 
on 5 June 1975 applied to become a full EEC member. It was again chiefly 
on politico-strategic considerations that she did so, although an im­
provement in the unfavourable terms of trade was also hoped for. Inter­
estingly enough, the EEC member-countries accepted the application for 
principally political reasons. The accession agreement was signed in May 
1979, and went into effect as of 1 Jan. 1981, with a five to seven-year 
transition period provided for harmonising a number of legal, institu­
tional, and economic issues.
13. Handicraft-related programs fostered by the, now incorporated into 
the E0MMEX, National Organisation of Greek Handicrafts (E.O.E.X.) were 
expected to give employment to about 50,000 persons.
14. The more immediate objectives of these measures was to improve the 
small units’ organisation and operation through the services of a spe­
cial research institute. This would help their networking, promote 
product standardisation, help them address markets collectively, advice 
on advertising, and liaise with other state organs. The 1966-70 plan 
also advocated better financing (e.g. by subsidising interest on loams 
to artisans via special credit institutions (KEPE 1965: 112, 317-27). In
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1964, the artisanal sector received 1.912 million drs (or 9.8%) of total 
bank financing to all of manufacturing (including mining), - an 
unimpressive amount when compared to the sector’s share in terms of 
employment and output.
15. So for example zoning restrictions did not apply to artisans in the 
congested Athens region. To operate their businesses, old and new ar­
tisans merely required a ’technical’ licence, and not even that was 
necessary if the HP of their machinery was below a certain point. In ad­
dition, artisanal workshops also profited from blanket reductions or 
waivers of tariffs on the importation of materials as well as of semi­
finished intermediate and capital goods. The extension of state- 
guaranteed financing to ’all smal1-size artisanal enterprises’ was help­
ful too, even if it benefited only a handful. What was perhaps most en­
couraging in the long run was the long overdue establishment of a 
Development Institute for Small Enterprises, which indicated a growing 
state interest in artisanal enterprises (Ministry of Co-ordination 
1968).
16. Medium-sized units were to be given assistance with respect to taxa­
tion, financing, and zoning regulations for workshops.
17. The 1973-1987 plan was the first attempt ever in Greece to draw up a 
more than short-term program. Its purpose was to make the country 
eligible for full EEC entry in 1987.
18. Complementarity was also implied in the role the plan assigned to 
artisans in respect of tourism.
19. The plan announced measures for training and re-educating artisans, 
strengthening research, and effecting institutional changes and expan­
sion of the basic infrastructure. These were to be advanced through the 
Centre for Artisanal Industry Development (KEBA), a result of a United 
Nations development - assistance program. Among the ’attractive incen­
tives to encourage the reorganisation of artisanal industry* were (a) 
special terms of financing; (b) the gradual equalisation of taxes and 
other burdens between artisanal and major industry; (c) tax reductions, 
rebates, and credit incentives to assist mergers and changes in legal 
entity, and to facilitate the enlargement of individual small-scale and 
artisanal units ,^KEBA establishing subcontractors and co-operatives for 
the collaboration of artisans with large enterprises and among them­
selves; (e) technical assistance by KEBA and the Greek Centre for 
Productivity (ELKEPA), to small and medium-sized enterprises, par­
ticularly export-oriented ones; (f) artisans’ industrial zones and 
zoning regulation, to assist the specialization of production on a 
regional basis. (Smal1/artisanal enterprises that did not emit pol­
lutants or otherwise harm the environment would be allowed to continue 
in the cities outside the designated industrial zoning, including
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Athens, which was already faced with a serious pollution problem; (g) 
the blanket technical control of new or existing artisanal units were to 
be simplified, and the ’liberal licensing policy for manufacturing units 
would be continued (Ministry of Planning and Policy 1973: 90-96, 197-98, 
227-36, 238-43).
20. Like its predecessors, the 1973-1977 plan attributed the country’s 
development difficulties to the ’until recently inward-looking orienta­
tion of Greek manufacturing addressing itself to the small and protected 
internal market’. It proposed to counter the fragmentation of productive 
units by bringing together very small and larger firms, and effecting a 
more rational organisation of industrial branches by forming intercon­
nected systems.
21. The 1976-1980 plan was the first five-year plan to be drawn up after 
Greece's return to parliamentary democracy in 1974 — a date that also 
marked the global economic crisis and the restructuring that followed 
which led to the emergence of a new international division of labour, 
job-less growth, and the challenge of the post-war social democratic ar­
rangement .
22. This issue is not dissimilar with the one discussed by Ellis (1964), 
whose work was subsequently reflected by Nugent (1966), Vergopoulos 
(1984), and others. Ellis argued that in Greece in the 1950s/early 1960s 
the tendency toward monopoly was for the most part unrelated to con­
centration. He claimed that it was advantageous for existing oligopolies 
to allow the operation of many small firms. Even if the latter were 
holding on only by the skin of their teeth, they fought hard to keep 
themselves in business, and in the course of doing so mobilised politi­
cal pressure 'in defence of high tariffs and other forms of protection’ 
(Nugent 1966: 129-30). In this way the oligopolies could offset the 
process of ’normal’ concentration which, it was implied, lead to the 
emergence of large and modern, hence competitive enterprises. They were 
operating to the detriment of progressive industrial branches that had, 
or could develop, a comparative advantage. In other words, they acted 
against the set development objectives, and strictly in their own im­
mediate interests.
With respect to the supposed political muscle of small operators I 
would point out that it was never shown to exist during the said period. 
Had it existed, how is one to account for the relative ease by which 
tariff protection was lifted at later dates? This does not mean that 
those immediately concerned might not really (if erroneously) have 
believed artisans to have political clout. What is certain is that there 
was a principle, observed by the state authorities, that calculated and 
determined prices, which of course showed that markets were operating 
imperfectly, in the sense that the prices were set in such a way that 
everybody made a profit, and profit margins were guaranteed even when 
costs were high due to outdated production methods, worn out means of
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production, etc. Obviously this system gave the larger and/or more mod­
ernised units with lower production costs higher than average profits. 
This meant they had an interest in keeping the small units in operation, 
ostensibly in a spirit of 1 ive-and-let-1 ive. (The source of this piece 
of information is personal knowledge of the situation in the production 
of ethyl alcohol, in which my family has been involved for many 
decades). These two account of the tolerance of small units by leading 
manufacturers explain to a certain extent why the former have not been 
actively destroyed by the latter, but they do not suffice to explain the 
artisans’ continued pro1 iteration.
23. Out of the 120,000 units officially considered artisanal, 109,000 
had an average workforce of 1.76 persons per unit. In other words, they 
were units of one self-employed person who offered work to one other 
person, usually a family member.
24. The artisans’ role in providing employment and as agents of 
’creativity* were highlighted in the 1983-87 plan and other pertinent 
texts of the same period (Boule of the Hellenes 1984a: 50; Boule of the 
Hellenes 1984b: 194).
25. This, of course, was an indirect admission that earlier plans had 
not produced the desired results. In fact, the 1983-87 plan (drawn up by 
a socialist government) acknowledged that there was neither a general 
nor a sectoral industrial strategy/policy, and that no viable strategy 
of specialisation had been developed in the past. Indigenous manufactur­
ing had not managed to expand in either the non-traditional sectors, or 
in the areas of new technologies, and in the period leading up to the 
country’s EEC accession, Greece’s position in the international division 
of labour had actually deteriorated. One indication of this was that 
while in other West European countries comparable in size to Greece the 
exports and imports of manufactured products balanced one another (which 
meant that these countries had specialised and deployed their compara­
tive advantages), in Greece they diverged markedly, indicating that 
specialisation was undeveloped. Manufactured imports, which in 1974 were 
2.5 times the value of manufactured exports, had by the late 1970s/early 
1980s climbed to 3 times the value of exports (Boule of the Hellenes 
1983: 54-55). This situation had resulted in negative growth rates and 
stagnation, which for a large part had been the result of foreign com­
petition (including foreign penetration of the domestic market) after 
Greece’s accession to the EEC. It should be noted that, according to a 
semi-official publication, heightened competition from EEC countries put 
an estimated 40% of all manufacturing units, most of which are of course 
artisanal (Skoumal and Kazis 1985: 80), into serious jeopardy of having 
to declare bankruptcy. The plan placed the blame for all this squarely 
on the previous conservative governments.
26. E0MMEK (ex-KEBA), is the specialist state organisation for the small
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and medium enterprises in manufacturing and the handicraft industry.
27. While the plan appraised positively the growth of exports in tradi­
tional SME consumer products, it pointed out that this was due to low 
labour costs and the use of indigenous raw materials. The increases were 
due not to the SMEs actively striving for exports, but to foreign buyers 
invading the country in search of bargains. It appears that a number of 
small units were part of international subcontracting networks. 
Moreover, the noted expansion had not been followed up by artisans be­
coming ’entrepreneurially more mature’, nor did it mean development in 
terms of production techniques, skill acquisition, and improved 
managerial or commercial organisation, which remained ’primitive’ and 
family-centred. It is possible that the plan’s vociferous affirmation of 
the importance of SMEs was related to the political situation: at that 
time (early 1980s) the ’small and medium’ businesses were proclaimed 
the bastions of progress and the true agents of development (see Konior- 
dos 1981). Previous conservative governments came under severe criticism 
for not helping them and for trying to develop the country by giving 
priority to large corporations and serving foreign interests.
28. According to the report, the so-called professional artisans do not 
calculate profits as a percentage of their turnover or capital. They 
hire few assistants, risk no capital, make no investments, their financ­
ing involves very small sums, they face no problems of management, and 
they do not stock nor are they concerned with distributing their 
products. They are not entrepreneurs in the proper sense of the term, 
but practitioners of a profession, hence ’professional artisans’. As a 
rule, establishments employing up to 5 persons are included in this 
category. By contrast, owner-managers of larger firms have an ad­
ministrative and managerial role and expect to obtain profits from their 
investment-enterprise (KEPE 1989a: 32, 56, 66, 70-72). The criterion of 
personal engagement in productive work, used to distinguish the profes­
sional artisans from other small and medium-sized business proprietors, 
is obviously similar to the criteria used in Ch. I concerning the dis­
tinction between SCP and CMP, but coarse and more empirical.
29. The failure was not total because labour-intensive networks were 
indeed set up in certain manufacturing branches. But the quality of the 
work was inferior, specifications could not be followed, and the goods 
were shoddily made. This activity was limited to a few traditional 
branches only. So the new aim will be the qualitative upgrading of sub­
contracted work.
30. Take the example of the domestic machine-tool production. As this 
was virtually non-existent in Greece, the required modernisation of the 
artisans’ productive equipment could not rely on it, and they had to 
have recourse to imports. This in turn meant that the domestic links be­
tween the two sectors (purchases, putting-out schemes, overall col­
220
laboration) could not really develop. In the absence of any long-term 
development policy for domestic industrial production of intermediate 
and capital goods an organic complementarity between small and larger 
units was a pipe dream. The most enduring complementarities that did 
developed have been, as indicated earlier, between small local units and 
foreign firms (see the following chapter).
31. The 1990-1993 plan was intended as an interim three-year plan, but 
aborted due to a change of government. It is not really an official 
plan, therefore, but seems to have been utilised as such.
32. That becoming an artisan makes good economic sense ties up nicely 
with the prestige which self-employment enjoys in Greece. This is 
characteristically a primary concern for men - unlike the situation in 
other countries of the semi-periphery, e.g. Brazil, where such work is 
poorly remunerated and hence considered inferior, which explains why 
there it mostly attracts women (Cavounidis 1985).
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CHAPTER VI - REVIEW OF SOCIAL STUDIES ON GREEK ARTISANS
Introduction
Despite the overwhelming presence of artisans and other small 
producers in Greek manufacturing, the stratum has not been studied sys­
tematically. To a certain extent this reflects the general malaise of 
social research in Greece (Petmesidou-Tsoulouvis 1984: 32-36), but the 
limited interest in the subject may also be due to the artisans’ 
peripheral role, an implicit acknowledgement of their being powerless 
and hence unimportant. However, their sheer numerical weight has 
prompted a number of writers to comment on various aspects of the exis­
tence, position, and role of the artisanal stratum. In fact, artisans 
are frequently cited as one of the peculiarities of the Greek socio­
economic formation.
As far as I have been able to ascertain, only two authors — A. 
Moschorias and A. Lytras — have focused on artisans whom, in accordance 
with their broader interests, they have approached as a segment of the 
broader category of the traditional urban petty bourgeoisie. J. 
Springer-Cavounidis has made a comparative study of artisans’ and 
working-class families. More recently P. Pizanias (1993) has published a 
study on Greece’s urban poor during the inter-war period, in which he 
advances a thesis pertaining to the raison d'etre of artisans and other 
small independents (linking it to the family, and reflecting cultural 
reproduction). Aside from the social scientists just mentioned, the work 
of N. Mouzelis must also be cited, as well as that of P. Bokovos, M. 
Negreponti-Delivani, A. Lyberaki, P. Nikolaou, and G. Samaras. While 
their analyses provide us with useful insights, they are obviously frag­
mentary, since artisans were extrinsic to these authors’ main subject.
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The intention of this chapter is to critically note what these 
authors have to say about Greek artisans and their relationship to 
economic development.
1. Interpreting the Artisans* Existence
1.1 N. Mouzelis: Artisans and negative SCP - CMP complementarity 
Mouzelis considers the continuing existence of artisans and other 
smal 1-commodity producers as indicative of the particular underdevelop­
ment that persists in Greece. For him, underdevelopment does not, or not 
only, mean a lack of industrialisation, but concerns ’the type of ar­
ticulation that connects the dynamic, high productivity sectors of the 
economy ... with those that are technologically backward’ (1978: 37-38). 
It is here that the experience of the Vest departs markedly from that of 
the underdeveloped regions. As Western industrialisation progressed, it 
assimilated pre-capitalist or non-capitalist sectors by either destroy­
ing or organically incorporating them. The latter case entailed the 
specialisation of non-capitalist producers (e.g. artisans), which led to 
productivity increases and the cultivation of an organic complementarity 
with capitalist industry proper through the dissemination of its tech­
nological, organisational, market, and other advances. Mouzelis con­
siders the effects of such capitalist parameters to have been important 
for forming unitary domestic markets and for contributing generally to 
the capitalist development of the advanced Western countries.
Conversely, underdevelopment generally implies the lack of such 
positive complementarity and the persistence of a negative one, of a 
disarticulation between capitalist and simp 1 e-commodity production (CMP 
and SCP); only a few links exist between the, technologically, much more 
advanced CMP and the more backward SCP. The CMP also shows its supe­
riority by higher rates of productivity and higher growth rates, and the
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extreme imbalance between the two sectors is shown precisely in the
failure of technological progress to spread from the capitalist sector
to SCP (Mouzelis 1980a: 254-55). In addition, the CMP drains SCP by
means of taxation and unequal exchange, plus
’... subsidies to large-scale industry, scandalous credit 
facilities, indiscriminate tariff protection enabling highly 
inefficient firms to achieve a quasi-monopolistic position, and 
the prevalence of indirect taxation which hit low income ear­
ners very hard, etc.’ {ibid: 246-67).
Mouzelis’ examination of the case of Greece speaks of a ’systematic 
transfer of resources from SCP to the industrial capitalist sector’, and 
holds the state responsible for this since neither sector is ’self- 
contained nor are they complimentary’ {ibid.: 261-62). This drain 
hobbles SCP establishments. At the same time the inability of the 
capitalist units to provide employment, or to either destroy or incor­
porate the non-capitalist ones, demonstrates their own relative retarda­
tion in comparison with their counterparts in the advanced capitalist 
countries. So SCP units are ’allowed’ to exist, and although the disar­
ticulation implies that the more dynamic capitalist sector depends on 
milking the non-capitalist one, the latter, despite its ’relative 
marginalisation*, persists in continuing {ibid.: 247, 254).
It should be stressed that Mouzelis does not imply the existence 
of a strict dualism, but rather sees the two sectors as diverging. I 
would point out that, as a matter of fact,, there is some complemen­
tarity in certain manufacturing branches, e.g. in garments and to a 
lesser extend in machining (see ch. IX). There, a number of artisans 
have managed to specialise, obtained modern equipment, and increased 
their productivity, which means that they have lowered their per-unit 
cost, and have linked their units to capitalist firms through putting- 
out and subcontracting schemes. In such instances the artisans* units 
are obviously closely connected with and probably wel 1-integrated into
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the overall capitalist economy, and do contribute to the formation of 
the single national market, of which they are part. But this is not the 
same as saying that an organic relationship of the two sectors has 
developed, of the kind we find in some advanced capitalist countries.
Despite instances like the above, which seem to be on the in­
crease, the dominant Greek variant of an approximate organic complemen­
tarity in the context of manufacturing consists of links between 
capitalist units and labour-intensive and low-paid clusters of very 
small specialist producers. The former are usually able to impose a 
monopsony on the latter, and in this sense fully control them. This type 
of spurious complementarity cannot result in transferring the dynamism 
of the capitalist sector to the SCP units, or only to a very minor ex­
tent.
We may say, therefore, that in as far as an organic complemen­
tarity is unfolding among the two types of producers in Greece, it is of 
a different kind to the one that exists in advanced countries. The ex­
isting links between artisans and capitalists producers are in fact in­
stances of neither ’disarticulation* nor of *malintegration* (Mouzelis 
1978: 43 and 1980c: 504-45 respectively). These notions, instead of 
designating the type of articulation effected, merely indicate a devia­
tion from some standard or model paradigm - namely that followed by the 
West. They therefore lead us away from the task, so aptly set by 
Mouzelis, of finding 'what sort of integrations what sort of links there 
are between capitalist and non-capitalist sectors in third-world forma­
tions* (Mouzelis 1980c: 504; his emphasis) so that we may understand 
what precisely constitutes underdevelopment.
Of course, what T. Parsons has identified as evolutionary univer- 
sals, and the necessity for societies to go through them, cannot be ig­
nored. But what are these evolutionary uni versa Is in the case of in­
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dustrialisation, are they given once and for all? For example, the mod­
ernist mass-production paradigm (Fordism) which as far as I understand 
had come to assume the position of a cultural universal, has to some ex­
tent been superseded by the post-modernist paradigm of flexible 
specialisation. This involves a realignment of standards which is still 
largely open-ended. Aside from again questioning what course should be 
followed to achieve industrialisation/modernisation, this ambiguity also 
complicates the search for types of integration and links between the 
capitalist and non-capitalist sectors.
Probably the most important divergence between organic complemen­
tarity in the advanced countries, and instances of complementarity ob­
served in the course of my fieldwork in Greece has to do with transfers 
of technological dynamism from the CMP to the SCP sector. Greece, al­
though capitalist, is not a producer of new technology nor an innovator, 
and the techniques and technologies that are applied in production are 
not developed within the country (see chs. IV and V). Accordingly, the 
SCP sector cannot benefit from any technological progress in the in­
digenous capitalist industry. By and large, technologies are imported 
ready-made, as already mentioned. In this sense, it is not enough to 
speak of organic complementarity at the level of a single country. In 
the context of world-wide tendencies, the case of Greece’s historical 
underdevelopment requires a consideration of the consequences of tech­
nology transfers in more global terms. What is an instance of non- 
complementarity at the level of a single country may be entirely com­
plementary at the level of the world economy. In this sense it could be 
argued that Greece is not without organic complementarity between SCP 
and CMP, and that particularly in respect of the spread of technological 
progress this has an international dimension.
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Then there is the issue of the advanced CMP systematically drain­
ing the backward SCP. The thesis sounds plausible, but remains at the 
level of hypothesis awaiting substantiation - perhaps by calculating 
unequal-exchange transfers, or showing concretely that taxation of ar­
tisans extracts their surplus and subsequently benefits capitalists. As 
things stand, the milking of artisans appears to me to be a case of 
alarmism, especially in view of the extensive underground economic ac­
tivities in which artisans, as well as other small producers, excel (see 
chapter IX).
2.2 A. Moschonas: A populist perspective
Moschonas’ Traditional Petty Bourgeois Strata: The case of Greece 
(1986) is the first systematic attempt to fill in the bibliographical 
vacuum on the petty bourgeoisie in Greece. A major premise of this work 
is that the petits bourgeois, and not least the artisans, occupy a 
central position in the economic and political spheres. If, therefore, 
it is not seriously considered, economic and particularly political 
developments cannot become fully intelligible, and by implication 
planned social change will not result in the desired consequences.
Moschonas considers that although the CMP has been dominant in 
Greece since the end of World War I smal 1-commodity production has con­
tinued extensively - this is no evidence of an anomaly in the theory, 
but rather a peculiarity indicating the existence of different 
historically-specific paths to development. He attributes the persis­
tence of small commodity producers in Greece to the limited commodifica­
tion of labour power, which was hampered by a massive emigration of the 
labour force, in combination with the ’tendency of the peasant migrant 
to reproduce in the urban areas ... relations of SCP’ (ibid.: 38), but 
unfortunately gives no proper explanation for this important structural
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continuity. He then declares that the continuing reproduction of SCP 
units is a result of Greece’s position in the international division of 
labour, which at that point in time obstructed the unfolding of 
capitalist accumulation.1
Moschonas acknowledges that capitalism did advanced in the course 
of the inter-war period, and seems to have expected SCP to follow its 
prescribed course towards extinction. However, a second chance became 
available to artisans and other petty-bourgeois strata: after World War 
II the state offered them substantial concessions to facilitate their 
recovery. These concessions, which affected the overall ’process of 
production and distribution of the economic surplus and accumulation of 
capital’, were extended because the reconstitution of the middle classes 
served primarily the institutional consolidation and legitimation of 
bourgeois rule. Ever since then, Moschonas contends, capitalist ac- 
cumulation in Greece has been constrained by these concessions to small 
producers, which have restricted its own proper scope.
The author notes that the SCP sector has continued to play an im­
portant role in the Greek economy by employing a large segment of the 
country’s active population, and entering into a set of interdependent 
relations with larger forms of capital, which, he says, derive extra 
profits from drawing surplus from the SCP and utilising its low-cost 
labour power. Moreover, in recent years big capital has exhibited a ten­
dency, contingent on changes in the international division of labour, to 
either marginalise or incorporate smal1-commodity producers (ibid.: 
267). The small producers, for their part, have proliferated as a result 
of the expansion of the internal markets, and indeed their resurgence 
has in good part been an effect of the country’s general economic 
growth. They have also increasingly come to use their numerical impor­
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tance to extract economic concessions from the state. This interaction 
between the traditional petty bourgeois collectively and the practices 
of the state (perceived as a servant of capital) Moschonas considers a 
form of class struggle (ibid.: 49-79).
A basic and recurrent theme in Moschonas* work is that the numerous 
petits bourgeois strata are indispensable for Greece embarking on the 
road to socialism. This is a course he considers possible and desirable, 
and associates it with PASOK, a political party of socialist preten­
sions, coming to power (in 1981). At the beginning of that party’s rule, 
when the challenge was how to effect ’development with change’, the 
petite bourgeoisie became an indispensable agent of that change due to 
its numerical-cum-political importance. Moschonas’ study emphasises 
primarily the centrality of the petty bourgeois in recent political 
developments.
Trying to draw lessons from past petty-bourgeois practice in the 
interest of present-day PASOK policies, Moschonas finds that after the 
late 1950s there was a change in the stratum’s earlier political align­
ment. Conflicts over the production, distribution, and redistribution of 
the surplus, as well as disagreements over Greece’s relationship with 
the EEC - which were feared to weaken its economic position by spreading 
unemployment and threatening its very existence due to enhanced competi­
tion (ibid. : 269-75) - led the petty-bourgeoisie in the mid-1960s to 
switch allegiance to the Centre Union party. While that party was in of­
fice, the small producers were requited with more substantial financing 
assistance and tax relief, which helped to confirm their disengagement 
from the political parties of the Right. Subsequently, that is during 
and after the military dictatorship, the ruling class suffered an 
’organic crisis of hegemony’ as a result of which its attempts to resume 
control over the petty bourgeois were unsuccessful. Moschonas* explana­
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tion of this failure is that the state had become addicted to serving 
the interests of big capital to the exclusion of the economic demands of 
the lower strata. Attempts to woo the petty bourgeoisie witheconomic 
measures and by appealing to its proprietorial ethos came too late. Its 
political awakening was irreversible and culminated in the 1981 politi­
cal victory of PASOK.
Moschonas is anxious that PASOK should not in any way al ienate its 
petty bourgeois supporters. He keeps telling anyone who cares to listen 
that artisans and other petty bourgeois elements should not be taken for 
granted, and that ’mistakes1 in handling them must be avoided at all 
costs. He especially counselled the PASOK government of the day not to 
delay the democratisation of petit bourgeois professional organisations, 
and to allocate the stratum greater surplus in the form of financing 
facilities, tax relief, and preferential treatment generally. He con­
sidered of paramount importance the establishment of co-operatives,2 
which if they are not to degenerate into capitalist joint stock com­
panies should become part and parcel of PASOK’s strategy to ’socialism’, 
known as ’socialisation’ (Koniordos 1981). Were this allowed to happen, 
he warned, the petty bourgeoisie would become subjected to differentia­
tion and of course turn away from those who had betrayed it, and that in 
turn would put the entire socialist project in jeopardy.3
Moschonas, in effect, recommends a political strategy of
measures and policies in favour of the petty bourgeoisie, advanced for
the purpose of neutralising opposition and winning them over to the road
towards socialism. This strategy, in other words, aims at buying out
these strata. It was originally put forward in F. Engels’ last writings,
with the difference that Moschonas makes not the working class but
rather the petty bourgeoisie the key social group capable of making or 
I
braking socialism. He extends his strategy to the SME category which -
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by virtue of its alleged subjugation to big and/or foreign capital - is 
also a part of 'the people’. In sum, Moschonas, argues that (class) col­
laboration between artisanal businesses and other SMEs (small and 
medium-sized capitalist firms), as well as with their workforce is im­
perative if the Greek socio-economic formation is to progress towards 
social ism.
Now, the links between big capital and the larger SMEs are much 
more complex and interdependent than Moschonas allows. Besides, the in­
ferred identity between SMEs and artisanal units and their workers is 
not all that evident; antagonistic cleavages are at play, as will be 
shown in Ch. IX. Therefore, it appears that Moschonas discloses really 
existing affinities and conceals existing differences to fit reality to 
his political program. Besides, the emphasis he places on the importance 
of the SME, i.e. of the small and medium-sized capitals, as the agent of 
'development with change’ — vaguely reminiscent of Varvaressos' views - 
does not transcend at best a left-wing neo-populist agenda (Kitching 
1990). Moschonas’ unsound postulates aside, his suggestion that the 
state should heavily intervene to assist the small producers is per­
fectly correct if artisans are to assume a more dynamic role. I would 
stipulate, however, that this assistance should be given not because of 
the artisans’ potential as agents of socialism, but because they exist 
in large numbers and have displayed economic initiative. Above all, they 
cannot be left unaided because if competition intensifies in the 
foreseeable future, as it is expected to do, they and the large number 
of people that are dependent on them will be the first to suffer.
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2.3 A. Lytras: — The state and collective action in the making 
of contemporary artisans
Lytras overall concern lies with the ’traditional urban petty 
bourgeois strata* that are the proprietors of their means of production 
and their own independent business. These strata include artisans, small 
merchants and traders, and a variety of independent occupations, from 
plumber to tavern proprietor, the practitioners of which are known as 
’professionals’ in Greece. The author takes the element of ownership 
they share as a characteristic of their bourgeois class; on the other 
hand, the fact that, although they hire labour power, they have to 
labour themselves is considered a working-class criterion. It is these 
two antithetical derivations that A la Lenin co-define these disparate 
strata in the unified social category of the traditional petty bour­
geoisie, and at the same time acknowledge its internal ruptures and 
cleavages. These are related to the different and often conflicting in­
terests of not only the various strata of the petty-bourgeoisie but also 
its individual members due to their different conditions of existence 
and particular circumstances. No doubt this situation of generalised 
particularism promotes individualism; certainly it does not cultivate 
nor conduce to collective forms of action (Lytras 1993: 225-26).
How is the development of small ownership and small production 
(including artisanal production) to be explained? Lytras attributes it 
not to some pre-capitalist remnants, but to the particular form taken by 
’capitalist relations’ (Lytras 1993: 116). Indeed, he maintains that 
’capitalist relations have created the petty bourgeois strata; first in 
the countryside, and during the post-war period in the cities* (ibid.: 
247) - I should note that the use of the term ’capitalist relations’ re­
quires clarification. As far as I can see, the author considers the 
proliferation of the traditional petty bourgeois entrepreneurs as a by­
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product of particularistic functional needs of the capitalist relations 
of production in Greece, as a functional prerequisite necessary for 
their reproduction.
For Lytras, the petty bourgeois strata ’continually verify their 
existence by means of state guarantees, financing and a series of sub­
sidies’ (Lytras 1993: 115-16, 243), and without state subsidies the 
peasants and artisans could not survive. I will contend that while this 
may be true for the peasants, it is not for artisans. Peasants’ occupy a 
position and role very different from that of artisans for unlike the 
latter, are subsidised by the state to produce low-priced food for the 
urban population (Vergopoulos 1975; Mouzelis 1978). Furthermore, as will 
be argued below (in chs. VIII and IX), the evidence from my own field­
work does not support that loans to artisans are of crucial importance 
to the reproduction of the stratum. To be taken seriously, Lytras* as­
sertion would need corroborative evidence on the extent of loan-taking, 
the periods, and sums involved and their specific effect on the 
reproduction of the artisanate, but such evidence is not supplied.
Aside from providing loans, says Lytras, the state is responsible 
for the overall safeguarding of national production and the domestic 
market. In doing so the state ensures that SCP units are sustained, and 
in the process, contra Mouzelis, intervenes to link the CMP to SCP 
’organically* (ibid.: 115-16). It is useful, I think, in this context of 
organic linkages to distinguish between direct and indirect links. 
Direct links between the CMP and SCP occur whenever the two interconnect 
in an unmediated way, perhaps via the market mechanism whose functioning 
the state promotes and guarantees. The links between the two modes are 
indirect whenever there is mediation, with the state providing the in­
terface, as when it furnishes loans and guarantees that enable artisans 
to operate/engage with the capitalist sector. Since indirect links are
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the result of the state’s mediated action, they should be recognised for 
what they are, without regrets or last-instance types of qualifications.
For Lytras, the post-war growth of small industry was shaped by 
the ’low-level investment performance’ of the big industrial units, 
greater domestic demand for consumer goods, attempts to alleviate un­
employment, plus the political need of the post-civil war state to en­
sure its legitimacy. I would agree that these were some of the factors 
and constraints of the situation at the time, and I think that they were 
an important aspect of the structure of opportunities that the artisans 
could utilise for their purposes. For our author, however, they are rep­
resentative of the context in which the state attempted to form an al­
liance with, or at least tolerate (ibid.: 231) the traditional petty- 
bourgeois strata. He accordingly considers the state’s blanket tariff 
protection instituted in 1950s, of which artisans took full advantage, 
as a concession to them, as a facet of this ’alliance’. To prove that 
this was the case it would have to be established that the state had a 
choice concerning which domestic producers its tariffs would protect. My 
view is that despite the systematic political exclusions the Greek state 
practised during and after the civil war, which of course did have 
economic repercussions, it was not possible to exclude very small 
economic units wholesale from its tariff protection. Since ideologically 
the artisans and their small businesses were certainly not identified as 
the enemy, their isolation was not sought. The absence of any pos­
sibility to impose exclusions indicates that blanket tariff protection 
was more of an unintended consequence of state action (and certainly a 
very real opportunity for the small businesses) rather than an expres­
sion of some alliance or even of tolerance. As a matter of fact, given 
the acute legitimation crisis the regime was then facing, it was rather 
the state that stood in dire need of securing a measure of tolerance.
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Part of its difficulty to achieve just that was that in the 1950s its 
ability to offer artisans something in return for their support was more 
theoretical than real.
An additional reservation with Lytras’ approach is that it is 
based entirely on guesswork. While in principle this is an acceptable 
methodology, in this particular context it is not enough - some evidence 
should have been supplied to substantiate it. In fact, Lytras’ view is 
quite similar to the one expounded by Vergopoulos (1984) and Tsoukalas 
(1984) with respect to the new middle classes. This holds that the Greek 
state and its foreign patrons engaged in an exercise in social engineer­
ing by reinstating or creating anew a thick middle stratum to act as a 
buffer against insurgency from below. While this may well have been the 
case, no evidence whatsoever has been offered that this attempt at so­
cial engineering included artisans. Not saying exactly when the state is 
supposed to have forged this alliance is another flaw. In some instances 
it appears that Lytras, in line with Vergopoulos and Tsoukalas, is 
referring to the late 1940s/early 1950s, elsewhere it appears that the 
so-called alliance was entered into after the political mobilisation of 
artisans and other traditional petty bourgeois, which would indicate the 
mid-1960s or latter.
Lytras* focus on the collective action of the above-mentioned 
petty-bourgeois generality in the post-war period is one of the more in­
teresting aspects of his work. He notes that their more or less volun­
tary organisations mobilised them and that collective action, which was 
addressed to the government of the day, took the form of nation-wide 
shop closures. The first of these was the most important one. It took 
place on 30 March 1966 and aimed at obtaining state protection against 
rent increases,4 as well as inordinate increases in the price of raw 
materials, and to oppose newly imposed taxes. The state responded posi­
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tively to these demands. During the 1967-74 dictatorship the small shop­
keepers (like everyone else) kept quiet, but afterwards they returned to 
action. Between 1974 and 1981 the high points of collective protest were 
three more country-wide shop closures. Peace reigned during the first 
PASOK term in office (1981-1985), but during the party’s second term 
(1985-88) four additional shop closures took place.5 Participation in 
all of these events is said to have been much the same in respect of all 
the traditional petty bourgeois strata, but the artisans were reported 
to have responded more swiftly than others (Lytras 1993: 230).6 I cannot 
think why they should have done so, since certain of the demands ad­
vanced did not affect them at all. It is more probable that the volun­
tary organisations representing the artisans called on them to act in 
solidarity with the shopkeepers and reported accordingly, but the ar­
tisans’ actual participation would surely have been very limited.
Whatever the truth of the matter, the petty bourgeois did rise up 
in action in the mid-sixties and after. Why did it do so, and why JfJ it 
not do so earlier? Lytras links these instances of collective action to 
the realignments, changes, and challenges in terms of their position and 
modus vivendi that followed the nexus of agreements between Greece and 
the EEC. The mobilisations were a protest - an explanation with which I 
would agree. Specifically the artisans began to object when it emerged 
that the forthcoming development called for changes that might endanger 
their reproduction, leave them stranded, and even posed the threat of 
re-proletarianisation. Once they had realised this they (or at least the 
organisations that supposedly represented them) mobilised in order to 
ensure that they would participate in the decision-making for the 
forthcoming developments (ibid.: 235).
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To be sure, as Lytras points out, there was nothing in the demands 
and protests by the artisans* organisations* to suggest a specific 
strategy. They were merely defensive, meant to keep their members’ posi­
tion intact. To this end they wanted safeguards against the ensuing in­
tensification of competition, and compensation for the lifting of 
tariffs, be it in the form of subsidies, rent controls, or whatever. 
Compromise was the principle underlying the organisations’ attempts. The 
demand for a voice in decision-making, at a time when the economy was 
being restructured (which they did not opposed in principle), was to as­
sure that the voice of artisans would be heard and compromises could be 
arrived at. In that way the artisans’ existence would be safeguarded, 
and their union bosses - who frequently were not elected but co-opted by 
the state - could expand their own power base. These traditional petty- 
bourgeois protests can be compared to guild closure and despite the 
short-circuiting of artisans’ organisations by often self-interested 
union bosses, remained above all defensive in character.
Why did the artisans not put forward an overall plan for their 
development? Was it a lack of competent leadership, or merely a matter 
of subjective disposition, a side-effect of their structural loca­
tion? This, of course, is the same old problem of why the petit bour­
geoisie has such difficulty in rising above immediate circumstances and 
embracing a more global perspective, in becoming a class for itself.
Perhaps the structuralist approach explains this best. The objec­
tively and historically recorded characteristics of the middle strata - 
whether individualism, particularism, state veneration, or their bel- 
ligent attitude to each other - all stem from their structural position, 
which encourages isolation, competition and mistrust. They can unite 
briefly only when they feel collectively threatened. For this reason the 
artisans have loose organisations which, nevertheless are politically
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partisan; it is not in their nature to be represented by organisations 
that are strong, autonomous and imaginative. What this line of reasoning 
implies is that petty bourgeois are ideologically incapable of visualis­
ing long-term changes in society that do not accord with their own 
world-view and with the reproduction of their established petty- 
bourgeois position. This, indeed, seems to have been Lytras’ view. As a 
result, assuring broader development prospects for artisans must be the 
task of some other social category, one that is not hampered by the 
structural and ideological constraints of the old petty bourgeoisie.
The danger of such an attitude is that it may lead to acquies­
cence, to a static acceptance of existing relations. It may mean that 
one not only sees a situation for what it is, but that one accepts it as 
given once and for all. This blinds one to the fact that existing ar­
rangements have to a very significant extent been socially constructed 
and may at any time be changed. The case of the ’Third Italy’ proves 
that other scenarios are possible (see Ch. Ill above; also Weiss 1988), 
even while the basic structural features of the artisanate can be kept 
intact. A different environment may actually allow the artisans a pos­
sibly less constrained existence. In that respect the artisans* poten­
tially more active and autonomous participation in shaping their own 
overall development should not in principle be ruled out;
A strong point in the artisans’ favour is their large number. It 
was this which seems to have alarmed governments when they realised how 
much they would lose in terms of political allegiance if they did not 
satisfy the artisans’ demands. It appears that it was this, a certain 
amount of party politicking aside, that convinced them that the demands 
of the petty bourgeoisie’s organisations (ibid.: 234-35, 242-43) had to 
be taken seriously. By doing so, and especially by activating the ar­
tisans* loan scheme in the mid-1960s, the state finally provided some
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guarantees for and supported the artisans. But these were concessions in 
response to demands - they were not the facets of an 'alliance*, to 
revert to an earlier point.
The state’s intervention is, I think, a good example of in­
stitutionalisation following individual agency in a historically deter­
mined context. Indeed, the state as a society-shaping force exerts a 
certain impact on social classes and strata. It should not be discounted 
or considered a mere epiphenomenon of class struggle, for then its ac­
tions become largely unintelligible. However, as mentioned earlier, this 
impact suffices no more to interpret the artisans' expansion in the past 
than it explains their continuing existence today. The point is rather 
how and to what extent the state affects artisans, and that is an em­
pirical issue.
It has been noted that all the various demands were addressed to 
the state. Is this an indication of petit bourgeois state veneration 
pure and simple? Lytras seems to think so. He points out that the roots 
of this 'statolatry' are to be found in history and notes historical 
precedents of strong and continuous state protection of small peasant 
property in the rural areas. At the risk of overgeneralisation, he seems 
to consider peasants and artisans as the rural and urban variant of the 
petty bourgeoisie. They are therefore homologous. Accordingly, what ap­
plies to the relationship between peasants and state applies equally to 
the state's relationship with their urban counterparts. I would add that 
though a more active state intervention (see Ch. V) now aims to incor­
porate the artisans, it is not comparable to the broad extent of state 
intervention on behalf of the peasants. Whatever the structural 
homologies that may exist between two categories, they do not affect 
their roles, nor the way the state perceives these roles, nor yet the 
type and extent of intervention to be accorded. Besides, as it will be
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shown in the empirical chapters, with the exception of already estab­
lished artisans’ offsprings, nobody is born an artisan. Becoming and 
remaining one is an act of individual volition, a fact that should not 
be ignored.
2. Micro-level Approaches: The Centrality of the Family - 
P. Pizanias; Family networks for escaping capitalism 
Pizanias' study examines Greece’s urban poor during the inter-war 
period. He notes that they possessed a particular ’know-how of survival’ 
by means of which they made ends meet. These methods were based on
knowledge that their peasant progenitors had acquired by personal ex­
perience and passed on to them as a form of cultural and social capital. 
Pizanias claims that such knowledge was widely shared among the urban 
poor. He attributes this to the broad structural similarities that prior 
to World War II used to characterise Greece’s rural communities, where 
SCP was the prevailing form of production. Hiis know-how was transmitted 
through socialisation within the family, was internalised and became 
part and parcel of the outlook and mentality of the urban poor. It was 
an intrinsic part of their way of life.
Howeveri there are some differences in how these methods operated
in the rural and the urban environments. The (earlier) rural know-how of 
survival entailed a form of social organisation that was centred on the 
nuclear family with which its members unswervingly identified and which 
they accepted as of primary importance in terms of their production and 
reproduction. It also involved a network of extended and fictitious kin, 
co-villagers and friends. All of these formed a primary group that had 
important mutual-aid functions, for instance to provide labour at har­
vest time. In addition, the money for sustaining the family did not come
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only from cultivating the family smallholding, but also included various 
other agricultural and non-agricultural activities.7 The periodic 
travelling or even migration this involved was the task of particular 
family members, whose responsibility it was to earn enough to preserve 
the family’s self-sufficiency in a rural economy of a multitude of very 
small plots. The social network mentioned above was useful for obtaining 
information about jobs and recommendations to employers, and provided a 
measure of welfare, security, and assistance - such as small interest- 
free loans, or a free bed and a meal when away from home.
Transferring the survival methods (which represented the social 
capital to be found in the primary groups social relations) to the 
cities permitted the survival of fresh rural emigrants. They were poor, 
but they were not pauperised, nor did they descend to the Lum- 
penproletariat. An important difference between the urban and the rural 
environment was, of course, that the bulk of the family*s sustenance was 
no longer obtained from the family smallholding, and even working the 
land became episodic at best. Instead, the unskilled urban poor had to 
support their family by wage labour and whatever other paid work they 
could find. The network of the urban poor helped them to find jobs and 
their reference group gave them all the support it could. Jobs seldom 
lasted more than a few days, and then, helped by kin and friends, one 
had to look for a new one. It was not unusual for somebody to hold more 
than one job concurrently. On occasion people also engaged in short­
lived petty trading or other ’independent* shoe-string activities, very 
often in partnership with other members of their primary reference 
group. In the course of their jobbing the urban poor usually acquired 
some rudimentary skill, which slightly improved their job prospects. 
Once they had picked up a few skills they often abandoned any minor
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partnership they might have entered and, even if employment was not 
lacking, set themselves up as independents (Pizanias 1993: 35-49).
The continual occupational mobility of the urban poor did not con­
duce to the formation of the attachments that could lead to the develop­
ment of an occupational or class conscience. By engaging in incessant 
horizontal mobility in their aspiration to achieve the essentially rural 
ideal of family-based self-sufficiency, the urban poor did become semi- 
pro letarianised, but managed to avoid utter proletarianisation. It could 
be argued that migration to the cities was accompanied by transfer and 
implantation of the rural know-how of family-centred survival — or, in 
other words, of functionally distinct but structurally undifferentiated 
relations pertaining to kinship, work, property, affection, and so on, 
under the inclusive kinship solidarity structure (Pizanias 1993: 169), 
but in the absence of the rural SCP base.
It may be claimed that the above mentality has been a contributing 
factor in the proliferation of artisanal concerns. Indeed, even if the 
desire to survive along the lines Pizanias describes implies so high a 
degree of occupational mobility that it prevented the formation of oc­
cupational and/or class identities among such people, the fact that the 
inter-war poor and their descendants have by now been city residents for 
two or three generations must have led to their, at least, partial oc­
cupational settlement. Post-war economic growth and development 
presented them with opportunities for safeguarding their subsistence 
that some of them, no doubt, took up and so became occupationally 
settled. Such a development did not contradict the self-sufficiency 
ideal. On the contrary, it made it easier to achieve in instances where 
they became artisans: if it did contradict it, as when they became 
skilled wage-workers, this was offset by the new job security. There­
fore, as Greece’s economy gradually began to develop, many of the ex-
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rural urban poor learned a trade, usually on the job, and once they had 
mastered the skills attempted to set themselves up independently - a 
move that fully accorded with their subjective aims and mentality.®
One way out of wage-labour, and consonant with the ideals and at­
titude of the inter-war poor and their descendants, was to become an ar­
tisan. (This nicely agrees with the replies given by interviewees when I 
asked them why they had became artisans - see chapter VIII). Needless to 
say, a SCP type escape from capitalism would have been unthinkable in 
countries where the historical trajectory of capitalism was more impos­
ing and forceful than in Greece. To become an artisan meant and means 
acquiring a kind of personal freedom and is a form of resistance from 
wage-labour. That artisanship is nevertheless a condition with a 
strongly social character is attested by the artisan remaining centred 
on the family unit, as well as by the numerical mass of the artisanate.
Summary and Conclusion
The above presentation and discussion of studies concerning ar­
tisans have identified a number of factors that illuminate the stratum’s 
proliferation. Since frequently the interpretations of the various 
authors are somewhat biased and not free of error, I shall try to offer 
a more coherent synthesis of what that literature has to offer.
1. The small commodity producers who emigrated to the Greek 
cities in the inter-war period and thereafter were much assisted by 
traditional attitudes and social networks, which effectively shielded 
the new urban poor from proletarianisation. The mentality and survival 
techniques which were inculcated into them by their rural forefathers — 
namely self-sufficiency based on the household as a production and con­
sumption unit, the importance of the family’s labour input, and a 
mutual-aid social network of kinfolk and other persons linked by affec-
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live relations (Pizanias, also Cavounidis) — have acted as ideological 
supports to would-be artisans and newly independent ones, and provided 
them with all-important social capital. That tens of thousands of uncon­
nected individuals have taken the same way out of capitalism signifies 
that there is a structural equivalence between their circumstances and 
the ideas they carry within them. It shows that they share a similar 
frame of reference and a similar habitus and overall way of life, in 
other words an analogous form of social organisation. It appears that 
the common social baggage carried by rural migrants and their descen­
dants is responsible for their uncoordinated but similar response to ex­
ternal challenges. In this sense individuals do appear to be ’bearers of 
structures’ & la L. Althusser, though this is not all they are. It 
should be remembered, of course, that this mass escape from industrial 
capitalism occurred in a society where industrialisation was retarded 
and constrained in particular ways, and where there seemed little will­
ingness to carry the process to its full conclusion.
2. An important economic factor in the artisans’ proliferation is 
that markets have expanded since the 1950s in the context of the 
country’s place in the international division of labour and role in the 
international system. This context has had a considerable impact on the 
structure of the national economy and, of course, affected those engaged 
in it (Moschonas). Market expansion resulted in extensive but not inten­
sive economic growth, hampered chiefly by the fact that technology and 
innovative products were not developed domestically and had to be im­
ported. Since the market expansion took place within the hot-house con­
ditions of heavy tariff protection, competition was limited. This meant 
that capitalist units could produce and profit without needing to be as 
efficient as their counterparts in the advanced countries. Neither was 
it necessary to undergo continuous modernisation. (The inefficiency of
244
larger units when compared with small ones is discussed by P. Nikolaou, 
N. Mouzelis, and A. Lyberaki.) These circumstances allowed the artisanal 
units to become established and presented them with a whole set of op­
portunities, so that in relatively peaceful co-existence with capitalist 
producers they managed to secure low-grade market niches for themselves. 
To a significant extent, therefore, their resurgence was due to the 
country’s overall economic growth (Moschonas). The context in which this 
resurgence took place, and the accompanying mechanisation of the ar­
tisanal workshops demonstrates that today’s Greek artisans are not a 
remnant of a pre-capitalist past (see chs. IV and V; Lytras 1993).
3. Since there are no strong links between the capitalist and the 
artisanal sectors, there is no transfer of the capitalist dynamic to the 
smal 1-commodity producers — for instance of technology (Mouzelis). It is 
also true that the artisan sector does not greatly compete with the 
capitalist one; it co-operates with it to some extent, and the two co­
exist without much ado. Not only, is the integration between the two 
sectors weak, it is also extrinsic in that it is effectuated much more 
by the state’s overall intervention in regulating the economy than by 
capitalist and artisan agents. Their complementarity, therefore, is very 
weak. On the other hand, over the last three decades artisans have not 
only mechanised their workshops, but are now gradually introducing ad­
vanced technological apparatus, all imported. In this sense, it could be
CL
said that there is/ certain complementarity between the indigenous ar­
tisanal sector and (foreign) capitalist producers, since the artisans do 
benefit, albeit via imports, from the technological know-how of interna­
tional capitalism. This of course is an effect of globalisation, which 
has put an end to the possibility of perceiving the non-capitalist and 
capitalist sectors as sealed and separate existing side by side at
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nation-state level; in consequence, dualism is not really a useful no­
tion for conceptualising this particular relationship.
4. Some writers have argued that politics has been a major factor 
in the persistence of the artisanate, due to the numerical importance of 
its vote. This was the case since the early-post war period, with the 
large-scale and turbulent dissociation of the labouring strata from the 
client-patron relations that had traditionally mediated the representa­
tion of their interests, and at the same time controlled them politi­
cally. The state having to contain this discontent meant that the ar­
tisans finally did receive a little attention, but they were not given 
any spectacular help because, for one thing, they were too close to the 
insurgent working class to be trusted, and for another they were assumed 
to perish anyway once industrialism advanced - by contrast the remaining 
propertied middle strata received the state's heavy assistance. Far from 
there being any alliance of the state with the artisans, they were 
merely not much bothered with taxation, inspections, and the like — they 
were simply left to themselves. The state’s practice of non-intervention 
makes the position about draining the SCP units and transferring their 
surplus to the capitalist sector difficult to sustain. Equally 
problematical, because insubstantiated, is the claim, that the artisans’ 
resurgence was the result of state intervention. In fact, it was not un­
til much later, from the late 1950s and thereafter, that successive 
governments began to look at the artisanate as a block of votes which, 
in varying degrees, they wooed by offering tariff protection, special 
loans, etc. (Moschonas, Lytras). The state’s half-harted intervention 
has had only a limited impact, however (see Ch. V). During the same 
period, Greece’s association with the EEC and the ensuing more intense 
competition has to a certain extent mass-mobilised the artisans into 
demanding greater state assistance to cope with the new threat (Lytras).
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This collective action is evidence that artisans are not completely 
bounded by political clientelism, and that they are not entirely devoid 
of potential for a perhaps limited, but autonomous participation in 
politics.
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Notes to Chapter VI
1. According to Moschonas, the process of indigenous capitalist ac­
cumulation or development in a semi-peripheral country such as Greece is 
structured by its articulation with the international (capitalist) sys­
tem, and crystallises in the country’s position in the international 
division of labour (1986: 27-30).
2. Moschonas considers co-operatives necessary not only for increasing 
production, but also because, as manifestations of the collectivity, 
they are an important means for overcoming the individualistic ideology 
of the petty bourgeoisie. In any case, it is even questionable whether 
there is such a thing as a distinct petty-bourgeois ideology. For a dis­
cussion of the shifting attitudes of this stratum see M. Ossowska 
(1986).
3. The discussion of the realignment of the petty bourgeoisie’s politi­
cal allegiances and Moschonas’ recommendations to PASOK bring up an im­
portant factor that has hardly been discussed: that of petty-bourgeois 
protest (and probably also self-assertion) as an essential aspect of 
PASOK coming to power (see Papasarantopou 1 os 1980).
4. The question of business premises pitched petty-bourgeois tenant 
against petty-bourgeois shop-owner. It was not unusual for a small 
proprietor to rent the premises where the business was conducted, and to 
own others which s/he rented out. This confirms that the petty-bourgeois 
position is one that inherently promotes particularism and in­
dividual ism.
5. The protests were against government attempts to impose continuous 
business hours of the nine-to-five type (instead of a day with a long 
break in the middle). This was an issue that concerned the shop-owners 
only: the artisans were already keeping these hours. Other objectives at 
these mobilisations were to cancel increases in taxation, to effect a 
watering down of the government’s incomes policy, and to deal with the 
various problems that had emerged in connection with Greece’s EEC acces­
sion {ibid.: 229).
6. It has been suggested that the reported relative swiftness in the ar­
tisans’ response could be an aspect of their proletarian background and 
to the collectivist affiliations many of them had when they were wage­
workers (see Ch. VIII). It is more than probable that their earlier mem­
bership of labour unions and similar organisations helped to give them a 
militant outlook and organisational skills in mass mobilisation which 
they retained. (For workers to be able to mobilise swiftly so as to
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press for a demand is an essential aspect, and often the only way for 
defending their interests.) A similar point has been made by N. 
Poulantzas with respect to French artisans (1978: 330).
7. Farming the smallholdings was not sufficient to keep the family 
going, hence the need to engage periodically in wage labour or other ac­
tivities for supplementing the basic SCP activity (also see Psychoyios 
1986; 1987; 1993).
8. Evidence to support this account is hard to get. But I think that 
what I have just outlined is indirectly verified in two respects. One is 
that the poor of the inter-war period and their descendants can no 
longer be found as Pizanias has described them. Therefore, we may assume 
that they have taken more permanent jobs, some no doubt in the in­
dustrial trades. The second is that since the early 1970’s Greece has 
been flooded by (mainly illegal) emigrants (Cavouriaris et al. 1972). 
Until that time the country was a net exporter of labour power, but 
since then the situation has been reversed. In more recent years it is 
the foreign workers who have occupied the lower e chelons of the job 
market, and they now do the work that used to be the ’prerogative* of 
the indigenous urban poor.
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Part Three: An Bnpirical Investigation
CHAPTER VII - ISSUES CONCERNING THE SAMPLE (RESEARCH REPORT 1) 
Introduction
The present chapter shows the difficulties that were encountered 
while trying to put together a sample of artisans for interviews, and 
how they were overcome. It was the absence of correct data on even so 
elementary a point as how many artisans there are, and the difficulty of 
obtaining access to them, that largely determined the choices made and 
the methodology adopted — specially the sampling method actually 
utilised.
The snow-ball type of sample employed presented its own dif­
ficulties. One of these concerns access to the interviewees. Another is 
its tendency to some particular bias which, if left unchecked, may dis­
tort the result. The snow-ball sample always leaves some degree of un­
certainty concerning adequacy and reliability, and by extension affects 
the conclusion of the study and in how far it may be used as the basis 
for further generalisations. After suggesting a way to largely overcome 
this drawback, background information is given on the questionnaire and 
its contents. Finally, the appropriateness of the sample is explored in 
terms of its adequate reflection of the category of artisans.
1. Preparatory work and early sampling choices
As artisans in Greece have not been the subject of previous social 
investigations, no material of any kind exists about them. All we have 
are some very general official census figures, but these refer to ar-
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tisans as a statistical category, which is defined as all manufacturing 
concerns with a work-force of up to 10 persons. Since these statistical 
artisans include not only artisans proper (simp1e-commodity producers) 
but also other types of manufacturers, they are of little use for il­
luminating the artisan (SCP) — semi-capitalist — capitalist continuum. 
Any attempt to study artisans, therefore, requires quite basic factual 
information, which I had to collect myself.
Several trades were initially investigated in the context of a 
pilot study conducted in Athens between December 1986 and January 1987. 
This involved 23 open interviews with artisans and small businessmen in 
carpentry, computers, garments, machining, and printing. It proved ex­
tremely useful, and provided information that led to the formulation of 
certain hypotheses and the rejection of others, allowed the design of a 
questionnaire, indicated areas for further probing, and clarified the 
choice of trades to be researched further. Technology as a basis for 
that choice was ruled out. First, it was discovered that one and the 
same workshop might employ both advanced and entirely obsolete tech­
nologies; second, I realised that beyond obvious differences (between a 
hammer and a computer, say) I did not have, nor could I fast enough ac­
quire, the knowledge to meaningfully distinguish between technologies.
The selection of trades in terms of growth was partially taken 
into account. Given, however, that precise evidence about the trajectory 
of each trade could not be inferred from official statistics or other 
sources, I was not entirely sure when making my selection whether the 
trades chosen answered my criteria. In the end two trades — machinists 
and garment makers — were considered sufficient. Machinists were a 
well-established branch of artisans which seemed to be declining slowly. 
The garment makers represented a trade that has been growing rapidly
since the early 1970’s and is showing signs of stabilisation.
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Machinists were selected for being a craft-trade central to in­
dustrialisation, and associated with labour-movement militancy (see 
Hobsbawm 1974d: 359-60). I thought that if there was a trade exhibiting 
a craft ethic in an environment hostile to indigenous manufacturing, 
this would be the machinists. It was this aspect that made their study 
especially interesting. Another reason for their selection was that, as 
far as I could judge, the technologies they utilise are of various 
levels of complexity, neither singularly obsolete nor ’high-tech*. This 
was assumed to indicate a measure of continuity, as well as of change 
and adaptability. Other interesting features were that machinists are 
rather numerous, that their industry is gendered, they are exclusively 
men.
Garment-making was selected because it is a relatively new and 
growing branch, with a proliferation of small units, some of which ap­
pear to prosper. Given the obvious but indirect links to tailoring, I 
thought I might find evidence of a transition from manual techniques to 
mechanised skills. Additional attractions of garment-making included 
reports that it involved large-scale subcontracting networks, and that 
the trade was open to women.
The two trades were perceived to illustrate a number of key ele­
ments, and finally selected because I thought they were largely typical 
of other artisans in different trades. An extensive and in-depth study 
of their most important features was hoped to make available factual in­
formation and provide a window into the stratum as whole.
For purposes of convenience the study was limited to Athens, my 
place of residence. In any case the survival and resurgence of artisans 
in the context of a competitive industrial economy, was beset with 
greater difficulties in Athens, the most highly developed region of 
Greece, than in the provincial towns and villages. In consequence, ex­
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plaining the artisans’ survival and present (favourable) circumstances 
in the Athens area would largely explain their survival in the rest of 
the country.
2. Indeterminate artisan population
Ideally, I should have established a sampling frame for each of 
the two trades, and drawn from it a representative sample of one in­
dividual artisan per enterprise. Although I did not intend to sample all 
artisanal units in my two trades, it would certainly have been il­
luminating to establish their numerical magnitude. This was not pos­
sible. It soon became apparent that the real overall population of ar­
tisans is not available from official statistics, nor are the relevant 
numbers for the two trades I decided to study. All I could get from of­
ficial statistics was a very rough idea about the extent of small units, 
but little more (see ch. V).
Not only are there no data on the general universe of the category 
of artisans but it can not even be inferred, however approximately, by 
comparing official data with data from the various Artisans’ Chambers, 
associations, and other voluntary organisations. The reason for this is 
that either the latter’s rolls are inflated by adding other small 
manufacturers to the number of artisans proper, or they list only a 
fraction of the true numbers that Chamber officials admit they know to 
exist but will not discuss further. Overall, the government statistics 
and the Chambers data deviate too much to be comparable.1 For similar 
reasons, the numerical extent of the two artisan trades I was interested 
in particularly could not be ascertained either. An idea of the mag­
nitudes we are concerned with is given in Table 7.1 below. The Table il­
lustrates the discrepancy between the figures given by the 1984 census 
for manufacturing establishments in Greater Athens (figures for the 1-10
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employment grade being more pertinent) and those provided by the Cham­
bers, even though some of the incongruities have been ironed out.
Table 7.1
Number of small, and smal 1 -medium. Athens manufacturing establishments 
in Machining and Garment-making in the Greater Athens area; (various 
sources).
1984 Census* 
1-50 employees
1984 Census* 
1-10 employees
Athens & Piraeus** 
Chambers 1-50 employees
Industry
Garments
Machining
6,158*
1,720**
5,757*
1,555**
8,000-8,500
3,500
* Source: ESYE (1988).
**Estimate for 1988 by Chambers’ officials.
* Corresponds to ESYE statistical code 243, but units of codes 2433,
2434, 2437 and 2438 have been excluded.
** Corresponds to ESYE statistical code 36.
Since the Chambers have no up-to-date registers, a selection of 
enterprises with the correct number of their employees would have been 
possible only by contacting individual firms. This would have meant an 
inordinate number of confirmatory trips, an unwarranted increase in ex­
penses, and still would not have covered the unregistered artisans. As a 
result, it was not possible to draw a truly representative sample, since 
the numerical extent of machinist and garment artisans is by no means 
certain.
3. Attitudes towards being interviewed
The greatest obstacle, however, and the one that obliged me to 
abandon the idea of drawing a sample from Chamber sources, representa­
tive or otherwise, had to do with the artisans’ unwillingness to be in­
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terviewed. Already in the pilot research it had become plain that 
smal 1-business proprietors were not at all willing to talk to strangers 
claiming an interest in them for the purposes of sociological study. Ar­
tisans were very reluctant to be interviewed, and would only submit to 
it if they were legally obliged to, as in the case of an official cen­
sus. In fact, my own early attempts during the pilot research to ap­
proach random artisans in various trades without prior introductions 
proved total failures.
Unlike the case of participant observers, when the researcher’s 
engagement in a particular milieu includes access to informal discus­
sions and so conduces to the research, my own situation was much less 
favourable. It involved acknowledging that I came from the outside, and 
my long questionnaire only reinforced the artisans* distrustfulness. 
Their blank refusal to let me interview them, without this having been 
arranged by an intermediary beforehand, was due, as I learned later, to 
believing me somehow associated with the Inland Revenue or some other 
agency that might be pursuing them.
However, once I could be introduced by someone the artisans knew 
personally and trusted, their attitude was very different. Since my en­
quiry involved a huge questionnaire, and I would need to occupy the at­
tention of would-be respondents for a considerable period of time, it 
was absolutely necessary to elicit their positive support for my 
project. To obtain not only access, but also a degree of energetic par­
ticipation, had to proceed through go-betweens who introduced me to 
potential interviewees. These contact-men were mostly artisans them­
selves whom I had interviewed, and well-known, esteemed and trusted by 
the prospective interviewees. The type of sample elicited by this ap­
proach is, of course, known as a snowball sample.
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4. Snowball sample
It was the problems and the overall situation outlined above that 
largely determined my particular sampling method and sample used. These 
in turn bear on the representativeness of the particular sample, and on 
whether the conclusions arrived at may be said to have a wider 
relevance.
Snowball sampling has been utilised in situations where it is not 
possible to obtain a representative sample and/or where it is not all 
that important, since what the researcher is after is to understand a 
particular situation, sub-culture or meaning-system. Snowball samples 
have, for example, been used in the context of investigations into drug 
usage (see the work by E. Goode on multiple drug use, cited in Rose 
1982: 193-206). The problem with this type of sampling is that, although 
the findings may indeed show certain patterns from which conclusion may 
be reached with reference to the sampled population, the typicality of 
these patterns and/or conclusions is often disputed. It is objected that 
because such a method of data-collection does not give consistent and 
reproducible results, its reliability is questionable, and it cannot be 
used as the basis of wider generalisations. I would suggest that it is 
possible to by-pass, or at least reduce, this handicap.
Consider the method employed by D. Bertaux and I. Bertaux in 
their studies of the French bakers’ trade. Seeking to understand why 
small bakery businesses have persisted, they were looking for informa­
tion to explain the phenomenon largely in bakers’ verbal 
autobiographies, from which they hoped to identify routines and patterns 
and extract meaningful relationships. They proceeded to interview in­
dividual bakers in general informal discussions centred on a number of 
key questions. They kept on interviewing different bakers until no 
qualitatively new data appeared, and no new relationships. Continuing
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the interviewing simply brought a further quantitative accumulation of 
data and relationships already discovered; it confirmed the earlier 
ones, but did not add to them. After about 30 interviews, the bakers' 
story was told, at least as far as it could be with the bakers them­
selves as a source of information. At a certain level of data collec­
tion, a point of saturation of information was reached, which the 
researchers saw as proof that emergent relationships indeed exist (see 
Bertaux and Bertaux 1981a, 1981b, Thanopoulou and Petronoti 1987: 34- 
37).
My own empirical research was conducted similarly with an eye to 
reaching the point of information saturation. My guide as to whether the 
machinist and garment artisans had provided all key information
from which patterns and perhaps relationships might be inferred was mere 
repetition of already received answers. By then, their story would have 
been told in rough outline. In practical terms, the number of my inter­
views was not limited to Bertauxs thirty. The research situation was 
somewhat different, in that my investigation was not limited to artisans 
in the strict sense. Other categories were also researched for compara­
tive purposes (see below). In order to safeguard the typicality of at 
least the prime focus of my research, the number of interviews was 
raised to 50 for each of the two trades, 100 in all.
The person actually interviewed was the proprietor of a small in­
dependent manufacturing enterprise, but the analytical unit interpreted 
was rather the artisanal workshop. With a response rate of roughly 50% 
the target of 100 interviewees (which was met) required that the in­
itiators of snow-ball leads, who were usually interviewees themselves, 
had to recommend a considerably larger number of potential interviewees. 
In the end, about 200 individuals were approached, each of them a full 
or part-owner of a separate workshop concern. Those who declined usually
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gave lack of time as an excuse, but I suspect that their refusal was due 
rather to the illicit character of much of their activities.
5. Access and go-betweens
Once it was clear to me that my only option was a snow-ball
sample, I was faced with a new obstacle: how to find the go-betweens
who, as already noted, had to be people whom the potential interviewees 
knew and, above all, trusted.
To find such go-betweens, I asked practically each and every per­
son I knew or met whether s/he was acquainted with any relevant ar­
tisans. If the answer was in the affirmative, I requested an introduc­
tion. If this was agreed, or when I was given permission to use their
name as a reference, (which was the norm), I then telephoned prospective 
interviewees and attempted to establish a first contact with them.
When the go-betweens themselves called their artisan acquain­
tances, access was usually granted. By introducing me as the researcher, 
the go-betweens were in fact guaranteeing for my ’veracity and basic 
harmlessness’ (Rose 1982: 194), i.e. that anonymity and privacy would be 
observed, and that nothing of what was to be discussed and revealed 
would be used to the interviewees’ detriment. Now a guarantor must be 
able to back-up his word, or have some authority which renders his/her 
affirmations plausible. In other words, the go-between had to be someone 
the potential interviewee respected, or trusted, or for some reason had 
to comply with.
It appears that the go-betweens themselves saw their role as 
partly that of a formal guarantor. Most of them, even when they agreed 
to act on my behalf, were somewhat reluctant to do so; it was apparent 
that they felt their role to be a burden, that they were averse to com­
mitting themselves. This reluctance is most probably the reason that, as
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a rule I was given only one and rarely a second name/address by go- 
betweens who could, had they wished, have provided me with many more. On 
the credit side, their giving me only one or two names compelled me to 
find more go-betweens, and this resulted in a more widely spread sample. 
The go-betweens themselves usually explained their aversion to furnish­
ing me with more names by judging most of their acquaintances as 
’unsuitable* for my research.
It is well established, of course, that go-betweens are invariably 
selective about what they pass on, information control being the source 
of their authority (Mendras 1991: 99); mine were no exception. In fact, 
informant selectivity must be acknowledged as a built-in bias of the 
data-collection method adopted. This bias should be identified and, if 
possible avoided or at least acknowledged. There was, of course, nothing 
really unsuitable about the artisans who my go-betweens claimed to be 
ineligible for interviewing. This was made plain when I pressured some 
of my acquaintances into nevertheless giving me names of allegedly un­
suitable artisans; when they did these artisans proved to be entirely 
suitable and I had very good interviewing sessions with than. In my par­
ticular case the bias the go-between selectivity was creating was that 
it led to the investigation of artisans they thought more worthwhile, 
but who actually were not quite as typical as most.
Access became easier once I contacted members of the Athens Union 
of Machinery Manufacturing Artisans and of an association of garments 
manufacturers. As indicated earlier, only a fragment of the total number 
of artisans were members of these organisations, and some of the members 
were not artisans. Yet through them I readily obtained introductions to 
small proprietors (of a variety of political persuasions). Also, it be­
came possible for me to draw on their experience and to orient myself in 
the world of each trade. In the course of the research I interviewed
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makers’ union, including both the present and the previous chairmen of 
the machinists’ union, and access to many more was obtained through the 
mediation of association members. Association members are of course more 
energetic and dynamic than mainstream artisans, either as producers 
and/or in being actively involved with the collective affairs of their 
trade. To the extent that a disproportionate number of interviewees were 
members of associations, my sample must be admitted to be biased towards 
them. This may, however, be more of a blessing than a negative feature, 
in the present case, because it provides a better look at the more ac­
tive and class-conscious elements in the two trades, and into their 
organisation. 2
6. The Questionnaire
A methodological difference between my own empirical research and 
the Bertaux study was that I did not rely on open-ended discussions in 
my interviews. I had learnt from the pilot research that, unless con­
trolled in some way, artisans would talk apparently quite uninhibitedly 
but evade issues of importance. As a result I decided to proceed from a 
more structured basis, and to aim at more clear-cut responses.
A very large questionnaire with 217 items was drawn up, some of 
the questions having two or more parts; most questions were closed. It 
was written and used in Greek after three revisions.
The structure of the questionnaire incorporates biographical 
material of each person interviewed. The questions were formulated on 
the basis of material gathered in the pilot research, a review of per­
tinent literature, and as a result of further study. Also, in the course 
of actually conducting the interviews some ethnographic note-taking took 
place.
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Questions fall into three groups. First-group questions aim at ob­
taining basic information about artisans. These are almost exclusively 
closed questions and revolve around four major themes: (i) background; 
(ii) preparations and setting up of workshop/becoming an artisan; (iii) 
internal organisation of the enterprise; (iv) relations of the 
enterprise/artisan with the outside world.
Second-group questions test hypotheses already formed and/or use­
ful for providing the basis for further hypotheses: They include some of 
the probing (open) questions.
In the third group are mostly open-ended questions attempting to 
elicit the artisans’ attitudes on a number of issues, especially with 
respect to their future prospects. A question may have more than one 
function, of course, and so may be part of more than one group.
All interviews were personally conducted by me. The 50 machinists, 
all of them men, were interviewed from February to July 1989. The 50 in­
terviewees in garment-making, 26 men and 24 women, were contacted in 
instalments between February and May 1989, October and December, and 
March and April 1990.
The actual interviews excluding interruptions lasted from at least 
one hour to at most three hours and 45 minutes. On average an interview 
ran for 1 hour 36 minutes, most being indeed around 90 minutes long.
7. Who were the sampled
Among the 100 people interviewed (full or part-owners of separate 
enterprises) 3 machinists and 13 persons in garment-making appeared, in 
terms of their number of employees, to be involved in capitalistic con­
cerns. Such entrepreneurs were not initially targeted and were meant to 
be excluded from interviewing. Some of the go-betweens, however, had 
suggested them as particularly appropriate, and it was not until the ac­
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tual interviewing that their true status became apparent. At that point 
I decided to go ahead and conclude the interviews, and to evaluate such 
instances for purposes of comparison; these capitalists were dubbed 
’larger employers’.
A second segment consisted of proprietors whose number of 
employees put them halfway between the artisan and the capitalist. Those 
in that grey-intermediate position were dubbed ‘small employers* follow­
ing E. 0. Wright (see Ch. I) and Scase and Goffee (see Ch. II). The 
third segment, which formed the bulk of interviewees in both trades ex­
amined, were straightforward artisans.
To assess whether members of the three segments identified were 
indeed artisans, capitalist larger employers, or half-way, their own 
work role was investigated and the individuals measured against it.3 A 
number of additional indices were also taken into consideration, such as 
the ratio between skilled artisans and unskilled workers in the busi­
ness.
Skill differentials forming the basic distinction between artisans 
(who are highly skilled craftsmen) and other workers (as a rule are less 
skilled or unskilled) were already mentioned in chapter II, with 
reference to the developed countries. Hie principle applies for the most 
part to this particular sample of Athenian artisans, as shown in the 
next three chapters. A skilled artisan’s worth in output is the rough 
equivalent of at least two, perhaps three unskilled labourers (see 
relevant points in Ch. I). In accordance with this criterion, a 
capitalistic organisation and exploitation would come about only when an 
artisan hires more labour than his own’s worth, in the sense that only 
then can he start exempting himself of manual labour.4
The second criterion is partnerships. Partnerships, which are 
widespread and mostly involve kin, imply some division of labour between
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partners so that at least one partner is usually specialised in contact­
ing the outside world; this means that that particular partner’s work 
role is programatical ly more management-oriented. It was then useful to 
consider the kind of work other partners performed so as to reach a 
decision about the type of enterprise they had.5
The third index is whether relatives, real and/or fictitious, are 
working in the business as wage labourers. Where such working relatives 
exist, to include them among ordinary, non-family workers would give a 
distorted picture of relations in the workshop. It must be assumed that 
artisans and their kin-workers form an affectionate primary group, where 
family and working relations are largely fused and operate on the basis 
of a familistic ideology. These relations are qualitatively different 
from those between labour and capital. For instance, in terms of labour 
relations it may be assumed that such kin workers will side with their 
hierarchically superior kin against the ordinary wage workers remaining 
in the enterprise. By extension, in calculations of the worker-artisan 
ratio they should be counted with their artisan kin and other 
proprietors, rather than with the remaining work force.
Work role and the three additional, co-determining criteria were 
considered for each individual interviewed, to ascertain h&r/h/r posi­
tion and that of the enterprise. However, these criteria are not exhaus­
tive. They do not, for example, include a consideration of the amounts 
of capital each entrepreneur possesses, his motivation for becoming in­
dependent and his expectations of that state.
The way the sample is structured is portrayed in Table 7.2. As it 
is indicated there, the artisan segment comprises 68% of the sample, the 
small employer segment 16%, and the (mostly incipient) capitalist seg­
ment 16%. The machinists consisted 82% of artisans, 12% of small 
employer and 6% of larger employers. In garment-making, artisans account
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Table 7.2
Type of Interviewee/Establishment by Enterprise Employment Grade 
[Key: M; Machinist; G; Garments: T: Total] (N=100)
ENTERPRISE ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
EMPLOYMENT M G T M G T M G T M G T
SIZE
Subtotal 30 25 I 55
UNITS
2 | 2 30 27 I 57
6 4 1 5 3 3 4 4 8
7 3 3 3 3
8 2 2 1 1 3 3
9 1 1 1 1
10 1 1 2 1 1 2
Subtotal CO CO 1 4 5 1 1 11 6 17
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 3
12 1 1 1 1
13 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 4 5
14 2 1 3 2 1 3
15 1 2 3 1 2 2
Subtotal 2 2 3 3 3 1 6 7 6 9 15
16 2 2 2 2
17 1 1 1 1 2 2
18 1 1 1 1
19 3 3 3 3
22 1 1 1 1
Subtotal 1 2 1 3 6 6 2 7 9
40 1 1 1 1
47 1 1 1 1
54 1 1 1 1
Subtotal
1
1 2
3 3
1 2
3
Total 41 27 68 6 10 |16 3 13 |16 50 50 |100
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to 54%, small employers to 20%, and larger employers to 26%. Whether the 
different composition of the two samples reflects sampling bias or dif­
ferences in the organisation of the two trades will be discussed later 
in the research report. It is clear, however, that the sample(s) show 
what they were meant to show, and in this sense the internal validity of 
the sample is sustained.
Another noteworthy feature of the sample is that, in terms of 
employment grade, a number of areas belong into more than one category. 
This suggests that the number of employees is not a sufficiently precise 
criterion for classifying a unit as artisanal, small employer or larger 
employer. This is all the more true since even a grade as ’safe* as that 
of 1-5 employees can be impure, let alone that of 6-10, although offi­
cial Greek statistics consider it as solidly artisanal. On the other 
hand, artisan’s firms may be found in the 11-15 employees bracket, not 
to mention that in this grade all three categories are represented. The 
following presentation and analysis of data collected in terms of num­
bers of employees will, therefore, also take into account the above- 
mentioned three categories.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have tried to show how certain external 
obstacles militated against the selection of a representative sample. 
These, coupled with the problem of obtaining access to interviewees, led 
me to adopt the ’snow-ball’ method. While snow-ball samples have their 
limitations, provided that the bias is dealt with, which may be caused 
by go-betweens steering the enquiry into unwarranted regions, they can 
actually prove to be very satisfactory. This presupposes, however, that 
saturation of information must be achieved. On that basis it is then 
possible to establish how typical the findings are, and to arrive at
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valid and meaningful generalisations. Other sampling-related choices 
have also been reported, along with a brief survey of the questionnaire 
used. Finally, the sample of owners of smal1-manufacturing units were 
individually scrutinised to decide whether their businesses are what 
they purport to be, namely artisanal. It was established that according 
to a number of criteria, the bulk of the sampled are indeed artisans, 
which finding largely establishes the internal validity of the sample. 
Moreover, two additional segments of roles/positions were identified, so 
that interviewees (and by extension their small manufacturing 
businesses) can be designated as small employer and larger employers. 
This, facilitates the comparative study of artisans according to a num­
ber of common parameters that is pursued in the following chapters.
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Notes to Chapter VII
1. An illustration of this is the number of productive units 
(establishments) with machinery that the National Statistical
Service has classified as artisanal. In 1984 the Greater Athens Area had 
49,631 of these, of which 47,836 were considered as productive units, 
yet only 39,328 (the for our purposes most appropriate figure — see 
chapter V) employed machinery. By contrast, the semi-state Athens and 
Piraeus Chambers of Artisans, in which membership is almost compulsory, 
had a register of approx. 48,000 enterprises, only 29,500 of which were 
confirmed to be operating.
The numbers on Chamber members come from information supplied by Mr 
Nicos Baklesis of the Athens Chamber of Artisans (BEA), and Mr Michael 
Yiagas of the Piraeus Chamber of Artisans (BEP), to both of whom I am 
indebted. When I interviewed Mr Baklesis, the Chamber was in the process 
of cleaning up its records of companies registered for tax and legal 
purposes only. In 1988, the number of artisanal units registered with 
the Athens Chamber was 37,000, but the daily 24 HORES of 3 November, 
1988 reported that only 23,000 of them had paid their annual dues (6,000 
drachmas, or the then equivalent of 25 pounds Sterling), and so were of 
confirmed operation. By another account, however, that of interviewee No 
019, an artisan garment-maker and elected member of the BEA*s boards of 
councillors, registered members (firms) numbered about 45,000, of which 
about 20,000 had paid their dues, of which only 2,000 approx. voted in 
the elections for councillors. Similarly the registered members of the 
Piraeus Chamber included 11,044 units (with 15,661 individual 
members), of which only 6,500 had confirmed their operational existence 
between 1984 and 1988; the status of the remainder is unknown.
2. Certain key contacts who also acted as go-betweens, who were members 
of the voluntary machinists* association that is politically controlled 
by the communists, introduced me only to artisans - members of the as­
sociation who were of a left-wing political persuasion. When I became 
aware if this, I asked for names and introductions to artisans of all 
other trends. Although my main contact expressed his disdain for my 
wish, he did agree to do so. In this way the left-wing bias was ran­
domised.
3. When a coincidence of the functions of labour and those of capital, 
which are control relationships, occur this appears as a fusion of work 
roles in the same person, in our case the artisan. On the other hand, 
work roles positioned in the one or the other end of the social rela­
tions of production, give the capitalist and the wage worker. Work roles 
therefore express different control relationships, they are determined 
by them, and accordingly may be utilised as a shorthand for class (in
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this context see Scase 1992: 23-6).
Taking then these considerations into account, if an interviewee was 
occupied exclusively with managerial type of work (function of capital),
i.e. was an owner-controller, s/he was considered a capitalist larger 
employer. If someone was more occupied with managerial work but still 
laboured manually, then s/he was considered a small employer; 
predominantly manual labour was considered typical of the artisan.
4. The artisan’s transformation ^ into a capitalist is concluded when 
his work-role is hardly or not all manual any more, the ratio between 
artisans and workers allows a finely tuned assessment of this shift.
5. I found out that partners had decided among themselves which of them 
I would interview, and almost always it was the partner who dealt in 
’external affairs’. These more management-oriented partners were not, of 
course, inherently more capitalist than their confreres who were 
predominantly occupied with the actual work, especially when these divi­
sions of labour were arranged under the kinship ideology.
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CHAPTER VIII - MODES OF BECOMING AN INDEPENDENT ARTISAN: EVIDENCE FROM
EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION (Research Report 2)
Introduction
The field-work findings on what makes artisans take up their 
profession are presented and discussed below in five separate sections. 
The first concerns the interviewees’ families’ occupational background. 
The second examines the question in terms of educational background, ap­
prenticeships and work experience, and especially the pre-eminent matter 
of skills and how they were acquired.
The next section looks at the question of ’how’, and considers the 
impact on artisanship of conditions at the micro-level. Emphasis is 
given to the interviewees’ statements about what information they had 
about setting up as independents, the necessary financing and how they 
acquired their customers. Mention is also made of the organisation pat­
terns associated with the starting-up phase.
This is followed by an analysis of the reasons why our inter­
viewees themselves established or joined up with independent workshops. 
The then available alternatives are examined, as well as the inter­
viewees’ own motivation, and what it meant to them to become independ­
ent.
The conclusion sets out attempts to identify patterns of the in­
terviewees trajectories.
The reader is reminded that information from interviewees’ 
responses in the present and following chapters are arranged on the 
basis of the categories: artisan, small employer and larger employer.
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1. Social Background: Origins (parents1 occupation) and intergenera-
tional mobility
In order to establish the social position of the interviewes it 
was necessary to acquire some basic information about their background. 
Information about their parents’ occupations then made possible certain 
comparisons - such as whether they exhibited intergenerational con­
tinuity, or change, or a mixture of the two.1
The mothers of the respondents (of 82% machinists and 66% in 
garment-making) were housewives; no diverging pattern is discernible in 
the answers from different artisanal categories. The mothers of six gar­
ment workers were seamstresses or had other jobs in the clothing trade. 
One occupation and way of life mentioned by a sizeable minority in both 
trades was that of peasant smal 1 -holder; it was probably under-reported 
because apparently thought too obvious to mention at all, as I later 
discovered.
The father’s occupation is of course more illuminating of a 
person's background than that of the mother. Emergent patterns on the 
basis of trade and type of interviewee are set out below.2 Peasant 
small-holding was the most frequently mentioned occupation and way of 
life - amounting to 36% of the responses (see Table 8.1). Next came 
that of worker (17%) followed by artisan (15%). The category 'other' ob­
tained 13% of the responses, and merchants accounted for 10%. The 
fathers were rarely clerks, let alone industrialists. Comparing the two 
trades shows that the fathers of machinists were in descending order, 
peasant smal 1-holders, artisans and workers. Those employed in the gar­
ment trade had fathers who were predominantly peasant smal 1-holders, 
merchants and businessmen, 3 and workers.
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Table 8.1
Father’s Occupation by Type of Interviewee 
[Key: M=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=100]
Father's ARTISAN SM. EMPLOYER LAR.EMPLOYER TOTAL
Occupation M G T M G T M G T M G T
Artisan 8 2 10 2 4 6 10 6 16
Industrialist 3 3 3 3
Clerk 3 2 5 1 1 3 3 6
Merchant 2 3 5 2 2 3 3 2 8 10
Peasant 19 9 28 2 5 7 1 1 21 15 36
Worker 7 6 13 2 2 4 9 8 17
Other 2 5 7 2 1 3 1 1 2 5 7 12
All 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
When considering the overall class structure of Greece — which 
since about 1960 has been characterised by an expansion of the middle 
strata, with approx. 29% of the active population in agriculture and a 
working class of about 8% (National Statistical Service of Greece 1994) 
— the working-class origin of my interviewees was almost two times that 
of the country’s average. On the other hand, the numerous new middle- 
strata professions are under-represented in the sample. Given that a 
working-class background implies limited resources, the fact that my in­
terviewees could become independent artisans (who, as shown in chapter V 
are better paid than skilled wage-workers), indicates intergenerational 
improvement and upward mobility. The same applies to those with a clerk 
father, despite the fact that in terms of mobility a white-collar back­
ground could be taken as functionally equivalent to a free-lance 
artisan’s position - in which case both may be included in the constel­
lation of the middle classes,4 and an element of intergenerational con­
tinuity be noted.
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Another important feature of the sample is that while artisans and 
small employers with a peasant/sma 11-holder background were certainly 
not raised in affluence, they did come from environments of enterprising 
small proprietors. If those of peasant origin are put together with 
those from other enterpreneurial occupations,5 they will jointly amount 
to circa 77% of the total.
Of course, if the Marxist view is adopted (according to which 
land-owning peasants correspond to the rural petite bourgeoisie) then 
artisans (who are urban petits bourgeois) with peasant origins instan­
tiate the intergenerational continuity of class position: their mobility 
is lateral only. By contrast, the larger employers in our sample, who 
came from the middle classes, seem to demonstrate an element of con­
tinuity and upward mobility. These two elements may also be characteris­
tics of the intermediate small employers, but the evidence is not clear.
In terms of class origins, therefore, our present-day independent 
artisans stem from the very poor rural or urban petite bourgeoisie and 
the working class. Becoming an artisan certainly did not mean downward 
mobility for any of those sampled when they compared their own position 
with that of their parents. While many artisans consider themselves to 
have risen on the stratification ladder, this is not the same as a bet­
ter position in terms of class.8 In overall terms, the majority of the 
independent artisans I sampled exemplified either continuity and con­
solidation of their class position (since they are occupying positions 
functionally equivalent to those of their petit bourgeois progenitors)7, 
or a definite improvement and upward mobility.
2. Education. Apprenticeships, and Work Experience
It is legitimate, I believe, to assume that those artisans inter­
viewed who were of poor peasant, worker, or marginal urban petit bour-
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geois origin and may be referred to collectively as coming from the 
lower class, developed within the context of their families language 
codes that were restricted when compared with those of middle, let alone 
upper-class youngsters (see B. Bernstein 1975). When the lower-class 
children started school, these restricted codes and more generally their 
low-class habitus, which functions ’as a matrix of perceptions, ap­
preciations and actions’ (P. Bourdieu, quoted in Petmesidou-Tsoulouvi 
1984: 57), clashed with the authoritarian school that operates more on 
the basis of middle and upper-class codes and habitus — a position that 
has been upheld in Greece as in Western Europe (Frangoudakis 1978). As a 
result, lower-class children tend to perform rather poorly at school 
(the class-relatedness of school failure has been demonstrated by 
authors such as P. Willis, 1977; see also I. Reid, 1986).
Indeed, interviewees with low-class backgrounds acknowledged or 
implied that they underachieved at school or dropped out. On average the 
artisans-to-be began working at the age of 14; those of
the older group today often started working when they were only 9, 10, 
or 11 years old. This implies that their prior orientation to work 
(Watson 1997: 100) was not in any way a matter of choice. They were 
obliged to work and, since they were minors, there was no question about 
any kind of contract between themselves and their employers — such con­
siderations existed only in the minds of their adult guardians.
Failure at school and dropping out means that many of them did not 
progress through what J. Piaget has designated as the ’formal opera­
tional stage of cognitive development’, which largely unfolds under the 
impact of formal education during early adolescence (from 11-12 to 15), 
and entails the acquisition of a capacity to grasp abstract and 
hypothetical ideas (Piaget and Inhelder 1973: 140-51; Giddens 1990: 73- 
76). They as a rule continued to think in more concrete terms, which
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restricted their ability to master new complex knowledge and pursue al­
ternatives that were at least nominally open to them. Any skills they 
wished to acquire were learnt while working. Qn-the-job apprenticeships 
involve learning by doing empirically by trial and error, and by repeti­
tive application of partial work-tasks; it resulted in what has been 
termed ‘specific traits’ (to be discussed shortly). Meanwhile the more 
general aspect of the work, let alone abstract theory, remained almost 
entirely beyond them. This process of education/training operated a 
mechanism of exclusion that effectively channelled interviewees with a 
lower-class background into manual jobs — in sharp contrast with the 
education and overall trajectory of those of middle-class origin who 
later became the larger employers/petty capitalists (see Table 8.3). 
This indicates a close association between educational-cultural and so­
cial reproduction. Before presenting material relating to the would-be 
artisans’ chances, I would like to briefly discuss traits.
2.1 On traits
Traits is a notion taken from psychology. It originally meant 
’dispositions’, or ’enduring tendencies within the individual to behave 
in certain ways* (see respectively Bampson 1989; and Krech, Crutchfield 
and Ballachey 1962: 103-34). The notion has also been used in the con­
text of approaches to dual and segmented labour markets, initially 
developed on the basis of the U.S. experience.8 It links ways and types 
of skill acquisition to labour-market segmentation. In the latter con­
text, traits have been defined as ’... behavioural patterns which will 
be reproduced in response to a given stimulus in a particular type of 
environment’ (Piore 1975: 130), and are differentiated into specific and 
general.
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A specific trait is behaviour produced in direct response to a 
stimulus offered by the environment. It is acquired in a given environ­
ment by means of imitation and socialisation. Thus a specific trait ac­
quired in the workplace by the process of on-the-job training, i.e. a 
productive trait, may be thought of as a habit.
General traits are sets of rules from which ’behaviour may be 
derived which enables an individual to deduce from the environment and 
the stimulus [at hand] what the correct response may be, although the 
particular combination of circumstances may never have been encountered 
before* (.ibid.: 130-31). Traits of this kind are generated either by in­
duction from a series of specific traits, or are taught at various 
levels of formal education. If, however, general traits are to be 
retained, they must be reinforced by continuous on-the-job usage. Other­
wise they may degenerate again into a set of specific traits.
It appears, therefore, that on-the-job training and formal educa­
tion respectively seem to be responsible for the distinction between 
specific and general traits, and concomitantly for the distinction be­
tween the lower (semi-skilled, skilled, and part of the salaried ranks) 
and the upper tiers of primary labour markets (professionals and 
managers), which also are mobility chains.9 Workers in the lower tier in 
a ’seniority district’ (lines of progression in blue-collar work found 
in medium and especially large enterprises) start their career (and 
mobility) by means of on-the-job training and progress as the job- 
mobility chains move to the next station. This is closely related to the 
jobs they have previously held and/or to their pre-employment station, 
which is influenced decisively by family and class. By contrast, upper- 
tier managers and professionals are in a position to occupy quite dif­
ferent and geographical ly dispersed jobs that are not related to the 
jobs they previously held. This is possible because they operate by
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employing an internalised code of behaviour made available by formal 
education, which involves their obtaining a set of general rules, i.e. 
general traits. High mobility among them serves the function of applying 
what they have learnt, and prevents the deterioration of general into 
specific traits.
Craftsmen, according to Piore, do not fit easily into the two-tier 
model of the U.S. primary labour market, although their mobility chains 
do seem to constitute a career ladder. While they would initially be in­
cluded in the lower-tier segment, the fact that they often become 
’supervisors, independent entrepreneurs, designers and innovators’ indi­
cates that in terms of job stability, variety and terms of pay they 
resemble the upper-tier segment. Craft jobs are similar to the jobs of 
ordinary production workers in that both types of jobs involve the mas­
tering of specific tasks, picked up on the job. In that sense craft- 
workers and ordinary production-1ine workers have similar mobility 
chains, but the former perform a much larger number of specific tasks 
than the latter. ’As these tasks accumulate, a certain number of craft- 
workers induce general principles from them’ (ibid.: 133). It is this, 
according to Piore, that accounts for the craftsmen’s mobility chains 
resembling those of the upper tier. But craftsmen are also different 
from managers and professionals in that their basic learning is 
specific. Even if they have acquired a formal education, it is likely to 
have accompanied their on-the-job training rather than preceded it, as 
is the case with occupations associated with upper-tier mobility chains. 
With respect to my own interviewees, it is clear that while certain in­
dependent craftsmen are indeed working from a set of general precepts, 
most of them will never be able to go beyond exhibiting a range of 
specific traits, however wide.
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The usefulness of the notion of traits is that it allows us to 
decipher the importance of education and on-the-job training in the for­
mation of particular types of skills/assets which, given the existing 
matrix of opportunities, orient would-be artisans in the selection of 
their subsequent paths. It is useful to distinguish traits (specific as 
well as general) as either technical or associated with administration, 
management, and commerce (henceforth referred to as administrative). Ar­
tisans as wage-workers should accordingly have amassed plenty of 
specific technical traits that they picked up on the job, obtained some 
general technical traits by attending low-grade technical classes, and 
some elementary-level specific administrative traits by observing what 
others did (e.g. their employers). Today’s small employers would have 
had acquired some low-level general administrative traits, mainly by ex­
perience and imitation, as well as technical traits on-the-job and in 
technical schools. Lastly, the larger employers should be imbued with 
administrative general traits of the highest order, picked up in the or­
ganised enterprises with which they had a family connection, and/or in 
management training at college. These assumptions were indeed borne out 
in my sample of interviewees, as well be seen from what follows.
2.2 Education
Formal education, one of the two ways by means of imputing general 
traits, has been assessed in terms of years of schooling and the types 
of school attended by the interviewees.
A comparison of the average years of schooling (see Table 8.2) 
shows that (with the exception of the small employers) machinists at­
tended school about 1.5 years longer than did their colleagues in 
garment-making. The greater differential in years of school attendance
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is close to two years, and may be attributed to the traditional attitude 
towards women.10 The difference in length of formal schooling between 
the two trades may also be related to broader differences in their or­
ganisation - a point to which we shall return.
Table 8.2
School Attendance (average in years), by Type of Proprietor 
[Key: M=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=100]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G
r 10 8.1 9.2 10.1 10.1 10.2 1 15.3 12.7 13.1 10.3 9.7 10
* 41 27 68 6 10 16 1 3 13 16 50 50 100
Y = Years of school attendance (average).
Computations mine; last digits have been rounded off.
The length of formal education quite clearly correlates with type 
of proprietor, confirming in effect the traits hypothesis. The emergent 
pattern, the distribution of which conforms to the average, is that the 
longer someone has been educated the closer s/he approaches the 
capitalist type. Inversely, the fewer the years of formal education, the 
closer the resemblance to the artisanal type. The number of years spent 
in formal education is, of course, a flat criterion which says nothing 
about the quality of education received and therefore about the levels 
of traits obtained; it can only be assumed that the longer the school­
ing, the more the material studied becomes more general, more theoreti­
cal, and the more the students become imbued with general traits. 
Relevant logical inferences may also be made on the basis of the type of 
schools attended, which will to some extent indicate the qualitative 
aspect of the education received.11
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Closer study of Table 8.3, which portrays the types of school the 
interviewees attended, reveals the existence of several patterns. As 
clarified in our discussions, most independent artisan and small- 
employer machinists took technical-school courses related to elementary 
and basic aspects of machining. Since they were earning their living 
during the day it was usually evening classes they attended. In other 
words, formal education exposed them to elementary general technical 
traits, while practical on-the-job training provided them with specific 
technical traits and a chance to apply the elementary general technical 
traits learned at school. These people were trained as skilled workers 
and craftsmen.
By contrast, there was little technical education in the garment 
trade. This is in part accounted for by the limited exposure of women to 
formal education - the over 55% primary education rate is largely due to 
them. It is also related to the character of the trade itself (often 
passed on to the apprentices in domestic surroundings), and to the over­
all state of the industry and the role of women in Greece.
The third pattern is that high-school, college, and university 
studies were followed mostly by today’s capitalist-type of proprietors.
ftfthiuA
This means that interviewees of migrant and worker/f background received 
at best only elementary and/or minimal technical education to equip them 
for skilled jobs. Relying only on their technical skills/traits, their 
limited assets, and almost entirely lacking an education in administra­
tive skills, they were obliged to keep to a specific kind of jobs, their 
greatest ambition being to become independent artisans. On the other 
hand, those of a more affluent middle-class background received a 
higher-level education and hence more general precepts, which prepared 
them for non-manual work careers. In this instance there was no lack of 
administrative traits/skills to prevent them from becoming petty
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capitalists. In consequence, the type of formal education received — 
which, as we have seen, is basically a matter of social background and 
class - provides people with differential assets that simply reinforce 
the pre-existing endowment and life chances.
Table 8.3
Type of School Attended, by Type of Proprietor 
[Key: M=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=1001
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LAR.EMPLOYER TOTAL
Type of school M G T M G T M G T M G T
Primary 5 15 20 4 4 5 19 24
Secondary* 1 4 5 1 1 2 2 1 7 8
Lower technical* 16 2 18 3 3 19 2 21
Professional
technical school * * 13 1 14 3 1 4 1 1 2 17 3 20
High school * 3 3 6 2 2 5 5 3 10 13
Technica1 col 1ege * 3 2 5* 1 1 2 2 3 5 8
University 1 1 2 3 5 2 4 6
Total 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
* 3 forms + 6 forms x Studies were not
**5 and 6 forms For two or three years. concluded (all five)
2.3. Apprenticeships and Work Experience: The importance of skill 
Given that the artisans, and to a lesser extent the small 
employers too, as a rule had no expectations of financial assistance 
from the families nor the prospect of a family business to inherit, they 
were forced to rely on whatever assets they could muster themselves. To 
a very large extent this meant acquiring skills. Skills were their prime 
asset, the means for obtaining the higher wages that would allow a cer­
tain amount of savings, and eventually these savings could be used as 
the capital to establish a business of their own. Once this was set up,
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skills were again the key factor: they safeguarded technical independ­
ence and kept down labour costs.
To be of maximum use to the artisan, the skills s/he acquired in 
the course of apprenticeships and working prior to establishing an inde­
pendent workshop had to range across a broad spectrum to allow tackling 
newly encountered work problems successfully (see Piore and Sabel 1984: 
115). This way an artisan acquired a good name in the trade and at­
tracted potential clients. If s/he did not have such a comprehensive 
grasp of skills, the prospective artisan could not expect to survive for 
long as an independent. Achieving a high level of skills, or in other 
words a capacity for innovative solution of work problems encountered, 
meant that craftsmen have moved from accumulating specific technical 
traits into establishing general technical traits. Of course, the range 
of skills they possessed also largely determined the particular type of 
products they could undertake to make as independents. Thus a machinist 
who set up to make general repairs had to be exceptionally multi­
skilled, in contrast to, say, a seamstress who sewed only shirts.
Technical skills were acquired by means of formal teaching and 
on-the-job apprenticeships. The interviewees acknowledged the contribu­
tion of formal education towards skill acquisition, though they did not 
appraise it positively in its own right. The emphasis in training was 
specific and practical; formal education was merely complementary to it. 
Acknowledgement of the role of the parents or relatives in the transmis­
sion of skills was also very limited.
The two main sources of acquiring technical skills were, there­
fore, work and technical school. The machinists overwhelmingly showed a 
proclivity for combining a longer and higher-level technical schooling 
with on-the-job training. While the work experience on its own also at­
tracted a sizeable minority of machinists, it was of paramount impor­
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tance for skill acquisition in garment manufacture. This agrees with 
earlier indications that in this area technical skills are mainly picked 
up on the job.
In practice, apprenticeships lasted considerably less than the 
traditional seven years (with the partial exception of that of small- 
employer machinists which did approach that mark). But whatever their 
length, complaints about them are as old as the notion of apprenticeship 
itself. The chief objection voiced was that for the most part appren­
ticeships functioned as a device to pay novices low rates while their 
masters extracted from them all they could and over an excessively long 
period, during all of which they were supposedly still learning new 
skills of the trade.
So what indicated the end of an apprenticeship? There was no 
specific answer to this, other than that the apprentice should have 
reached a sufficiently high level of proficiency. In the complete ab­
sence of any system bestowing credentials, this level had to be recog­
nised by other qualified craftsmen. If they considered the apprentice as 
on a par with them, they exerted pressure on the master to confer the 
new status. In this sense the master artisan, although largely control­
ling the apprenticeships in his workshop, was restricted by the collec­
tive traditions of his craft community.
There is a marked difference in the length of apprenticeships be­
tween machinists and the garment trade. As shown in Table 8.4, espe­
cially the artisans and small employers in garments reported them to 
have lasted a far shorter period, half or even less, than in machining. 
This correlates with the already noted tendency of garment proprietors 
to attend school for a significantly shorter period than did machinists.
As already noted, the apprenticeships and overall work experience 
of today’s larger employers, which usually took place in a family con­
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text, was very different from the analogous experience of those of more 
humble background. While for the former it was primarily a matter of 
learning the particulars of running an enterprise and the ways of com­
merce, whatever administrative (specific) traits the latter managed to
Table 8.4
Duration of Apprenticeships (average), by Type of Proprietor 
lM=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=100]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Y 4.8 2 3.6 6 3.3 4.6 5 4 4.2 5 2.6 4
N 40 27 67 6 7 13 2 8 10 48 42 90
NA 1 1 3 3 1 5 6 2 8 10
T 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
Y = Duration of apprenticeships (average) in years 
N = Number of responses 
NA = No answer
T = Total number of interviewees
Computations mine; last digits have been rounded off.
obtain were limited to what they could pick up by observing the more en- 
terpreneurial members of their family and to their own rather limited 
formal education. The sum of administrative traits so acquired was en­
tirely insufficient for a successful business career — as is proved by 
the continual and severe difficulties artisans are facing in the busi­
ness world today. The situation of today’s small employers was somewhat 
better than that of the artisans, chiefly because they had the benefit 
of longer schooling. However, since their focus had been particularly on 
the job technical training, they do not feel at home in the business 
world. As I shall argue later, tf this lack of early socialisation
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into specific traits and traits of a general managerial-administrative 
nature that acts as a block to the expansion of their enterprises. The 
above would suggest that there is a qualitative difference of emphasis 
in the meaning and content of their apprenticeships between today’s ar­
tisans and small employers on the one hand, and larger employers on the 
other.
Apprenticeships aside, it is overall work practice and the ex­
perience gained on the job that allows the accumulation and increasingly 
thorough mastery of skills. The issue of work experience was raised with 
those interviewees who had a background of paid work, and three quan­
titative indices of work experience were formulated. (1), the number of 
enterprises in which the respondents worked for wages is taken to ex­
press the variety of different work environments encountered. (2), the 
number of years in paid (non-family) employment is seen as reflecting 
exposure to work in more autocratic conditions. (3), wage-work in same- 
craft jobs gauges the versatility of the craft-specific skills obtained. 
It was hypothesised that the higher the values of these indices, the 
greater would be the preparation their work experience offered inter- 
viewess for eventually standing on their own.
Table 8.5, which depicts the values obtained for the above three 
indices, clearly indicates that both today’s independent artisan and 
smal 1-employer machinists worked for wages in a larger number of en­
terprises than did those in the garment trade, and for a much longer 
period - most most of than came from the working class. This skilled 
labourer’s path to proprietorship (and embourgeoisement) is not unique 
to Athenian artisans, and appears to have parallels in other parts of 
the world (Piore and Sabel 1984: 293). Garment-trade artisans were 
employed in fewer enterprises, but for more years than the employer 
categories in their trade.
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Table 8.5
1. Number (average) of Enterprises where Interviewees Worked for Wages
(excluding those who had work only in family firms).
2. Number (average) of Years in Paid Employment, and
3. Continuity of Wage-Work Jobs, 
by Type of Proprietor 
[M=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=100]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
1. 4 2.8 3.6|| 4.1 2.8 3.2 1 2 4.7 4 * 31| 4 3.2 3.6
2. 13.7 9.9 12.4 12 8.5 10 6 8.8 8.5 13.3 9.3 11.6
N 37 23 60 6 9 15 1 9 8 44 41 85
FF 4 4 8 1 1 2 4 6 6 9 15
T 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
3.
Yes 37 21 58 6 4 10 1 3 4 44 28 72
No 2 2 5 5 6 6 13 13
FF 4 4 8 1 1 2 4 6 6 9 15
T 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
N = Number of interviewees who responded affirmatively. 
FF= Interviewees that have worked only in family firms. 
T = Total number of interviewees
Computations mine; last digits have been rounded off.
Artisan and smal 1-employer machinists, along with artisan garment 
makers, exhibit a solid same-craft work background. Once they became in­
volved in their particular trade they tended to remain there. By con­
trast, the work experience of most small employers in both trader was 
not in same-trade jobs. This again directs attention to the fact that 
work was different for the different proprietors. The one- or two-word 
descriptions interviewees were asked to give of every job they had held 
demonstrate that larger employers and small employers in the garment 
trade did not do manual work in manufacturing, but mostly work related 
to sales and the administrative running of the enterprise. The dif­
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ference between small and larger employers is due to the former’s ad­
ministrative work tasks having been more limited.
It should be noted that artisans and small employers, especially 
in machining, improved their skill level in each successive job they 
took. However, a clear step-by-step improvement of skills between two 
jobs and hence along the job-mobility chain is not always evident, and 
the skill-level trajectories in some instances actually appear quite er­
ratic. It is when wage-labour careers are taken as a whole that the im­
provement in skill levels become more clearly defined. Overall, a large 
range of skills obtained over many years of wage-work in different 
places - in other words, extensive work experience - is a feature that 
marks especially the artisans when compared with the other types of 
proprietor.
The kind of enterprise in which the interviewees were trained is 
also of importance. It is no accident that artisans in both trades, and 
roughly to the same extent, reported to have worked for wages more often 
in small than in medium-sized or large firms. The reverse was reported 
by the major employers in both trades, with small employers standing be­
tween the two.
The numerical prevalence of small firms in the interviewees’ work 
experience is in part explained by how the two industrial branches are 
structured, i.e. by the fact that in both of them small units greatly 
outnumber medium or large ones. This does not, however, explain the fact 
that artisans tend to have a background of working in small units, and 
larger employers in larger ones. The pattern becomes meaningful when we 
consider that small-firm proprietors (who, in the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, may be assumed to be similar to our artisan
interviewees) provide a model that a good number of their workers 
evaluate as positive and so attempt to emulate. It is understandable,
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therefore, that the future artisans wanted to work in an environment 
similar to the one they hoped to establish themselves one day. If close 
working proximity made it possible for their employers to have them un­
der constant surveillance, the reverse was also true. As the employees 
observed their artisan-bosses they learned how workshops operated and 
how the business was organised - they picked up elements of know-how 
they could later put to good use. I think that the power of the example 
may also be invoked in the case of the sample’s small capitalists.
From the perspective of skill too, small workshops have advantages 
for workers who aspire to become independent one day. Since they are 
routinely short of mechanised equipment (see also next chapter), they 
invite unorthodox and innovative solutions to technical problems. This 
then encourages the workers to develop a more comprehensive breadth of 
specific traits (as well as general technical traits), and so equips 
them with the ability to find solutions to problems encountered for the 
first time. In other words, it provides them with the technical prereq­
uisites of artisanship, which involve possession of a range of skills 
(this point is also made by A. Lyberaki 1991: 203-04).
2. Starting u p as an Independent
3.1 Prerequisites
No artisan set up independently on the spur of the moment - leav­
ing aside those who joined or were co-opted into a family-owned en­
terprise, or who bought shares in and joined an already operating busi­
ness (a rarity). The average time that elapsed between when the decision 
was taken and the launch of the new enterprise was 12 months for single 
independent artisans and small employers in machining and five months in 
the garment trade, and eight months for larger employers in garment 
making. The starting-up period may be said to extend over another 12 to
2Q7
18 months after launching the new enterprise, and during this period the 
survival of the young business remained an open issue.
3.1.a Collecting information
To establish a new artisanal workshop requires more than a 
craftsman’s technical skill. The second most vital element is informa­
tion about issues such as the overall current market situation in one’s 
particular trade, the location where demand is likely to be satisfac­
tory, the availability and cost of the raw materials needed, and the 
means for financing the venture.
Passing on such information was informal and casual, taking place 
during working and leisure hours, right from the first days and 
throughout the interviewees* apprenticeships. The master craftsmen 
presented the long years of apprenticeship and then working as a paid 
craftsman as indispensable for their employee one day reaching the so­
cially hallowed goal of becoming an independent artisan. For the appren­
tices the man who had achieved this goal figured as role models, and 
their proximity attested to the possibility that the ambition to become 
independent could indeed be realised. Detailed information circulated 
all the time, covering virtually all aspects of setting up on one’s own. 
The subject of becoming and remaining independent was a daily discussion 
issue with other workers on the job and elsewhere, with members of the 
family or with colleagues who had more or less successfully taken the 
big leap already. It was an essential aspect of being socialised into 
the craft - for the machining as well as garment-trade interviewees.
It was startling, therefore, when about 45-50% in both trades 
answered my question ’Whom did you consult when you were planning to set 
up independently?’ with ’Nobody’. However, most of them explained this 
by adding: ’I knew all about it already’. Given that the relevant infor­
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mat ion had been steadily supplied over a number of years, this makes 
sense. The remaining half of the interviewees said they had discussed 
the issue with family members, of whom some were involved in the family 
business. About 20% of artisans machinist acknowledged asking the advice 
of fellow workers, and another 15% spoke to other artisans they knew 
personally. In other words, would-be-independents surveyed their im­
mediate milieu to obtain a precise picture of their likely prospects.
^.l.b The logistics of setting up shop
Having acquired the necessary skills and information, the artisan 
now had to consider establishing the actual workshop and its legalisa­
tion. The latter means establishing a firm, including registration with 
the tax authorities, issuance of books for accounting, etc., and a 
licence from the Ministry of Industry. A licence from the fire brigade 
is also needed. Registration with the appropriate insurance fund (TEBE) 
and payment of its dues is compulsory, and itself a prerequisite for 
registering for tax purposes: only then will the licence to operate be 
issued by the Ministry. This specifies the HP (horse-power) capacity of 
the machinery that may be installed, and in the area covered by my 
research has in the last fifteen years required complying with anti­
pollution ordinances. Sooner or later a new firm must also register with 
the Artisans’ Chamber (for my sample in Athens or Piraeus).12
In some instances, mostly when the workshops was part of an exist­
ing residential building, not all the legal stipulations for starting up 
were observed, even though the sums of money involved were quite small. 
It was quite usual that initial compliance with the absolutely indispen­
sable requirements was followed by systematic evasion of rules and 
regulations.
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What could not be dodged in the physical establishment of the 
workshop was the investment of a certain amount of money for paying the 
rent of the premises, (usually several months in advance), installing a 
telephone (a long-drawn out affair in Athens), arranging for the supply 
of cheap industrial electricity, and the purchase of at least a minimum 
of machinery and hand-tools, which with only two exceptions, all inter­
viewees said they had had in their possession when they were launching 
their new business. In this context it is noteworthy that, as roughly a 
third of the respondents in all categories pointed out, many of these 
pieces of mechanical equipment were second-hand (see Table 2>.6). An-
Table 8.6
Mechanised Tools Owned at Setting Up Independently, 
by Type of Proprietor 
[M=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=100]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LAR.EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Brand-new 16 9 25 1 3 4 7 7 17 19 36
Second-hand 10 12 22 5 5 10 3 2 5 18 19 37
Old and new 15 6 21 2 2 4 4 15 12 27
Total 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
other third said that theirs were brand new, and the rest possessed both 
new and second-hand utensils. Paying for raw material could be postponed 
until the first down-payments from customers had come in. While the 
necessary start-up capital was not very great, some cash had to be 
available at the outset. In addition, certain money reserves were needed 
to carry newly independent artisans through the first period when
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regular work was not yet assured. How these funds were procured repre­
sents the third key-factor in setting up on one’s own.
3 .1.c Financing the venture
A partial solution lay in the parallel activities of some artisans 
both before and after the foundation of the new business. A significant 
segment of artisan machinists (29.2%) and a smaller one in the garment 
trade (11%) acknowledged that while they were still wage-working they 
also did some work of their own. These side activities played a sig­
nificant role in acquiring both customers and a reputation, and later 
helped to make the new independent enterprise a success. In the early 
period after launching the new venture a number of artisan machinists 
(17%) still continued to work for wages, since their new business did 
not suffice for their sustenance. It was personal labour, therefore, 
that was the chief element for securing the necessary starting-up funds.
The interviewees were asked to name the means by which they 
secured the money to purchase their mechanical equipment, which was one 
of their main costs, of course. The reported sources of finance — in 
frequencies (more than one option selected) - appear in Table 8.7.
It is worth noting that a good part of the machine-tools purchased 
by the machinists while setting-up shop, especially brand-new ones, were 
cheap East European ones. The widely available Bulgarian or Romanian 
lathes of the 1960s, for instance, were clones of western products. The 
remaining purchases were usually second-hand and mostly general-purpose 
machine-tools, often German-made in the late thirties, forties or 
fifties. They were bought cheaply and on the instalment plan from a 
state agency (ODYSEE), which had acquired them as part of Germany’s war 
reparations. Equipment of this type was resold a number of times. Both 
the new and second-hand machine-tools were either automatic and semi­
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automatic; no instances were reported of purchases during the starting- 
up period of CNC (computer numerically controlled) machine-tools. The 
representatives of the companies concerned or those who resold the 
equipment accepted payment by bills of exchange. On the other hand, most
Table 8.7
Sources of Financing the Purchase of Mechanical Equipment.
by Type of Proprietor 
[M=Machinist, G=Garments]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LAR. EMPLOYER
M G M G
©/ o/ o/ ©/ o/
/ o  /o /o A i /o
Savings 50 53 50 38 26
Bills of exchange 36 34 41 31 11
Loan 7 6 12 20
Family contribution 4 5 9 19 13
Other 3 2 30
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Computations mine; last digits have been rounded off.
mechanical equipment for setting-up independently in garment production 
was purchased new or second-hand, and was of various European or 
Japanese makes. These too were not very advanced technologically, and 
did not incorporate electronics in their control mechanisms. For the 
most part they consisted of heavy-duty sewing machines, specialist 
sewing machines, and cutting equipment. Again, the sellers of brand new 
or used machine equipment accepted payment by bills of exchange.
Among artisans and small employers, savings were by far the most 
frequently mentioned source of paying for equipment purchases. This was 
followed by bills of exchange, a widely available credit facility. 
However, the pattern for artisans was unlike that of small employers in
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that the former did not report receiving any financial assistance from 
their families. The pattern of the larger employers is markedly dif­
ferent, since taking out bank loans and obtaining financing from ’other’ 
sources prevailed over forms of financing derived from ability to work 
manually.13 It may be concluded from the above that purchasing 
machinery, and by extension setting up an independent business, was ar­
duous for the artisans but not impossible. The availability of credit 
facilities did, of course, play a very important role. Particularly 
bills of exchange were indispensable for the establishment of new and 
independent workshops.
Another factor that kept the overall capital requirements for 
starting up relatively low was the existence in these two trades of a 
plethora of small and very small units. Being uniformly ill-equipped and 
with little constant capital, they effected a low level of entry costs 
that made starting-up for prospective independent artisans quite 
feasible.
The small starting-up sums are illustrated in the following two 
cases. Although as a rule interviewees showed a marked aversion to 
giving actual figures, two of them did mention the amounts with which 
they had launched their enterprises, and these were extremely modest. In 
the first case (machinist artisan No. 225), the interviewee set up with 
45,000 drachmas he had inherited from his father and with some bills of 
exchange. In the second case (machinist No. 235) the four partners who 
started on their own in 1969 each contributed 40,000 drachmas, and took 
out one million drachmas in bills of exchange to buy their mechanical 
equipment.14
Finally, the interviewees’ initial labour costs were also very 
limited since, as already noted, newly independent artisans relied 
heavily upon their own (and family) labour. In summary, therefore,
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financing the new venture was made possible by extra work, access to in­
formal credit (bills of exchange), and low start-up costs.
3.1.d The customers
Attracting customers is the fourth key element for setting up a 
workshop. As already mentioned, when my interviewees set up on their own 
the country was experiencing a period of economic expansion. But this in 
itself could not guarantee customers for the new business. Besides, at­
tracting customers was no easy matter for yesterday’s wage workers with 
almost non-existent linkages to the market. For most of them the major 
approach to customers, and often the only one, was through their former 
employers. These could help actively, either by placing orders with the 
new workshop or, when specialties did not overlap, by passing on cus­
tomers and linking up the new business with various subcontracting net­
works and the market at large.
Another way for the new independents to acquire a clientele of 
their own was to try to steal their ex-employers’ customers and/or 
pursue a similar specialisation, which of course meant competing with 
them. The new entrepreneurs* strong point was their lower price, which 
went hand in hand with faster work, and especially with longer hours. 
For their ex-employers and competitors, who invariably were artisans and 
small employers themselves, that represented a very serious challenge 
and - at least in some cases when a craftsman had set up a new concern 
or more rarely left a partnership to become independent — led to all-out 
war.
Whatever the circumstances, the departure of core workers to set 
up their own business entailed an element of threat for the old masters, 
and in some instances put an abrupt end to the personal relationship be­
tween artisan and master craftsman. The worker’s potential departure
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hangs over every small concern, of course, and from this it may be 
presumed that newly independent artisans exert constant competitive 
pressure on the established ones; the competition they themselves en­
counter when starting up comes mainly from their former masters. The am­
bivalence of the situation is well portrayed in the response of an ar­
tisan machinist when asked whether he ever referred any of his customers 
to newly independent ex-workers of his. ’Yes’, he replied, adding that 
this happened ’after we’ve come to a brotherly understanding’ (No. 224).
The interviews made it clear that in both trades help also came 
through the widespread networks of subcontracting, which link small 
producers among themselves as well as to larger producers — even though, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, my interviewees did not realise the 
extent of the subcontracting nexus. Subcontracting relations contain an 
element of patronage — they are not business exchanges simply on the 
basis of mutuality, but rather business exchanges on the basis of favour 
and obligation. For example, in return for help from his erstwhile 
employer, the newly independent artisan will undertake to do work for 
him, even for very low remuneration. Depending on circumstances, this 
unequal relationship may extend beyond well the initial period of start­
ing up the independent business. This can happen when the new business 
has not managed to attract sufficient customers of its own, and/or is 
actively prevented from doing so by the patron putter-out - 
(particularly so, as I found out, in the case of women homeworkers in 
garment-making).
3.2 Organisational patterns
The transition to independent proprietorship usually took place in 
one of two organisational contexts, which in many cases overlapped; that 
of the family, and that of partnerships. Because they involved a pooling
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of resources and skills, they facilitated setting up the new venture 
much more than if a prospective independent went about it all alone. 
These contexts also provided a more efficient matrix for eventually ex­
panding the firm, given that they allowed elementary divisions of labour 
among the partners and/or family members.
Out of the hundred respondents, 26 became proprietors by joining 
existing family firms. As Table 8.8 demonstrates, these were mostly con­
centrated among garment manufacturers.
Table 8.8
Organisational Context when Starting up. by Type of Proprietor 
lM=Machinist, G=Garments, T=Total; N=100]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LAR.EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Pre-existing 
family firms 7 8 15 2 2 2 7 9 9 17 26
Partnerships
(a)
involving relatives
26 2 
22 2
28
24
5 5 
3 3
10
6
2 9 
1 8
11
9
33 16 
26 13
49
39
Sole proprietors 
(b) 15 25 40 1 5 6 1 4 5 17 34 51
Total (a)+(b)
with previous part- 
ership experience
41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
17 11 28 3 6 9 1 7 8 21 24 45
Partnership is the dominant organisational form among machinists 
of all types - i.e. for 66% of them (63.5% of whom were artisans). It is 
also widespread among the small as well as larger employers in garment 
manufacture, but almost absent among that trade’s artisans. This may 
mean that whenever the requirements of starting-up capital are more sub­
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stantial, only partnerships are able to pull together the necessary 
resources. Of all my interviewee artisans wishing to be independent, 41% 
formed partnerships, of the small employers 62.5%, and of the larger 
employers 69%.
Most of the partnerships involved two or three persons (in 29 and 
14 cases for machining and garment respectively). Four partners were 
rare (5 cases in al 1), and there was only one instance of as many as 
five; no particular patterns were evident with respect to trade or type 
of proprietors. Mostly the partnerships consisted of relatives, or of a 
mixture of relatives and former fellow-workers or co-opted ex-employees. 
In 30 of the 39 cases concerned, the relatives were members of the same 
nuclear family.
With respect to the organisational ability of the sample it is 
worth noting that 45% of all interviewees (41% of the artisans, 56% of 
the small employers, and 50% of the larger employers) had previously 
participated in other enterprises, as a rule manufacturing the same or 
similar items. Regardless of the causes of the brake-up of the earlier 
partnership, this will have provided them with a certain practical ex­
perience in administration, with specific administrative traits in other 
words, and in this sense made them somewhat better equipped for their 
new venture.
Sole proprietors form just over half of the new independents con­
sidered here, but are concentrated mostly in garment manufacture 
(representing 93% of the artisans, 50% of the small employers, and30% of 
the larger employers). In machining, sole proprietorships were found in 
36.5% of the artisans, and in negligible percentages in the other types 
of proprietors. Again, it is probably the low start-up costs in garment 
production that makes single proprietorships more possible. Ibis is par­
ticularly the case of women artisans who often started up simply by
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taking in put-out work to earn a living; in such cases capital require­
ments are negligible. By contrast, the much higher capital needs of 
major concerns in garment production correlate with the predominance of 
partnerships.
4. Why Independence?
When considering the difficulties skilled craftsmen encounter in 
setting up and operating their workshops, it becomes understandable why 
they regard it as an achievement and personal triumph. This brings us to 
the reasons why artisans become artisans, and what alternatives were at 
their disposal at the time.
The available alternatives were both limited and not at all 
promising. The majority of the artisans, and half of the small 
employers, but very few of the larger employers, thought that they would 
have had to work for wages had they not become independent. The 
remainder did not know what else they could have done, and said that due 
to their lack of education they had had no viable alternative. A mere 
handful of the interviewees thought that they might have found some kind 
of commercial position. Evidently, none of these prospects were con­
sidered as acceptable alternatives at the time of changing from wage- 
labour to becoming independent.
The most pervasive reason why both artisans and small employers in 
machining opted for becoming independent was an extrinsic one: namely, 
to improve on their income (see Table 8.9). Also, it was important for 
them to know they were able to stand on their own feet. In addition, ar­
tisans were impelled towards independence because it would allow them to 
do creative and innovative work without constant supervision.
In garment-waking too, a better income was the major consideration 
why the interviewees had opted for independence. Women artisans also em­
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phasised the possibility that independence gave them to care for their 
dependents. The existence of the pertinent skills, and of a family 
tradition were also of some significance. To a limited extent small 
employers were motivated by the prospect of independence because it per­
mitted doing creative work.
Table 8.9
Motives for Becoming Independent, by Type of Proprietor (frequencies)
[M=Machinist, G^arments]
Motives
ARTISAN 
M G
SM. EMPLOYER LARG.EMPLOYER 
M G  M G
% % % % % %
Financial 41 46 45 50 20 20
Independence from boss 17 13 20 13
Wanting to do creative work 17 4 33 13 20
Had the ability 11 11 22 6
Family business 4 11 6 40 27
Political persecution 4 20
Care for dependents 18 6
Other 6 10 6 20
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Computations mine; last digits have been rounded off.
There is a difference in emphasis between the two trades, which 
centres on the attitude to the work as such. Machinist craftsmen gave 
greater importance to the work experience as such than did artisans/ 
small employers in garment production. No such considerations applied to 
the larger employers, whose motives were different altogether. They were 
mostly concerned with maintaining their social position by following the 
course ready laid out for them in the existing family-owned firm.
Overall, it was a variety of factors that made my interviewees 
reject other options in favour of setting up as independent artisans. 
The emergent pattern clearly shows that the most persuasive motive con­
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cerned the good economic prospects they hoped this would open up. While 
this was justified up to a point, the artisans* expectations were prob­
ably exaggerated, because they had already decided against skilled 
wage-labour as an alternative. The second motivation was the intrinsic 
satisfaction felt by employees at the prospect of being freed of the 
authority of the boss/foreman. Moreover, being one’s own master is per­
ceived in Greece as a positive social value, and at least ideologically 
facilitated attempts at becoming independent. To put their abilities and 
skills to work creatively and for their own benefit was found to be 
psychologically fulfilling and as fostering a sense of self-respect. 
This is also true of the overall improvement in social position that 
results from artisanal independence, evident in comments such as *1 be­
came the master of my household*. Increased self-respect and social re­
spectability were an intrinsic part of what the interviewees expected 
from setting up on their own as independents. For the rest, the com­
posite nature of their motives reflects the opportunities that were open 
to them.
Summary and Conclusion
As was to be expected, their different backgrounds and cir­
cumstances provided my interviewees with different opportunities. These 
variations expressed themselves in the skills acquired, the education 
given, and all of this then affected their subsequent job careers. When 
we consider the personal history and progress of the interviewees, four 
main patterns emerge that eventually led to the status of independent 
artisan.
The first, comprises persons with a background of rural or newly 
urban and marginally petits bourgeois families. Coming from a materially 
disadvantaged environment and not able to profit from the educational
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institutions that offered the premise of upward mobility, it was vir­
tually compulsory for most of the interviewees who later became artisans 
to enter an apprenticeship for some kind of manual work in their early 
teens. There they picked up a wide range of skills, which in many cases 
were complemented by courses in low-grade technical schools. At the end 
of their apprenticeships they continued to work for wages, and with ap­
proaching middle age they had to decide about their future. The choice 
lay between either remaining a skilled worker in a primary labour 
market, perhaps as a foreman or a core worker in a small enterprise, or 
setting up independently by using one’s technical skills (the chief 
available asset), and the openings for upward mobility provided by the 
structure of the economy and the period of economic expansion. Those who 
opted for independence were mostly the multi-skilled workers who had 
been employed in small firms and had observed their artisan bosses in 
action. It was they who were best equipped to perform such a role them­
selves.
Besides the necessary skill, setting up on their own required 
relevant information, adequate means of financing the new venture, and 
being able to attract customers. With respect to information about all 
aspects of how to become independent, this circulated within the trades, 
all the time. The relatively modest financial requirements were met by 
the craftsmen’s own savings and by bills of exchange; their families 
were too poor to give them monetary assistance. The custcaners, finally, 
were often passed on by the new independents’ former employers or 
’stolen* from them.
For this group of interviewees it can be said that by coming to 
occupy a position functionally equivalent to that of their origins, they 
effectively maintained their social position. In this way intergenera- 
tional continuity is upheld.
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The second group of artisans consists of the interviewees with a 
working-class background. In all other respects the observed pattern was 
identical to the one just described, but their trajectory meant upward 
intergenerational mobi1ity.
The third pattern is gender-specific and only affects women in 
garment manufacture. Whether by descent or marriage or both, these women 
were working class or marginally petits bourgeois. Usually they had some 
experience with skills related to garment-making. Faced with certain 
difficulties in their family life or other unsettling circumstances, 
they were obliged to work for wage but had nobody to look after their 
children while they were out of the house. They had to find flexible 
work, such as putting-out work, which occasionally meant that the ar­
tisan was a semi-proletarian. A variant of this pattern includes women 
without previous experience in garment-making. These had to pick up the 
skills from their friends and relatives, who often acted themselves as 
subcontractors. From a formal perspective, they too come under the 
description of independent artisans.
In the fourth pattern a quite comfortable petty-bourgeois family 
background was followed by a career in various middling jobs culminating 
in independent artisanship. Obviously this path is characterised by 
broad intergenerat ional continuity. There are two main sub-types, (i) 
conformist and (ii) more creatively enterprising.
Of these, (i) involved the inheritance of or a share in an ar­
tisanal family business. The young person concerned never needed to do 
wage-work, (but if it did happen it lasted for only a short time). Since 
an artisanal family firm exists and subsists mostly thanks to the 
owner’s own labour input and his mastery of the craft, artisans of this 
type in effect tend to adopt traditionalist attitudes; for example, they 
seem unwilling to organise sustained profit-maximising investments. In
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other words, the new artisans simply followed in the footprints of their 
predecessors.
Sub-type (ii) entails changing from the family’s background in 
trade and other petty-bourgeois enterprises to the status of independent 
creative craftsman. In the cases where the skills involved were rela­
tively easy to learn, the choice of the trade was affected by the 
economic conjuncture — as in the case of some small employers in garment 
manufacture. Here the petty-enterprise background may have influenced 
the choice of a course that to some extent was investment-oriented and 
profit-seeking, but rarely led to full capitalism. The transition 
usually stopped half-way, because petty-enterprising was tradition- 
oriented too. By contrast, those who became larger employers and more 
properly capitalist came from that class themselves, or from well-to-do 
merchant and other middle-class enterpreneurial backgrounds. Most of 
them have inherited their businesses. Others obtained a family-financed 
higher level of education, which taught them administrative and 
managerial skills useful in their future career.
The transition from employed to independent artisan was made by 
either single individuals or by several persons, usually close kin, 
forming partnerships. Both occurred with much the same frequency, but 
roughly half of the interviewees also had some earlier enterpreneurial 
experience, usually in the same line of business. The incidence of 
partnerships correlates with the level of starting-up costs and com­
plexity - the higher these are, the more often independent businesses 
involve partnerships. So for instance machinists, who have higher 
start-up costs than do garment-makers, show a much more marked tendency 
towards partnerships than the latter.
Why did the artisans of our sample decided to become independent? 
For one thing, for the most part the one main alternative open to them
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was to remain in wage-labour. Despite the risk involved, independence 
did appear to be the best option available and offered a way out from 
poverty and other unfavourable circumstances. Chief among the more posi­
tive motives was the hope of improving their financial position, but 
generally speaking none of these craftsmen set up his/her little busi­
ness in the hope of becoming rich, of ’making it big* (though no doubt 
some may have harboured such dreams). The financial improvement desired 
was to assure an honest and decent livelihood — where the moral overtone 
should not be ignored. Other motives besides the more narrowly 
materialistic ones included the wish to have liberty of action and full 
control over one’s own work. An assertion of personal agency to effect 
things was also important, no less so than the need to be respected, to 
be socially recognised as the provider of the family and its dependents.
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Notes to Chapter VIII
1. Using occupation as the key to an individual’s social position raises 
a number of questions. So for instance, is naming a single occupation an 
adequate portrayal of individuals who have two or more jobs? In what 
period in time in the parent’s life are we interested, and how do those 
circumstances compare with their offspring’s current position? More 
broadly, what is so special about occupation as such, and in what way is 
it a correct indicator of social class, and so on? On the other hand, 
occupation does give a rough idea of social position, and by extension, 
perhaps of class. After carefully weighing the pros and the cons, I 
decided that occupation was a variable worth looking into. (On the 
relationship between class and occupation see Scase 1992: 3-4, 23-26; 
also Watson 1997, Ch. 5).
2. The six occupations cited in Table 8.1 are constructed variables
formed by grouping the responses received on this issue. 3. The commer­
cial element in the background of those occupied in the garments trade 
clearly demonstrates continuity. Prior to the development of this sector 
in the 1970s, it was the tailors who routinely traded fabrics. To the 
extent that this activity predominated they were described as merchants. 
In any case, their Greek appellation was emborordftes - merchant - 
tailors.
4. According to G. Runciman (1990: 380-81), three different but func­
tionally equivalent criteria of economic power characterise all the dis­
parate middle-class strata: control, ownership, and marketability. In 
the present case, those with white-collar backgrounds drew their 
economic power from their control function and marketability, which are 
broadly comparable to the ownership and control to which artisans owe 
their economic power.
5. The fathers who were artisans, industrialists, merchants, and most of 
those included in the other category, were involved in some form of en­
terpreneurial activity involving ownership of property and/or the means 
of production.
6. For example, an artisan with peasant/sma 11-holding background, while 
having moved upward in status and probably improved his financial 
stakes, has not changed his class position since he has remained within 
the petty bourgeoisie. Such shifts within the middle class as a whole 
often involve conjunctural differences between stations that, however, 
’are not consistent differences in the economic power institutionally 
attaching to their roles as such’ (Runciman 1990: 385).
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7. Interviewees of artisan stock exemplify continuity. Twelve of them 
were born and raised in Athens, the remaining four came from other 
cities - an artisan background is usually an urban background too. These 
16 have either remained in the same social class as that of their 
fathers, or they moved upward to become larger employers.
8. On primary and secondary labour markets and industrial dualism see
Doeringer and Piore 1971; Piore 1975; Berger and Piore 1980.
9.
’... the concept of mobility chains represents an attempt to 
formalise the intuitive notion that socio-economic movement in 
our society is not random, but tends to occur in more or less 
regular channels. These channels are such that any given job 
will tend to draw labour for a limited and distinct number of 
particular points [stations]. As a result people hold jobs in 
some regular order or sequence. We shall term such a sequence 
a mobility chain’ (Piore 1975; 128).
10. According to the traditional but dominant perspective, girls and 
young women need not be well educated, since their main function is to 
get married, and for this an elementary education is sufficient. My 18 
women interviewees or two-thirds of the artisan contingent in the gar­
ments industry, accordingly attended school for fewer years than their
men counterparts (for only 6.6 years on average, against 8.1 for the 
men).
11. For an overall discussion of Greek education and a detailed account 
of technical education in Greece see the work of S. Pesmazoglou (1987), 
pp. 240-79 in particular.
12. Registration with an Artisans* Chamber may be postponed until a bank 
loan is needed, an export/import license, or bidding for a state tender, 
all of which require such membership.
13. A number of interviewees said they took out loans to establish their 
business: among the artisans 8 machinists and 7 in garment-making; among 
the small employers 4 in garments; among larger employers 1 machinist 
and 6 in garments. These are too few to attempt any generalisation, but 
two things stand out: (i) larger employers took out bank loans much more 
often than did the other categories; and (ii), the artisans took most of 
their loans from relatives or friends and less often from banks. This 
indicates the different opportunities open to the different types of 
proprietor.
14. From allusions and fleeting comments, and from the general picture 
of mechanised equipment in the workshops, I received the strong impres­
sion that starting-up costs in the garments industry were much lower 
than in machining.
306
CHAFTHR IX — ASPECTS OF BEING AN AkllSAN (Research Report 3)
Intrcxiuction
In this chapter the aim is to identify the more typical features 
and underlying patterns that characterise the state of being an artisan. 
For this purpose I have drawn on the material collected in the course of 
my field-work. The first section below scrutinises the circumstances and 
relationships inside the workshop. The link between the artisan and his 
workshop is examined by considering my interviewees’ closeness to their 
units as well as ties between the business and the family. Another facet 
of artisanship is the management of small businesses, which is inves­
tigated by looking at partnerships with respect to decision-making and 
the division of labour. The success or otherwise of the way they were 
managed is related to the incidence of loan-taking. In section 2 the 
focus is on production: what is being produced, and how production is 
organised. Section 3 discusses the issues of work and labour relations, 
in particular the artisans’ own labour-input, how the work is organised 
in the workshops, the situation of the various categories of workers 
there, the importance of skill, family and kinship, and the relations 
between the boss and his employees.
In section 4 the focus shifts to the nexus of relationships that 
link the artisans and their businesses to the outside world. This in­
volves an examination of the interviewees’ relations with agents exter­
nal to the workshop with whom they engage in economic exchanges — i.e. 
customers and competitors. Relations with the state bureaucracy, as well 
as with fellow artisans, are also discussed.
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1. Ins ide the workshop
1.1 Artisans* involvement
The first point to be made here is that artisans are absolute 
rulers in their workshops; they report only to themselves (and their 
partners, if any). Their work involvement in their enterprises can be 
assessed in terms of two quantitative indexes: the duration of the ar­
tisans’ own workday, and the closely related number of shifts they work 
there.
A11 my interviewees are busy in their workshops for a good part of 
their time either at the work-bench, or in outside activities.1 On 
average, the business proprietors sampled laboured over 11.3 hours per 
workday. A quarter of them spent another half to one hour at home on 
duties such as planning, telephone calls, or paper-work. This uniformly 
long workday should not, however, obscure the already mentioned sig­
nificant variation in the content of their work, with the outstanding 
element being the artisan’s personal involvement with the actual work.
The intrinsically different type of work performed by different 
types of proprietor underlies the number of shifts (one shift is approx. 
eight hours) during which workshops operate. What could be termed one- 
and-a-half shifts (roughly 12 hours) was reported by about half the ar­
tisans, against a quarter for the small and larger employers. When the 
reported number of shifts is translated into hours of work, however, the
resulting figures deviate considerably from that of the work hours per
day reported by the interviewees.
The explanation of this lies in the meaning given to the word
’shift’. The interviewees understood it to refer to the work performed
by the unit’s labour force as a whole. Artisans running a one-man busi­
ness did report the extra hours (the half shift) they themselves work as 
the only workforce. On the other hand, some artisans and the small
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employers who employ labour on a regular basis do not normally assign 
overtime work.2 If necessary they usually meet their extra labour needs 
by doing the work themselves,3 and mentioned only the one regular shift 
worked by the whole labour force. In other words, the number of shifts 
has been both over- and under-reported. By way of contrast, the larger 
employers, whose labour contribution differs from that of the artisans 
and small employers in that they do not work themselves manually, 
pointed out that during these extra half-shifts they employed some or 
all of their workers.
It is evident that the artisan’s relationship to his/her workshop 
is very close. The artisan-worker and the workshop are hard to differen­
tiate, as the confusion over the number of shifts and number of work- 
hours indicates. This continuous involvement and physical presence in 
the workshop is a constant element of artisanship. It defines it, and 
affects all the various facets of the activity of an artisanal business, 
whether inside or outside the workshop. It is no exaggeration to say 
that an artisanal enterprise carries the stamp of its master artisan,4 
and it may be said that being an artisan is a distinct way of life.
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the family constitutes 
the base from which individual members attempt to set up their small 
business and provides them with all the support it can muster. One form 
of such support is the frequent participation of kin as partners in ar­
tisanal businesses, as well as as workers. This is yet another tie unit­
ing the family and the business, so that, for certain purposes and 
depending on circumstances, a good number of artisanal units cannot be 
considered as separate from the families concerned. In matters cardinal 
for defining distinct entities, such as the existence of distinct 
economic functions embodied in separate budgets, the two cannot be dif­
ferentiated.
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Indeed, if we take a look at the budgets for the family and the 
enterprise it becomes apparent that for most of the artisans (53.6% of 
machinists, 81.5% of garment-makers, 64.7% on average) there is no dis­
tinction between them. This of course means that there is no distinct 
economic function either, and the family and business are so intermixed 
that they are virtually one and the same. It will be remembered that ar­
tisanal units in garment-making are mostly under single proprietors. 
Here we see that family and business are virtually indistinguishable 
when the business is owned by a single person or by partners who are 
junior members of the same family, and so have to comply with the wishes 
of the senior partner/patriarch. This suggests not only the allocation 
and distribution of funds being under a single command, but also that 
the revenues of each of the family members have been pooled.
By comparison small employers and larger employers by 2/3rds have 
distinct budgets, which indicates a more clear separation between family 
and firm, despite the close links which may otherwise exist between the 
two entities.
1.2 Managing the workshop
1.2.a Partnerships and decision-making
Partnerships are quite common in all the units sampled and serve 
several and varied purposes. They involve the pooling of the small 
amounts of capital that result from savings, as well as of skills and 
more broadly of labour power. Partners are usually kin (mostly close 
kin), with one of them teaching the craft to the other(s). Other 
partnerships were set up among work-mates pooling their resources, or 
through the co-option of craftsmen by their bosses. In no instance has a 
partnership originated from the merger of two or more distinct units, 
even though this could make good sense economically.
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A characteristic feature of partnerships is that in almost all 
cases the shares are distributed among the partners equally.s The 
origins of this equality - which both prevents strife within the nuclear 
family and facilitates reproduction in its own image - may lie in the 
rural inheritance norms that call for roughly equal shares for all close 
heirs (Daskalopoulou-Kapetanaki 1993: 294). This tradition will have 
been brought to the cities by the artisans’ families of orientation 
migrating from the countryside. In any case, equal shares accord better 
with the ethos of independence sought in artisanship. It is not possible 
here to more than mention this point, which requires and deserves fur­
ther research.
The fact that the partners’ shares in the business are largely 
equal bears the implication that all will require full participation in 
decision-making. It can also be responsible for consensus and unanimity 
in the reaching of decisions. Moreover, equal property rights have con­
tributed to artisans giving their businesses a legal form, which then 
increases the need for unanimous decisions if the company is to continue 
as such.
Table 9.1 lists the distribution of the legal forms of the com­
panies in my sample.
The legal forms of companies designated as E.E. and O.E. charac­
terise artisan and smal1-employer partnerships that empower each partner 
with equal rights and responsibilities. This means the business cannot 
but operate on the basis of unanimous decisions, or the company, whether 
E.E. or O.E., comes to an end.6 By contrast, E.P.E. and A.E. companies 
(corresponding to the western Ltd. and S.A.), which in the main concern 
larger-employer firms, allow the administration to proceed by majority 
decisions and provides for limited liability. The companies listed as 
personal are, of course, owned by a single artisan proprietor.
311
Table 9.1
Legal Form of Company at Interviewing, by Type of Proprietor 
(Key: M=Machinists, G=Garment-makers, T=Total, N=100)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER L. EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Legal Company 
Form
Personal 15 22 37 4 4 1 3 4 16 29 45
E. E.* 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 6
0. E.* 21 3 24 5 4 9 4 4 26 11 37
E. P. E. (Ltd) 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 5 6
A. E. (S. A.) 1 1 2 1 3 3 1 4
Undeclared** 2 2 2 2
Total 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
* For E.E. and O.E. companies see text below.
** It is illegal not to register a business at all.
The implications of the partners having an equal voice in the ad­
ministration and overall operation of an artisanal business are far- 
reaching and pervasive. This was reflected by the extreme cautiousness 
with which interviewees discussed the decision-making process and the 
handling of eventual disagreements. Partners are well aware - some from 
first-hand experience of a previous business failure - that an exacerba­
tion of differences may put a more or less severe strain on the partner­
ship; if this were to result in the dissolution of the business, it 
would seriously disrupt their means of making a living. In consequence, 
partnerships are, as a rule, conducted on a basis of cautious diplomacy.
The interviewees invariably pointed out that the way to reach una­
nimity is to talk things over with their partner(s) in a spirit of good 
will, in a co-operative and friendly way, building on their mutual 
trust, and never losing sight of their common aim of improving the posi­
tion of their business. Conversely, any unilateral move must be avoided
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if it might conceivably be interpreted by the partner(s) as threatening. 
Disputes being systematically avoided, many of the interviewees could 
describe the spirit prevailing between themselves and their partners as 
’harmonious*. They valued flexibility, a willingness to make concessions 
and compromises, a conciliatory attitude, and a readiness to explore new 
ways if their desirability could be argued convincingly.
Some of the respondents said that when they disagreed with their 
partners they would, if possible, defer a decision, leaving the issue to 
’mature’. While the threat of break-down of the enterprise is quite suf­
ficient motivation for a peaceful resolution of disputes, in a few cases 
seniority and/or paternal authority were also mentioned as affecting the 
handling of disagreements and decisions. Only two of the larger 
employers spoke of decisions being taken by a majority.
1.2.b Division of labour among partners 
What are the criteria for agreeing on a division of labour among 
partners? Those mentioned by the interviewees included seniority and 
gender, the pre-existing work-load and the time available for it, in­
clination and speciality, previous work experience or education/train­
ing. Whenever no particular arrangements for task allocation exist, the 
work exigencies by themselves oblige the partners to follow rudimentary 
divisions of labour.
As illustrated by Table 9.2, the sample’s larger employers allo­
cated tasks among the partners more frequently on the basis of merit 
than do artisans. This reflects the role that impersonal, achievement- 
oriented credentials play in determining division of labour in modern 
capitalist business organisations.
The diverse criteria of task allocation found among artisans do 
not, however, always facilitate the best profits. They frequently show
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Ci) the family hierarchy being transferred to the workshop, (ii) an ef­
fort to meet the partner’s inclinations and preferences (this came out 
very clearly in the course of the interviews), or (iii) certain people 
being given priority for non-economic reasons. Since this disregard for 
profit maximisation is in fact typical of the artisanate, we must try to 
find the reasons behind such apparently irrational choices.
Table 9.2
Criteria of Task Allocation Among Partners, by Type of Proprietors (N=49)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER L.EMPLOYER TOTAL
N % N % N % N %
Criterion
a. None (no task allocation
acknowledged among partners) 2 7.1 2 4
b. Seniority and gender 4 14.3 4 8.1
c. Work-load/time availability 3 10.7 3 6.1
d. Inclination 4 14.3 1 10 5 10.2
e. Specialisation in the field 12 42.8 7 70 9 81.8 28 57.1
f. Exigency of the work 2 7.1 2 20 4 8.1
g. No response 1 3.5 2 18.1 3 6.1
Total 28 100 10 100 11 100 49 100
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
It seems to me that although artisans do not actually object to 
higher profits, their doings are motivated more by other objectives. 
Priority is given to not rocking the partnership boat, since disruptive 
conflicts could mean the loss of the business and so of the means of ex­
istence.
Artisans who acknowledge the importance of past experience and 
special skills in sharing out work-tasks with their partners said that 
task allocations are never rigid. In fact, partners routinely rotate in
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their particular manual jobs. Usually it is a question of which of them 
is available at that moment to deal with any particular matter. As one 
respondent said of himself and his partner: ’we can do the same things, 
so work allocation between us largely depends on what we’ve got to do 
already’ (interview No. 203). This means that specialisation among 
partners is minimal.
If division of labour is one of the purposes of partnerships in 
artisanal enterprises, it must also be recognised that it is restricted 
by the limited extent of the business operations. This is especially 
evident in workshops not employing outside labour, in which objective 
limitation and the need to maintain the enterprise reinforce one 
another.
The impact of the size and its effect on the overall purpose of 
the enterprise is seen in the case of small employers. These, are more 
ready than artisans to adopt profit-maximisation criteria when consider­
ing divisions of labour with their partners. Today their continued 
operations and existence generally appears more secure than that of ar­
tisanal units or when compared with their own past (all of the small 
employers sampled in machining and most of those in garment manufacture 
started their entrepreneurial careers as artisans). It would appear, 
therefore, that there is a correlation between unit size and reasonably 
safe prospects, and this in turn determines an important aspect of the 
internal organisation of the unit, namely how the partners divide the 
work among themselves.
In two-partner concerns, in which both partners-proprietors are 
active in the workshop, it is the norm for one partner to be responsible 
for the more commercial side of the business and for handling relations 
with the external world; the other then concentrates more on actual 
production and the day-to-day operation of the workshop. Where there are
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more than two partners (in 25 cases, or 50% of all partnerships), the 
division of labour between them tends to be more detailed, particularly 
with respect to the administrative and commercial aspects.
1.2.c Managerial competence and financing
None of the artisans in either trade who are responsible for 
managing their small businesses have had any relevant specific training. 
Such aptitude as they have developed for it was acquired empirically, 
on-the-job, and a question of trial and error. On the other hand 19% and 
44% respectively of the small and larger employers were given some 
training pertinent to management. As noted earlier, it was particularly 
in garment-manufacturing that quite a number of small as well as larger 
employers have a commercial/entrepreneurial background, and can there­
fore meet the task of business management more effectively.
Although the artisans are noticeably lacking in managerial skills, 
a sizeable number of them (39% of machinists, 48.1% of garment-makers - 
an average of 42.6%) summarily dismissed the suggestion that they might 
need to pick up such skills. Among the small and larger employers, 37.5% 
refused to acknowledge any such necessity. The reasons given in the two 
cases differ considerably. The artisans’ denial has to do with their 
lack of dexterity in matters of entrepreneurial flair and skills, which 
lack they acknowledge only indirectly. In any case, they are clearly 
daunted by the idea of learning such skills and want to have nothing to 
do with them. The employer groups, on the other hand, appeared quite 
content with the managerial skills already at their command, and believe 
them sufficient to confront whatever issues may arise.
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Those who did acknowledge their need for better managerial skills 
expressed very different attitudes, in accordance with their status as 
larger employer, artisan, or in-between. Small employers with a 
managerial function, as well as larger ones suggested positive measures 
such as self-education, attending relevant seminars, hiring a 
specialist, or passing the matter on to their children who are expected 
to pursue the appropriate studies. Artisans, on the contrary, when asked 
how they intend to acquire these skills, replied by saying ’I don’t 
know’ - appearing to be quite satisfied with or at least resigned to 
their situation remaining as it is. From this I infer that although ar­
tisans often say that they look forward to their business expanding, 
they lack the ability for the required step-by-step planning. It looks 
as if by growth they simply mean more of the same, which would explain 
their apparent disregard for the development of the commercial side of 
their enterprises. Their limited managerial competence is certainly 
reflected in the way they deal with the financing of their concerns.
New businesses which survived the highly unstable starting-up 
period, still had and have to confront the issue of financing their on­
going operations. Vith the exception of a few of the larger-employer 
firms that have access to banks, the great majority of the enterprises 
sampled continue to rely on self-financing from the routine returns of 
the business. However, some of the interviewees did report taking out 
loans. The main source mentioned for such loans were the banks that ad­
vance low-interest ’artisans’ loans’; there was rarely any mention of 
the specialist state organisation for small businesses (EOMMEX) that is 
empowered to advance guaranteed loans to artisans. Only five cases gave 
other sources of loans, for four of them it was kin, and for the fifth a 
money-lender.
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The pattern that has emerged is, firstly, that larger employers 
are taking out loans regularly, small employers and artisans, in that 
order, do so less often. Artisans usually reported only one loan per 
workshop business,7 while larger employers have so far taken out three 
or more loans each during the existence of their enterprises; the small 
employers fall in-between.
Secondly, fewer garment-producers take out loans than machinists.
Thirdly, the purposes the loans were applied for were given as 
follows: to acquire the workshop building, buy raw materials, purchase 
machinery, and to obtain liquid capital. The first two were only rarely 
mentioned; it was the other two, acquiring machinery or working capital, 
that were the usual reasons cited for getting a loan. Most of the ar­
tisans used their loans to buy mechanised equipment. This accent on sup­
plementing the productive capacity of their workshops is perfectly con­
sonant with the artisans’ overall situation and work orientation. The 
larger employers took out their numerous loans mostly as working capi­
tal, which accords well with their more entrepreneurial orientation.
This leaves the amounts of the loans to be discussed. This is not 
known in all cases, because not all interviewees were willing to give 
actual figures. It may be inferred from the various comments they made, 
however, that the loans were considerably smaller for artisan 
proprietors than for small employers; those for the larger employers 
(who are in fact capitalists) being the highest. This also indicates 
that artisans managing their own businesses have not been very success­
ful in obtaining (the more extensive) bank financing. On the other hand, 
given the artisans’ background, it may be that for them the small number 
of loans taken out already represent an achievement.
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2. Features of Production: Type and organisation of output
Machining and garment-making are very broad designations which 
give only a rough idea about the activities involved. Let us therefore 
take a closer look at what is actually being manufactured.
The machinists make a variety of goods and perform a range of 
processing jobs. In terms of the type of their product, the machining 
units sampled, may be grouped into four categories:
(a) design and manufacture of dies and moulds (10 units),
(b) construction of specific machine-tools (22 units),
(c) general manufacture of machinery and fittings (8 units),
(d) miscellaneous other constructions, plus accessories, parts, 
small tools (10 units).
The garment-makers’ businesses often produce complete articles, 
but some specialise in processing particular parts of garments. For in­
stance, sewing-only put-out work dominates 14 units, all of them ar­
tisanal except for one small employer. Garment-making can be classified 
in five categories, namely:
(a) men’s clothing (13 units),
(b) women’s clothing (21 units),
(c) children’s clothing (3 units),
(d) mixed types of clothing (9 units),
(e) other miscellaneous clothing (13 units).
The type of product made largely determines how it is produced. 
Garments are usually made in small batches, but in machining there is 
greater versatility. There, the products of categories (a), (b), and (c) 
are what the tradespeople call ’constructions’: they are made a bit at a 
time and then assembled, and the manufacturing processing involves con­
siderable manual skills.® Items such as a die, a piece of quarry
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machinery, or an accessory part, are manufactured in accordance with the 
customer’s needs, and this implies continual change in terms of design 
and specifications from one order to the next. When an order is placed 
for a small number of identical items of machinery the machinists again 
make them on a one-of-a kind basis, by building up each piece from its 
components. However, because of their (often outdated) tools and 
machinery, they are not able to meet exact specifications. Mass- 
production methods would, of course, solve this problem, but necessitate 
very major investments as well as large orders, neither of which is 
available at the level of the individual workshop. Besides, it is almost 
certain that from a technical and organisational perspective artisanal 
units could not cope with the organisation of mass production.
Some of the items of the machinists’ (d) category can, however, be 
mass produced - for instance nuts and bolts, gears, various metal acces­
sories, and so on. These products are considered relatively easy to make 
since they require materials (tin, low-quality steel, aluminium alloys) 
whose processing by well-established and available technologies is not 
complex. In fact, the specifications for such products were either set 
by the original (foreign) producers, so that machinists only have to 
copy them, or furnished by the customers. This meant that machinists are 
not required to design them themselves, nor to develop a market for such 
items. Products of this type usually under-cut imports of similar goods, 
and only occasionally leave some room for exports too. Since, therefore, 
the market is available and large enough, and the required technology 
for standardisation/mass production is not difficult to achieve, the 
necessary funds have been raised to finance such projects.
Having said this, it should be added that while machinists 
(particularly artisans) primarily make their products on a one-of-a-kind 
basis (70%), and secondarily in smal1-batches (22%), garment-makers
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manufacture theirs in smal1-batches (80%). As might be expected, small 
and larger employers operate small and somewhat larger production runs.
With respect to the organisation of production, only a few of the 
larger-employer businesses use mass-production techniques. In these in­
stances a few highly skilled core workers are employed as well as the 
services of in-house or contracted professionals and a large number of 
less skilled workers. It is more usual for most small and larger 
employers, and of some artisan garment-makers too, to produce in stages. 
This means that up to a certain stage of completion the workers co­
operate in processing goods by applying certain divisions of labour 
among themselves, and are then re-deployed for the next stage, and so 
on. Broadly speaking, the less skilled workers are directed by craftsmen 
acting as foremen, and/or by the proprietors themselves; expert profes­
sionals are brought in only rarely.
Ihe mass of the machinist artisans, however, who construct their 
machinery and dies one at a time or in small batches organise production 
according to each particular item, with the master artisans themselves 
performing the most complex work. In each case the other workers assist 
them with less skilled but often more taxing work. If other skilled 
craftsmen are hired, these duplicate the role of the master artisan, and 
they too are at the centre of the manufacturing process. Single master 
artisans without any employees of course undertake the completion of an 
order all by themselves.
The sources of product designs and specifications are pointers to 
how the work is organised. On the one hand, about half of the artisan 
machinist identified themselves as such sources, which suggests con­
tinuous transactions from perception and execution, from start to 
finish. Artisans in both the industries examined here put a premium on 
customers providing them with designs that become the basis of a large
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part of their output; the specifications they workfare those generally 
used in each trade. On the other hand, the larger business units have 
acknowledged the impact of the market and of established practice in 
product manufacture, and have become more involved with standardised 
items and come nearer to mass-production.
3. Work and Labour Relations
In this section additional material is presented on the work done 
by the interviewees themselves and by members of their families, as well 
as concerning the issue of skill. Non-family workers are also discussed, 
as are labour relations in the workshops.
3.1 The artisans* own labour input
At the time of the interviews, the artisans were spending most of
their working time in doing manual work. Those in machining said that on
average they spent about 65% of their working time in production 
(including supervisory work), and the remainder in administration and 
management. The garment-makers work in production for about 73% of their 
working hours, the other 27% is spent in administration/management. The 
reason given for the high number of workshop hours was the need to earn 
ones living and to be thrifty.
With one exception, small employers in both machining and 
garment-making respectively reported spending roughly 58% and 61% of 
their time in production, and the remainder in administration/manage- 
ment. Asked why they joined in the production work, half of them said it 
is to save paying employee wages, and the other half that they need to 
supervise the wage-workers.
The artisans’ actual work - regardless of the size of estab­
lishment — shows a high degree of skill and competence. As discussed in
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the previous chapter, it was precisely because they commanded a wide 
range of skills that they succeeded in becoming independent: their com­
mand of the technical prerequisites of production in their particular 
trade allowed them to use their personal skill and work-input to produce 
new articles or effect repairs.
Artisans working alone necessarily performed both the important 
and the trivial tasks of production. On the other hand, whenever a small 
business employs kin or other wage workers, it is the master artisan’s 
prerogative to draw up and work to his/her own designs. It is s/he who 
undertakes the technically more complex and demanding work, leaving more 
ordinary processing to the other workers. This superiority expresses it­
self also with respect to items of newly acquired machinery, especially 
if they incorporate advanced technologies: they are always operated ex­
clusively by the artisan themselves.
The practice also acts as something of a closure mechanism, of 
course. By restricting the know-how of complex new skills the artisan- 
craftsmen perpetuate the respect for their high standing that the 
workers traditionally accord them (and that helps them build up their 
authority). In parallel, their managerial activities are often presented 
as of vital importance, and their own knowledge of them as indispensable 
for the running of the firm. This inflated image of the managerial func­
tion, together with their superior status as craftsmen has, both in 
their own eyes and in those under their authority, allowed their role as 
the dominant authority of the business to become ideologically convinc­
ing and acceptable (see Antony 1977), and so has legitimised their posi­
tion in the workshop.
Among the larger employers, half of those in garment-making acknow­
ledge being occupied with production for about 20% of their time. Even 
so, only a fraction of this time is spent performing the highly skilled
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(manual) work of pattern designing, laying out, and cutting the fabrics 
into variously-sized pieces (which paid workers sew together into 
diverse garments). Most of this 20% of the time is in fact occupied with 
supervision of the workers. The remaining four-fifth of their working 
day is allocated to administrative/ managerial work - which is also the 
task that keeps the other half of the larger employers in garment-making 
busy full-time.
3.2. Workshop employees
3.2.a General
At the time of the interviews, among artisans, 10 of the 
businesses in machining and 2 in garment-making did not employ 
wage-workers,9 but most respondents said they employed one or more 
workers. In 92% of the cases the wage-workers were taken on for an in­
definite period once they had passed a short trial period, but each of 
the three categories of interviewee had their own approach to hiring 
workers and their own set of criteria.
For the artisans, hiring a worker is more than choosing a pair of 
capable hands. Of major importance are also personal knowledge and 
evaluation of the potential worker's character, his skills or attitudes, 
and the relationship with him/her. This kind of assessment is based 
either on recommendations from the applicant’s workmates, relatives, 
friends, etc. , or on prior knowledge: a personal relationship was 
reported in 50.6% of all cases. Impersonal means of recruitment such as 
newspaper advertising (utilised mostly for labour-intensive garment 
manufacturers seeking unskilled or semi-skilled workers), or the offi­
cial Manpower Employment Organisation (OAED), are the least popular 
among the artisans for recruiting personnel. They were reported by only 
21.6%, (the other approx. 28% did not hire workers at all). The larger
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employers, on the other hand, rely heavily on impersonal means of 
recruitment (60%), and much less on their colleagues* suggestions 
(23.3%) or other methods (16.7%). The small employers occupy an inter­
mediate position: particularistic (personal) ways were reported by 
44.4%, impersonal ways by 40.7%, other means by 14.8%.
Wage employees work a regular 40-hour week, and in a large number 
of units (44%) they also do overtime - quite regularly in 13% of the 
firms, and infrequently in 31%). In the smaller businesses and in 
garment-making, overtime is more irregular and less frequent than in the 
larger units and in machining. Among the larger-employer firms the in­
cidence of overtime ranges from 77% in garment-making to 100% in machin­
ing, while the respective percentages for the categories of artisans and 
small employers, are 66.7% and 40% in garments, and 39% and 26% in 
machine production. This size-linked pattern arose from the fact that in 
the smaller units, with their limited work-loads and labour require­
ments, the artisans’ own plus any available family labour can, if neces­
sary, be utilise for long hours and at a low cost (as shown later on). 
This is sufficient to meet the labour-input requirements of artisanal 
units and reduce the need to employ hired hands part-time or full-time. 
In the larger establishments the greater scale of operations requires 
more than the working proprietor’s own and his family’s labour, and wage 
workers must be hired on a regular basis.
The situation with respect to paying the hired workers is as 
follows.10 As a rule, all the interviewees respondents pay their workers 
once a week (amounts calculated on a hourly basis). This applies to 90% 
of artisans in machining, and 93% in garment manufacture, with the 
respective figures for small employers being 95% and 75.3%, and for 
larger employers 21.1% and 75.3%. The remainder of the employees receive 
a monthly salary, and a sprinkling of individuals are paid a commission.
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The fact that salaries are paid in only the larger-employer firms re­
lated, of course, to the (legal and practical) needs of larger companies 
for a number of administrative staff and clerks, all of whom tradition­
ally receive salaries. However, some of the production workers in these 
larger establishments also receive a salary. This unusual procedure is 
part of a policy aimed at improving labour relations by extending to 
selected skilled manual workers the monthly salary that signifies more 
secure employment and enhanced status (indicating that the worker is 
’respectable’).
In the context of the sample’s artisanal workshop, paid labour is 
classified in terms of either the level of skill or kinship.
3.2.b Skill
For the purposes of this research I initially developed a six-fold 
scheme distinguishing between craftspeople, the skilled, the semi­
skilled, the unskilled, apprentices, and a sixth category of ’others’ 
that included scientific and clerical personnel. Subsequently, however, 
the first two were collapsed to form the composite category of the 
skilled, and the next two the unskilled. This became necessary not only 
in the interests of conciseness, but also because my artisan and small- 
employer groups always spoke in terms of the time-hallowed tripartite 
division of apprentice, worker, master/artisan.11 These are the 
categories that in the end were adopted in this work.
Before presenting the material on workers’ skill, I should also 
note that the artisans sampled tend to employ a single term for a 
plurality of major worker categories. So they do not differentiate be­
tween unskilled and semi-skilled, but describe both indiscriminately as 
unskilled. Similarly the skilled and the craftsmen are both routinely 
described as craftsmen or masters, the terms being interchangeable in
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everyday speech. Now obviously the collapsing of distinctions among 
workers of varying levels of skill is not due to the absence of separate 
and specific words, because these do exist and are widely known. Neither 
is it a matter of courtesy or flattery, though sometimes this may play a 
part. It is rather that collapsing the distinctions has to do with the 
organisation of work in the two trades, with the artisans’ attitudes to 
their wage-workers’ skill level, with power games between the wage­
workers and the artisans, and with the social conventions vis-A-vis 
skilled work.12
From the repl ies obtained in the interviews two sets of pattern 
emerge for the employed workers’ tasks and skill level, which shed some 
light on the work organisation in such small enterprises. As shown in 
Table 9.3, in the machining trade the artisanal workshops engage a much 
higher proportion of skilled workers than do the larger businesses — 70% 
and 48% - and also take in most of the apprentices. The small employers’ 
workforce was that 37.5% unskilled (and partially skilled). The larger 
employers also have a contingent of scientific and clerical workers (37% 
of their workforce), the other two categories hardly at all. These data 
agree with the kind of goods being made in machining shops. Multi­
skilled workers/craftsmen are needed more often in the small shops that 
concentrate on one-of-a kind or smal 1-batches products and on repairs, 
that are engaged, in other words, with continually changing specifica­
tions and designs. At the same time, these are the best places for 
workers to develop a large range of skills. The larger units, which 
produce in bigger batches and have a higher standard of quality and 
precision requirements, need to have scientific personnel as well as 
some clerical staff (due to their size). I should mention that in these 
larger firms the production workers are for the most part semi-skilled 
but (as I found out) out of courtesy referred to as skilled. In contrast
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- for reasons given above - the largely semi-skilled workers in small 
employer enterprises are considered as unskilled by their master- 
artisans who directly involved themselves in ’constructions* as well as 
’production’, and who possess a craft perspective and an experienced 
opinion about the performance of workers.
Table 9.3
Employees Classified on the Basis of Skill, by Type of Proprietor 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers, T=Total)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Skill level
(a) N 67 22 89 34 23 57 34 124 158 135 169 304
% 69.8 36.0 56.7 47.2 30.3 38.5 48.6 52.5 51.6 56.7 45.3 49.7
(b) N 11 34 45 27 45 72 8 89 97 46 168 214
% 11.4 55.7 28.7 37.5 59.2 48.6 11.4 37.7 31.7 19.3 45.0 35.0
(c) N 18 3 21 8 8 2 2 28 3 31
% 18.7 4.9 13.4 11.1 5.4 2.8 0.6 11.8 0.8 5.1
(d) N 2 2 3 8 11 26 23 49 29 33 62
% 3.3 1.3 4.1 10.5 7.4 37.1 9.7 16.0 12.1 8.8 10.1
T N 96 61 157 72 76 148 70 236 306 238 373 611
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
(a) Skilled workers, (b) unskilled, (c) apprentices, (d) other (clerical and 
scientific personnel)
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
In garment-making, the predominant employment pattern is that a 
smaller percentage of skilled and a larger percentage of unskilled 
workers are hired in the artisanal and small-employer units than is the 
case for machining; in the larger-employer units the pattern is
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reversed. Also, the two larger types of business hire clerical person­
nel, and some larger employers firms employ design specialists.
Garment-making still is a labour-intensive operation and for the 
most part the work consists of following the instructions given. Apart 
from some expertise in sewing, most workers need not know much else, and 
this accounts for the high percentage of unskilled or partially skilled 
employees in this trade. In the smaller units the proprietors themselves 
often design some of the garments they manufacture and also do the more 
important work, such as cutting the fabrics, there is no need for the 
workers to be versatile and/or skilled. On the other hand, in these 
larger units the special role that in the small ones is reserved for the 
artisans is taken over by hired skilled personnel (which accounts for 
their larger number).
Respondents in both industries reported a major shortage of 
skilled labour. This was especially acute in the artisanal estab­
lishments (over 72%), but roughly half of the remaining interviewees 
also mentioned it. In machining this shortage is general; in garment- 
making it has more to do with the low wages offered in artisanal 
businesses and was seasonal. A number of proprietors (about 30% of 
machinists and 20% of garment-makers) said they take on apprentices as a 
way of countering this shortage and to safeguard a steady supply of 
workers. However, this does not solve the shortage; as shown in Table
9.3 the number of apprentices is very small.
3.2. c Kinship
Wage-workers may also be classified in terms of kinship ties with 
their employers. They are either ordinary workers hired from outside, 
more (three out of four) or less close family relatives, or fictitious 
kin (godfather, best man — both known as ’coumbari’, godson, etc.).
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Fictitious kin are not numerous, but their presence in a workshop 
is often of critical importance because they are usually competent core 
workers, multi-skilled and frequently craftsmen. They can be depended on 
to peform a variety of skilled jobs, and do not need direction or super­
vision in the performance of their work. They frequently enjoy a sub­
stantial measure of work autonomy and discretion, and can fully replace 
the master-artisan if necessary. Their presence in the workshop in fact 
means doubling the ski 1 led-labour capacity.13 However, just like the 
other wage-workers they were subject to orders given by the master- 
artisans; they were not involved in ’co-exploitation* (Hill 1986:17-18).
Ordinary kin workers are entirely dedicated to the artisan. Their 
mutual trust has positive consequences for the work input and labour 
costs of the enterprise. About 66% of the kin-workers are reportedly 
being paid ordinary wages, just like the other workers, but approx. 24% 
receive only a small allowance, while the remaining 10% may draw money 
from the business up to a certain limit. Meanwhile the duration of the 
kin-workers* day is not limited to the roughly 7.5 hours of the ordinary 
wage-workers. Instead it was reported to be 8.8 hours in machining, and 
9 hours in garment making (fluctuating from max. 9.7 hours in artisanal 
units to min. 7.9 hours in smal 1 -employer businesses). A standard week 
means 44 hours for kin-workers in machining, and 45 hours in garment- 
making; for ordinary workers it is only 38.5 hours. In other words, 
family members work 5.5 hours or 17%, and 6.5 hours or 17.3%, in machine 
and garment production respectively, longer than ordinary workers, and 
on average are paid less.
An additional advantage of having kin-workers in an enterprise is 
that they can help control the ordinary workers.14 Together with the 
working proprietors (whether artisan or small employer), the kin-workers 
form an alliance that give precedence to the enterprise over their per­
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sonal desiderata of work and remuneration, precisely because they per­
ceive their individual interests as being identical with those of the 
business and in part compensated by non-material rewards. Since the mem­
bers of this alliance, which I shall call the ’artisans’ block’, work 
next to ordinary wage-employees, they assume an active role in monitor­
ing and controlling them.
The deployment of kin as workers is extensive. The distribution of 
real and fictitious kin was as follows:
In machining, kin are found especially in smal 1-employer and 
secondly in artisanal businesses. In the more labour-intensive garment- 
making they work mostly with the small artisans and less so in the other 
two types of business. The hiring of kin and the extent of the practice 
appears to be at odds with the interviewees* answer to the question of 
whether they preferred hiring relatives to other workers; 78% of them 
had said No. This apparent contradiction was resolved when the respon­
dents explained that by ’relatives’ they had understood kin other than 
members of their immediate household; close family are considered as in­
herently entitled to be part of the business.15 This is another indica­
tion of the identity between family and small business, which neverthe­
less has different implications for the business part of the equation 
depending on the type of enterprise.
As might be expected, the percentage of kin workers is greater in 
smaller units (see Table 9.4).16 Their importance becomes self-evident 
when considering that the artisans’ block numerically exceeds the ordi­
nary workers, and makes it feasible to operate the business economically
Machining Garment-mak i ng
artisanal units with kin 
smal1-employer units with kin 
larger-employer units with kin
48.7%
83.3%
0.0%
77.8%
60.0%
53.8%
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Table 9.4
Breakdown of the Workforce by Kinship, and Labourer — to - Unit 
Ratio, in Units with Kin-Workers. by Type of Proprietor
Breakdown of the Workforce
Total Work­
work­ Plain Kin in Fictiti­ Working All wage Artisans force
force workers units ous kin proprie­ workers block in
in in units with in units tors in in units units
all with kin with units with with
units kin kin with kin kin kin
M N 171/41 43/16 18/14 9/9 35/20 70/20 62/20 105/20
* 4.2 2.7 1.3 1.0 1.7 3.5 3.1 5.2
AA
G N 90/27 24/12 35/21 — 23/21 59/21 58/21 82/21
* 3.3 2.0 1.7 1.1 2.8 2.8 3.9
M N 88/6 41/5 15/5 3/2 12/5 59/5 30/5 71/5
* 14.7 8.2 3.0 1.5 2.4 11.8 7.6 14.2
c r c
G N 94/10 36/6 7/5 2/2 8/6 45/6 17/6 53/6
* 9.4 6.0 1.4 1.0 1.3 7.5 2.8 8.8
M N 77/3
♦ 25.7 - — — - — — -
LE ------ ------- ------- --------
G N 258/13 106/7 16/6 2/1 11/7 124/7 29/7 135/7
* 19.8 15.1 2.7 2.0 1.6 17.7 4.1 19.3
M N 336/50 84/21 33/19 12/11 47/25 129/25 92/25 176/25
*
T
6.7 4.0 1.7 1.1 1.9 5.2 3.7 7.0
1
G N 442/50 166/25 58/32 4/3 42/34 228/34 104/34 270/24
* 8.8 6.7 1.8 1.3 1.2 6.7 3.0 11.2
NOTE: The line indicated by an asterisk (*) presents the labourer to unit 
ratio for each cell.
Figures rounded to the last digit; computations mine.
(Key: A=Artisan, G=Garment-makers, LE=Larger employer, M=Machinist, N=Number 
of responses by number of units, SE=Small employer, T=Total)
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and cope with competition. It may also explain, at least in part, the 
resilience of small businesses to economic crises. Kin-workers clearly 
form one of the major assets of an artisanal, or smal 1-employer en­
terprise. They are mobilised and deployed at will, work hard for long 
hours, and cost far less than hired workers. Without them a good number 
of artisans would have gone under. In times of hardship, they redouble 
their work load and effort, still producing more at significantly lesser 
cost than do ordinary wage-workers. In this way they offset at least 
some of the advantages of their larger-employer competitors, who have to 
meet the costs of overtime or new investments. Another important aspect 
of kin-workers is that even if though their level of technical dexterity 
might be lower than of ordinary workers, their moral incentives is such 
that it prompts them to unstinted hard labour to keep an ailing business 
going. It is also frequently thanks to them that artisans can expand to 
become small employers.
This situation certainly shows that the close connection between 
the household and business in SCP is not limited to family support at 
the time an artisan sets up independently, or to a logistical and/or no­
tional identity between the two. It continues with the vital role played 
by family labour in the survival from the ’simple reproduction 
squeeze*,17 and the furtherance of SCP. It would also seem to involve 
what S. Cook has called ’endofamilial accumulation’ (1976, 1981, 1984a, 
1984b), i.e. the process of conversion of unpaid family labour into 
capital which up to a point helps small businesses to survive and even 
expand (see below, this chapter).18
3.3 Labour control and labour relations
The high ratio of members of the artisans’ block to ordinary 
wage-workers given in Table 9.^ implies that the latter are under an
Hi
enhanced form of ’simple* control, i.e. the direct personal power and 
authority of the employer over the employees (Edwards 1979: 25). The 
similar numerical strength of the two sides allows the artisan-block 
members engaged in production to work side by side with ordinary 
workers. Whether or not they act as taskmasters (which would depend on 
their own level of skill), the arrangement certainly lets them keep a 
watchful eye on ordinary workers. The mere presence at the next work­
bench of kin-workers who identify with the proprietors rather than the 
ordinary employees will have its effect. It will also disrupt any at­
tempt by workers to assert their interests collectively, and render any 
expression of their dissatisfaction and dissent practically impossible. 
The ’direct, arbitrary and personal’ {ibid.: 34-36) features of this 
enhanced simple control can be reduced whenever the artisan or another 
skilled kin-worker (real or fictitious) is the taskmaster, because in 
such cases it is the implicit criteria of workmanship and craft that are 
observed and regulate the tempo of the work. Otherwise there will be 
little restraint of arbitrariness. In addition, an element of ’technical 
control’ inherent in the use of machines also plays a part to regulate 
working.
In the larger employer firms, which have a higher ratio of ordi­
nary wage-workers to members of the proprietors’ families, there is less 
personal supervision of the workers. Besides, the artisan-specific ra­
tionale for a close control of workers - to prevent any attempt by a 
skilled worker contemplating to become independent from luring away 
clients and/or to steal ’trade secrets’ — makes little sense in the 
larger enterprise. The larger firms are using more technical and 
bureaucratic types of control today, but the increasing reliance on 
foremen and technical devices notwithstanding, most of the larger 
employers sampled still personally exercise a measure of simple control
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over their workers and continue their paternalistic approach towards 
them.
3.3.a Allocating work
In the artisanal enterprises units, workers are assigned their 
tasks on the basis of their speciality and/or the existing workload, 
which determine the order in which the jobs are done, as well as on the 
basis of worker availability. It should be kept in mind that wage­
workers in artisanal units are often multi-skilled, which explains the 
rather ad hoc work-al location in obedience only to the imperatives of 
market demand. With job allocation always premised on the worker being 
able to perform the job, whatever that might be, the process is less er­
ratic than it would appear. The larger employers allocate work-tasks on 
the basis of a worker’s (single)-skil1 speciality, and/or according to a 
daily/weekly work plan; they also rely on the judgement of foremen. The 
small employers* criteria are similar to those of artisans.
Having said that, I want to add that virtually all the small 
producers sampled, but especially the artisans, show functional 
flexibility in their enterprises. This is to say that the tendency for 
artisanal units to employ multi-skilled workers means that these can be 
put to a variety of jobs, with the deployment of multi-task workers 
helping to compress costs. All of the small producers have achieved a 
numerical flexibility, employing only the exact number of workers re­
quired at any time - the ’accordion’ principle. Well before these terms 
were coined or became fashionable in the post-Fordist discourse (Piore 
and Sabel 1984, Brown 1992: 224-27) the corresponding practices
(flexibility and those related to family labour) contributed to the 
artisan’s adaptability and survival. An adverse aspect of this situation
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is that, with the erosion of guild-type paternalism, small units employ­
ing non-unionised wage-labourers, can easily become sweatshops.
3.3.b Mediation, problems, social dealings
Three additional aspects of labour relations in small businesses 
are discussed in this section. The first is whether the sampled 
employers intervene in disputes among their employees, the second inves­
tigates the type of problems that tend to arise between them and the 
employees, the third looks at non-work relations between the two parties 
by examining three variables: whether employers meet socially with their 
employees, whether they lunch with them (commensal ism), and whether they 
allow them the use of the workshop machinery for their own purposes.
Just over 60% of all proprietors said they do intervene in the 
disputes among the hired workers in their enterprise. The reasons they 
gave for such intervention suggests that their main objective is to 
avert more violent clashes. They want to give tempers a chance to cool 
down, and to find some compromise solution to help bridge any dif­
ferences between their employees. In all cases the proprietors were less 
motivated by a paternalistic attitude towards the workers than by a 
practical concern to restore peace and productivity in the workshop. Be 
that as it may, such ’neutral* mediation, with the proprietors in the 
role of the arbiter, only enhances the paternalism.
Aside from disputes among the workers, problems also arise of 
course between the proprietors and their workers. These are financial, 
related to the work and/or more technical, personal, etc. Their rate of 
incidence varies from one type of business to the next. Most of the ar­
tisanal proprietors in machining, and a good number of those in 
garment-manufacture reported that there are no problems worth speaking 
of between them and their employees. This could mean either that they
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have managed to completely dominate their workshop, or that pressure 
from the skilled workers has forced them to adopt a fraternal approach. 
Both interpretations are in fact found in the pertinent responses.
Many of the owners of the two smaller categories of enterprise in 
both trades reported that they do come up against what they cal 1 techni­
cal or more broadly work-related problems. What they actually mean is 
not technical issues as such, but rather difficulties stemming from the 
fact that their workers have undergone the same kind of training as they 
themselves and are often their equals in skill. Such workers will hold 
quite definite views on how best to proceed in their work, and so of 
course do their artisan bosses. The so-called technical problems, there­
fore, and for that matter those of a more avowedly personal nature, stem 
from the difficulty the proprietors have in distancing themselves from 
their craft brethren and/or erstwhile work-mates and imposing their own 
views on them.
At the same time none of those proprietors feels comfortable with 
his/her employer status and in dealing with the employees admitted that 
they find it hard to assert their prerogatives, given the common social 
background they share with the wage-workers. Also, they are hampered by 
the absence of any clear superiority on their part in terms of work 
skills, which would provide some justification for a hierarchical order 
in the workshop; this would be much easier if most of the workers were 
unskilled, but usually this is not the case. CScase and Goffee, who ob­
served the same difficulty in a situation structurally similar to the 
one under scrutiny, suggested that a way out of this was for the 
employers to adopt a fraternal attitude towards their workers.)
The larger employers too meet problems vis-A-vis their workforce, 
but in their case the issue is more straightforwardly how to increase 
productivity. They feel no qualms about asserting their authority.
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Concerning social relations outside work between employers and 
employees, these do indeed exist in the artisanal and smal1-employer es­
tablishments of both trades, who unlike larger employers often reported 
having lunch with their employees. In view of the symbolic significance 
of commensal ism uniting those involved and the intimacy this fosters 
this information indicates that relations between especially the ar­
tisans and then the smaller employers and employees are not only close 
but also warm and friendly. This is borne out by the social occasions 
that bring the two parties together. Many owners of the smaller 
businesses visit their workers at home and vice versa, or they go on 
private outings together; the larger employers rarely meet with their 
workers socially, if at all, and then only formally.
Another friendly gesture over and above the requirements of ordi­
nary labour relations is employers granting their workers the gratis use 
of the workshop machinery for their own purposes. Since this implies a 
job on the side, it is an indirect permission for the worker to earn 
some extra money — which puts them under some obligation to their 
employer, of course. It is again with artisanal and small employers that 
this practice is mostly developed. Since in all three instances of non­
work relationships it is the employers rather than the employees who 
take the initiative, this is further proof of fraternal/paternal 
benevolence in the conduct of artisan employers.
4. Relations with the World Outside the Small Business
In this section the relations are examined that the interviewees 
regularly entertain with the outside world. The first area of focus is 
purely economic, looking at customers and competitors and the strategies 
vis-A-vis both. A second area of focus concerns relations between the 
respondents and state agencies and state-dominated apparatuses, and
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their attitudes about them. A last subsection briefly touches on the 
relations of artisans among each other.
4.1 Customers
In all types of business units and in both trades (although less 
so in machining than in garment-making at a ratio of 62% to 88%), the 
bulk of customers are specific individuals and/or companies known to the 
respondents personally. This is no doubt related to the fact that for 
the most part the enterprises sampled do not retail their products to 
impersonal markets. They have no separate show-room and/or retailing 
shop to display the goods produced, a few of the larger firms in 
garment-making excepted.19 If products are on show at all, it is so that 
prospective customers can look at them while they are being produced in 
the workshop, and/or installed in other clients’ establishments. For the 
most part, goods are disposed of wholesale on the basis of orders 
placed, or the work done is subcontracted.
Table 9.5
Market Product Appeal, by Type of Proprietor (in per cent) 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER
M G M G M G
Greater Athens 75.0 72.0 53.0 48.0 33.3 44.8
Rest of Greece 24.0 28.0 40.8 45.8 43.3 39.5
Abroad 1.0 6.2 6.2 23.3 15.6
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
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Generally speaking, the products manufactured by the interviewees 
are destined for their local market.20 The artisanal enterprises par­
ticularly address themselves to their own local markets, while the 
larger employers at the other end of the range do so to a markedly 
lesser extent and instead concentrate more on the national market. Just 
a few of the small employers, and more so the larger companies destine 
their products for the international market, as shown in Table 9.5, 
above.
Responses received to the question ’Who are your customers?* are 
presented in Table 9.6. They indicate that the size of customer firms 
are industry-specific, with the market differing considerably between 
the two trades.
Table 9.6
Size of Customer Firms, by Type of Proprietor 
(in per cent; more than one response given) 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER
M G M G M G
65.9 7.4 I 83.3 20.0 | 100.0 61.5
63.4 33.3 83.3 80.0 66.7 46.2
90.2 85.2 I 50.0 70.0 | 53.8
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
The data in Table 9.6 indicate that in machining, producers of 
different types (and sizes) had firms of all sizes as customers. In the 
present context this may show that the artisanal units are to a certain 
extent integrated with the rest of that industry, which contrasts with 
the situation in garment-manufacturing in terms of type of producer and
Large
Medium
Small
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size of customer. This is the more remarkable in that customers in 
machining come largely from outside the industrial branch, while in 
garment-making they belong to it. The higher concentration of smaller 
customers among the clientele of machining artisans, and the inverse 
tendency observed for the other types of producer, calls for an explana­
tion.
As shown earlier, the smaller machinists specialise in the lower- 
profit, labour-intensive, production and/or repairs of one-off jobs; 
less often they produce in small batches. This would suggest that while 
the integration of the artisanal and other small employers with the 
manufacturing industry as a whole is real, it is only peripheral: their 
role is limited in meeting the demand for jobbing goods and services.21
Among garment-makers, the segregation of producers and customers 
according to size seems to be related to the structure of this industry, 
and to the fact that divisions of labour between firms within this par­
ticular industrial branch are more developed. Again, of course, the ar­
tisanal firms have a subsidiary role, that of the labour-intensive 
putter-out, condemned to have larger same-trade units as their sole 
customers.22 The latter also often act as wholesalers and/or 
retailers.23
Differences in the market situation of the two trades as well as 
between the various types of business underlie the ways in which my 
respondents secure their customers. On the one hand, the artisan 
machinists pointed out almost unanimously (92.7%) that their good 
reputation in the market is crucial for attracting customers, and spoke 
of customers well satisfied with the quality of their workmanship. They 
also noted (48.8%) that friends and acquaintances can be useful for 
mediating customers, but low price was not in itself considered of major 
importance (it was mentioned by only 19.5%). Finding customers appears
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to be less a matter of price, but of being known as a good craftsman. 
Same-trade small employers and larger employers said they use similar 
ways for attracting customers, but for over 50% of them advertising 
plays an additional and very important role.
Far more garment-making artisans emphasised the importance of low 
price (51.8%), and delivery on time was the second most often mentioned 
factor (37.0%). Reputation in the market and the mediation of friends or 
acquaintances were mentioned by less than a third of respondents 
(29.6%). This permits the interference that, in contrast to the situa­
tion in machining, skilled wage-work is not in great demand among the 
artisanal businesses in garment-making. In fact, the emphasis on low 
price would suggest that even the smallest of units may be sweatshops at 
least some of the time.24 Small employers and very much so larger 
employers, on the other hand, do depend on their name in the market, on 
advertisements and fashion-shows, on sales representatives, and on 
’sampling* in order to find their customers. In other words, they rely 
on methods that are more ’bureaucratic* and more suitable for addressing 
a larger clientele.
4.2 Competition
All three interviewee categories considered as competitors chiefly 
establishments of a size similar to their own, as shown in Table 9.7 
(A). The pattern, like that for customers, was the same in both trades.
The way the various respondents deal with the subject of competi­
tion has not emerged very clearly (with one exception). The machinists, 
especially the smallest among them (see Table 9.7 (B)), emphasise the 
importance of ’quality* (read skill). Most of the garment-makers, in 
view of the large market for their goods, but also the multitude of 
producers, opt for lower prices to make themselves competitive. An ex­
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ception are a few larger employers who have taken the initiative by 
specialising in new models.
The majority of the interviewees consider their usual ways of 
dealing with competition effective, but round 40% of the artisans, 18.7% 
of the small and 62.5% of the larger employers acknowledged that they 
are not. Asked what they intended to do about it, some gave specific 
remedies, quite a number of artisans/small employers in both trades 
flatly stated they do not know what to do, and others made vague 
references to the need for more up-to-date machinery and said the state 
should intervene to change the situation; they disavow all respon­
sibility of their own.25 It was quite obvious that the interviewees have 
no intentions of upgrading their businesses themselves.26 They seem to
Table 9.7
Respondents' Identification of Competitors (A), and 
How they Deal with Competition (B). by Type of Proprietor 
in per cent; more than one answer given 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers)
ARTISAN SM. EMPLOYER L. EMPLOYER
M G M G M G
(A)
Artisanal units (1-9 workers) 82.9 77.8 83.3 80.0 33.3 24.3
Medium-sized units(10-49 workers) 24.4 33.3 16.7 60.0 39.2
Large enterprises (50+ workers) 7.3 3.7 33.4 10.0 33.3 15.4
Foreign competition 31.7 7.4 66.7 40.0 66.7 53.8
No competition 12.2 7.4
(B)
Improving on quality 80.5 55.6 50.0 70.0 66.7 61.5
Punctual delivery 46.3 37.0 66.7 50.0 33.3 46.1
Price 46.3 70.3 83.3 80.0 33.3 69.2
Specialisation & new lines/goods 22.0 14.8 50.0 40.0 66.7 84.6
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
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consider this to be the job of the state, or at least expect state 
financing and overall active support. While the larger employers too tie 
the future of their businesses to external factors, they at the same 
time expressed positive ideas about what they themselves might do and 
what alternatives are open to them. So for instance it was suggested to 
hire expert advice, to study business administration, or to improve 
their organisational skills by attending relevant seminars, etc.
4.3 State agencies
Artisanal and other small producers in the overall group of small 
and medium enterprises are frequently referred to in the literature as 
agents of the informal economy (Tanzi 1982; Gaertner and Wenig 1985; 
Alessandrini and Dallago 1987). In my own research too I came up against 
evidence that there is quite extensive recourse to informal practices.27
One case in point is putting-out agreements. These are in most of 
the cases and most of the time oral, i.e. informal, which implies sub­
stantial under-reporting of revenue and rampant tax evasion; only 7 
respondents said that their putting-out contracts are always in writing. 
Furthermore, and despite what interviewees said, it appears a good num­
ber of the units (in garment-making) taking in put-out work are not 
registered at all. Another instance of informal practices that came to 
my attention concerns the systematic avoidance by the employers of the 
compulsory contribution to the workers insurance fund (IKA). The way 
this is done is by false declaration of the number of workers in their 
shops (which also helps with tax evasion).2® In fact, the ’benefit’ of 
this practice is three-fold. In addition to reducing insurance payments 
it often means that the wages paid are below the basic minimum 
prescribed by law, especially where foreign (usually illegal) workers, 
are concerned. Lastly, these declarations can be used to ’prove’ that
344
the enterprise has much less work than it actually does, and that will 
reduce its tax burden.
Illegal employment and non-comp 1 iance with the minimum wage rate 
goes hand in hand with the workshop buildings being unsuitable, with ex­
its blocked, with hazardous machinery, and a complete lack of any kind 
of safety equipment, to mention these violations only. State agencies 
(such as the inspectorate of labour) periodically inspect most of the 
larger businesses, as the interviewees told me, but failed to make an 
appearance in 72% of artisan units. Safety inspections by agencies such 
as the fire brigade are unheard of. Evidently, the official agencies get 
out of performing their duties whenever they can, and where they do do 
them, they do not check that their recommendations have been followed, 
and take no serious action against repeated violators of the law.
Then, take the case of bids for state and local authority tenders. 
Several of the larger and a handful of artisanal firms said that they 
had managed to obtain some of them (all in all about 19%, of whom 10%, 
or roughly a quarter of the stratum*s total, were machinist artisans). 
At the formal level their firms were properly qualified for the work and 
made the lowest bid. But those who got them, as well as those who did 
not, were unanimous in denouncing the arrangement for the tenders as 
dishonest. Not a few of them pointed out that there are certain cliques 
to which one must belong to have a chance of being awarded a tender, and 
that kickbacks to officials are the order of the date and an absolute 
prerequisite. To be sure, no concrete evidence of any of this was 
produced, but the information given was very consistent, so that I think 
that in at least part of the allegations may be taken to be true.
Extensive collusion was said to exist also on the matter of taking 
out loans from the largely state-controlled banks and the specialist 
state organisation for small and medium manufacturers (EOMMEX). The al­
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legations were similar to those noted above. While certain interviewees 
may well have exaggerated when explaining their failure to obtain a 
loan, the overall pattern of information is again too consistent to be 
disregarded. What is certain is that the officials concerned know per­
fectly well (but do nothing to stop the practice) that small producers 
regularly take out an ’artisan’s loan’ (which carries lower, state- 
subsidised interest rates), supposedly to purchase machinery (the pur­
pose of these loans), but actually to finance their day-to-day ac­
tivities.
The above instances seem to indicate that informal practices are 
largely tolerated at central state level, and that some local officials 
go a step further by using that tolerance as the basis for continuous 
informal and unlawful practices, in the manipulation of which they ex­
cel. The reason for the central state being tolerant of informal prac­
tices has been quite openly expressed by ex-Minister of Finance D. 
Tsovolas, when he pointed out (see Ch. V) that without resorting to in­
formal practices, SMEs cannot manage to survive on their own, and this 
would create unwarranted social tension.29 His point may be seen as an 
explicit elucidation of the thoughts governing the actions of many other 
high state functionaries unwilling not to be burdened by the so-called 
political costs of unpopular decisions. In consequence, it appears to be 
perfectly acceptable to tolerate informal practices, keep some check on 
them, but on the whole overlook them.
Aside from this deliberate policy towards small businesses, the 
state also, for reasons that cannot be examined here, tolerates the 
plain incompetence of its agencies as well as their steady, low-level 
corruption (extensively reported by the interviewees), which are also 
contributors to the re-emergence, spread and survival of artisanal and 
other small firms. Indeed, incompetence and corruption may be seen as a
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by-product of the state’s tolerance and indirect support of informal 
practices. Such tolerance by itself, unaccompanied by energetic inter­
ventions of the central and local state, is quite insufficient to effect 
the upgrading and development of small firms that has so often been 
proclaimed as desirable by successive Greek governments.
There are, of course, some specialised organisations with the 
declared aim to assist the artisans and other small entrepreneurs con­
tact the state largely through them. One is EOMMEX (Greek Organisations 
for the Small and Medium Manufacturing Enterprises); the other is TEBE 
(Professionals Artisans and Merchants* Fund), a social security or­
ganisation. However, artisans reported distrusting them. In fact the 
EOMMEX does not prioritise the smallest of units, i.e. those with a 
workforce of up to five, and plays an active part in the organisational 
outflanking of the artisans by larger of the SMEs.30
4.4 Other artisans
My artisan and other smal1-employer interviewees often expressed 
admiration for the technological achievements and organisational ar­
rangements of larger-employer firms. Whenever one of the former under­
took some work for the latter, s/he was proud to have been found worthy 
of election. Mostly, however, work is subcontracted among small en­
terprises not so very dissimilar. It would seem that artisans and small 
employers have a preference for doing business with others like them­
selves. Why should this be so?
As mentioned earlier (see Ch. V), the Greek economy as a whole and 
particularly the two industries surveyed, are dominated by a large num­
ber of very small units. This in itself largely explains why they do 
business with other very small firms - they are available — but it does 
not explain why they should actually prefer to do so. My personal view
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is that artisans and other small proprietors, are all too aware of the 
frailty of such as they. Large and often foreign firms are felt to be 
threat to their existence. This makes them think of themselves in terms 
of an imaginary community (Anderson 1991), of the small 'us*, against 
’them’ and, suitably bolstered by popular tradition and political 
ideologies, such a voluntaristic response makes practical sense. The 
corollary of this defensive ideological construct is a form of activity 
that F. Parkin (1974) has identified as a solidaristic attempt at social 
closure. In the case of my interviewees it expresses itself in extending 
solidarity to others of similar size and circumstances, and excluding 
the alien larger units. It is also worth noting that a somewhat more 
formal extension of mutual solidarity among the ’small’, is found in 
Greece today in the form of various attempts by regional associations of 
small merchants and manufacturers to ’buy local*.
In more general terms, a considerable volume of business activity 
seems to depend on a loose and informal social network of very small 
producers, retailers and consumers, usually but not always centred in a 
particular industry or locality, and gives to those involved a sense of 
purpose and self-respect. This support network facilitates the continued 
operation of existing SCP units, and by cultivating the social accept­
ability and desirability of the ’small’, has also functioned towards 
their propagation. Indeed, being a small businessman is widely perceived 
in Greece as a definitely positive social value.31
Artisans and, to a somewhat lesser extent, small employers, very 
often have similar origins and work backgrounds; some were work-mates 
and friends in the past. As independents, they co-operated in giving 
each other put-out work, and recognise that most of their competitors 
are also their peers. Their interactions are not only economic, but ex­
tend to socialising in non-work environments. Artisans and small
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employers - the former slightly more than the latter (85.3% and 81.2% 
respectively), and machinists slightly more than garment-makers (87.2% 
and 81.0% respectively) - report meeting their peers in the evening, ex­
change home visits, and dine out together. Only 37.5% of the sample’s 
larger employers did likewise. Furthermore, associating socially with 
colleagues is regular practice for one-third of the respondents, which 
indicates that keeping up fraternal relations between artisans is quite 
common. This social intimacy affects economic transactions, too. It is 
typical for an artisan proprietor who does not own a particular piece of 
equipment to put out the work to be done with it to an artisan who does 
possess it ’so as to help each other, on a friendly basis’ No. 246). It 
seems clear that a sense of community still binds together independent 
artisans and small employers in the two industries with which we are 
concerned.
Conclusions
The most prominent patterns that emerge from the material 
presented and discussed in this chapter are as follows.
1. Among the three categories of manufacturer sampled, the ar­
tisanal proprietors work for the longest hours. For most of that time 
they perform skilled manual work, but they also execute various 
managerial-administrative tasks in the course of running their business. 
As they become older they increasingly slow down their manual work and 
occupy themselves more with tasks away from the workbench.
2. Artisanal proprietors without partners and working alone, do 
not consider the business and the family household separate. The former 
is perceived as an extension of the latter, and in some respects, such 
as a joint budget, they are fused. This testifies the artisanate being 
more than a question of occupation, but a whole way of life.
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3. Artisanal partnerships are often entered into as a way to 
muster skills and enhance the workshop’s productive capacity, as well as 
its capital. Formed to enhance the artisans* chances of success, they 
also aim at improving the partners’ finances. Partnerships usually in­
volve close kin; less often it is work-mates who join forces, or a 
wage-worker is co-opted as partner by the master artisan. Shares are 
normally distributed equally distributed, which promotes unanimity of 
decisions. The unanimity element is also reflected in the division of 
labour among the partners. A concerted effort is made to insulate the 
partnership from outside interference, since otherwise the business 
might crumple, and of course to align it with the more strictly 
business-oriented needs of the enterprise.
The lower-class origins of the artisans in both trades under 
scrutiny restricts the general traits they command and along with it 
their general outlook. This is seen in the case of artisans with 
managerial responsibilities who, unlike their counterparts in larger 
units, are completely opposed, to attempting to improve their managerial 
skills, although they were not particularly successful in securing the 
essentials for improving their unit’s position. Apprehensive of some­
thing they do not control, they are content with their situation to 
remain as it is,
4. Machining artisans, alone or in collaboration with partners 
and/or other workers, manufacture their goods mostly on a one-of-a-kind 
basis. By contrast, in garments-making production is in batches, divi­
sion of labour is more developed, and the antecedent greater specialisa­
tion and co-operation are evident.
Chronic shortages of suitable pieces of machinery are commonplace; 
those available are usually of old make. Attempts to replenish them does 
not close the gap with larger manufacturers, who retain their edge by
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more frequent purchases of new and/or high-tech pieces of machinery. The 
artisanal proprietors also have some technical difficulties with modern 
machinery, which reflects the limits of their formal education.
5. Artisanal workshops often hire wage-labour on the basis of 
personalistic-particularistic criteria. Hired hands are classified as 
either apprentices/unskilled, or skilled workers, or master craftsmen. 
In machining, which as a rule employs skilled workers and apprentices, 
they are mostly paid weekly wages and work regular hours; they do less 
overtime work that their counterparts in larger businesses who, may be 
paid a monthly salary. The bigger establishments employ a large number 
of unskilled workers, and only they have scientific and clerical person­
nel. This distribution correlates with the type of goods manufactured in 
each business category. In garment-manufacturing, employment also 
reflects the organisation of work in each category of enterprise, but 
here the ordering of the patterns were reversed.
6. Aside from non-kin employees, many of the workers are members 
of the artisan proprietors* families, for the most part close relatives, 
and also fictitious kin. Kin workers are an invaluable asset since, 
being strongly committed to the business, they work harder and for less 
money than do non-kin employees. Fictitious kin are trusted core workers 
able to take the place of the master artisans. Both categories of kin 
exercise an important control function over plain workers. The latter 
are frequently sweated but, as they are skilled and practised mutual 
self-supervision they have little need for taskmasters. In overall 
terms, the relation between the type of worker hired and how the work is 
allocated shows that the functional flexibility in these small en­
terprises is an important element in artisanal survival.
7. As employers, the artisan proprietors exhibit paternalism but 
also elements of fraternal ism towards their more skilled workers. The
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latter is an expression of the discomfort they feel as employers when 
the employees are their equals in terms of skill.
8. Artisans more than the other types of small proprietor know 
their customers personally, which means that they can cultivate them so­
cially and befriend them, which of course retains them their custom. The 
artisans’ close relationships with their customers has to do with the 
fact that, (unlike the larger manufacturers), they mostly address local 
markets because of their organisational and financial limitations.
9. Artisan machinists receive orders from a wide range of other- 
branch industries. For them it is good workmanship and the network of 
acquaintances that brings them their customers. In artisanal garment- 
making, the customers who often intervene in production with supplying 
specifications or demanding quality control come mostly from within the 
trade, through involvement with extensive putting-out schemes. These are 
due to shortages of specific machinery and/or lack of skills, and aimed 
at lowering costs. The respective patterns for the two trades can be 
said to reflect their different market situations and in that sense, the 
artisanal enterprises appear to be integrated with the rest of the 
economy. But when it is taken into account that for the most part the 
customers as well as the competitors are the proprietors of businesses 
not dissimilar to the artisans’ own, it is seen that integration with 
the wider employer-economy is limited. It involves work-only sub­
contracting (in garments), and limited orders for items of inferior 
quality (in machining), and is peripheral.
10. The circumstances that small enterprises do business with 
other small concerns enterprises echoes the structure of the Greek 
economy. It also reflects a spontaneous if uncoordinated attempt on 
their part to cope with competition by closing their ranks. Aside from 
artisans and small employers preferring to place orders with businesses
352
like themselves, they often socialise among each other. This shows that 
they form something of a community, which is true for each of the two 
trades examined.
11. That artisans and small employers are on the whole content 
with their position can also be inferred from the fact that they are 
satisfied with the way they cope with the competition. In other words, 
they are not interested in expanding their businesses. For any improve­
ments in their situation they rely on the state, which they expected to 
take the initiative and provide leadership. By contrast, the sample’s 
larger employers are far less self-satisfied and, regardless of any pos­
sible state intervention, see a more active role for themselves.
12. The artisans’ relationship vis-&-vis the state has another 
facet. Extensive informal practices have been recorded, which are 
largely attributable the government’s unwillingness to be strict with 
the stratum - most probably for political reasons. On the one hand, the 
state displays a boundless tolerance of artisans, and on the other ex­
hibit a covert unwillingness to assist them in any comprehensive way. 
These are the two facets in the state’s attitude to the artisans that 
have helped to keep them in a state of dependency. The attendant 
apparatus’s incompetence and even corruption among lower state offi­
cials, has convinced artisans that recourse to informal practices is im­
perative if they are to survive.
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Notes to Chapter IX
1. Outside activities include work-related activities that must be ac­
complished outside the workshop, e.g. visiting the bank, meeting cus­
tomers, paying V.A.T. , arranging for purchases, and so on.
2. Artisans and small employers for the most part considered overtime 
work to be unprofitable since it is paid at higher rates.
3. Obviously, spending long hours in the workshop is the artisans’ way 
of coping with the competition and making up for the time spent in 
managing the business. To a lesser extent this is true for the small 
employers* too.
4. According to some definitions (e.g. Cholevas 1965; Papakyriakou 
1965), a distinguishing feature of artisanal businesses is the impact of 
the personality of the proprietor(s) on the unit, which is premised on 
the assumption that artisans are physically present in the workshop for 
long hours.
5. The few exceptions to the rule mostly involve cases in which property 
transfers from older kin to younger have not yet been concluded and/or 
are being withheld. Where they are postponed and promised for later they 
are being used as means to ensure deferential behaviour by the younger 
kin towards their elders.
6. This is so especially in the case of the more widespread O.E. com­
pany, where the partners participate with all their property and have 
full liability. The all-inclusive character of O.E. firms befits the 
family business.
7. The artisans’ fragile economic position is reflected in only 16% con­
sidering they have no need of any loans and that their own means are 
sufficient. Such an answer was given by 37.5% of the small employers, 
and by 56% of the larger ones.
8. Machinists reserve the word ’production’ for the large-scale making 
of goods. One of-a-kind and smal1-batch manufacturing were called 
’constructions’, a word that succinctly describes the process of build­
ing up an item of machinery from individual pieces.
9. In addition, four artisans, (two from each trade) said that they used 
no outside labour, although they were assisted by members of their im­
mediate family. They obviously saw no reason to distinguish the labour 
input by other family members from their own.
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10. I was trying to identify labour costs in relation to the overall 
business expenses, but my interviewees were not happy with this ques­
tion. Only about a third of them gave a definite answer, and one I find 
rather dubious. In most of these answers labour costs were said to be in 
the region of 25 to 30% of total expenses; in some cases 40 or 45%. In­
formation from an analysis made by an informant shows that the labour 
costs of a typical artisanal unit in machining would not exceed 20% of 
the total costs, and this latter figure seems to me to be a rather more 
realistic estimate. There will be fluctuation from this mark, of course, 
due to type of product, price of materials, method of production, amount 
of family labour, quality of the workforce, etc., etc.
11. In the western countries, the distinction between skilled and craft 
workers revolves around the completion of a formal or informal appren­
ticeship, at the conclusion of which the workers are proclaimed 
craftsmen (Penn 1990: 126). The craftman’s status was/is a closure 
mechanism that secures higher remuneration to craftsmen than to skilled 
workers. Enforcement of these craft-related privileges was/is intimately 
linked up with the existence of long-standing craft guilds powerful 
enough to sustain them. Rule, who studied skill in the early days of in­
dustrialisation in Britain, notes that restrictions of entering into ap­
prenticeships were all-important in maintaining the number of craftsmen 
small and, therefore, keeping wages high (1989: 100,102). A similar 
point is made by R. Penn (1990) who provides contemporary evidence for 
Germany, the U.S. , and the U.K. Apart from similarly distinguishing be­
tween craft and skilled labour, Penn makes the point that craft status 
may also be achieved by following an informal apprenticeship. TTiis is 
possible either by means of internal career ladders found in large en­
terprises, or by labouring next to a master craftsman in the context of 
a small workshop (ibid.: 57, 125-26, 197). For Penn, an outward indica­
tion that the apprenticeship has been concluded is to be found in the 
level of wages paid: when they approach those of the craftsmen, the new 
status has been reached and recognised (ibid: 52, 129). He also makes 
the interesting point that *... the social determination of skill is 
very much the effect of local labour markets and, in particular, the 
relative power of skilled manual workers within [large] plants’ (ibid.: 
58, emphasis added).
In Greece the situation with respect to apprentices (often dubbed hel­
pers or assistants, or even ’little masters’) differs from that found in 
the West. Craft guilds, to the extent that they existed at all, were 
very weak and unable to impose equivalent closure mechanisms. An indica­
tion of this is the fate of the restrictions clause introduced by a 
handful of guilds, which by the mid-1960s had all, with the exception of 
three trades (bakers, pharmacists and notaries public) been abolished by 
the state; since then these too have gone. As my artisans’ comments made 
clear, apprenticeships within the same trade could be very different, as 
for instance in their duration. Most of the Greek apprenticeships were 
informal and focused on in-job training. This common characteristic ex­
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plains why it is the always the level of workmanship that is most ap­
preciated, even though interviewees also value a worker’s quantitative 
output. So, it is level of workmanship, productivity, the range of 
skills, and age, that are the basis of artisans distinguishing between 
plain workers and craftsmen.
12. The demotion of those that could be called semi-skilled to the un­
skilled group may be attributable to the functional needs of small-scale 
businesses. Since the manufacturing of particular articles in workshops, 
particularly those of machinists, is neither continuous nor standard­
ised, it is necessary for workers to be easily re-deployeable, e.g. to 
shift from the drill to the lathe, and so on. This of course requires 
that they have dual or multiple skills, and is the reason why the most 
of the workers in machining workshops are skilled; the only really un­
skilled are fresh apprentices. By contrast, the semi-skilled operant is 
restricted to one particular activity and during slack periods can be 
used only for unskilled work while still receiving higher pay. This is 
uneconomical for the employer, which readily explains why semi-skilled 
workers were seldom reported to me, and not even considered a distinct 
category but on a par with the unskilled (what Manwaring and Wood 1985 
tagged as having ’tacit skills’). In any case, wage-workers as a group 
having very limited power, employers can easily impose their ’political’ 
definition of skill.
One should also take into account, as M. Rose (in Mann 1983: 356) has 
suggested, the particular sub-culture in the context of which skill ac­
quires a particular meaning. In our case skill represents the level of 
dexterity that allows a particular type of work to be performed to a 
standard the tradespeople have agreed on collectively. So a 30-year-old 
worker habitually employed in the machining trade would be assumed by 
other same-trade workers to have accumulated experience, hence con­
sidered to be skilled, and therefore paid at the appropriate rate. If it 
so happens that this particular worker’s skills are inadequate, if they 
are not versatile enough in terms of the norms of the trade for good 
craftsmanship, or his work is substandard to what may be expected from a 
worker of his age, then his artisan boss and mates will not refer to him 
as semi-skilled but rather as unskilled, regardless of any training/ap­
prenticeship s/he may have undergone. In the case of the present 
research it would appear that the definition of skill in everyday use 
within the trade is at odds with the official nomenclature of unskilled 
/semi-skilled/skilled. The latter may have its uses in other contexts, 
for instance in analysing the workforce in mass-production industrial 
organisations, but makes little sense to the practical experience of 
both artisans and workers in the machining trade.
13. It had been their high skill level that originally earned fictitious 
kin the attention and respect of the master-artisan, who then personally 
befriended them. The special rapport between them rests on them being 
members of the same craft. This by extension puts such persons on an
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equal footing with the artisan, and so makes them eligible for becoming 
the artisans5 fictitious kin. In return for job security, better pay, a 
more responsible position, and suchlike, these skilled workers pledge 
their loyalty and work hard. The various functions of the fictitious-kin 
relationship are largely fused, with personal, emotive and religious 
elements discernable, as well as economic and' social ones. In brief, 
fictitious kinship in the present context involves a personal alliance 
of persons occupying different positions but with broadly similar back­
grounds and in the same trade.
14. 'Control5 has been defined by R. Edwards as 5the ability of 
capitalists and/or managers [and/or artisans and their agents, we may 
addl to obtain desired work behaviour from workers5 C1979: 17).
15. The main reason mentioned by the interviewees for not wishing to 
hire their more distant kin was that such employees tend to think they 
are entitled to intervene in business matters. Restraining them is dif­
ficult without triggering a clash of all the kinfolk. There was unanim­
ity that 'relatives and work don't go together, and if they do, there's 
hel1 to pay'.
16. The actual number of kin may well be higher than the figure 
reported. I infer this from the fact that the number of kin (both 
natural and fictional) reported to me concerned primarily the inter­
viewees' own relatives, although they had been asked to enumerate their 
partners' kin also. Therefore, the real number of kin working in the 
sampled units is likely to be substantially higher, which would mean 
that their impact as group is greater too.
17. H. Bernstein has discussed the simple reproduction 'squeeze' in the 
context of African peasantries. His notion seems to me to be applicable 
in other instances of SCP too, even though the factors behind the 
squeeze may be somewhat different.
The simp1e-reproduction squeeze is a result of 'increasing costs of 
production/decreasing returns to labour'. This situation is brought 
about when the domestically produced use-values, by which peasant com­
munities traditionally catered for their needs, are replaced by an in­
creasing consumption (personal and productive) of commodities they have 
to purchase. Once the peasants become entangled in such a process, a 
fall in the prices of their agricultural produce will soon follow. 
Peasant households experience this development as a deterioration in the 
terms of exchange for their cash crops, the sale of which must finance 
their simple reproduction.
As Bernstein points out, this squeeze brings an obvious response from 
the peasants: intensification of commodity production, or curtailment of 
the level of consumption, or both. The simple-reproduction squeeze also 
conduces to indebtedness, and to the further erosion and even break-up 
of traditional social institutions. In fact, as the larger peasant units
collapse, households increasingly have to reproduce as individual units, 
relying all the more on commodity production and exchange. This, 
however, also means that these SCP units manage to ’compete effectively 
with capitalist enterprises producing the same commodities’ (Bernstein 
1979: 429).
18. This recourse to non-valourised inputs, or self-exploitation, makes 
possible more than the simple reproduction of SCP: given a favourable 
conjuncture, it also allow expanded reproduction. The unfolding of this 
process within the context of the household Cook dubs endofamilial ac­
cumulation. If for the sake of argument we visualise a continuum, at the 
one end of which stands a one-person worker-owner unit, and at the other 
a multi-person worker-owner/employer plus hired-labour unit, then our 
group of worker-owner plus spouse and children represents an inter­
mediate stage - Cook’s endofamilial accumulation. The direction of 
change is from the former (individual SCP) to the latter (which echoes 
capitalism). The economic viability of artisanal production rests with 
these unaccounted inputs, and the profits they bring to the family unit 
are by no means insignificant. However, accumulation is rare. As Cook 
points out, moving beyond family labour to wage labour, i.e. to in­
cipient capitalism, may not prove feasible for most peasant-artisan 
units (Cook 1978: 28-30).
19. About one-third of the machinists sampled said that they do not dis­
play their goods at all. A good part of the approx. 30% section of 
garment-makers who also do not exhibited their goods in their workshop, 
secure orders by what is known as sampling - that is, they visit their 
customers and show them their wares.
20. The overall local market, or the Greater Athens Area, has over three 
million residents. However, although as a rule the larger enterprises do 
address the whole of this market, the smaller manufacturers often sell 
their goods in a much smaller locality, for instance a particular neigh­
bourhood or a suburb and its environs.
21. Some of the artisanal machinery shops (31.7% of them) acknowledged 
having pub1ic-sector enterprises among their customers, but more often 
than not such customers turned out to have indirectly provided only one 
or two order for subcontracted work.
22. Although there was no systematic set of data about the number of 
customers of each interviewee business, it emerged in the course of the 
fieldwork that over 40% of artisanal garment-makers have only a single 
one.
23. Garment-making artisans (77.8%), small employers (40%), and larger 
employers (38.5%) said that a sizeable part of their production goes to 
wholesalers and retailers. Most of it is sold on the domestic market,
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but one-third of the larger employers1 output is exported.
24. Only 37% of garment-making artisans, but over 68% of each of the 
other two categories of business proprietor, socialised with their cus­
tomers. It would seem that when customers are chiefly interested in 
low-priced goods, like those made by the artisanal workshops, there is 
little point in trying to cultivate them personally for the sake of 
securing orders.
25. Pronouncements such as the following were typical: 51 can’t expand 
because I haven’t received any state assistance. My problems can’t be 
resolved’ [No. 2151; or ’It’s not up to us, it’s for the state to decide 
and to provide the necessary infrastructure’ [No. 240].
26. At this point it should be mentioned that when discussing this issue 
with my interviewees, it was the artisans among them who time and again 
pointed out they have no wish to expand their businesses, nor for that 
matter would they knew how to go about it. What they want, they kept 
saying, is to make a living — if possible a rather good living, but no 
more. This attitude is exemplified by the fact that although no ques­
tions on the matter were put to them, 15 artisans (22%) mentioned the 
amount of their income as antimisthia meaning in Greek recompense for 
wages, which shows that they still think like wage-workers and not like 
entrepreneurs.
27. The informal economy is also known under the epithets of unofficial, 
second, black, shadow, underground, hidden, and a host of others 
(Gutmann 1985).
28. All Greek businesses are obliged by law to post an official form in 
a prominent place (often the business administrative office) which lists 
all the members of the personnel. However, I observed that the number of 
employees recorded there was as a rule substantially below the number of 
workers the interviewees admitted they had hired. In the many cases 
where I surreptitiously checked the number of wage-workers listed 
against the number on the shop floor, I found them to disagree.
29. In a similar vein G. Kyriopoulos, chairman of the Athens Chamber of 
Artisans, has argued that tax-evasion is a way for the artisans of 
defending themselves against an injust system of taxation (see Artisans 
Issues 1992: 4).
30. I have been able to consult an internal EOMMEX document listing the 
criteria that a certain enterprise in the small and medium bracket has 
to satisfy to be granted a subsidised low-interest loan, in this case 
for the purchase of a small computer. Units with fewer than six 
employees are given very few points, which effectively excludes them 
from obtaining such a loan (relevant evidence also appear in Deniozos
1993).
31. This is inferred from numerous observations. All of them appraise 
small business proprietorship extremely positive. Let me give an ex­
ample. After the 1993 privatisation of public transport in Athens, one 
of the published letters of gratitude from drivers who had become owners 
or part-owners of their vehicles thanked the government for establishing 
the former wage-employees as proprietors. The positive evaluation of 
small-scale property, and the fact that it is part of both right- and 
left- wing populism in Greece, has not yet been investigated, and may 
prove an interesting area of research.
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CHAPTER X - LIMITATIONS OF ARTISANSHIP (Research Report 4)
Introduction
In what follows material pertaining to the limitations of artisan- 
ship is presented and discussed. Ihe focus is on three areas. The first 
concerns the expansion of artisanal units and restraints to their 
growth. Particular attention is paid to innovativeness as a major cause 
for expansion, and to factors hampering the upgrading of skills and the 
acquisition of complex up-to-date machinery.
Hie second section investigates the artisans’ participation in 
voluntary and compulsory organisations (Artisans* Chambers). Ihe em­
phasis is on the restricted representation of their interests and how 
they are outflanked.
The third section takes up the respondents* own evaluation of 
their position. The material allows us to look at their motivation, 
their priorities, what their work means to them, and their future expec­
tations. The pattern of their attitudes suggests that their limited 
perspectives have an effect on their present activities and overall 
situation.
1. Difficulties of Expansion
1,1 Business expansion
A little over half the respondents,1 (the machinists more so than 
the garment-makers) acknowledged that their business activity had ex­
panded in the two years prior to the interviews (see Table 10.1). Ihis 
was somewhat puzzling, since that period was marked by a general 
downturn in economic activity. But when considering the scarcity of 
skilled workers in machining (see Ch. IX), which means more demand than
361
workshop production can handle, the expansion is seen to reflect an 
adaptation to the needs of the situation. It meant the acquisition of 
more modern machine-tools and other equipment for increasing output, 
rather than adding to the labour force. Given the economic difficulties 
of the conjunction, it favoured more repair work as well as the produc­
tion of spare parts and cheap substitutes which, (especially in machin­
ing) required multi-skilled workers (e.g. the artisans themselves). 
Semi- or un-skilled workers are of little use for making repairs or 
manufacturing one-of-a kind pieces of machinery* In consequence, the em­
phasis was on increasing the productivity of multi-skilled wage-workers 
and the master artisans by means of more up-to-date machinery and longer 
hours of work.
Table 10.1
Expansion of Business Activity (during the two 
years prior to the interviews), by Type of Proprietor 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers, T=Total)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Yes N 26 9 35 5 8 13 2 9 11 33 26 59
% 63.4 33.3 51.5 83.3 80.0 81.2 66.7 69.2 68.7 66.0 52.0 59.0
No N 15 18 33 1 2 3 1 4 5 17 24 41
% 36.6 66.7 48.5 16.7 20.0 18.8 33.3 30.8 31.3 34.0 48.0 41.0
T N 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
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While business expansion rested on different promises for each of 
the categories of small producers, affecting them differently and in­
volved substantially different volumes of output, it did not lead to a 
major change in their situation. None of the artisans who reported ex­
pansion have transcended the limits of artisanship, nor did the business 
expansion in the other two categories trigger a ’lift off’. It merely 
helped to perpetuate their situation.
1.2 Innovations and Inventions
1.2.a Innovative potential
Inventions, and especially innovations,2 are not usually for­
tuitous, but for the most part depend on familiarity with the pertinent 
methods and ways of working. It was mainly machinists who reported that 
they made innovations. Their knowledge of the capacities, tolerance, and 
other attributes of their machinery is an indication of their dexterity 
and technical know-how, both of which are a prerequisite for innova­
tions. The extent to which machinist service their machinery themselves, 
’play’ or ’tinker* with it, is an index of how chiefly they are to have 
a potential for innovation (which may or may not be realised).
From the answers to relevant questions, given in Table 10.2 below, 
it appears that it is mainly machinists rather than garment-makers, and 
primarily the artisans and/or their partners among them who personally 
service and repair their mechanised equipment. Also, all of them said 
they had made modifications without recourse to outside help. The larger 
employers, on the one hand, who deal with many different and some up- 
to-date pieces of equipment, entirely delegated such tasks to in-house 
skilled craftsmen and/or help from outside. The artisans and small 
employers also, of course, frequently have recourse to outside services.
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Table 10.2
Respondents (a) Acknowledging Servicing/Repairing, and (b) Modifying their 
Own Machinery, both without Recourse to Outside Help, by Type of Proprietor 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers, T=Total, 0/V=0ther/Various]
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
(a) (more than one option)
Yes 1100.0 37.0 75.0 1 83.3 40.0 56.3 1 7.7 6.3 92.0 30.0 61.0
0/V 1 29.3 100.0 57.4 |ioo.o 80.0 87.5 1133 3 107.7 112.5 44.0 98.0 71.0
(b) (.100 cases)
Yes N 28 4 32 4 3 7 2 2 32 9 41
% 68.3 14.8 47.0 66.6 30.0 43.7 15.4 12.2 64.0 18.0 41.0
0/V N 13 23 36 2 7 9 3 11 14 18 41 59
% 31.7 85.2 53.0 33.3 70.0 56.3 100.0 84.6 87.5 36.0 82.0 59.0
T N 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
The unanimity with which the artisans reported fixing up their 
machinery is, of course, a reflection of their close participation in 
production. Such repairs/fixing up must be considered a craft charac­
teristic, and would suggest that there is an affinity between tinkering 
with machinery and making invent ions-innovations. Regularly fixing up 
one’s mechanical apparatus presupposes mastery of the technologies in­
volved, of course. In the present instances the various pieces of 
machinery were not new, and will have presented no insurmountable tech­
nical difficulties, In few cases of modern electronic appliances, the 
respondents (artisans especially) will not attempt to deal with them but 
depend exclusively on outside experts. In fact, the upgrading of skills 
and adaptation to new technologies proceeds at a very slow pace, 
reflecting the empirical nature of the artisans* knowledge.
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In garment-making only one-third of the independent artisans and 
small employers said they look after the maintenance of their machinery, 
and a handful reported having themselves made modifications to it. Un­
doubtedly the difference between them and the machinists is due to the 
nature of the work in each trade. In machining, the necessary skills are 
the same as the every-day work: the building and repairing of machinery. 
In garment-manufacture the emphasis is not on the machinery used but on 
fashion and artistic design and, since Greece is not a fashion leader, 
the innovative element in garment-making itself is almost non-existent. 
The particular items manufactured and the market structure, especially 
in the lower ranges of production, (in putting-out) do not conduce to 
the development of new lines.
Recourse to outside help was quite essential for the development 
of innovations in the very small firms. It has for some time been as­
sumed that outside help for the independent artisans usually involves 
co-operation between people working in different trades and more or less 
well known to each other (see Sabel 1982: 225-26, and my Ch. III). In 
the present sample, however, such collaboration for substantial 
modifications involved some degree of friendship in only one-third of 
the cases (those involved were mostly machinist artisans). All the 
others were entirely contractual. This impl ies that the informal net­
working that played such an important role for the ’Third Italy*, is 
virtually absent in Greece.
1.2.b Blocking the exploitation potential 
Despite the commonly held belief that, aside from making repairs, 
small manufacturers do not innovate but only produce rather simple and 
technologically out-dated products, quite a large segment of respondents
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said that they had deve 1 oped one or more technical innovations, which 
typically constituted a small part of their production.3 These self- 
declared innovators consisted of 46.4% artisans, 80% of the small 
employers, and all of the larger employers in machining; in garment- 
manufacture the figures were much more lower: 3.5%, 10% and 15.4%
respectively. The innovations reported concerned product improvements 
and/or amendments in the processing methods. They were also related to 
new goods, but no new productive methods were reported. There were no 
organisational or commerce-related innovations.
Innovations are of two kinds: (i) original devices for use in 
one’s own production line developed specifically to meet an order from 
outside, which might be a whole item or a part of the products ordered; 
(ii) innovations concerned more with the design of a particular item or 
series of items, i.e. the design and/or manufacture of special dies, or 
original designs in garment-making. In terms of originality the reported 
innovations may have not be particularly novel, but rather involve im­
provements to existing procedures. It seems that as a rule they were of­
ten independently arrived-at solutions to problems solved earlier in 
other countries, of which our innovators knew nothing or virtually noth­
ing.
The accounts of how it was done did not substantially differ be­
tween small and large firms. Many of the innovations came about through 
tinkering with the tools and items manufactured; it was largely a 
trial-and-error process based on experience. The artisans and small 
employers of the sample especially referred to experience when narrating 
how they had arrived at their innovations, and this accords with their 
background and ’trait* predisposition.4 Recourse to outside help was ac­
knowledged in only four cases. Expert technical assistance, which was
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supplied for a fee, was obtained for developing the invention into an 
innovation, but no new partnerships or enterprises resulted from this.
When probed, all respondents but one who reported innovations ac­
knowledged that these were not patented. They said that the high cost of 
researching and developing the invention to the standard required, the 
dues for obtaining an official patent, and the follow-up costs (e.g. 
lawyers fees), discouraged them from trying to safeguard their innova­
tions by patenting them. Besides, official patents are not considered an 
effective protection, since minor alterations to the innovation could 
make copying perfectly legal.5 This seemed to me to conceal another 
reason why the interviewees avoided patenting: some of their so-called 
innovations were simply copies of (usually foreign) products they had 
modified superficially, if at all.
Now, the practical significance of a patent is the commercial ex­
ploitation of an innovation. This usually means mass-producing it and/or 
conceding it for a fee, which, however, implies investments that by ar­
tisanal standards investments are major and unavailable. Then, there is 
the question of the size of the market. From my artisan and small 
employer interviewees* viewpoint the market seems not to extend far 
beyond the local market, so that putting an innovation into production 
is potentially very risky and possibly the road to economic disaster. 
Even if the necessary funds could somehow become available, the in­
novators lack the necessary organisational and entrepreneurial skills to 
effect the investment, and the obvious solution of appointing an expert 
to undertake the management of the investment clashes with the artisans* 
suspicious attitude towards outsiders. As a result, those artisans and 
small employers who did innovate, did not have sufficiently strong 
economic motives for patenting their prototype. In all these cases the
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expansion potential for the practical exploitation of the innovations 
was blocked.
In the course of developing the new idea into an innovation only 
a single respondent reported receiving any financial/technical/organi­
sational assistance from pertinent state agencies or from any other of­
ficial source.6 Most respondents did not even apply - showing how dif­
ficult they find it to deal with bureaucracies (which correlates to 
their background experience as has already indicated). Those who did 
apply were turned down, which is of course a negative index of state as­
sistance to the more active elements of this entrepreneurial stratum. 
The artisans’ mistrust of the state ties up nicely with the justified 
conviction that state assistance would not be forthcoming, so ’Why 
bother to apply?*. It is this attitude that forms an effective barrier 
to the development of creative artisanal ideas into inventions and in­
novations.
Most of those who reported that they have made innovations said 
this has occurred at their place of work as part of and in the course of 
executing orders. The innovations were incorporated into the final 
product, or are being used in production, whether in the form of equip­
ment or of processing-methods. In all these cases, innovating was part 
and parcel of the normal everyday work and quite routine - like finding 
a new solution for a piece of machinery or a mould ordered from them. 
Innovations of this kind are for many machinists an essential aspect of 
business and neither lead to expansion nor accumulation, nor do they 
change their situation in any way. They are simply ordinary occurrences 
to maintain their residual position in the market. If an innovative 
solution is put through and proves attractive to customers, its positive 
influence affected only the individual enterprise that developed it and 
will profit from it; there will be no spillover effects benefitting
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other artisans. More than anything else, innovations are the achievement 
of individuals. If the new product should be successful then, so I was 
told, it was highly probable that other small local or even foreign 
firms would copy it.
The function then of innovations, which in Schumpeter fashion are 
so often thought to lead to the breaking of new ground and the satisfac­
tion of new needs, did not have such effects in Greece among my sample, 
nor did it revealed some heroic element in the entrepreneur concerned. 
The purpose of the artisans* innovations was simply to carry out an or­
der and so to keep the business in operation. In this, the artisans dif­
fer markedly from what may be called the capitalist purpose of innovat­
ing, where investments in the development and patenting of the innova­
tion result in it becoming an important asset that make possible the 
firm’s survival within a competitive environment.
1.3 Limited adaptability
Following the path of business expansion and growth is a complex 
process. At the small-firm level, one positive influence is keeping 
abreast of the relevant technological developments, which must be 
adopted and applied if the small enterprise is not to become gradually 
marginalised and go out of business altogether. For our purposes the 
ability to follow developments may be assessed in terms of whether the 
interviewees upgraded their skills through seme form of further educa­
tion; used or considered using more up-to-date machinery/equipment in­
corporating microchips; and applied technological production develop­
ments by, for instance, engaging scientific staff or consulting outside 
specialists.
With respect to the latter, only larger-employer firms engage 
scientific staff and do so sparingly from which we may infer that the
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small enterprises did not follow nor adapt to technological develop­
ments .
Additional evidence point in the same direction. The interviewees 
were not at all keen to upgrade their skills by attending some form of 
further education. The exceptions to the rule were some artisan 
machinists, and the majority of the larger employers in garment-making, 
who between them amount to 25% of the total. The former exclusively men­
tioned training in technical issues such as metrology, mould fabrication 
techniques, lasers, or tolerance and fatigue of materials; the latter 
focused on managerial skills such as marketing, sales, financing, office 
mechanisation, or administration.
The 75% (artisans and small employers) who had no further educa­
tion claimed, alternatively or in combination, the following:
(1) That they do not need such courses/seminars/lectures - which 
mean that they are copying with problems of work, and maintaining their 
self-image of the craftsman/businessman in a potentially more demanding 
and competitive and thus threatening environment, as Watson suggests 
(1992: 44-45).
(2) That they have no spare time to attend them - which is 
plausible when considering the long hours they spend in their workshops.
(3) That the existing courses etc. do not meet their needs - a 
possibility that cannot be discounted.7
(4) That no relevant courses are being offered - an explanation 
that is patently untrue. Having said this, it should be acknowledged 
that (as already indicated and, as far as I can ascertain) it appears 
that most of the technical and administrative courses are simply trans­
lations of foreign ones, little related to the existing actual situation 
in Greece and the specific needs of its artisans. Those who had attended 
a short course on lasers told me that it had been very interesting, but
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that they could not see how what they had learned could be applied in 
their particular workshops and markets. Aside from these more formal 
ways of keeping abreast of technological developments, artisanal 
proprietors and small employers obtain a certain amount of information 
on technological developments in their field from visiting trade fairs 
and attending demonstrations of machinery and other equipment organised 
by local company representatives. The larger employers who had not at­
tend any seminars/courses, asserted that they had no need of them be­
cause their work was progressing quite satisfactorily; they were per­
fectly able to cope with new developments and adapt to them on the basis 
of the assets already at their command.
With regard to installing modern equipment incorporating 
microchips, very few interviewees answered affirmatively. Only 14 
businesses in all even had an office computer (9 larger-employer units, 
3 small employers, and only 2 artisanal proper). The proprietors of 
another 31 units said they intended to obtain an office computer in the 
future, but only the largest among them appeared to really mean it. 
Modern computer-controlled production machinery was used by an even 
smaller segment of interviewees, mainly larger employers. From among the 
mass of those who have no access to it, some of the machinists said that 
it would need a ’substantial1 investment which put them off; another 
segment of machinists, as well as most of the garment-makers, considered 
the acquisition of such machines superfluous.
From the above material it emerges that the artisans’ failure to 
adapt to technological developments also means a failure to respond to 
the emerging openings and challenges. The underlying causes that partly 
explain why this should be so involve, among other things, the interplay 
of market-related and hence general factors, e.g. a pre-existing mar­
ginalisation, smallness of production and market, and the antecedent
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down-graded specialisation. More particular factors are the lack of 
available time, and being content with one’s station. Organisational as 
well as more macro-level factors also play a role, such as the inability 
to compensate for individual weaknesses by establishing voluntary 
producers’ associations and co-operative schemes, the structure of 
financing, state reluctance to bring about modernisation, etc. What is 
certain is that as very small firms cannot adapt to the changing en­
vironment, or do so belatedly, they themselves undermine their chances 
of improving their position and any potential they may have for expan­
sion.
2. Voluntary and Compulsory Organisations
Between the artisan’s workshop and the outside world stand a num­
ber of voluntary and compulsory organisations of artisans. Mediating and 
representing interests, they may be seen as the interface between the 
micro world of the artisans and wider, macro-societal concerns. How the 
two fields are linked and what influence they have on the artisans is 
investigated below.
2.1 Reciprocal relations
Undoubtedly the political screenings of individuals and organisa­
tions, the outlawings and proscriptions effected during and after the 
civil war, which more or less acted like the pre-war exclusionist 
measures, were instrumental in purging artisanal organisations from the 
numerous leftists until well into the 1970s. Inversely, left-wing ar­
tisans usually avoided joining such ’cleansed’ organisations. But the 
ideological segregation also affected how and to what extent these 
bodies represented their members* collective interest.
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If they were considered ‘loyal* the organisations were actively 
supported by the state. For instance, they were subsidised by it, which 
of course meant that they were also state-regulated. The price for such 
support was high: the unitary sectoral organisations splitting up into 
many separate ones, the low and mostly nominal membership, and the crip­
pling of voluntary organisations (and of the compulsory Artisans* Cham­
bers) in certain cases led to their transformation into personal istic 
coteries. As far as the co-ordination of the voluntary bodies was con­
cerned, an inflated number of sectional organisations were in one way or 
another part of the GSEBE(E) the artisans confederation of voluntary 
organisations. The latter for the most part was governed by an executive 
committee, whose members had been vetted for their political ideology, 
were affiliated to those in power, and were elected by highly obscure 
electoral methods and processes. (The situation was much the same with 
respect to the top leadership of the Chambers.)
It seems that these organisations were chiefly concerned with 
self-preservation rather than with representing their members’ inter­
ests. The earlier role complementarity between voluntary and compulsory 
organisations was no more. As representation of interests became less 
and less, civil society became increasingly ineffectual, until the dif­
ference between the two types of organisation was more quantitative than 
qualitative. State corporatism had become s tat ism.
The collapse of the dictatorial regime in 1974 did not bring about 
any very dramatic changes in the structure of the Artisans’ Chamber or 
of the GSEBE. The procedures, electoral system, and leadership remained 
largely intact, the old pre-dictatorial leaderships being more or less 
tolerated if not outright supported by the conservative New Democracy 
governments of the 1970s. Opposing this and calling for a democratisa- 
tion — which did not mean the same thing to all the parties involved -
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was the concerted response of the parties of the Left and of PASOK. It 
took them about ten years to change the situation.
During those years it was the disputed legitimacy, the struggle 
against undemocratic organisational structures, and the leadership prac­
tices of these organisations that were the basic motive for the creation 
of a series of new or splinter unions and associations specific to dif­
ferent industrial sectors and/or geographical regions. They unanimously 
tilted towards the political Left and initially were rather successful 
in enrolling members.® Their opposition to the status quo professed to 
counter government policies and to promote the artisans ’real* inter­
ests. Such ’real’ or ’authentic’ interests and needs were mostly formu­
lated defensively rather than in a program of positive orientation and 
action.® In effect, a rival structure was set up in parallel to the 
Chambers, which contested and gained points on all fronts. It campaigned 
against same-trade older associations or their right-wing executives, 
against the GSEBE(E) until the old leadership was toppled in 1984 by 
changing the law, and against the old executive cliques of the Chambers 
until control was wrested from them.
The new majority, dominated by pro-communist CKKE) elements with 
pro-PASOK forces in second place (Lytras 1991: 20, Mavrogordatos 1988: 
164-65), was gained by contesting positions in various pre-existing sec­
tional associations, by creating new ones, and using both to win places 
in the GSEBE(E). The key role in this was played by the parties of the 
Left utilising their superior organisation technology and mobilising 
their members and supporters, who enrolled en masse and conquered many 
of these associations by sheer force of numerical superiority. This then 
gave them enhanced representation in the GSEBE(E) confederacy. In the 
meanwhile the new organisations, via lawsuits and other forms of pres­
sure, attempted to become members in the GSEBE(E), with mixed results.
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It was only in the mid-1980s, well after the self-styled socialist 
government of PASOK had came to power, that significant changes were in­
troduced to the organisational structure and voting system of GSEBE(E). 
The ensuing elections brought about spectacular changes in the political 
affiliations of its leadership. In the mid-1980’s the GSEBE(E) came un­
der the control of KKE and PASOK forces; in 1987 the KKE gained complete 
control of it (Lytras 1993: 137). Thereafter the GSEBE(E) was employed 
as an opposition springboard against the government of the day, and in­
cidentally against the Artisans’ Chamber leadership and policies with 
which it was in disagreement (Mavrogordatos 1988: 163-71).10
When PASOK came to office in 1981, the artisans supporting it who 
until then had had an oppositional role function in the voluntary or­
ganisations rivalling the Artisans’ Chambers, the elected pro-PASOK sup­
porters in these Chambers, and the Athens Artisans* Chamber as a whole 
after it came under left-wing control in mid-1980s, all pretty well 
ceased to criticise state policies and lauded PASOK’s alleged pro- 
artisan measures. The supporters of the defeated New Democracy party 
tried to reconquer positions in the state apparatus via both the volun­
tary organisations and the Chambers. In this process they launched suc­
cessive waves of polemic against the socialist onslaught, but they were 
not very successful with the artisans (ibid.).
Despite rhetorical pronouncements by either side, the representa­
tion of artisans interests’ has not substantially improved. Any measures 
taken, supposedly to meet the artisans demands, have been only partial 
and addressed to individual cases rather than to the stratum as a whole; 
they were inherently political trade-offs, aimed to attract 
voters/clients for political party x or y. Their purpose was solely to 
build up each party’s clientelistic power-base.11 This is a very clear 
example of the political superseding and reserving the development of
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the economic. Many of the artisans have come to see these developments 
as a pendulum of competing interests in which their own welfare is of no 
account at all, and which they are powerless to influence. This in­
evitably rather dampened their interest. In recent years they have be­
come increasingly indifferent to what their voluntary or compulsory or­
ganisations may say or do, while the petty-bourgeois tendency amongst 
them towards their ’molecularisation’ has resurfaced.
2.2 Voluntary organisations in the two industries
2.2.a Machinists
Most artisans today are not members of voluntary associations. Of 
the minority who are registered members in some trade-specific voluntary 
organisation body, very few can be considered active, since they do not 
fulfil the minimum criterion of membership, which is to vote and pay the 
dues. The machinists sampled deviate from the norm, however, in that an 
unusually high proportion of the interviewees are active members in such 
an organisation. Out of the 50 machinists, 28 belong to trade-specific 
organisations in Athens and Piraeus (23 artisans, four small employers, 
and one larger employer).12 It is noteworthy that the pertinent associa­
tions are specifically intended to be artisans’ unions, yet the current 
chairman of the important greater Athens Union of Artisan Machinists is 
a fully-blown larger employer/small capitalist.13
The existence of more than one sectoral voluntary organisation is 
due to the incidence of machinists being regional. The two organisations 
are not antithetical but regularly co-operate in the promotion of issues 
of common concern. Members of KKE and PASOK as well as other left­
wingers were particularly active in the creation of both associations, 
but the remaining members, as well as the elected executive staff, are 
affiliated to all of the major political factions. Nevertheless, the two
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associations are widely (and correctly) considered as being largely 
KKE-controlled. Their opponents (interviewees and others) argued that 
these machinists unions as well as similar organisations in other in­
dustries are being used as transmission belts for political propaganda 
by KKE. An important segment of the interviewees and members of the as­
sociation, both ordinary members and elected on the Athens union execu­
tive, are loyal KKE-members or otherwise affiliated with the party, and 
most of them acknowledged that their politics do have an influenced on 
their union-oriented activity. Needless to say, the role played by other 
major political parties (affiliated with the socialist-populist PASOK 
and the conservative New Democracy) in the industry-specific voluntary 
organisations does not diverge from the ’transmission-belt’ type, though 
of course the political objectives differ.
Machinists opposed to board of the Athenian union informed me that 
out of the estimated 1,100 to 1,500 businesses operating in the union’s 
area of responsibility in 1979, only 180 machinists bothered to vote. 
Only 90 of them turned out to then elect the chairman of the union 
(according to interviewee No. 211 who was a member of the association’s 
board for 1979-82). Another machinist claimed that ’out of 1,000 
workshops, only about 45 members were active in the union’ (interviewee 
No. 202) — roughly the same proportion as above. However, according to 
the current chairman of the union, of the roughly 1,000 machining units 
in Athens, 450 are members of the union (interviewee No. 226). It is 
possible that both sides were telling the truth: the nominally regis­
tered individual members may indeed have been in the region of 450, and 
yet far fewer may have voted.
A closer approximation to actual figures may be obtained from a 
register of members published in 1986 for commercial purposes by the 
Athens Union of Artisan Machinists. This mentions only 188 members, al­
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though one would have to expected many more. I was told that the reason 
for this small number was the low response rate among machinists. It may 
be inferred, firstly, that the mass of machinists did not identify with 
that union and preferred not to be associated with it, even though this 
might cost them potential customers. A second inference concerns the 
number of active members ready to participate in seme neutral union- 
sponsored activity (other than voting). Since 188 enterprises were 
listed in the register, then if each business had on average 2 
machinists/partners (as was the case with my own sample) the number of 
machinist members would be 376 at the most; a more modest assessment 
would be around 300. Thirdly, there is the matter of the actual size of 
the machinist businesses. The various estimates give their number be­
tween 1,000 and 1,500. If this is multiplied by two (proprietors/ 
partners), this makes, 2,000 — 3,000 independent machinists in the 
Athens region (see the estimates of Table 7*1)* This would give an or­
ganisational density of the union (active members as a percentage of the 
total number of machinist artisans) in the region of 10 to 15% - quite 
comparable to the national average for artisans and small professionals 
estimated at 15% for the year 1988 (Mavrogordatos 1988: 163).
It must be acknowledged that my sampling took place at a time when 
union membership and influence were at a particularly low ebb. The ques­
tion is why the union has so patently failed to attract or sustain mem­
bers. More to the point: is this an isolated instance, or are artisans 
as a whole not amenable to organised representation?
Like other small producers, machinists working in the isolation of 
their separate workshop and in a competitive market, must do al­
most everything by themselves, or at least actively participate in all 
workshop-related activities. Their immediate circumstances virtually 
force them to assume an individualistic stance. Their mode of work makes
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them avoid activities that are both time-consuming and geared towards 
collective rather that their own immediate interests. However, such an 
explanation, which refers us to what has been termed petty-bourgeois in­
dividualism, does not suffice. At best it only indicates that certain 
(however important) structural determinations influence the machinists’ 
outlook, attitudes or predispositions, in a way broadly analogous to 
their influence on the privatised worker (see Giddens 1993: 228-29; also 
the discussion in Newby 1979: 106-07). The latter’s particular outlook, 
or image of society, is derivative of the influences exerted by local 
circumstances but, though plausible and tenable, not inevitable, since 
the emergence of other factors could have shaped it differently.
It seems to me that the machinists’ relationship to their union is 
better understood if considered in a wider context. This means taking 
into account the element of artisanal individualism as well as the 
machinists' experience of the Athens union, in how far it realised their 
hopes and expectations, and how this came to relate to their attitude to 
the state (already touched upon in the previous chapter).
After 1974, machinists were attracted to the union by the prospect 
of something being done about their problems. The personalities of some 
of the more militant amongst them, who had suffered imprisonment and/or 
exile during the dictatorship (and whom I interviewed), added to the at­
traction, since their past struggles guaranteed their unselfish dedica­
tion to the cause. The new union’s express purpose of discussing issues 
of concern, of proposing solutions, co-ordinating action, and promoting 
the artisans' interests - in a word, its avowed readiness to represent­
ing the machinists’ concerns - looked authentic and attractive. Accord­
ingly, a large number of machinists joined it. At a later date, the 
union even created a supply co-operative to facilitate bulk purchases of
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materials, often imported, which was another indication that it was 
looking after its members.
However, the most important problems affecting machinists - 
whether loans and funding, modernisation of equipment, zoning and 
relocation, protection from foreign competition, participation in state 
bids, upgrading of skills, etc. - could be addressed and solved only by 
involving the state in one way or another. To pursue their particularis­
tic concerns, the sensible thing for the machinists was to strive to 
reason with the responsible state officials, but the over-politicisation 
of state-related activities (due to the prevalent system of 
clientelism), largely ruled out any reasoned approach. The alternative 
was to exert pressure on the state to advance their affairs, but for 
this to be effective they were too few, their importance in the economy 
and society was insufficient, and they had too little spare time to 
devote to fighting for their collective interests. In these cir­
cumstances they opted for uniting with the other sectoral associations 
and the Chambers of Artisans to form a sufficient large body to carry 
some influence and compel the state to take notice. In this they were 
not particularly successful.
Within this larger picture, drawing the union into the partisan 
politics of the opposition Left and PASOK (by political propaganda via 
the ’transmission-belt'), was not conducive either to clearing a path 
that could bring some concrete results for the members of the 
machinists’ union. This was hardly surprising, since the union’s 
militant dissidents focused on criticising the conservative governments 
of the 1970s and early 1980s for not addressing the machinists’ problems 
and for serving the interests of big capital. This approach, garbed in 
hotly militant rhetoric, helped to sever what channels of communication 
there had been, with the result that state functionaries did not recog­
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nise the said union. In the absence of any understanding with the 
responsible state apparatuses, union officers saw the solution of the 
machinists’ difficulties to depend on broad changes, such as a change in 
government or even of the social system. Many machinists slowly became 
disillusioned by the political nit-picking and squabbling between the 
various union factions and the union’s inability to achieve any concrete 
results. Having become estranged they pulled out quietly. To a large ex­
tent their rejection of the union was due to union politics and to the 
dominant faction of the executive who identified with the KKE.14 The 
ever-dwindling members of members created a vicious circle of weakness, 
which more and more reduced, the union’s ability to represent the 
machinists.
A considerable part of the electoral success of PASOK in the 1981 
and 1985 elections was due to the many small business-proprietors and 
artisans who supported it. In return, PASOK as the ruling party at­
tempted to consolidate its electoral base by granting them favours and 
being more open than the previous government to parleying with the 
various small producers associations. In this sense the machinists* 
union got a reprieve, but the fact that it was not controlled by 
unionists of PASOK persuasion, and moreover expressed criticism of the 
new government’s management of artisan affairs, led to the rupture of 
relations. This took the form of outright rejection as a possible 
partner in discussions with the government,15 and led to its further 
isolation by the machinists.
Not only the union, but also the supply co-operative it had 
sponsored fared badly. The interviewees, including members of the union 
board, said that the co-operative had failed to become a vehicle for ar­
tisan development because it could not attract enough members or funds.
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This meant that attempts to supply materials at reduced prices were 
sporadic and insufficient.
When it became obvious that the union could not deliver in the 
here and now what it was supposedly striving for, even left-wing 
machinists lost interest in it. It seems to me that the union failed be­
cause it let itself be involved in party politics, which is to say that 
once again the machinist artisans did not manage to organise 
autonomously. For most machinists the union’s failure is a clear indica­
tion that attempts at collective action are futile, and that all such 
organisations are powerless and transient. This conclusion has helped to 
reinforce the machinists predisposition to seeking individualistic solu­
tions to their problems. At the same time, it has hardened their stance 
to expect ’rain and sunshine’ from the all-powerful state and those who 
controlled it — hence the statolatry.
2.2.b Garment-makers
The garment-makers sample almost entirely follow the norm of non­
participation in voluntary organisations. Only exceptionally do the in­
dependent artisans among them become members of a voluntary sectoral or­
ganisation. At the other extreme, most of the larger employers inter­
viewed do belong to such bodies. Of the 50 interviewees in garment- 
making, 12 are members of the Athens Association of Garment Manufac­
turers (only three were artisans, one small employer, and eight larger 
employers). The Association has about 430 members situated ’mostly in 
Athens’; about 300 have paid their dues and so may be considered as ac­
tive. This figure indicates a very low participation when considering 
that, according to interviewee No. 019,16 the sector’s enterprises in 
the Athens region number approx. 4,500, a figure to be compared with the 
even higher estimates cited earlier in Ch. VII.
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The above-mentioned Association is connected with similar such 
bodies in other cities, e.g. Thessaloniki and Patras, and concentrates 
on informing, co-ordinating, and representing its members. Interviewees 
who are members of the Association gave a very positive appraisal of its 
activity, and pointed out that it is the only one such body the state 
agencies listen to. Critics, on the other hand (non-artisans, and non- 
members) complained that it is a self-serving organisation that should 
be opened up. Artisans and most small employers either consider it to be 
devoid of interest to them, or they do not know of its existence.
It was a leading executive member of the Association who gave me 
useful information about the Association and the sector’s development. 
He said that the garment industry, which developed mainly after 1970, 
consisted of first-generation entrepreneurs. These had been attracted by 
the favourable conjuncture (high profit expectation) from various other 
branches of the economy. He held that those they were neither 
capitalists proper nor high-level experts in the field, nor were they 
textile manufacturers. 'Textile production is more industrialised* in 
the sense of mechanised-automated, while 'garment-making is more ar­
tisanal, labour intensive’; only about 5 to 10% of garment-makers have a 
background in textiles. He said that most newcomers to the industry are 
middle-of-the-road businessmen and middle and low-level managers.17
My interviewee suggested a triple grading of firms in the in­
dustry. Roughly 100 export-oriented enterprises are followed by an in­
termediate stratum of about 400 firms producing for both export and the 
internal market (at a ratio of 60-40). He implied that these two 
categories consist of rather large firms. His third grade is the un­
specified mass of small artisanal enterprises that address the domestic 
market. The Association caters almost exclusively for the larger en­
terprises of a capitalist character and a few firms in the small-
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employers’ group. The bulk of the artisanal and smal1-employer 
businesses of my sample, which do not export but address the local 
market, are left outside the Association. Since none of the interviewees 
mentioned any other pertinent association or union, it appears that most 
of the garment-makers sampled (like the vast majority of small firms in 
that particular industry) do not belong to any relevant voluntary or­
ganisation at all. There is no representation of their interests, and 
they are entirely without a voice.
Particularly disadvantaged by this non-inclusion in collective or­
ganisation and action have been those working on piece-rates, who are 
usually without any form of insurance. Since they are often women of un­
settled family background they can not rely on familial support, the 
traditional bulwark of smal 1-commodity producers, at times of hardship. 
In addition, the threat of subcontractors withdrawing their informal 
contracts effectively disposed of some early attempts at autonomous or­
ganisation. Other, similarly early, hopes at being incorporated in an 
Athens-wide union of employed garment-makers also faded because of the 
fear of artisans taking in put-out work that they might be blacklisted 
by those who supplied them. In any case, the said union had the un­
desirable feature of being KKE-controlled and vociferously political. 
Also of some weight against unionisation was the indifference bordering 
on hostility of the male-dominated trade-union leadership, who consider 
women artisans taking in put-out work not as their class brethren but as 
’nagging’ and ’unstable petty-bourgeois females’. As a consequence of 
this failure to promote horizontal organisations, small firms working on 
piece-rates are completely powerless.
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2.3 The artisans role in their Chambers
The Artisan’s Chambers are compulsory organisations.18 Their legal 
status that of publie-law corporations, expresses their close involve­
ment with the state. It was the state which brought them into existence, 
provided them with the legal framework that made membership in them ef­
fectively compulsory, subsidise them, and intervene in many other ways 
in their operation, such as for instance by legislation on their inter­
nal structure (as in the 1980s). In other words, the state bureaucracy 
maintains a controlling role in the Chambers, and uses them to penetrate 
and coerce civil society. In return, the Chambers have the task to ad­
vise the government on issues pertaining to their members.18
Despite compulsory membership in Artisans’ Chambers, a segment of 
artisans in my sample (5 machinists, or 12.2% of all machinist artisans; 
and 11 garment-makers, or 40.7%) and one smal1-employer in garment- 
making were not registered. They had avoided doing so by refraining from 
applying for a loan, by holding off from any direct imports or exports, 
by not forming a legal company to conduct business, by not keeping offi­
cial accounts for the inspection of which a Chamber certificate of mem­
bership is required, and by generally avoiding all situations for which 
official certificates are required (which certificates are the main 
reasons why other small businessmen did register with their Chamber).
Judging by the number of those who voted in Chamber elections, it 
appears that active artisan participation in the Chambers is limited. 
Among the artisan proprietors, 23 machinists (56% of the sub-sample) and 
4 garment-makers (14.8%), exercised their voting right in the 
Chambers.20 Among the small employers, 5 machinists (83.33%) and 4 
garment-makers (40%) did so, while among the larger employers the 
respective figures were 3 (100%) and 7 (53.8%) - a relatively high
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figure. If this pattern applies more generally, and taking into account 
the earlier mentioned estimate of about 2,000 members voting out of the 
45,000 in the Athens Chamber elections (see Ch. VII, footnote 2), it 
would seem that a disproportionately large number of non-artisans, who 
nevertheless are members of the Artisans' Chambers, elect their own can­
didates and largely take control of them. This is nothing less than an 
organisational outflanking of true artisans, which clearly manifests 
their difficulty, and indeed inability, to organise their own represen­
tation.
Table 10.3
Assessment of Artisans' Chambers, by Type of Proprietor 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-fflakers; in per cent)
ARTISAN S. EMPLOYER L. EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G M G M G M G
Positive 26.3 17.6 16.7 22.2 66.7 46.1 27.6 28.2
Negative 47.3 58.8 33.3 55.5 30.8 42.5 48.7
Neutral 26.3 23.5 50.0 22.2 33.3 23.0 29.8 23.0
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 38 17 6 9 3 13 47 39
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
The interviewees were asked their opinion about the Artisans’ 
Chamber to which they belong (in Athens or Piraeus), and their assess­
ments were grouped as positive, negative, and neutral. As the distribu­
tion in Table 10.3 shows, larger-employer firms much more often than 
smaller ones considered the Chambers in a positive light, and inversely 
saw them less often in negative terms. Most of the smaller businesses, 
on the other hand, did not assessed the Chambers favourably, but said 
they were performing poorly and inefficiently. Antagonism between con­
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tending political factions was one of the main reasons why the respon­
dents, taken as a whole, thought of the Chambers in negative terms; only 
a handful criticised them for being very close to the state.
This close relationship with the state from the very start 
promoted the Chambers’ dependency on it. Instead of becoming, as offi­
cially stipulated, the mechanisms for co-ordinating and overseeing 
strategic planning on artisan affairs, their dependence on central state 
financing and laws that could only be implemented and/or circumvented by 
Ministerial decisions, subjugated the Chamber executives to the govern­
ment of the day. On the other hand, also because of their close 
relationship with the state, the Artisans' Chambers can be used for 
propaganda purposes by political parties contemplating the conquest of 
the central state. One way of doing this is to get their members elected 
to the Chambers’ boards. The forum can then be used to ’expose* the 
government's reputedly anti-popular and anti-artisan line and to promote 
their own as pro-people and pro-artisan. In fact, rather than consider­
ing their Chambers a source of advice, successive Greek governments as 
well as the opposition have succeeded in implicating them in the all-out 
power struggle between them (see Mavrogordatos: 1988: 55-56, 181-89).
In consequence, the Chamber executives have become either mouth­
pieces of the government in power, or opposition springboards for at­
tacks on it. The Chambers' original task of interest representation is 
now hopelessly entangled with partisan intrigue and machinations. As the 
interviewees remarked, even simple and ordinary decisions can become 
political issues which, of course, adversely affects the level of serv­
ices rendered. Such negative development continuously worsens the al­
ready low level of services provided by the Artisans’ Chambers, and fur­
ther aggravate an already intolerable situation.21
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Quite clearly, this situation nullifies the Chambers’ claim that 
they represent artisans and constitute the consultative body on ar­
tisans’ affairs vis-A-vis the government. Furthermore, it has destroyed 
their credibility and estranged them from their artisan members, as is 
seen in the very poor participation of members in the elections for 
counci 1lors.
A good number of my interviewees have come to the conclusion that 
the Chambers have abandoned their proper objectives and ought to 
redefine their purpose - but precisely how, they could not say. Even the 
few respondents who, due to their party-political affiliation with the 
majority of the Chambers’ leadership, are verbose about it and appear 
quite willing to assess it positively, were hesitant about their trade- 
related reasons for identifying themselves with these organisations. 
Quite plainly, the interviewees could not see how, in the particular 
circumstances, the Chambers can help the advancement of their 
businesses. In my own view it is this very uncertainty that gives away 
the fact that the Artisans’ Chambers have never had more than a very 
limited role to play, and have now run into a protracted identity 
crisis.
This is not to deny that, as one councillor (interviewee No. 019) 
for the Athens Chamber of Artisans noted, the Chambers were never 
designed as mechanisms for putting forward their members’ claims. Their 
tasks are limited by official statutes, which is the pretext for their 
formalism and their docile compliance with governmental decisions - and 
which necessarily limits the number of persons that can take an active 
interest in them. In effect, there is a packing capacity constraint. I 
would suggest that if the Chambers acted more independently, which would 
necessarily entail raising actual claims, their members would be ready 
to identify with them and help to support and promote them. Existing
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capacity constraints could then be tackled by organisational re­
arrangements .
The Artisan* Chambers have not solved the problem of representing 
the very small proprietors, and formulation of policies to be pursued 
remains slanted towards the larger so-called ’artisanal* enterprises. As 
things stand, it is obvious that ordinary small artisans are struc­
turally prevented from fully participating in the Chambers. They are not 
only constrained by lack of free time and administrative skills, but 
they are not sufficiently motivated to play an active part in them, e.g. 
by running for office. In other words, their resentment of the existing 
situation, which is on record, goes hand in hand with an unwillingness 
to commit themselves to change what to them seems a situation replete 
with powerful but alien interests. The larger employers, on the one 
hand, who still fall within the inflated official definition of artisans 
and are therefore members of their Chambers, have more time to spare, 
more relevant training and experience, and are better equipped to 
reflect on and plan broader problems - they possess organisational 
skills and experience of manoeuvre in committee meetings, as well as the 
glitter of (relative) success. They also show a greater willingness to 
participate, since their market situation (which as indicated earlier, 
is geared more towards addressing larger firms and more impersonal 
markets), fits well with the connections and advantages they may expect 
from the Chambers. It was undoubtedly factors such as these that brought 
the participation of such pseudo-artisans and virtually excluded the 
true ones.22 In other words, the former have succeeded in outflanking 
the latter, both numerically and organisationally.
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2.4 State bounty for select organisations
The Artisans’ Chambers are not only recipients of central state, 
financing but are also used by the Ministry of Commerce as a channel for 
the distribution of modest sums of cash to select voluntary organisa­
tions. The boards of the Chambers also assist some voluntary organisa­
tions independently (various numbers of the Artisans‘ Issues magazine). 
Obviously the purpose of such transfers of funds is not, as
proclaimed, simply to aid these particular associations’ development, 
but to reward certain organisations politically associated with those in 
power. This indirectly results in a measure of state control over civil 
society. Assistance has also been distributed in other forms, e.g. the 
gratis allocation of office facilities to such organisations (according 
to the official publication of the Athens Artisans’ Chamber Artisans 
Issues, No. 49-50).
There is a recognisable pattern with respect to the sums involved: 
a small first-level organisation will normally receive an annuity of 
100,000 drs, a national sectoral/trade federation 250,000, a body with a 
more significant membership (such as OBSA) 500,000 drs, while the 
GSEBEE, the third-level confederation of all voluntary organisations, 
receives instalments of one or two million drachmas. Since the sums are 
clearly pre-determined on the basis of the level of each particular or­
ganisation, these hand-outs are not accidental but part of a deliberate 
policy. This betrays a particular relationship between the Chambers and 
the central state administration, with the Chambers accepting a role in 
controlling civil society.
The significance of such dealings lies in that, on the one hand, 
they have corrupted the voluntary character of these organisations by 
making possible and/or promoting their bureaucratisation. On the other 
hand, they have cultivated an ethos and practices that tolerate and
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indeed promote the use of the Artisans’ Chambers to support the 
favourite voluntary organisations of whatever government is in power 
(Mavrogordatos 1988: 182 argues along similar lines).
With respect to the voluntary organisations that receive such as­
sistance, the state’s incorporation of artisans does not seem to have 
led to their board members re-thinking the position and role of their 
organisations. Judging by the complaints from such board members, they 
appear to be concerned only with receiving larger state grants. This in­
dicates that the absorption into the state-corporatist nexus has made 
the voluntary associations dependent on state assistance, and are fast 
losing their autonomy. At the same time, the concomitant bureaucratisa- 
tion has estranged them from their ordinary members. This has brought an 
erosion of their ’tribunean’ function,23 in their bargaining position, 
which has estranged the members still further, and so means still weaker 
interest representation of artisans and further dependence.
The role of the Artisans’ Chambers themselves, both in their 
direct dealings with voluntary associations and in terms of administra­
tion and the economy - e.g. supporting sectoral trade fairs, exhibi­
tions, and other commercial activities, issuing the membership certifi­
cates, that are a prerequisite for taking out loans and for exporting or 
importing24 — almost inevitably render them an arena of economic and 
political confrontation. The more control over them makes it possible to 
intervene and influence their members’ business dealings, the greater 
the interest of the political forces in using them as stepping-stones to 
state power. In the process artisans not only do not benefit, but their 
interest representation crumbles.
Generalising from the case of the artisans* compulsory and volun­
tary organi sat ions, it can be said that Greece has very few voluntary 
organisations that do not seek and gratefully receive financial hand­
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outs from the state. In consequence, civil society is weak and adul­
terated, since its depedency has robbed it of autonomous scope and ac­
tion. Indeed, civil society in Greece has to all intents and purposes 
virtually surrendered to the state, in a manner broadly analogous to the 
times of Turkish over lordship. The Ottoman state was not an increment of 
society, but itself constituted society. Also, it did not direct some 
form of progress from above, but strove to maintain the existing rela­
tions in perpetuity. In turn, those positioned within the various state 
apparatuses shared in the power and were perceived as being in a condi­
tion of bliss and grace (see Sarris op cit.). In modern Greece, too, it 
would appear that to a significant extent both individuals and groups 
are concerned with who is to receive the blessings of state boundy, and 
who is to be excluded from its ’liberality*. The state and its personnel 
meanwhile are busily perpetuating their dominance over society. With 
respect to artisans this practice means entrapment of their organisa­
tions which facilitates the stratum’s organisational outflanking.
3. Self-Image and Future Prospects
The present section will look at the attitudes of the sampled in­
terviewees to their trade, their place in it and in society; what expec­
tations they have for the future of their businesses, persons, and 
families; how they envisage the reproduction of their positions, and the 
likely role of their descendants in that process. The survey will help 
us ascertain whether they anticipate to break out their current situa­
tion, or are completely bounded by it. The findings will be useful for a 
more comprehensive assessment of the stratum.
3.1 Appraisals of self and position
With respect to self-appraisal, my concern was to identify to what 
social category the interviewees feel they belong and what they think 
about their work. Their opinions of their own position were gauged by 
the suggestions they put forward on what prospective independents ought 
to do to succeed in a same-trade career.
The subjective approach to class consciousness was a useful way of 
ascertaining the self-image of the respondents. They were shown an 
open-ended list of social categories, classes and other social groups, 
and asked to state to which they think they belong. Table 10.4 shows 
that the category ‘artisan* was overwhelmingly chosen by those we too 
identify as artisans, as well as by small machinists. The categories 
’working person* and ’small and medium’ [entrepreneur! appealed to well 
over a third of the artisanal proprietors and to two-thirds of the small 
employers, half of whom also identified themselves as ’middle class’. 
'Small and medium’, was the category chosen by most larger employers 
(and by all of those in machining) with 'entrepreneur' in second place 
(but again wholly subscribed to by the larger machinist employers). The 
designation ’middle class' was appropriated by half of the sample's 
larger employers.
There were no noteworthy discrepancies between the categories with 
which the respondents themselves identified and what has been designated 
as their objective class position. This consonance reinforces the per­
tinence of the latter.
The category that seems to me to be of particular interest is that 
of 'small and medium’. The pattern of responses indicates that it ap­
pealed to all categories of interviewees, especially so to the larger 
employers who - the reader is reminded - are capitalists. It would ap­
pear that the ’small and medium’ category has special meaning for those
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who see themselves as belonging to it. The larger employers among them 
routinely address and involve themselves with organisations for the 
’small and medium’ (e.g. EOMMEX, Artisans’ Chambers, etc.), convinced 
that this is their right and at least partly unaware of their usurpa­
tion. The artisans and the small employers who also identify with the 
’small and medium’ category do so because that is what they are and that 
is what they are designated as, and because they have not realised the 
take-over of their organisations by the capitalists. Besides, since (as 
we have seen) they can not actively participate in such organisations, 
they have come — each one of them individually - to regard domination of 
these apparatuses by the larger employers as proof of their own in­
feriority, which leads them to withdraw still further.
Table 10.4
Respondents’ Self-selection of Social Category, by Type of Proprietor 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=<iarment-makers)
(in %; more than one option)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
Social Category
1 31.7 29.6 30.9 50.0 30.0 37.5 15.4 12.5 32.0 26.0 29.0
2 2.4 1.5 16.7 20.0 18.7 100.0 61.5 68.8 10.0 20.0 30.0
3 41.5 37.0 39.7 66.7 40.0 50.0 100.0 76.9 81.2 48.0 48.0 48.0
4 11.1 4.4 6.0 3.0
5 80.5 70.3 76.5 83.3 30.0 50.0 23.0 18.7 76.0 50.0 63.0
6 24.4 14.8 20.6 50.0 50.0 50.0 66.7 46.1 50.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
7 7.3 25.9 14.7 16.7 6.2 8.0 14.0 11.0
Social categories:
1: Working people 
2: Ent repreneurs
3: Small and Medium [entrepreneur]
4: Workers 
5: Artisans 
6: Middle class
7: Other (included are one, two or three mentions for each of the categories: 
proletarian, home-worker, producer, family-man, good mother).
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
With respect to their businesses, most interviewees indicated that 
they were generally satisfied with it. The contentment was especially 
high among the machinists (and total for the larger employers among 
them) - as see Table 10.5 A. This must be attributed to the stronger 
craft-element in their work as compared to garment-making, and that it 
is geared more to problem-solving. (Sewing is comparatively routine and 
monotonous.) This hypothesis is confirmed by the answers to what 
satisfies the interviewees most in their work (Table 10.5 B). All 
categories of machinist, said that they take pride in their craftsman­
ship, and that they value the (technical) challenges in the course of 
that work which demand creative solutions. The garment-makers rank lower 
in their choices of pride in workmanship and creativity, although the 
former was chosen by 40% — between 76% who mentioned money, and 34% who 
are pleased to have their own business (the majority of the latter being 
small employers).
The views expressed about what qualifications prospective inde­
pendent artisans ought to have and what they should beware of if they 
want to be successful, allow an appreciation of our sample’s priorities 
and key issues. At the same time these appraisals are an expression of 
the artisans’ attitude to their own trade and position.
The machinist artisans laid heavy emphasis on the importance of 
skill for young artisans wanting to set up independently; skill was 
stressed by 33 out of the 38, or 86.8% of the sub-sample. The suggest­
ions they made for potential newcomers also largely revolved around the 
indispensability of good workmanship. They did not give pride of place 
to the possession of capital, and there were not many references to 
financial matters (in 13.1% of the sub-sample’s responses). It almost 
looks as if they regard capital and financing as the incidental result 
of business performance, which itself depends on the all-important good
m
craftsmanship. The craft element, something the artisans really grasp 
and appreciate, is therefore the criterion of business success as well.
Table 10.5
Respondents * Contentment with their Business, and Reasons 
Given for Work Satisfaction (by Type of Proprietor) 
(Key: M=Machinist, G=Garment-makers, P=Partially, T=Total)
ARTISAN SMALL EMPLOYER LARGER EMPLOYER TOTAL
M G T M G T M G T M G T
A. Content with Business (out of 100)
Yes N 35 16 51 5 8 13 3 6 9 43 30 73
% 85.4 59.3 75.0 83.3 80.0 81.2 100.0 46.1 56.2 86.0 60.0 73.0
P N 5 7 12 1 2 3 5 5 6 14 20
% 12.2 25.9 17.6 16.7 20.0 18.8 38.5 31.3 12.0 28.0 20.0
No N 1 4 5 2 2 1 6 7
% 2.4 14.8 7.3 15.4 12.5 2.0 12.0 7.0
T N 41 27 68 6 10 16 3 13 16 50 50 100
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
B. Reasons Given for Work Satisfaction (in %; more than one option)
1 68.3 77.8 72.0 50.0 80.0 68.7 66.7 69.2 68.7 66.0 76.0 71.0
2 17.0 17.6 14.7 40.0 25.0 33.3 38.5 37.5 16.0 24.0 20.0
3 29.2 33.3 30.8 16.7 50.0 50.0 33.3 23.0 25.0 32.0 34.0 33.0
4 63.4 37.0 52.9 66.7 50.0 56.2 66.7 38.5 43.7 64.0 40.0 52.0
5 97.5 25.9 69.1 66.7 40.0 50.0 33.3 23.0 25.0 90.0 28.0 59.0
6 17.0 3.7 11.7 14.0 2.0 8.0
7 24.4 14.7 33.3 12.5 24.0 12.0
8 14.6 18.5 16.1 50.0 18.7 53.8 43.7 18.0 24.0 21.0
Reasons (grouped from the responses given to an open-ended question): 
1: money
2: social position (elevated)
3: pride in setting-up a business, being your own boss 
4: creativity
5: pride in own craftsmanship 
6: research opportunities 
7: challenge 
8: miscellaneous
Percentile figures rounded to the nearest digit; computations mine.
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The emphasis on skill and craftsmanship is somewhat less among the 
artisans in garment-making (mentioned in 19 out of 27 cases, or 70.3%), 
and greater importance than among machinists is given to the possession 
of capital and to broader financial issues (mentioned by 33.3%). This 
seems to reflect the different roles capital plays in two trades: in
garment-making (but certainly not in machining) it is quite possible to 
set up a small business without the founder having to be a craft-worker.
The small employers in both trades laid less emphasis on the per­
sonal skills of would-be independents, and more on the ability to work 
hard. On the other hand, they did stress the importance of capital when 
suggesting what business strategies newcomers should follow. The larger 
employers did not mention personal skilfulness at all, and concentrated 
altogether on business strategy, on ’not missing the target, that’s to 
say profit-making’ (interviewee No. 221). This suggests that as business 
survival becomes independent of the proprietor himself having a hand in 
production, the road to success is seen as more dependent on economic 
calculation and the market. For some of the small and certainly for the 
larger employers (but not the artisans), ’success’ is not the same as 
survival through manual work, and this is an important difference.
3.2 Future prospects and the reproduction of artisans
The targets the interviewees set for their enterprises show that 
many of the artisans amongst them intend to expand their business; the 
remainder are content with keeping things as they are. For those en­
visaging growth, it was seen more as a defensive strategy, as a re­
action rather than a choice meant to ensure survival in view of the ex­
pected intensification of competition. Many of the artisans said that 
this eventuality worried them, and made them feel insecure when they 
thought of the future. They hoped to deal with the situation by upgrad-
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ing their machinery and resorting more to mass-production, but these 
were still just vague plans. It seems clear that they are not seriously 
oriented towards breaking out of and superseding the conditions that 
characterise simp1e-commodity production. This lack of serious prepara­
tion for the future of their business implies that after all, and 
despite the concern they had voiced, the artisans are not all that much 
troubled about it and/or think they will manage — by reverting to wage- 
labour if worse comes to worst, or because the smallness of their en­
terprise will cushion them against competitive pressure from large 
manufacturers. These, reasons, as well as the existing constraints to 
expansion (technological, organisational, subjective, etc., already dis­
cussed earlier) imply that whenever targets get set for the future they 
are very loosely adhered to. At best, the anticipated expansion may 
bring a measure of belated modernising the equipment so as to catch up
with competition. At worst, the plans, tentative in any case, will be
abandoned.
By contrast, the larger employers are much more prepared to plan a 
course of action, although they too are preoccupied with the uncertainty 
as to how things will develop as the result of stronger competition due 
to the country’s full integration with the EU. Some of the small 
employers as wel 1 as other interviewees think of expanding via commer­
cial isat ion but the prospects for doing so are few.
It may be argued that if this is what those standing between the
SCP and CMP think about expansion, or those who want to move from one 
type of productive unit to another, or who find commercialisation a 
feasible strategy, artisans by implication have virtually no real chance 
of changing their situation through becoming capitalists, either via 
production or commerce. They are certainly aware of the severe dif­
ficulties of an overall expansion, in other words of the transition
towards the CMP, and this in part part explains why they do not harbour 
any aggressive plans for the future. We may conclude that in consequence 
the mobility trajectory of the vast majority of artisans and small 
employers, is based on individual skill (the reader is reminded that 
most of the smaller employers had wage-earning backgrounds and became 
proprietors by largely relying on their own skilled work), reached its 
highest point when they became independent proprietors and masters of 
their own business. It cannot go further than that.
One way of handling the problem of what to do with business en­
terprises when their proprietors retire is to transfer it to the next 
generation which is a process of intergenerational continuity. In fact, 
42% of the interviewees said their offspring would take over their busi­
ness or a share of it. A further 37% thought retirement was too far away 
to make any plans and had not thought what to do with their business. 
However, a 13% group composed solely of artisans said they will sell 
their business to their partner or to workers, who can thus raise them­
selves to the status of business proprietor; a further 8%, again all ar­
tisans, announced that they will never stop working. When they die the 
business goes too.
If the potential for intergenerational continuity actually 
materialises at the high rates the interviewees mentioned, this will 
mean that the artisanal stratum will reproduce itself to a significant 
extent. It would also indicate a tendency of the artisanate becoming 
less and less capable of upward mobility. On the other hand, many of the 
artisans anticipated or were in the process of watching their children 
becoming educated. This may mean that eventually their offspring will 
enter the family business in a white-collar capacity. If the parent’s 
unit is large enough, this ’combination of formal education, manual 
skills, and practical experience [would be] ideal for the creation of
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dynamic flexible enterprises’ (Piore and Sabel 1984: 293). But of the 
one-hundred businesses surveyed, only one fits this description (one of 
the larger machinist concerns). In default of this solution, the edu­
cated offspring may opt for white-collar work elsewhere, which would 
mean severing her/his ties with the family business. In such a case the 
life of the parent’s business will come to an end, and that would con­
firm that the purpose of its establishment and maintenance was not ac­
cumulation but providing a living for the artisan-proprietor and family.
The explanation of why the interviewees want or do not want their 
children to follow in the family tradition allow us a further insight 
into their views on their work and their expectations.
Artisans and small employers in both trades emphasise the 
’settled’ character of their occupation. The artisans in particular said 
that by joining them their offspring were guaranteed a job and, by ex­
tension, a livelihood. Read backwards this reveals that they are preoc­
cupied with survival and subsistence — which is understandable in view 
of their background. The same element, but also a more positive ap­
praisal of the wealth-creating potential of their businesses, as well as 
the psychological aspect of continuity, are the prevailing themes in the 
answers given by the larger employers and to a lesser extent by the 
small ones too.
Gender plays an important role in the preferences and dislikes ex­
pressed. Machinist respondents with daughters exclude them from joining 
their workshop, while those with sons welcome them with open arms. On 
the other hand, in garment-making girls are considered as very suitable 
for the trade, while no obstacles are put in the way of boys who wish to 
join.
The widely noted concern of the interviewees for their children’s 
education deserves further comment. It is a marked feature of Greek
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society to pursue education for the purpose of eventually obtaining 
credentials that will be used to secure an appropriate non-manual posi­
tion (Tsoukalas 1982; Theodorakopoulos 1978). What is remarkable in our 
case is not that the better-off among the sampled should want to educate 
their children, but that there are some (only a few, it is true) indica­
tions that artisans and semi-artisanal small employers are doing 
likewise. Given the universal high esteem for graduates in Greece, this 
suggests a raised status for them and by extension for their family.
A final point on the ambitions artisan families have for their 
children, since this reflects how they perceive their own position. Ac­
cording to Cavounidis (1985), these ambitions often take the form of 
dreams of upward social mobility which, she points out, is considered so 
important that parents feel compelled to make sacrifices to help their 
children achieve it. Cavounidis reports that the garment-maker artisans 
she researched in Nea Ionia (an industrial suburb of Athens) thought 
manual work as anathema, and aspired of a ’clean* career in the service 
sector for their children. This view seems to me partial and exag­
gerated. When in my own research I was given similar answers, it was 
only from some of the garment homeworkers who formed the last link in 
the chain in putting-out networks; they resented the hardship, the 
sweating, they suffering. Their views reflect the more proletarianised 
and unprotected segment in the category of independent artisans, those 
whose position is not substantially different from that of ordinary 
wage-workers; it does not extend to the remaining garment-makers who 
were content with their work and position.
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Similarly and even more so, machinists place a premium on hard 
manual work. Since their independent position was achieved precisely by 
means of hard work, hard work must clearly involve an element of upward 
mobility. It is difficult to see how they themselves would denignate it 
so totally as Cavounidis says they do when she reports them to consider 
their life’s achievements with contempt, as anathema, and so vehemently 
despise it as a work prospect for their children. The work must cer­
tainly have been exhausting at times, and of course they would hope 
their children to have a future which could dispense with such hard 
labour and might even raise them further up the social ladder. But, 
dreams and wishes aside, there is ample evidence that artisans appraise 
their children’s future and their own position and type of work far more 
realistically.
Conclusion
1. Prior to 1990, about half of the artisan-proprietors and many more 
of the other two categories of interviewees experienced a rather 
moderate economic expansion, due to different reasons, and manifesting 
itself in different ways for each producer group. With regard to the 
smaller establishments it was not sufficient to change their overall 
situation, or even minimally prepare them for an eventual 'lift off’. 
The status quo remained unaffected.
One reason why that expansion was so moderate lies in the very 
limited innovative activity of small businesses, particularly those of 
garment-making artisans who do not innovate at all. For them, economic 
growth is more than anything a matter of external market influences that 
have proved exploitable. But even the artisan machinists, who do have an 
aptitude for innovation could not make good use of favourable cir­
cumstances. This may be attributed to the absence of a number of exter-
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rial factors, such as a co-operative social network, the relevant legal 
framework and state assistance, suitable business practices, etc. In ad­
dition, the structures of the industry as well as the market had am ad­
verse impact and effectively blocked the emergence of innovations.
Even when it was possible to develop innovations, they were more 
an individual achievement and less a social process; accordingly, their 
impact was not widely felt. In any case, the high costs are forbidding 
and, in combination to the irrelevance of existing support schemes, do 
not make innovations a viable option to pursue. Ihe existing innovative 
potential has remained undeveloped and, since it cannot be employed for 
expansion and accumulation, it is being used ad hoc for the simple sur­
vival of small craft-work units.
Artisans and other small producers showing no inclination to 
upgrade their technical and organisational-managerial skill level also 
affected expansion adversely. Neither are they modernising their 
machinery and equipment, or only very infrequently, nor do they strive 
to bring their production in line with contemporary technological 
developments. In other words, they demonstrate a marked difficulty in 
adapting to change, which I attribute to their background (educational 
and social). This means that artisans are not able to face up the com­
petition aggressively, and whatever expansion they might undergo will 
rest on such rickety foundations that it is bound to topple at the first 
puff of adversity.
2. Voluntary organisations to some extent and Artisans* Chambers more 
so have at least in part been sustained and influenced by extensive 
state intervention. This means that the producers’ associations, in 
which participation is slim, have not been allowed to promote their mem­
bers’ interests autonomously. The situation is similar with the Ar­
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tisans’ Chambers, where state intervention is also heavy. As a matter of 
fact it is not at all clear whether interest representation was ever the 
real reason for their existence and continuing operation, or whether 
from the beginning they were intended as a mechanism for controlled in­
corporation. This feature of state intervention is no doubt related to 
the fact that there has been no collective action by artisans. In this, 
the isolated circumstances of their economic life should be considered 
an inhibiting factor.
State intervention in artisanal affairs lags substantially behind 
what artisans themselves say they require. They were certainly never 
given any strategic guidance towards a "Third Italy" type of incorpora­
tion or any other clear plan for their future. Despite these serious 
drawbacks and considerable misgivings about the state’s benevolence, for 
the artisans the state and its various apparatuses remains the only 
authority that can offer any kind of solution to their problems. 
However, seeking assistance from the relevant state apparatus, has made 
them become engulfed in a dependency nexus.
State tutelage of artisans is founded on a mixture of incorpora- 
tive and/or exclusionist tactics. These had for long been instrumental 
in channelling, guiding, countering or thawing any civi 1-society type of 
organisation, depending on whether it was loyal to the government of the 
day. Moreover, artisans were and are systematically outflanked, largely 
because of the state’s definition of who may officially be considered an 
artisan. The impact of this can be seen in the gap between the social 
composition of the Artisans’ Chambers membership and that of their 
boards, by who has access to loans and other services, and by the over­
all direction of Chamber policies.
Organisational outflanking has also been evident in the many 
voluntary organisations whose politically motivated leaderships remain
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true to the logic of statism. In fact such organisations are frequently 
used to conquer positions in the state apparatuses so as to assist their 
own political party. All in all, artisans lack an autonomous voice and 
as they cannot represent themselves, must leave their interests to be 
mediated by others.
The constraints imposed by the combination of organisational and 
political tutelage has effectively discouraged the artisans from any 
kind of collective action. As separate and isolated individuals 
/enterprises they have no option but to have recourse to such 
authorities as seem likely to be able to help. The result of this orien­
tation is even stronger individualism combined with statolatry.
3. The artisans self-appraisal gives us an accurate assessment of 
their current position and potential. Their hopes are modest. The ar­
tisans see their position as an achieved end-station with which they are 
quite content, (an appraisal that is in conformity with their non- 
proprietor background, work trajectory, and age), and their future 
aspirations are strongly determined by the wish to consolidate them­
selves in their position. Expansion towards capitalism is not only a 
practical impossibility, but due to lack of capital and technical and 
managerial skills and also because of their advancing age they do not 
even find it desirable. This means that only through their offspring, 
intergenerational ly, might artisans be considered as having a potential 
for accumulation, but in practice they do not appear to really harbour 
any such hopes. They were only a few instances in the sample of an 
educational-status intergenerational mobility, which means little in 
terms of upward class mobility. On the other hand it appears that a sub­
stantial minority of artisans has placed or intends to place their
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children in their businesses. Such reproduction of the artisanal stratum 
increasingly from within indicates processes of closure.
In this chapter it has been possible to establish that the ar­
tisans sampled have been affected by a number of constraints setting 
limits to their (individual) expansion towards full-blown capitalism. A 
number of these constraints originate from social environments exogenous 
to the artisans and which operate at both micro and macro level. Their 
impact trickles down until it bears upon the isolated artisan and 
his/her unit. On the other hand, other constraints may for analytical 
purposes be identified as arising from grass-roots level, from the cir­
cumstances in which individual artisans find themselves, from their 
background, from the work and market situation, and from the micro- 
organisational and other features of their enterprise.
Taken together, individual micro and macro situations/constraints 
interact to delineate what actions are possible for artisans. The rup­
ture of these limits by less than a handful of them does not invalidate 
them. But while it confirms their general applicability, it at the same 
time demonstrates that human ingenuity may manoeuvre through and even 
shake off the rigidity of structures.
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Notes to Chapter X
1. The reader is reminded that information obtained from the inter­
viewees is arranged on the basis of the categories into which these have 
been allocated: artisan, small employer and larger employer. The latter 
are fully blown capitalists and are contrasted to artisans; those desig­
nated as small employers are of a mixed type (see Ch. VIII).
2. For present purposes innovation is defined as:
’the successful introduction into the [national 1 market of new or 
improved products that have been invented or perfected by [an] en­
terprise, and/or the application in production of new or improved 
processes [and designs] invented or perfected by the enterprise* 
(Babanasis et al.\ 914).
(By contrast invention entails the development of an idea for a product, 
short of its introduction into the market.)
The usefulness of this working definition of innovation is that it 
restricts the term to production only, excluding organisational, market, 
and other types of innovation. It also facilitates minor and incremental 
innovations, and comparisons relevant to our subject-matter.
The particular definition was formulated in the context of a research 
project in the micro-electronics industry in Greece in which I took 
part. In the formulation of this definition a number of works on innova­
tion were consulted, including E. M. Rogers (1962), Innovatienota 
(mentioned in Kok and Pellenbarg (1987: 147), M. D. Thomas (1987), Nel­
son and Winter (34; p.48), and C. Freeman (1988; 1989).
3. The vagueness concerning the number of innovations interviewees have 
developed (they showed that this was more than one by using the collo­
quial term patents in the plural), and the extent of their use, indi­
cates that they do not hold them in great esteem.
4. ’Experience* was the key-word in 12 out of the 22 available accounts 
on how innovations were developed, of which 9 pertained to artisans and 
3 to small employers.
5. Until a few years ago the Greek patent law offered only very limited 
protection. This has changed with the passing of a new law which has 
aligned the country’s legal patent and copyright framework with that of 
the European Union. Nevertheless, interviewees continued to consider the 
protection of patents as very restricted, and this negative appraisal 
continues to influence their attitude and actions.
Respondents who said that they innovated, and in particular 
machinists, claimed that if they showed their innovation to a fellow 
machinist, in all probability he would not copy it out of camaraderie. I
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was told that this was not merely a manifestation of craft solidarity, 
but because an experienced machinist, having seen a particular item, can 
identify the person who has crafted it; this meant that copiers can be 
identified. When somebody has made an innovation of some importance, al­
most everyone in the industry knows whose product it is and what 
machinery is made with, so that in a sense and informally ’one registers 
one’s name, one builds up one’s professional reputation (interviewee No. 
242). Accordingly, public opinion among the machinists would act as an 
informal mechanism of social control isolating the copier, who is con­
sidered as scum and ostracised. Therefore, such unofficial patenting, 
i.e. recourse to among confreres honour, easy identification, and the 
threat of isolation act as disincentives, and curb the temptation of un­
authorised copying of innovations. The situation is entirely different 
with foreign products however, against which no formal or informal 
restrictions apply.
In view of this tradition, machinists were not worried about being 
copied by their like. They were, however, concerned that some impersonal 
’big’ and powerful corporation, preferably foreign, able to afford 
kick-backs to employees of a state organisation such as the patent of­
fice, might obtain the blue-prints of their invention in order to modify 
them. Such conspiracy stories widely circulating amongst machinists, 
betray an attitude of awe toward the ’big* and the ’foreign*; compared 
to them the smaller machinists feel inadequate. To their way of think­
ing, even just applying for an official patent is the surest way for 
such imaginary competitors to steal their solution.
6. The exception was a larger employer unit in machining with a 
workforce of 54 that was organised and well-connected, and utilised the 
most up-to-date technologies. The company received some technical assis­
tance from ELOT, the state-agency for standards.
7. In fact some of the courses/seminars being offered definitely are not 
intended for artisans, for instance those concerned with disseminating 
Taylorist principles of work such as seminars on time-and-motion 
measurement (Artisans Issues, various numbers); or those whose subject- 
matter is too theoretical and technically complex, and so irrelevant to 
their needs.
8. Members signed up as individuals, not as business representatives as 
was the case with the Artisans’ Chambers.
9. Very prominent among such themes was the claim that Greece’s full EEC 
membership would mean bankruptcy for many thousands of small uncompeti­
tive businesses. They would not, so the opposition parties argued, be 
able to withstand the unfettered foreign competition and would crumble 
in the absence of tariff protection and other state support. Other nega­
tive subjects mentioned were the disarray within the TEBE and its lack 
of service to artisans, or the difficulties in securing loans. Some
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positive action as well as broader issues were also raised, but these 
too only as part and parcel of the anticipated destruction of artisanal 
and other small businessmen (see various issues of the journal News of 
EBE.
10. In the middle to late 1980’s, the KKE-controlled GSEBEE obtained 
notoriety for offering pay increases in excess to those demanded by the 
socialist-controlled workers’ co-federation (GSEE) during the annual ne­
gotiations on pay raises between employer and employee associations. The 
GSEE was keeping in line with the socialist government’s austerity 
program. A contretemps came about when the employer organisation offered 
to pay more, but the employees’ representatives wished to receive less 
(Mavrogordatos 1988).
11. When I was conducting my pilot study I interviewed the spokesman for 
artisans and various shopkeepers for the KKE of the Interior (Greece 
then had two Communist parties, the other being more Moscow-oriented). 
He acknowledged that his party was taking an active role in organising 
industry-specific proprietors’ associations, not because it considered 
them a revolutionary force (even though envisioning the middle strata as 
future allies), but simply because the partly had members and supporters 
among them and had to preserve them as such. If his party were to be 
seen as unconcerned with their interests, there was a real danger of 
them defecting to other parties that exhibited a higher level of active 
interest. He claimed that the other parties had similar motives - which 
I think was probably correct.
It should be mentioned that the KKE, which professed an insurrection­
ary approach to what it termed ’socialism', was trying to assuage the 
small proprietors’ fear of being expropriated if that party should come 
to power one day. The KKE went to some lengths to appease such anxieties 
by absolving artisans and their like from the stigma of being exploiters 
of labour, and insisted that the fact that they employed hired labour 
did not and could not alter their position as more or less permanent 
allies of the ’vanguard’ working class (Kortzidis 1991: 3-6).
12. Out of the 28 machinists who said they are members in a voluntary 
sectoral organisation, 25 belong to the Union of Artisan Machinists' of 
Athens and the Environs, two of the other three to the Union of Piraeus 
Metal-workers, and the last to the Union of Piraeus Iron-workers.
13. The take-over of trade and craft-based associations and unions by 
small capitalists appears not to be rare. Lyberaki also notes that in 
the Athens-based Producers Union of Metal Products and Construction two 
factions have emerged, the ’dynamic’ one (for which read small 
capitalists) and the ’traditional’ producers; the former has succeeded 
in dominating the union’s board (1991: 208-11).
14. That was the view of the opponents of the union leadership, but
409
uni on-board members' too acknowledged that the close relationship with 
the party had alienated many machinists. As one of them, a KKE-member, 
said: ’Being pro-KKE party-partisan is hardly evidence of the unions
industry-specific character’ (interviewee No. 244).
15. I was told by a militant ex-chairman of the board (and a KKE member) 
that on one occasion when he was chairman the union executive had 
managed to meet with the responsible Minister to discuss issues of im­
portance to the machinists. But just before the beginning of delibera­
tions the Minister disputed their contention of being representative of 
the trade by pointing out the extremely small number of voters in the 
union elections. Some heated exchanges followed and promptly put an end 
to any possible progress. This event intensified the problem of limited 
participation, and led to even more embittered disputes between contend­
ing political factions, which in turn further alienated members from ac­
tive participation.
16. Interviewee No. 019 participated in the board of the Association of 
Garment Manufacturers and was also a member in the Health Council of the 
Labour Inspectorate, therefore could be considered a reliable source and 
might well be in possession of some inside information.
17. My informant noted that the non-specialist origin of garment-makers 
has reduced the probability for a nucleus of fashion designers to 
emerge. Yet, the development of indigenous fashion designs appealing to 
the international market is considered to be of paramount importance, 
and absolutely necessary if the industry as a whole is to cope effec­
tively with the ongoing processes which only further enhance competi­
tion: namely, the restructuring of the industry world-wide, and the 
transition towards unmitigated international trade liberalisation. This 
discrepancy seriously hampers future prospects for the sector.
18. One would expect that, because of the compulsory membership in Ar­
tisans Chambers, the much more numerous very small concerns would 
dominate. However, the larger and stronger members are usually better 
able to organisationally outflank the smaller and weaker (see Mann 
1986). In the case of the Artisans’ Chambers, the inflated definition of 
’artisan’ which allows up to 49 employees in this category has made mem­
bers the owners of manufacturing concerns meeting that upper mark of the 
official definition, which are out-and-out capitalistic. Other criteria 
of inclusion are a broadly defined personal involvement of the business 
proprietor(s) in the enterprise, and an upper limit to the annual gross 
turnover, which is reviewed annually. Furthermore, a number of even 
larger firms have been identified as members of the Athens Chamber of 
Artisans, in direct contravention of even the inflated definition of 
what is ’artisanal’.
These top-heavy ’artisans’ are in reality small and medium-sized 
capitalist proprietors. By joining the Artisans’ Chambers they can and
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do use their power to outflank the mass of the much smaller and true ar­
tisanal units. In consequence, the mass of artisans is subordinated and 
under-represented in favour of the much more powerful and vociferous 
larger businesses — which as shown later in this subsection, have been 
extremely successful in controlling the Chambers. They in fact have 
reaped disproportionately more benefits than they are entitled to under 
their Chamber membership.
19. The official tasks of the Chambers is the study of problems affect­
ing their members, on the. basis of which they offer advice to the 
government. They also support their members by providing them with a 
number of services.
20. The reader is reminded that the machinist artisans interviewed were 
exceptions to the norm for trade-specific organisations.
21. Respondents regularly complained about the bureaucratic entangle­
ments in which they were caught up, even for the most trivial matters. 
Some of them said that red tape is a self-perpetuating device, of the 
Chamber officials; others attributed it to the Chambers’ organisational 
ineptitude.
Red tape goes hand in hand with closure tactics, which at times as­
sume a highly pretentious legalism and formalism. I personally witnessed 
this lethal combination in operation during my vain attempts in 1986-87 
to obtain basic information from the Athens Artisans’ Chamber about the 
number of its members and such-like.
22. The evidence comes from my investigation in the ’Who’s who’ of the 
elected councillors in the Athens Artisans Chamber.
23. On G. Lavaus’ concept of tribunean function see Diamantopoulos 1989: 
137-39).
24. Membership certificates also entitle a small business to exemption 
from paying V.A.T. when buying machinery and to taking out low-interest 
artisans’ loans.
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CHAPTER XI - CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation has been an attempt to answer the question why 
contemporary artisans in Greece, instead of declining as was expected, 
have made a very significant come-back. As a result of this, a substan­
tial segment of manufacturing has remained in the hands of petty 
producers, despite the country’s overall capitalist development. In this 
concluding chapter I shall present a resume of points that explain the 
specificity of Greek artisans.
At this point I should note that the pattern of answers obtained 
in the course of the field-work from artisan interviewees in machining 
and garment-making is broadly similar; industry-specific variation does 
not substantially affect their formation or basic features. This means 
that the basic profile of artisanship that has emerged has wider ap­
plicability. The pattern of answers also verifies that indeed larger 
employers are qualitatively different from artisans, in social terms 
they are small capitalists, while small employers do indeed stand in- 
between.
Despite the disparity of the circumstances to which the term ar­
tisan has been applied, it does make sense to use it for describing in­
dependent manufacturers who own their means of production and who take 
part themselves in the production process. Artisans invariably were and 
are apprenticed in their trade, and their chief resource is possession 
of the skills that allow them to work with the tools and machinery that 
are customary or generally available in their craft at any given his­
torical period. Since artisans depend on their own and family labour, 
they are involved with simp 1 e-commodity production CSCP), and do not
412
practise or aim at accumulation; the objective of their manufacturing is 
to acquire a basic standard of living. In class terms and despite inter­
nal (craft-based) fragmentation, artisans may be regarded as a stratum 
that is part of the petty bourgeoisie (see Ch. I).
Social formations that developed late did not follow the classical 
capitalist episode of change. In some instances as older forms of 
production were being pushed out of existence by capitalism, simple- 
commodity production sprung from their remnants. In others, pre-existing 
or newly emergent simple-commodity producers responded to the advance of 
capitalism by redoubling their own efforts, mobilising the nuclear 
family’s labour and on occasion that of extended kin too, by cutting 
down on their own consumption and by intensifying the production of com­
modities. The outcome of all this, conditional on the particular context 
and the conjunction, is that frequently capitalist firms coexist with 
SCP businesses, and sometimes the latter even compete successfully with 
the former.
In Greece, in the turmoil of the 1940s, during the country’s oc­
cupation by the Axis powers and the civil war afterwards, artisans al­
most doubled their numbers, and in a way strengthened their position. 
The ruination and disarticulation of domestic large manufacturing and 
the economy as a whole at first provided them with fresh opportunities, 
because they could make repairs and produce a variety of different 
goods. Until the early 1950s, reconstruction in Greece was much slower 
than in other war-ravaged countries of Europe, due to the civil-war, to 
the economic elite concentrating on commercial and financial activities,
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regime instability, and the particular development choices that were 
made. Such economic recovery as was achieved involved a reconstitution 
of the lop-sided pre-war industrial structure in exacerbated form. This 
situation again advantaged the artisans, who once again could fill the 
gap and meet the needs of the pauperised populace for cheap light goods 
and repairs.
Becoming an independent (self-financed) artisan during that period 
meant opting for an occupation that could potentially sustain those with 
skills who were suffering from the drop in real wages, unemployment and 
the overall vicissitudes of those violent years. It could also be a 
refuge from political persecution (by migration to the relative 
anonymity of the big cities), and an individual escape from capitalism. 
All in all, the artisanal resurgence in Greece was a spontaneous and un­
coordinated process triggered by the particular structure of the situa­
tion.
The artisans’ proliferation in Greece is due to more than the 
country’s limited and lop-sided industrialisation. It is also a result 
of the lateness of the attempt to industrialise. The particular timing 
of the more systematic of these attempts in the late 1940s/early 1950s 
meant that latecomers to the industrialising experience (such as Greece) 
found it very difficult if not outright impossible to follow in the 
footsteps of earlier industrialisers. The late developers, especially if 
they were small and/or weak countries, had to manoeuvre in an interna­
tional context where a number of more powerful and advanced capitalist 
countries had already imposed an international division of labour ap­
propriate to their own needs and purposes.
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Moreover, in Greece the situation was aggravated by the fact that 
planning, whether by the state or individual capitalists, was program­
matically self-defeating. As a side-effect of their choice to base the 
task of industrialising the country on the Marshall Plan, they seemed 
deliberately to abstain from mobilising the available indigenous 
resources. Under the Marshall Plan (see Ch. IV) Greece could do very 
little on her own, and industrialisation was left in the hands of for­
eign investors - who did not respond to the invitation, or did so only 
belatedly. Meanwhile national markets were thrown open to foreign im­
ports of goods not produced in the country, making local manufacture of 
similar goods non-competitive and their development problematic. The 
process was nevertheless pursued for reasons that had to do with those 
in power wishing to be seen by their foreign political mentors to adhere 
to the economic ideologies of free trade and a free market, perceived to 
accommodate the problem of modernisation by the diffusion of market 
forces. The timing of Greece’s development effort and its relative late­
ness, therefore, as well as the particular path followed thereafter, 
should be understood as important structural constraints to the scope of 
development, and inter alia as providing ample market opportunities for 
the artisans.
By the early 1950s reconstruction in Greece was more or less com­
plete, and state authority had been re-imposed. Since the anticipated 
large-scale industrialisation seemed reluctant to materialise, the ar­
tisans’ continuing expansion became more noticeable. The state was 
finally obliged to recognise that they helped to keep down unemployment, 
supplied markets with a wide range of cheap goods, and that were even 
ideologically of some importance, since they exemplified the vitality of 
the free-market economy. Their existence could be said to strengthen the 
social base of the regime. So, while state officials mistrusted artisans
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who originated from the insurgent working class, and held fast to their 
view that the coming industrialisation was certain to bring their 
demise, they half-heartedly acknowledged their existence.
Despite the economy’s expansion, industrialisation (largely 
foreign-induced) did not come about until the 1960s. By focusing very 
largely on the technologically unsophisticated branches of light 
manufacturing, it had few backward linkages, was capital-intensive, 
produced limited value-added, lacked research and development and so was 
not the least innovative. At the same time it did not lead to either ex­
tensive proletarianisation of the labour force, nor to any diminution of 
the artisanal sector. As a matter of fact, the artisans experienced yet 
another expansion, which reflected the successful mechanisation 
/modernisation of their workshops. The extensive type of growth that 
Greece was undergoing in the particular (quasi-protectionist) cir­
cumstances made it possible for highly inefficient larger firms to sur­
vive and prosper. Competition in this live-and-let-live atmosphere was 
very limited, because it was economically unsound for the large manufac­
turers to compete for the minute market share of the artisans, who were 
therefore left undisturbed for the most part.
The expectations that Greece’s Association Agreement with the EEC 
and the opening-up of the economy to market forces would instigate mod­
ernisation and greater competition were not realised, because for 
political reasons the link-up with Greece under the Colonels’ dictator­
ship was frozen until 1974-75. Restricted foreign competition meant that 
artisans could continue to supply their little market niches and co­
exist peacefully with larger producers. This situation continued even 
after 1975 until at least 1985 (Mitsos 1989), despite periodic crises of
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accumulation, and despite Greece’s progressive accession to the EEC and 
the very gradual insertion of an element of competition into the 
country’s economy as a whole. Again, the refusal of the artisanate to 
lie down and die should be attributed to the existing situation in 
manufacturing, where challenging the domain of artisans in certain 
branches and low-grade markets would have been not only arduous and un­
sound for individual capitalist units, but also an undertaking without 
government support. In addition, the view could nor be discounted that 
small enterprises, especially the newer ones among them, could cope with 
crises more effectively than larger firms because of their greater 
flexibility (Lyberaki 1988).
While it is true that capitalist firms have attempted to incor­
porate certain artisans through subcontracting, such attempts have been 
limited to putting-out in some branches only. In fact, it was not pos­
sible for relations between the two sides to have progressed much beyond 
that, because the capitalist sector, impaired by organisational back­
wardness and the virtual absence of whole branches indispensable for a 
true broadening of industrialisation (e.g. machine manufacturing), pos­
sessed only very limited endogenous dynamism from which the artisans 
might have benefited. An example of the impotence of indigenous 
capitalist firms to forge ties with artisans and obtain their collabora­
tion is that all the machinery used by the latter is imported, because 
Greek manufacturers cannot make it. This contrasts with the situation in 
advanced capitalism, where the indigenous capitalist sector supplies ar­
tisans and where systemic impulses for constant change generate oppor­
tunities for the very small independent businesses. The latter provide 
specialist products or services, including high-tech goods and services. 
Since in Greece no genuine high-tech opportunities can occur, businesses
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of this kind that do spring up provide only labour-intensive putting-out 
links, as with the garment-makers researched.
The character of the development process in Greece and the expan­
sion difficulties encountered by capitalism have been such that they 
provided artisans with plenty of market opportunities. Given the merely 
tentative drafts for or complete absence of any real program for a 
long-term strategic restructuring of industrial development, there was 
nothing to stand in the way of a continued proliferation of artisans. 
Their numbers have grown steadily, and they have acquired permanent im­
portance as a source of employment. As artisans maintained their posi­
tion and proliferated, they showed artisanship to be a viable alterna­
tive to capitalist manufacturing in Greece not only in times of overall 
expansion, but in times of economic crisis too.
A look at the official state plans concerning the artisans* role 
in development since the 1950s (see Ch. V) shows an unusual degree of 
consistency in sustaining the stratum as such, while simultaneously 
eroding its independence. On the one hand, the state not only tolerated 
artisans, but even extended to them a measure of support (e.g. tariff 
protection, minimal taxation and interference, some provisions for small 
loans). On the other, it encouraged their involvement in putting-out ar­
rangements, for which it advocated their specialisation within a 
framework of dependent incorporation - quite obviously this line of ac­
tion gave priority to larger establishments, to which the small ones 
could be functionally useful.
This approach was not dictated by some deliberate strategy aimed 
at a modern artisanate playing its autonomous role in the development 
process. No such strategy existed, neither then nor now, largely because
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the artisans have never been the subject of in-depth investigation, due 
no doubt to the entrenched evolutionist belief that they would be swept 
away anyhow by some forthcoming industrialisation, and/or by foreign 
competition. Since they are perceived as having no future, why bother 
with them?
The lack of the state’s clear perspective on the artisans is 
reflected in the confusion surrounding their very definition. While in 
Italy and Japan - the only two advanced industrial countries with large 
small-firm sectors successfully incorporated with the rest of the 
economy — artisans are clearly defined as a homogeneous legal category; 
in semi-peripheral Greece, where they play a relatively greater role, 
they are not. By not acknowledging their specific quality with a proper 
definition, successive governments and the pertinent state agencies 
could avoid the political, economic and eventually social implications 
and responsibilities a clear identification of the stratum would have 
brought in its wake. As it was, the state’s outlook remained conditioned 
by partly contradictory tactical considerations only, which explains why 
state policies for the artisanal stratum frequently did not produce the 
desired results.
The state’s handling of artisans pursued two main purposes. First, 
for the sake of convenience, they were made use of to fill various gaps 
in supply and to keep down unemployment. For the latter reason espe­
cially, certain state policies extended some positive help towards the 
stratum’s maintenance, thereby also defusing any potential political em­
barrassment the demise of the artisanate might entail. However, while in 
a number of western countries a large number of the newly established 
self-employed have benefited from special pertinent government schemes, 
in Greece the state did and still does nothing to help newcomers set up 
independently. In this sense, artisans in Greece are entirely self-made.
Secondly, the advancement of putting-out schemes purported the ar­
tisans’ dependent incorporation into the mainstream economy. It was ex­
pected that putting-out, by establishing a form of ’functional dualism’ 
(de Janvry in Jaffee 1990: 56-57), would facilitate the growth and 
restructuring of capitalist firms and, by reducing costs, increasing 
profits, and making them numerically more flexible, eventually render 
them more competitive. The expendable artisans were to be used as 
development fodder. On the other hand, putting-out was also supposed to 
increase the specialisation of artisans - a process which would inject 
them with a modicum of economic efficiency while undermining their inde­
pendence. This too would assist with restructuring and, moreover, had 
the ideologically convenient (but quite unrealistic) potential of trans­
forming some of them, through growth and/or mergers, into larger 
entrepreneurs. Putting-out was seen as a recruiting ground for future 
small capitalists.
Since the 1950s the state has been playing an increasingly larger 
role in regulating artisans, but without much positive success. The 
limited role allocated to artisans in development is paralleled by the 
institutional role they were given, which is unsupported by any 
specialist apparatus and institutional arrangements specifically to ar­
tisans. In a way, the state’s persistent incompetence has been the 
saving of the artisans. If the plans for them had been put into effect 
and incorporation had been more actively followed through, the artisans 
would have come under much greater pressure. At the same time the social 
cost in terms of closed businesses and unemployment would have been un- 
acceptably high, contradicting the concept of development, contradicting 
the free market ideology, and likely to entail adverse political conse­
quences for those in power. So whatever was said, nothing was done, in 
order to avoid upheavals that could have exposed the economic develop­
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ment as a ruthless project of capitalist expansion. In the meantime the 
artisans could profit from the ’soft’ treatment they were receiving to 
secure new market niches, consolidate, mechanise, survive, and multiply.
The symbiosis of a capitalist and an artisanal sector poses the 
question of their articulation. It is noteworthy that the expansion of 
Greek manufacturing as a whole has meant the expansion of both its 
capitalist and artisanal sectors (see Ch. V). One result has been the 
cultivation of certain links between them, and this applies to both 
branches focused by my research. These links are limited to capitalist 
businesses operating putting-out schemes, mostly of the work-only sub­
contracting kind. In a few instances, mostly in northern Greece, foreign 
or indigenous capitalist firms have managed to pass on some of their 
dynamism to the artisans, and have been instrumental in their estab­
lishment and progress (see Simmons and Kalantaridis 1995).
The norm, however, has been that the artisans* proliferation takes 
place while each sector continues to address different markets, coexist­
ing with the other on a live-and-let-live basis. As mentioned already, 
field-work data shows that the bulk of artisanal transactions is with 
other very small units, and that their main competitors are again 
businesses similar to their own (see Ch. IX). In any case, there is very 
weak complementarity between the two sectors. The artisans are obliged 
to import virtually all their mechanical apparatus and very often their 
raw materials too (e.g. steel from Germany, fabrics from Italy), and the 
capitalist firms do not as a rule purchase the artisans* products.
If this situation of two more or less disconnected sectors exist­
ing side by side is identified as dualistic, this would imply that the
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more advanced sector is draining the backward one. On this I have 
several comments.
To start with, there is no evidence that there is any drain, any 
transfer of resources from the backward artisanal sector to the advanced 
capitalist one (see Ch. VI). In fact, the supposed ’milking* of artisans 
- through the Greek state for fiscal reasons attempting to increase 
their taxation and control their informal economic activities - seems to 
be a false alarm; at least up to 1994. It could even be argued that, 
given the artisans’ numerous informal practices which of course spell 
tax evasion, and the various concessions from the state, that apply to 
them just as to the capitalist manufacturers, artisans are actually at 
the receiving end of the drain, which is sapping other segments of the 
population.
Secondly, the contention of dualism does not take into account 
that the pullulation of artisans owes much, if perhaps indirectly, to 
side-effects of capitalist manufacturing and activity — such as new 
skills, techniques and technologies, financial institutions, expanding 
commodification, etc. This influence is particularly noticeable in the 
operation of the simple reproduction squeeze, which, as a result of 
stronger competition, is exerting pressure on the artisans to mechanise 
and overall modernise their businesses in order to cope with it.
Thirdly, although the two sectors are still quite distinct tech­
nologically, there are indications that the gap between them is narrow­
ing. One of the main reasons for this is that in Greece both sectors are 
concentrating on the manufacturing of established products using well- 
known techniques. Technological improvements and new financial arrange­
ments (e.g. leasing) now make it more easily possible for artisans to 
turn out items of new machinery that technologically are no different
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from those in operation in the larger production companies, and so will 
narrow the technological gap between them and the capitalist firms.
On a more fundamental level, the reasons why SCP in Greece has not 
developed a more positive complementarity with capitalist units should, 
I think, be sought primarily in the historical processes that shaped in­
digenous capitalism (see chs IV-V). The preservation and expansion of 
SCP and the poor performance of capitalism are due to the inability or 
unwillingness of indigenous and foreign capital to invest in manufactur­
ing at the stage when this was most necessary. It is this basic charac­
teristic of underdevelopment of Greece and other peripheral countries 
that engendered the opportunities of which artisans availed themselves. 
In this sense the artisans’ proliferation was an unanticipated by­
product of peripheral capitalism. This is not to discount Mouzelis’ 
doubts about the prospects of industrialisation today, even if suffi­
cient capital should become available (1978: 40), because lop-sided 
development (like all development) has its own dynamic. The gap cannot 
be closed simply by adding long after the event what was missing at a 
much earlier stage.
We see, therefore, that the dualist thesis does not apply to the 
Greek situation, and that the links and the complementarity between the 
two types of manufacturers are different from those existing in the ad­
vanced countries. Not only are their relations limited but, since they 
are often mediated by the state, they are also largely indirect. A 
critical instance is the artisans having to impcrt their machinery due 
to the absence of a comprehensive machine-tool industry in Greece. This 
as well as the severe limitations and in effect indevelopment of all the 
so-called high-tech branches in Greece, seriously hampers the tech­
nological modernisation of artisans to make them organical ly complemen­
tary to the indigenous capitalist manufacturers The reason for this
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backwardness of the supposedly more progressive of the two sectors is 
that capitalist producers too lack proper research and development 
departments and/or facilities, and so cannot innovate. Besides, artisans 
often find it difficult to understand technological developments. In 
this plexus of relations characteristic of the serai-periphery there is 
no indigenous capitalist technological dynamism. The lack of domesti­
cally produced machine tools being compensated for by importing them 
could be said to be a transfer of some of the dynamism of global 
capitalism to the local market of the domestic artisanal sector: the two 
exhibit features of a positive complementarity. In this sense there is 
no negative complementarity or negative articulation, nor dualism proper 
at the national level. Instead, one may go to the other extreme and talk 
of elements of a positive complementarity between the two entities, but 
this would require redefining the notions of dualism and complementarity 
to take into account the impact of processes of globalisation.
Aside from the timing, the specific circumstances and market op­
portunities, is there something distinctive in Greece’s social structure 
that promotes independent small businesses? This can be answered affirm­
atively: a key feature of Greece’s social structure used to be the inde­
pendent family smallholding in the countryside, in other words the agent 
of rural SCP. The influence of this organisational form (characterised 
by a supportive network of family and other primary relationships, and 
necessitating some elementary entrepreneurship) on migrants of peasant 
extract was such that its coherence and purpose were kept intact in the 
urban setting. Its ideological discourse considered the poverty-free 
ideal espoused by rural simp 1 e-commodity producers as identical with a 
self-sufficient family-based existence in the towns (see Ch. VI). When
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this attitude came to permeate the urban context, it provided a ready­
made model for small businesses and the people operating them — a situa­
tion resembling the link between share-cropping and urban entrepreneur- 
ing in Italy (see Ch. III).
In my own research this continuity between rural and urban SCP is 
manifested, on the one hand, in the large segment of both machinists and 
garment-makers who had an independent peasant/small-holding family back­
ground, and were assisted by members of their primary group, which shows 
that such a support network exists and functions as part of their social 
capital. On the other hand, the survival culture of the rural family- 
based SCP and that of the urban poor, is reflected in the practice of 
the artisans I sampled to start work when they were still children, and 
in their adherence to such a culture and a wish for independence; in 
this artisans in both trades researched exhibit similarities with the 
small employers but differed markedly from the larger employers (see chs 
VIII-X).
This involvement begins with long apprenticeships to learn the 
skills required for the new life. Also, quite a number of artisans came 
from urban families with definite entrepreneurial dispositions. This not 
only provided them with an organisational model, but also with a variant 
of the survival culture, according to which ownership of an independent 
business in all probability means being able to make a living, as well 
as representing a very positive social value indeed (see chs VIII-X).
Greece, unlike more advanced industrial countries such as Britain, 
has never known a politically-inspired movement such as the ’enterprise 
culture’ to propagate the virtues of small property (see Ch. II). It 
would in any case have been entirely superfluous, because in the rural 
and urban popular cultural traditions, the ethic of independent business 
proprietorship has survived the capitalist onslaught. People could and
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do draw inspiration and organisational assistance from it to embark on 
an independent smal1-business career; this is a characteristic specifi­
cally Greek.
Another feature of Greece’s social structure at the micro level 
that encourages artisanship is the very existence of particular craft- 
work and artisanal traditions. Since craftsmen and artisans, along with 
the whole industrial system in Greece, lack generational depth 
(Cavounidis 1985), these traditions may not have the binding force of 
long-established practices, but field-work research does indicate that 
socialisation in the craft is not limited to passing on technical skills 
and know-how but also embraces a range of ethical values and a subcul­
ture that are part of being an artisan.
As my research has shown with respect to both garment-makers and 
machinists, these traditions were inculcated into the younger generation 
in the course of their long apprenticeships, and while they laboured for 
wages before setting up on their own. As a rule, all potential artisans 
were apprenticed on-the-job. Whenever artisans attended school, they did 
so for a substantially fewer number of years than the small and par­
ticularly the larger employers. Of course, artisans* limited exposure to 
education has circumscribing them in a lasting way, while their reduced 
educational opportunities indicates the existence of a class barrier. 
Their practical experience was acquired by working mostly in a sequence 
of small firms similar to those the interviewees later established them­
selves. Even younger workers of an artisanal family business had to work 
alongside the other employees for a number of years before they were 
made partners. This gave them the opportunity to learn a wide range of 
skills that later enabled them to handle a wide range of different 
items, and made them more flexible than their counterparts in larger 
firms who were turning out more specific goods.
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Once someone was acknowledged as a craftsman, the options open to 
him/her were the following: to become independent, to work in the 
primary sector of a large firm, or to become a core worker in a small 
unit. The first option, which was pursued only after the newcomer had 
eight to ten years experience of wage-working, carried and carries by 
far the greatest prestige, and is regarded within the craft as normal. 
Besides, a number of craft traditions exist to facilitate independent 
artisanship - such as assistance newcomers received from their ex­
bosses, the patterns in partnership formations (an important organisa­
tional vehicle for setting up an independent business), help from work­
mates (indicating the operation of a ’buddy’ system) and/or close rela­
tives, and in the master co-opting partners from his/her core workers 
(see Ch. VIII).
Craft-based links appear to be kept up to some extent by independ­
ent artisans, and exert an impact on the market by facilitating economic 
associations and an informal code of personal conduct. In fact, the bulk 
of the artisans’ economic transactions involve other artisans or other 
small companies. This does not mean that artisans have transcended their 
antagonisms and effected synergies, as has been the case in the Third 
Italy (see Ch. III). On the contrary: attempts to obtain collaboration 
among artisans through some organisational means have invariably failed. 
This must be attributed as much as to their marked individualism, and by 
extension to their difficulty to organise themselves effectively, as to 
the unsatisfactory character of the relevant state intervention.
So far we have touched mostly on external factors influencing the 
continuing reproduction of artisans, and on features of the social
42/
structure. Of equal importance is the element of personal agency for an 
artisan establishing herself/himself as an independent.
Anyone can try to become an artisan, but only the multi-ski 1 led 
wage-workers (or the sons/daughters of artisans) can attempt independ­
ence, promising both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, with any like­
lihood of success. It should be remembered that success does not consist 
only in the practical returns from owning and operating a small busi­
ness. A major aspect of success is the social value attached to being 
one’s own master, and the upward mobility this implies. Having become an 
independent master artisan is an end in itself — a view shared by aspir­
ing artisans and both their family and craft milieux.
In the sample studied, the family’s contribution to getting the 
new business set up rarely extended beyond providing purpose and 
psychological support; it was typically too poor to make a financial 
contribution itself. Skilled workers aspiring to independence must have 
savings of their own, or draw bills of exchange for repayment from in­
come from their own work. It is obvious that possession of the ap­
propriate skills is absolutely crucial. Where there are few or no finan­
cial assets and only a mastery of the required skills, starting-up often 
involves partnerships with family members and/or trusted co-workers, 
especially when the initial requirements are unlikely ever to be met by 
a skilled worker’s savings. Whether they proceeded on their own or in 
partnerships, it was always the skilled themselves who initiated and 
carried through the transformation of their social position. It was in­
dividual agency and not collective effort/action that was the key to ar­
tisanal independence. The experience has strengthened the artisan’s 
self-reliance in the safeguarding of her/his interests, further rein­
forced by cultural aspects, and structural position, while the ex­
igencies of the work limit spare time for collective purposes. The in­
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teraction of these factors also inhibits co-operation with competitors, 
as well as combining with other artisans to promote mutual interests. 
Instead, the artisans pursue an individualistic course, both to achieve 
and maintain their independence, which has resulted in their fragmenta­
tion as a social force, and in the last resort in their isolation. As 
unspectacular as it is solitary, the socially visible course artisans 
follow is an expression of their determination to be and remain strictly 
their own masters. This is their secret and the wider social dimension 
of their position and action.
With regard to the generic non-development of civil society in 
Greece, the artisans* rampant individualism has made their stratum 
chronically incapable of representing itself in any unified and effec­
tive way. The fact that artisans, in both industries researched, have 
not managed to muster enough strength and leadership to press for their 
demands explains why they are one of the social groups that has 
presented the fewest problems to those in power. A reflection of the im­
potence of the stratum to become for itself is that it has allowed it­
self to be organisationally outflanked by small and incipient 
capitalists as well as by the various party-political apparatuses that 
further disorganise it and distort its autonomy. In fact, since the or­
ganisations claiming to represent them are not at all a vehicle of their 
autonomous collective action, the artisans* agency has remained in­
dividualistic.
The artisans’ organisational shortcomings means they have been un­
able to mount a sustained political challenge to press for their 
demands. This weakness was exacerbated by the absence of any serious at­
tempt by parties in opposition to help set up such organisations as a
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means to win the artisans vote. In terms of the clientelistic mode of 
incorporating the people into politics, to which all the main political 
parties were attuned, there was little point in setting up artisans’ or­
ganisations along horizontal lines. Besides, the institutional impedi­
ments were such that local-government authorities, which often were con­
trolled by the opposition, were unable to have any effect on artisans 
whatsoever; the neo-localism observed in Italy that expedited the con­
cern with artisans (see Ch. Ill) was for a complex set of reasons un­
thinkable in Greece. All of this means that the artisans had and have a 
very limited political role, and as they have never become an issue of 
particular importance in the political contest, initiative for them is 
left to the state, which keeps its concern to a minimum.
The liberal state had, of course, the constitutional obligation to 
bring artisans, along with other social groups, into the nations’ 
economic and political life, and in this case this process assumed a 
nominally corporatist form (e.g. the Artisans Chambers). But even though 
the state had a free hand, it not only lacked vision, but actually 
pursued a dual line in handling the artisans, one that both incorporated 
and excluded them. Exclusion was brought about by installing as ar­
tisans’ spokesmen those who were artisans only in name; at the same time 
the corporatist framework has been retained through the Artisans’ Cham­
bers, even though they operate more as an ideological pretence than 
truly representative bodies.
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It emerges from my empirical findings that the theories and con­
cepts set out in Ch . I proved very useful in guiding the analysis by 
providing the notion of SCP which allows qualitative distinctions. They 
were also indispensable for deciphering the SME category by exposing its 
class bias, and of enduring relevance for explaining the artisans’ dif­
ficulty in acting collectively.
Specifically, the SCP notion proved heuristic for distinguishing 
between artisans who employ no wage-labour (or only peripherally), and 
those who employ a relatively large number of wage-earners. The patterns 
for independent Athenian artisans and larger employers are consistently 
different (see chs VII-X), these differences being directly related to 
the employment situation. The concept of relations of production (which 
lies at the basis of the SCP notion) can be very useful not only in 
macro-historical comparisons, but also when examining a specific social 
situation at the micro-level of analysis.
The SCP terminology again proved valuable in the more empirically 
oriented chapters on the enormous difficulties in the way of artisans 
expanding their businesses and becoming small capitalists. This rein­
forces N. Poulantzas’ point that there is a class-type barrier blocking 
the artisans’ transformation into small capitalists, and justifies his 
opposition to the relatively neutral ’small and medium-sized enterprise* 
category (SME), which tends to minimise the qualitative difference be­
tween artisans and small capitalists. My research (chs V, X) shows that 
the term of SME, which is used by official and semi-official Greek 
government publications and state organisations, is highly misleading 
since it tends to obscure the small artisans’ distinctiveness as an in­
terest group.
Besides, Marx’s views on the petty bourgeoisie are borne out by the 
fact that Athenian artisans, as my findings demonstrate, notwithstanding
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their awareness of their distinct and difficult position are unable to 
organise themselves from a ’class in itself’ to a 'class for itself’. 
This in turn has prevented any effective promotion of their collective 
interests, and renders them vulnerable to all types of manipulation by 
antagonistic interest groups. As I have tried to show in Ch. X, this 
situation is due to the artisans’ particular work and market situation 
encouraging their relative isolation and marked individualism, as indeed 
Marx pointed out long ago.
On the other hand, my findings do not confirm the Marxist theory on 
artisans’ proletarianisation or on their inherent tendency to promote 
capitalism. To be more precise, the continued survival and even resur­
gence of Athenian artisans in the context of a social formation in which 
the CMP is dominant runs counter the Marxist prognostication about the 
stratum's proletarianisation. It is true of course that, among Marxists, 
Poulantzas re-cognised the eventuality of their long-term survival, but 
less due to systemic tendencies and more because of political elites 
trying to stop the trend towards proletarianisation. As I have shown 
(chs IV-VI, X), political elites played no such role in the Greek case, 
so that Poulantzas* explanation for the survival of simp 1 e-commodity 
producers does not apply in Greece. Instead, it is more fruitful to see 
it in terms of the small returns accruing to agents of CMP (at least in 
the semi-periphery) endeavouring to expand their hold over the economy 
and society.
Neither do my findings support Lenin's view that SCP by its very 
nature, spontaneously, enhances capitalism and the bourgeoisie. The vir­
tual inability of Athenian artisans to transcend their position, and the 
weak linkages between the artisanal and the much more dynamic capitalist 
sector (see Ch. IX) suggest that, even if Lenin’s theory was true for a 
particular historical period, it cannot be upheld today in a more ma­
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ture, albeit not fully developed, capitalist context. However, if 
neither proletarianisation nor capitalist transformation is at work, it 
makes little sense to consider the artisanal stratum as transitional, as 
is maintained by the theories discussed in Ch. I. Instead, it should be 
seen as a relatively permanent, numerically very important although 
relatively non-organised social stratum and quite typical of most 
countries that started their capitalist development late.
Overall, it seems to me that the Marxist concepts and theories of 
Ch. I retain much of their usefulness for the analysis of the artisans* 
stratum although some of them, as indicated, have not been confirmed em­
pirically in my study. I suggest, therefore, that if they are to be 
upheld, this should be done selectively.
Searching for the specificity of the Athens artisanate I compared 
my findings to the case studies discussed in chs II and III. It emerges 
that Athenian artisans come from humble social origins. They typically 
start manual work early as apprentices, possibly attend low-grade tech­
nical school and, once they have mastered their skills, spend about ten 
years working for wages before they establish themselves as independ­
ents. A working-class background has been observed also among the 
Italian artisans, as well as among small entrepreneurs in construction 
work whom Scase and Goffee studied in Britain.
Social origins aside, Greek skilled workers may be motivated to 
choose artisanship for purposes of survival (as with homeworkers in 
garments), but also as a way of acquiring a better basic standard of 
living and to safeguard their work autonomy (as with machinists). 
However, the same motivation characterises the Italian artisans and 
British builders.
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In all cases, starting-up was usually financed by personal savings. 
While in Italy state assistance, private firms, redundancy money, and 
the family’s economic support were important factors, for the Athenian 
artisans financial assistance from their families was not important 
(unless they had an artisan background). Instead, they relied heavily on 
bills of exchange, available to them on the basis of their reputation as 
good workers.
In the literature, the family appears as a very important factor in 
reducing labour costs, given that members of kin work hard for long 
hours and receive little pay; my study confirms this. Besides, as in 
many other countries, artisanal concerns in Athens too are largely 
family-structured. In addition, in Greece the family members are in­
volved in partnerships that provide an important organisational 
framework for small businesses; in such cases the workshop is often seen 
as an extension of the household. Asides from involving kin, partner­
ships may also be formed with colleagues (who often become fictitious 
kin) or with co-opted wage workers; in all cases the partners usually 
have equal shares, decisions are taken unanimously, and divisions of 
labour are established.
With respect to the labour relations in artisans’ workshops these 
are often mediated by kinship: workers being kin have an important con­
trol function over the wage workers. Despite claims to the contrary, the 
latter do not choose to work in the small Athenian units because they 
value the allegedly informal and friendly atmosphere there, nor are 
labour relations in small firms particularly harmonious. A number of 
studies have shown that this is patently not the case. In fact, it is 
the younger, the unskilled, and the more unprotected workers that are 
oriented to this sector of the economy, which in turn explains why, as 
Piore and Sabel have pointed out, workers in small units are usually
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sweated, which is true in both Italian and Athenian artisanal units. 
This goes hand in hand with a paternalistic stance by the artisan boss. 
However, it has also been shown that employers may well adopt a more 
fraternal orientation vis-A-vis their subordinates; in fact, this is 
widespread among Athenian artisans when the employee worker is a 
finished craftsman. The argument that fraternal ism is not only a 
political tactic of employers, but also, for those who have a working 
class background, a way of coping with the employment situation, is con­
firmed in the Greek case.
The loose occupational community of artisans that can be said to 
exist in Athens also includes skilled wage-workers, who are occasionally 
assisted by the artisan boss to become independent producers. By con­
trast, in Italy this occupational community is rather more tightly 
bound. It is to be found in the industrial districts where it co­
ordinates and integrates the individual artisanal units and affects 
overall economic growth.
In the above, I have compared patterns pertaining to the artisans’ 
origins, their starting-up as independents, and aspects of relations 
within the workshop and trade. However, artisans' business links and 
practices, their limitations and their relations with the external world 
are also worth considering. So among Athenian artisans it is good 
workmanship and a network of acquaintances that bring in their cus­
tomers, whom they often get to know well personally. Much of their work 
also involves other small businesses, either as suppliers or customers, 
which reflects the structure of the Greek economy. Italian artisans, in 
addition to good workmanship and the personalistic element, rely on su­
perior design and production technologies, the various services made 
available to them collectively, and on their integration with the 
decentralised production network that safeguards their access to na­
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tional and even international markets. However, despite their dif­
ferences in attracting and securing customers, informal economic ac­
tivity is as extensive among the Athenian artisans sampled as among 
others abroad, and is practically indistinguishable from the formal 
kind. Athenian artisans condone and explain it as a defence mechanism 
against pressures of competition and lack of state concern.
On the whole, the Greek artisans researched are not keen to expand 
their business activity. Their low educational level makes it difficult 
for them to employ state-of-the-art technologies, and so precludes them 
from promoting innovative ideas into actual pro-ducts. In this they 
sharply contrast with their flexibly specialised and innovative Italian 
counterparts. Athenian artisans also lack motivation to expand because, 
having no distinct economic role that would promote synergies and ah up­
surge of economic activity, their doing well individually depends 
largely on external market influences. Therefore they remain content 
with the level of what they have achieved.
In terms of their collective organisation, Athenian artisans have 
only a rudimentary one because they find it difficult to combine their 
work with interest representation. This renders them vulnerable to or­
ganisational outflanking, so that for the most part they operate as iso­
lated individuals. The lack of interest in collective organisations 
reflects less the absence of issues that could bind them together, than
the fact that in the past such organisations have not delivered what
they promised. This sharply contrasts with the Italian experience, but 
more recent developments there have not been incorporated in the present
study and should also be taken into account.
Different patterns may also be discerned with respect to the role 
of the state. The Greek state, contrary to the state in other countries, 
has shown very limited interest in artisans and has been very slow in
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drawing up policies aiming to help them. At best, the artisanal stratum 
has been regarded as potentially facilitating the growth of larger 
firms, but certainly not as an agent of overall development. Such assis­
tance, therefore, as was extended to it may have facilitated its sur­
vival but certainly not its dynamic growth.
The discussion above does not lead us to a radically different pic­
ture from that given in the available literature, but rather confirms 
it. It is not, therefore, at the micro-level so much but more at the 
societal level that the specificity of the Greek artisans is to be 
found. At the risk of over-simplification, it seems to me that the re- 
emergence of large numbers of artisans in the post-war period combined 
well with the type of industrialisation that actually took place in the 
1960s and 1970s and provided market openings and more broadly a struc­
ture of opportunities. This, instead of destroying the artisans, made 
possible their continued reproduction and led to workshop mechanisation, 
which enhanced their ability to further adapt and survive. From the late 
1970s onward, the large number of artisans (who already enjoyed wide so­
cial acceptance because of their association with the time-honoured in­
dependent small proprietorship) were found to be a very significant 
source of employment at a time of almost negative economic growth, which 
strengthened their standing even more. The continued reproduction of the 
artisanate with only a modicum of state intervention, and the absence of 
competition in its symbiosis with capitalist firms have meanwhile 
brought about the pragmatic acceptance of artisans by the decision­
makers. Without either specific interventions on their behalf or any 
major challenges, the stratum was largely left to itself and managed to 
survive. Whether this situation will help the artisans* future existence 
is an open question.
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THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Below is an English translation of the questionnaire used in my field­
work research for collecting primary data; original is in Greek.
* * *
ARTISANS’ QUESTIONNAIRE (GREATER ATHENS AREA) Confidential
A) No:
B) Date of interview:
C) Place of interview:
D) Duration of interview:
E) Kind of Artisanal Enterprise: (i) Garments
(ii) Machining
(iii) Other
F) Workshop Premises:
1. When was the present workshop set up (year of establishment)?
2. Area in which the workshop is located:
3. Age and Sex of Owner(s):
Owner(s) Male Female Years of Age
(up to 30/31-45/over
45
lrst Interviewee
2nd
3rd
4rth
4. Size of enterprise (number of paid employees)
Permanent Staff Seasonal Staff
Male Female Male Female
Workshop Only:
Retail Shop Only:
Office Only:
Mixed Duties:
Total:
5. Father’s Occupation:
6. Mother’s Occupation:
7. You were born in:
Athens-Piraeus 
Other parts of Greece 
Abroad
8. At what age did you come to Athens?
Years of Age:
Did you come alone? Yes:
No: Who with?
Why did you come to Athens?
(Go to Q. 9)
Where?
Where?
9. Did you ever work abroad?
YES: NO:
Country:
For how long?
What was your job? 1st:
2nd:
3rd:
10. What kind of education did you receive?
School Years of formal education
1. Primary School
2. High School (3 forms)
3. Vocational/Technical School
4. Technical High/Technical Lyceum
5. High School (6 forms)/Lyceum
6. Technical College
7. University
8. Post-graduate studies
9. Other
Total:
11. While being a student, were you working?
YES: NO:
For what reason?
What kind of job?
12. At what age did you start working (years of age)?
13. Where did you acquire your skills?
1. At school: 2. At work: 3. Both at school and at work:
14. [Question withdrawn]
15. How long did your apprenticeship last (in years)?
16. Did you get paid at the same time?
1. YES: 2. NO: 3: I paid:
17. [Question withdrawn]
18. Who was your boss at your first paid work — provided that you worked 
there for at least two months? (Apprenticeships included as first 
paid work).
1. A relative Relationship:
2. A family friend
3. Someone from the same vi1lage/area/town/neighbourhood
4. Other (please specify):
19. Who recommended you for your first job?
20. a) Since you started working, for how many different enterprises
have you worked? (Total number of enterprises).
b) How many years have you been in paid employment?
c) What kind of enterprises were those you worked for, what was the 
your status there (what sort of work did you perform), how many
people were employed in each enterprise? (Start from the first
enterprise you worked for).
Enterprise Kind of work No. of employees
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
21. Why did you change work?
1. For financial reasons
2. For personal reasons
3. For educational reasons (to learn skills)
4. For political reasons
5. The company closed down
6. I was laid off
7. Other (please specify):
22. a) While in paid employment did you have any other business of your
own?
YES: NO:
Sometimes:
Often:
b) As an employee, how if at all did you obtain higher wages?
23. Did you present workshop ever belong to a member of your family?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 29)
24. If ’yes’, before you were engaged in this workshop, had you been 
employed elsewhere?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 26)
For how long?
Kind of work:
25. [Question withdrawn]
26. Since you started working in this family business, have you worked 
elsewhere too?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 29)
For how long?
Kind of work:
27. [Question withdrawn]
28. [Question withdrawn]
29. a) Is this present business the first one you ever set up (either by
yourself or as a partner)?
YES: (Go to Q. 31) NO:
b) Before this one, in how many enterprises did you participate?
What kind of enterprise(s)?
30. Reasons for leaving the previous enterprise(s):
31. For how long did the preparations for setting up the present 
workshop lasted?
w32. Were you working elsewhere, too, on setting up your first business
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
(the present one or another one in the past)?
YES: NO:
Why?
At present, do you do any side work?
YES: NO:
Why?
Who did you consult while planning to set up the present workshop?
a) Provided that it is not a family business, what made you set up 
this present workshop?
b) Suppose you had chosen to do some other work instead of the
workshop, what would it have been (what kind of difficulties and
what kind of prospects would it have)?
Knowing that you were preparing for your first enterprise, your
former employer:
1. Encouraged you: Why?
2. Discouraged you: Why?
3. Did nothing:
4: Knew nothing:
[Question withdrawnl
a) Did you have in the past or do you still have any partners in the 
enterprise?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 45)
b) Did the present enterprise resulted from the merging of two or 
more artisan shops?
YES: NO:
At present, do you have any partners?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 41)
Are they still the same partners?
YES: (Go to Q. 42) NO:
Why did the previous partners leave?
What was the relation at first between you and you present
partner(s)? What kind of participation in the workshop do they have,
and what kind of work do the do?
(1st) Relative: Kind of kinship:
Work mate:
Friend:
(2nd) Relative: Kind of kinship:
Work mate:
Friend:
(3rd) Relative: Kind of kinship:
Work mate:
Friend:
Participation (%): 
Kind of work:
Participation (%): 
Kind of work:
Participation (%): 
Kind of work:
How is the work distributed among you and your partners?
a) How does decision-making take place?
b) What happens in case of disagreements?
Do any relatives of yours or of your partners’ work in the workshop? 
Yours:
YES: How many? NO: (Go to Q. 49)
Partners':
YES: How many? NO: (Go to Q. 49)
46. What king of kinship relation is there between you/your partners and 
your/their relatives working here?
i: iv:
i i: v:
i i i: vi:
47. a) Do these relatives:
Get ordinary wages? No. of relatives:
Get any allowance? No. of relatives:
Draw money from the business within certain limits:
No. of relatives:
47. b) On average, how many hours does each of them work every day?
i: iv:
ii: v:
i i i: vi:
48. Can any members of your partners* families participate in taking 
decisions concerning your enterprise?
YES: NO:
Directly: Indirectly:
49. a) What is the legal form in Greece of your company?
Personal: E.E.: O.E.: E.P.E.: A.E. :
b) Changes in its original form:
From: to
From: to
From: to
— No change:
50. On setting up for the first time a workshop, did you own the 
handtoo1s/machinery?
YES: Partly: NO: (Go to Q. 52)
51. If ’yes’ or ’partly’, how did you acquire the money for the equip­
ment purchase? (more than one options)
Savings: Bills of Exchange:
Sale of property: Loan: Other (explain):
52. If ’no’ or ’partly’ , how did you get the equipment?
Rental: Didn’t pay:
53. [Question withdrawn!
54. (Question withdrawn]
55. [Question withdrawn]
56. On setting up the present workshop was the machinery basically:
New: Second-hand: Some new, some second-hand:
57. At present,
Do you own the machinery (in %)? 
Do you hire the machinery (in %)? 
Do you get it for free (in %)?
58. What is the total Horse-power of the machinery in your workshop now?
HP
59. Do you own a vehicle for transporting goods?
YES. NO:
Van: Lorry: Car: (No. of vehicles in each category)
60. [Question withdrawn]
61. At present, -do you lack any machinery or vehicles?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 63)
Machines (kind):
Vehicles:
62. How do you overcome this problem? (more than one options)
1. Putting out work:
2. Working harder with available machinery:
3. I don’t:
4. Other (please specify):
63. Do you have any machinery you are not using at all?
YES: NO:
64. Reasons for keeping this additional machinery.
(more than one options)
1. For future expansion:
2. In case of emergency:
3. Other (please specify):
65. Do you own any machinery, too complicated to handle?
YES: NO:
66. [Question withdrawn]
67. How do you overcome difficulties arising from (a) new material and 
(b) new techniques/processes?
(a) New material: 1. Insignificant or no problems:
2. By mobilising experience and im­
agination:
3. By using specialist help:
4: Other (please specify):
(b) New techniques/processes: 1. Insignificant or no problems:
2. By mobilising experience and im­
agination:
3. By using specialist help:
4: Other (please specify):
68. Did you get a loan to set up this business?
YES: NO:
From: Relatives: (more than one options)
Friends:
A bank:
A usurer:
Other sources (please specify):
69. Did you get any additional 
what purpose?
YES: No. of loans:
1st loan: Bank:
/*<?/) *02111:
3rd loan: Bank
loan(s) from a bank or from EOMMEX? For
NO:
EOMMEX
EOMMEX
EOMMEX
Purpose:
Purpose:
Purpose:
4th loan: Bank: EOMMEX: Purpose:
5th loan: Bank: EOMMEX: Purpose:
6th loan: Bank: EOMMEX: Purpose:
70. [Question withdrawn]
71. In case you didn’t get a loan, why didn’t you apply for one? In case 
you got an insufficient loan, why didn’t you apply for a bigger one?
1. There was no need/it was sufficient:
2. The conditions were tough/loans can be a nuisance:
3. My application was rejected:
4. Other (please specify):
72. Did you get any other loan(s)?
YES: (more than one option) NO:
Source: 1. Relatives:
2. Friends:
3. Usurer:
4. Client:
5. Other (please specify):
73. At present do you work in production yourself?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 76)
74. How much of your time approximately do working in production, 
administration/management take up daily each? (in %)
1. Cannot differentiate:
2. Production:
3. Administration/management:
75. Reasons for working in production:
1. Financial:
2. Out of habit:
3. Control/supervision of production:
4. Other (please specify):
5. Doesn’t work in production:
76. Did you use to work in production in your workshop:
1 year ago: YES NO
Harder: Same: Less:
2 year ago: YES NO
Harder: Same: Less:
3 year ago: YES NO
Harder: Same: Less:
77. At present how many hours on average do you work for the workshop 
each day?
........  (hours per day).
78. Do you do any work for the workshop at home?
YES: Hours per day (on average): .........  NO:
79. How many work-shifts are there in your workshop?
One: One and a half: Two:
80. At present, is the workshop open during weekends/holidays? V/hen it 
was first set up?
At present: 1. Often At first: 1. Often
2. Sometimes: 2. Sometimes:
3. No: 3. No:
m
81. [Question withdrawn]
82. Is your own work and that of the people in the workshop as a whole 
as intensive today as it used to be at the beginning?
Yourself - More: Less: Same:
Workshop - More: Less: Same:
83. How do your employees (if any) get paid?
No employees: (Go to Q. 109)
Day/weekly Wages: How many?
Monthly Salary: How many?
Percentage: How many?
Other (explain): How many?
84. Do they usually work overtime?
Often : Sometimes: No:
85. How much of your expenses are labour costs (in %)?
86. In terms of technical abilities your workers are classified as:
1. Master Craftsmen: How many?
2. Craftsmen: How many?
3. Apprentices: How many?
of which under state subsidy (number)?
87. [Question withdrawn]
88. Is there any staff shortage in your enterprise?
YES: Why? NO:
164. Do you hire apprentices?
YES: NO: Why 'No1?:
165. Ways of training apprentices:
89. As far as you know, is there anyone who used to own a workshop in 
the past working for
you now?
YES: How many? NO:
Are they efficient? YES: NO:
90. How do you distribute work among your employees?
91. Ways of supervising workers:
92. Do you lunch together with the employees?
Often : Sometimes: Never:
93. Do you meet your employees at social events?
Often : Sometimes: Never:
On what occasion?
94. Have you entered in a fictitious relationship (godfather, groomsman, 
etc.) with a former or a present employee of yours?
YES: How many? NO:
95. Ways of hiring a worker (more than one option):
1. Advertisement in newspapers:
2. Former workmates:
itp* 3. Relatives’ recommendation:
4. Colleagues’ recommendation:
5. Other (please specify):
96. Do you prefer to hire relatives?
YES: NO:
97. Why?/Why not?
98. Staff get employed usually for:
1. Definite period
2. Indefinite period
3. Other (please explain):
99. Do you intervene in disputes among employees?
YES: NO:
In what ways?
100. What kind of problems arise between you and the employees?
101. During the last two years how many accidents took place in your 
workshop?
.......  (if none go to Q. 103)
102. What do you think the reasons for such accidents were (more than
one option)1
1. Neglect of safety regulations: 4. Lack of safety equipment:
2. Lack of experience: 5. Just happened:
3. Tiredness: 6. Other (please explain).
103. Do you know of any worker that stopped working for you in order for
you to set up their own workshop?
YES: How many? NO: (Go to Q. 107)
104. As far as you remember, those who left in order to set up their own
workshops used to be, in terms of their technical level:
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
1. Very eff icient:
2. Efficient:
3. Fairly efficient:
4. Inefficient:
5. Do not remember:
105. Do you do business with any such former employees?
YES: NO:
106. After such employees left you (in order to become independent 
workshop owners), were there any cases of customers preferring your 
former employees’ workshops to your own, with or without your 
recommendat ion?
1. I referred customers to them:
2. They managed to attract some of my customers:
3. There were no such cases:
107. Have you allowed any of your workers to use tools/machinery for 
their own purposes?
Often Occasionally: NO: (Go to Q. 109)
kn
108.
109.
110 . 
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
■ m
Did their using your tools/machinery involve:
1. Payment:
2. No payment:
3: Some other kind of arrangement (please explain):
Have you hired out tools/machinery to other artisans:
Often Occasionally: NO:
[Question withdrawn]
Your customers are (up to 4 options; rank them in order of 
importance):
1. Large manufacturing enterprises: 6. Public sector enterprises
2. Medium manufacturing enterprises: 7. Municipal enterprises:
3. Small manufacturing enterprises: 8. Foreign enterprises:
4. Wholesalers 9. Other:
5. Retailers:
Do you meet socially with your customers?
Often Occasionally: NO:
a) Are your products exhibited in:
1. Your workshop: 3. They are not exhibited:
2. A separate show-room: 4. Other:
b) Do you trade in raw materials or products other than your own? 
YES: NO:
Raw materials: Other products:
The sales of your products are (in % approx..):
1. Who1esa1e:
2. Retail:
3. Inviting bids, there is no resale.
How do you attract customers? (Up to 4 options; rank them in order 
of importance):
1. Fame in the market/satisfied customers:
2. Price;
3. Advert isement:
4. Exhibition:
5. Chamber of Commerce/EOMMEX:
6. Traders indexes:
7. Suggestions of friends and acquaintances:
8. Location of workshop or own retail
9. Other
(a) Your products appeal (in %, approx.):
1. To the local market (neighbourhood, surrounding areas):
2. To the market of the Greatest Athens area:
3. To the market in the rest of Greece:
4. To the markets abroad:
(b) Is the bulk of your clients specific?
YES: NO:
Do your customers provide or intervene in:
Often: Occasional ly: No:
1. Setting standards:
2. Quality Control:
3. Manufacturing process:
4. Credit/Capital:
5. Material employed:
6. Machinery employed
118. [Question withdrawn]
119. [Question withdrawn]
120. Have big-size orders forced you to extend your machinery equipment 
in order to cope with the work load?
YES: NO: I had no such orders:
121. Have you expanded your work during the last two years?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 123)
122. What caused such an expansion?
123. Generally speaking, does your annual production exhibit seasonal 
fluctuations in output/quantities?
YES: NO:
124. a) What exactly do you manufacture/produce now (in the last year)?
1.
2 .
3.
b) What did you use to manufacture during the first year of this 
workshop, or of your participation in this workshop — if you 
joined it at a later date?
1.
2.
3.
c) Would it be possible for you to have produced articles totally 
different from those you have been manufacturing so far?
YES: NO:
What kind of articles?
What prevented you from doing so?
125. If work is put out to you, what kind of work/products do you do?
1. I do not take put out work: (Go to Q. 127)
2. Finishing:
3. Semi-finished products:
4. Completed products
5. Accessories/Fittings:
6. Other (please explain):
126. Do you assign part of the work put out to you to others?
Often: Occasionally: NO:
127. If you put out work, the work/products you assign to others is/are:
1. I do not take put out work: (Go to Q. 129)
2. Finishing:
3. Semi-finished products:
4. Completed products
5. Accessories/Fittings:
6. Other (please explain):
128. As far as you know, do the people to whom you put out work assign 
part of that work to others?
Often Occasionally: NO:
Vi'-S’
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
HZ*
In subcontracted work (fapons) do you make the agreements orally?
1. I do not get involved with subcontracted work:
2. Often:
3. Occasionally:
4. No:
Do you meet socially with other artisans?
Often Occasionally: NO:
Your competitors are (rank them in order of importance):
1. Small artisans (1-10 employees):
2. Medium (11-50 employees):
3. Large (more than 50 employees):
4. Foreign competition:
5. Other (please explain):
6. Have no competitors:
In which way do you cope with competition? (Rank them in order of 
importance).
1. Improving quality:
2. Improving delivery times:
3. Pr i ce:
4. Employing new machinery:
5. Specialising new products/1ines of work:
6. Other (please specify):
Is this way(s) of coping with competition effective?
YES: NO:
What else do you intend to do?
Do you participate in associations or co-operatives?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 136)
Do you benefit from it? What do you think your prospects are in the 
association or co-operation?
Have you any experience of EOMMEX’s services? What do you think of 
them?
YES: ......... NO:
Have you enrolled in the Artisans’ Chamber?
YES: NO:
Why ’yes’? Why ’No*?
Do you vote in the elections there?
YES: NO:
What do you think about the Artisans’ Chamber?
Are you a member of some union for the promotion of the goods you 
manufacture?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 142)
Do you vote in the elections there?
YES: NO:
What do you think of this union?
Are you a member of a local professional’s and artisans’ associa­
tion?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 146)
144. Do you vote in the elections there?
YES: NO:
145. What do you think of it?
146. Are you a member of another trade union or association?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 149)
147. Do you vote in its elections?
YES: NO:
148. What do you think of it?
149. Are you registered with the professionals’ and Artisans Insurance 
Fund (TEBE)?
YES: NO:
150. What do you think of TEBE?
151. Do you participate in competitions or do you bid for state provi­
sions?
1. Often: 3. No:
2. Occasionally: 4. Intend to:
152. Can a workshop like yours participate in such bidding as well as be 
awarded orders? Please explain "your point of view.
153. Do you participate in competitions for local authority provisions?
1. Often: 3. No:
2. Occasionally: 4. Intend to:
154. Can a workshop like yours participate in such bidding as well as be 
awarded orders? Please explain your point of view.
155. How do you distribute your business (in %) among:
- Newly manufactured products: - Repairs/Services:
156. [Question withdrawn]
157. Do the orders you accept concern (rank them in order of 
importance):
1. One-of-a-kind products:
2. A wide range of specifications, smal 1-batch production:
3. A limited range of specifications, smal1-batch production:
4. A limited range of specifications, large-batch production:
5. Other (please explain):
158. Is production in your workshop:
1. Line production:
2. Specialised according to product type:
3. Other (please explain):
159. For how long does the stock of raw material suffice in normal 
production periods?
1. I do not stock raw materials/they are purchased on the basis of 
orders:
2. For ......... months.
160. Do you manufacture any brand named products?
YES: NO:
161. Are the design and specifications of your products (more than one 
options'):
1. Exclusively yours:
2. Mainly yours, customers induce slight alterations:
3. Customers’ basically:
4. The dominant ones in the market/those in fashion today:
5. Adaptations/aIterations.based on patterns/styles dominant in the 
market:
6. Custom-made:
7. Other
162. [Question withdrawn]
163. Your production is based (more than one options):
1. On the skilful handling of the machines:
2. On the skilful handling of hand-tools:
3. On workers faithfully following your instructions in the use of 
machines:
4. On overall experience:
5. Other:
[Q. 164 and 165 follow Q. 88]
166. Have you brought any innovation to the way of production?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 175)
How many?
167. Is it (or was it) part of your production?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 174)
168. How did you develop the new product/device/pattern/design/solution?
169. In developing the new idea, did you get any financial or technical 
support from any official organisation?
- Financial support: YES: NO:
- Technical support: YES: NO:
170. Did you get any technical support from anyone else?
- Financial support: YES: NO:
- Technical support: YES: NO:
171. As a result of your co-operation with others for developing your 
new idea, did you form a new partnership or a new enterprise?
1. No such co-operation ever took place:
(Go to Q. 173)
2. New partnership: YES: (continue) NO: (Go to Q. 173)
3. New enterprise: YES: (Go to Q. 173) NO: (Go to Q. 173)
172. What did the new partner specialise in?
173. Have you supplied other enterprises with your innovation?
YES: How many? NO: (Go to Q. 175)
m
174. Why don’t you develop your new idea?
175. Have you attended any course/seminars in order to cope with han­
dling new machinery and material, acquiring new skills and design­
ing practices?
YES: NO:
What kind of courses? Why not?
176. Have you or any of your partners effected any substantial modifica­
tions in your machinery, without any outside help?
YES: NO:
177. Have you or any of your partners effected any substantial
modifications in your machinery, with outside help?
YES: NO: (Go to Q. 179)
178. Who did you turn to for help?
1. A friend: what does he specialise in?
2. A skilled craftsman:
3. A specialised company:
4. To the firm’s agent:
5. Other:
179. Who does the service of the machines (more than one options)?
1. Yourself and/or your partner:
2. Skilled craftsman/service-man:
3. Firm’s agent:
4. A friend: what does he specialise in?
5. Other
180. In case you had some machinery modified or a spare part manufac­
tured, do you know of any modifications/technical applications 
which were later developed and became available in the market?
Yes: No: Have no modifications done or spare parts made;
181. Do you have knowledge of the advantages of a computer in your 
work/bus iness?
Yes: No: Some:
182. Do you own a computer?
1. Yes: (GO to Q. 184)
2. No: (continue)
3. Intend to: (GO to Q. 184)
183. Why don’t you (.more than one options)?
1. It is too expensive:
2. Choosing a computer is too difficult:
3. Learning how to use a computer is too hard:
4. I do not need one:
5. Other:
184. Has your workshop remained in the same place since it was first es­
tablished or have you moved at all?
1. Same place: (Go to Q. 186)
2. Have moved: how many times?
185. Why did you move?
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
WO
Did you get any complaints from neighbours, or some union, society, 
local authority, etc., for noise, pollution and so on?
YES: NO:
What kind of complaints?
Were the police called in?
a) At present, is your workshop:
1. Joined to house (downstairs, next to it, etc.)?
2. Your home too?
3. Located in another place?
b) Are the budgets of the enterprise and the family all one?
YES: NO:
In the past, did your workshop use to be your home too? 
YES: NO:
For how long (no. of years)?
When?
a) At present:
Do you rent your workshop?
Do you own it?
b) When you first set up this business:
Did you rent your workshop?
Did you own it?
[Question withdrawn]
Was there any inspection or intervention from the Labour Inspec­
torate?
YES: NO:
For what reason?
How many times?
[Question withdrawn]
Who keeps the account books?
1. Yourself:
2. An accountant:
3. Other (please specify):
[Question withdrawn]
Is your activity as a manager based on:
1. Previous education:
2. Previous experience:
3. Education and experience:
4. Other (please explain):
Today, do you need additional knowledge in business management? 
YES: NO:
How do you intend to acquire it?
In case of your illness, is the workshop:
1. Closed:
2. Open: Who runs it?
During the annual holidays, what happens to the workshop?
1. I have no holidays:
2. Everyone is on holiday. The workshop is closed:
3. The workshop remains open: Who runs it?
4. Other:
199.
200 . 
201 .
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210 .
211 .
212.
213.
214.
[Question withdrawn]
[Question withdrawn]
What do you expect your professional status to be in 5 years’ 
time?
Is there a target you have for your enterprise?
YES: NO:
Which one?
What do you intend to do with your business upon your retirement?
Do you wish your children to be in the workshop permanently and 
succeed you?
1. Have to children: (Go to Q. 210)
2. Don’t know/Haven’t thought of it: (Go to Q. 209)
3. Yes: (continue)
4. No (Go to Q. 208)
Why do you wish your children to be in the business?
Do you think your children respond to your expectations?
1. Yes: (Go to Q. 210)
2. Partially: (Go to Q. 210)
3. They are very young: (Go to Q. 210)
4. No: (Go to Q. 210)
[Question withdrawn]
Reasons for which you do not wish your children to stay in the 
business:
What are your plans for your children’s future career?
In general, are you contented with your business?
Yes: No: Partially:
What satisfies you most in your work (.more than one options)?
1. Money/Income: 4. Creativity:
2. Social Status 5. Skilfulness:
3. Ability to set up the business: 6. Other) please explain)
[Question withdrawn]
So far, which was the hardest period in setting up this workshop? 
Why?
Period: Reason:
Which class or special group do you think you belong to (more than
one options)?
1. Employees:
2. Entrepreneurs:
3. ’Small and Medium’
4. Workers:
5. Artisans:
6. Middle Class:
8. Capitalists:
9. Petty bourgeoisie:
10. Wealthy:
11. Poor:
12. Craftsmen:
13. Other (please specify)
7. Proletariat:
215. When voting in national or municipal elections does each party’s 
policy on artisans’ problems affect your choice?
a) National Elections:
b) Municipal Elections:
216. What so you think the qualifications of a prospective artisan 
should be? What should s/he beware of?
1. 
2 .
3.
4.
217. Is there anything you would like to add?
YES: NO:
C
